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Abstract 
 
This thesis is aimed at solving this puzzle: If the rules are the same, how do 
regulatory authorities compete for business firms to come to their jurisdictions? I 
suggest that it is better to think of regulatory competition in terms of regulating and 
regulated sides finding a partner to form a marriage. I argue that an important 
dimension to regulatory competition is competition between different types of micro-
level enforcement regimes for different types of firms. Assuming the rules stay the 
same, depending on the match or mismatch of regimes’ and firms’ preferences, 
enforcement regimes have differential results in business attraction, enforcement 
effect and regulatory advantage. This argument is elucidated by a so-called ER 
(enforcement regime) Framework that uses the cultural institutionalist approach – a 
fusion of historical institutionalism and Mary Douglas’ grid-group typology. The 
framework is used to interpret the empirical findings about regulatory competition for 
foreign investment in China. The thesis adds to our knowledge about the dynamics 
both of regulatory competition and of enforcement regimes, and helps to fill the gap 
that exists between the literatures in these two areas. 
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Introduction 
 
The main driver in writing this thesis was to address the puzzle that I had faced for 
many years as a professional. I worked for ten years in the first free trade zone in 
China. Although the national government established 15 free trade zones for the 
same purpose of attracting overseas investment and their regulatory authorities 
implemented similar rules, they ended up with sharply contrasting achievements. 
Typically, while two other zones in the same city had only a few investors, our zone 
was fully occupied by hi-tech overseas manufacturers. We had to enlarge the area 
of the zone in order to satisfy the increasing demands of incumbent and interested 
overseas investors. Meanwhile, according to the former Special Economic Zones 
Office of the State Council, the free trade zones were generally under suspicion of 
smuggling and losing money, i.e. gaining US$1 for spending US$7, but our zone 
was free from such misconduct and was the only one earning foreign currency, i.e. 
gaining US$7 for spending US$1. The different achievements of the free trade 
zones had attracted wide interests from scholars and professionals. However no 
one could give a convincing explanation about the likely causes of the differences 
between the free trade zones.  
In this thesis, I intend to solve this puzzle: if the rules are the same, how do 
regulatory authorities compete for firms to come to their jurisdictions? The thesis 
explores how regulators compete in such circumstances by using different 
approaches to implementing the rules, including enforcement practices. However, 
different firms prefer different styles of regulatory approach or enforcement regime.  
As a result, I suggest that it is better to understand regulatory competition for 
business in terms of finding a partner to form a marriage. I argue that an important 
dimension to regulatory competition is competition between different types of micro-
level enforcement regimes1 for different types of firms. Assuming the rules stay the 
same, depending on the match or mismatch of regimes’ and firms’ preferences, 
enforcement regimes have differential results in attracting business, enforcement 
effect and regulatory advantage. This central argument is elucidated in terms of a 
theoretical framework named as the Enforcement Regime (ER) Framework  
(Chapter III).  The theoretical framework aims to draw together the literature on 
regulatory competition and enforcement styles, discussed in Chapters I and II, filling 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, the regime refers to micro-level regime unless specifically noted.  
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in the gaps between them, and is used to interpret the empirical findings discussed 
in Chapters IV to VIII.   
 
1. Significant Findings of Empirical Fieldwork 
In January, February and July of 2008, I conducted field research in the cities of 
Shenzhen and Suzhou - the two most successful cities in competing for overseas 
investment in south and east China. The findings of the empirical fieldwork not only 
confirmed my previous professional observations about sharply contrasting 
regulatory competition (RC) achievements among locations but also enriched my 
knowledge about the dramatically different enforcement practices and competing 
approaches of the frontline regulatory authorities.  These findings clearly alerted me 
that enforcement practice at micro level was so significant to RC outcomes that an 
analysis of this dimension would provide a comprehensive and accurate account for 
the empirical phenomenon of RC. My main empirical findings can be disaggregated 
into three levels: macro, middle and micro. 
Macro level  At the macro level, the competitor is the national government, who 
was competing for foreign investment in a global context, competing against other 
nations.   Here, regulatory competition operated through the regulatory rules. The 
national government decided the strategy of competing for quality foreign 
investment and set social regulatory goals such as product safety, environmental 
and labour protection. It not only made the rules but also monitored implementation 
of those rules at lower levels of government and even intervened at the micro-level 
into decisions as to how firms should be treated in particular instances. The 
engagement of national government in the lower-level implementation practice 
suggested that it recognised that the success of its strategy of competing for foreign 
investment through rule making at macro level would be fundamentally affected by 
implementation practices at the micro level. This implied that macro-level RC 
through rule-making was closely linked to micro-level RC through rule enforcement.   
Middle and micro levels The middle level refers to the middle-level 
governments, where the competitors were provincial and municipal governments. 
They engaged in  high profile,  head-on competition for foreign investment between 
one another and actively claimed successes in winning quality overseas investment 
as desired by the national government. However, through a closer look at their 
achievements, I found that desirable businesses mostly clustered in only a handful 
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locations rather than settling evenly across a province or a city. These sub-city 
locations, i.e. special investment zones (SIZ), towns and villages, were regulated by 
authorities at the local or micro-level. This finding suggested that the successes of 
provincial and municipal governments were generally showcased by those of the 
few sub-city locations with business clusters. The lack of success of most other sub-
city locations was kept quiet.  Whilst the middle-level authorities also made 
provincial and municipal rules which applied across their regions, it appeared that 
ultimately their success in regulatory competition also depended on enforcement 
practices at the micro level.  
Micro level At the micro-level are the frontline regulatory authorities based in 
specific sub-city locations such as SIZs, towns and villages. I found that their 
enforcement practices were dramatically different in spite of the fact they were 
implementing similar national, provincial and municipal rules. Some competed for 
quality foreign investment as desired by the national government. Some targeted 
exactly the type of overseas firms that were not, for varying reasons, desired by the 
national government. Some were disinterested in competition. Some were driving 
away overseas investors in order to make room for favoured domestic business. 
The relations and interactions between the authorities and firms based in their 
jurisdictions were sharply different from one location to another. The economic and 
social achievements of those locations were also very different. These findings 
suggested that micro-level enforcement of the rules made at macro and middle 
levels was highly varied and entailed both desirable and undesirable economic and 
social outcomes. I was convinced by the findings at this level that RC through rule 
making at macro level was fundamentally affected by enforcement of these rules at 
micro level. 
After conducting the fieldwork, I further understood that none of the existing theories 
of regulatory competition could adequately explain my empirical findings2. Firstly, 
RC scholars appeared unaware that RC through rule-making at macro and middle 
levels was closely linked to rule enforcement at the micro level. Except for 
identifying the broad impacts of stringency versus laxity of enforcement, these 
scholars had overlooked the fact that micro-level enforcement practice was 
fundamentally significant to RC. Consequently, they could not fully explain how 
different sub-national regulatory authorities could compete for business when they 
were all charged with implementing the same rules.  Secondly, when addressing RC 
                                                 
2 For details, see Chapter III. 
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at the middle level, most scholars seemed to have taken for granted that all sub-city 
locations were equally successful or unsuccessful in competing for business; and 
that self-made provincial or municipal rules were automatically and evenly well-
enforced at the micro level. Consequently, they could not explain, when 
implementing the same rules, why some locations attracted more business than 
others. Finally, RC scholars had considered the competitor (the regulator) and the 
firm whose business was being competed for as quite separate from one another. 
Hence they paid no attention to the relations and interactions between regulators 
and firms and were thus unaware of the issue of whether there was a ‘match’ and 
‘mismatch’ between their respective preferences and styles. Consequently, in a 
situation where the rules are the same, existing theories of regulatory competition 
could not explain why regimes were selective about businesses; why firms chose 
particular locations to conduct business; and why regimes were so different in their 
economic and social achievements. Therefore, an interrogation to the dynamics of 
micro-level enforcement was called for in order to give a more comprehensive and 
accurate account of the empirical phenomenon of RC that I had observed both as a 
professional and as a research student. However, most enforcement theories in 
socio-legal analyses focus on enforcement styles and businesses responses to 
regulation, and whilst they emphasise the need for a ‘matching’ of regulatory style to 
the firm’s response to regulation, enforcement theories are not concerned with the 
question of how enforcement styles can be used to compete for business, as 
opposed to how they can be used to improve compliance with regulation.   A 
question therefore arose: How to make sense of the empirical findings so as to 
develop a qualitative theory of RC?  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
To make sense of the findings of my empirical fieldwork I needed a suitable 
theoretical framework. I found two sets of theories to offer the most resonant 
insights: historical institutionalism and Mary Douglas’ Culture Theory. I drew these 
together to develop a ‘cultural institutionalist’ framework which I then used to 
analyse my findings. The approach used was therefore iterative and inductive: I 
used the theories to interpret the empirical findings, and the empirical findings to 
review the theoretical framework that I developed.  
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2.1   Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism defines institutions as formal and informal norms, 
procedures, routines and conventions embedding the organisational structure of 
political economy (Thelen and Steinmo: 1992; Ikenberry: 1988; North: 1990; 
DiMaggio and Powell: 1991; and Hall and Taylor: 1996). It offers the opportunity to 
explore the reciprocal relationship of institutions, including regulatory rules, on 
regulatory players’ behaviour, and assumes that micro-level regulatory authorities 
and firms are operating with some degree of rationality. It therefore enables an 
understanding of how both firms and micro-level regulatory authorities respond to 
the regulatory regime by drawing attention to the preferences of firms and local-level 
regulators, and how each seeks to achieve those preferences given the broader 
institutional context in which they are operating.  
Notwithstanding their common interests in the reciprocal relationship of institutions 
and players, neo-institutionalists 3  interpret this relationship differently. A key 
difference in their interpretations is how players’ preferences are formed. Economic 
institutionalists consider that players’ preferences are formed exogenously. 
Institutions provide strategically useful information and an enforcement mechanism. 
Players are rationally driven by utility maximisation so that their behaviours are 
instrumental and strategic (Coase: 1937 and 1960; Williamson: 1975; North: 1990; 
and DiMaggio and Powell: 1991). North even regarded that institutionalisation of 
ideological consensus, contrasting to individualisation, was an efficient substitute for 
formal rules. Sociological institutionalists argue that players’ preferences are formed 
endogenously. Institutions provide not only useful information but also moral and 
cognitive templates. Players are mindful of social appropriateness for their choices 
and behaviours (Meyer and Rowan: 1977; March and Olsen: 1984; Granovetter: 
1985; Douglas: 1986; Jepperson: 1991; DiMaggio and Powell: 1991; and Zucker: 
1991). Historical institutionalists see that players’ preferences are formed partly 
exogenously and partly endogenously. While institutions shape and structure 
players’ choice, players act and interact with bounded rationality (Simon: 1957). In a 
particular context, their choices and behaviours may cause unintended and 
inefficient outcomes (March and Olsen: 1984; Krasner: 1988; Goldstein: 1988; Weir: 
1992; and Campbell: 1998). 
                                                 
3
 In this thesis, institutionalism refers to neo-institutionalism only. For more details about the distinction between 
old and new institutionalisms, see DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Black (1997).  
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Institutionalism has been broadly used in the regulation studies (Black: 1997; 
Morgan and Yeung: 2007; and Baldwin et al: 2013, pp53-65). However, strictly 
speaking their use is very limited in RC study and implicit in enforcement study. In 
the RC study, Bratton el al mentioned the involvement of economic and sociological 
lenses (1996, pp2-3). If we accept that these two lenses could be interpreted as the 
use of economic and sociological institutionalisms, then we can identify the following 
gaps in existing RC theories: While the economic lens focuses on the impact of 
rules and competitive measures to attracting business and gaining regulatory 
advantage, it ignores the restraints of institutional structure and regulatory process. 
While the sociological lens emphasises institutional constraints and operative 
forces, it is blind to competing for business4. Therefore, I am going to use historical 
institutionalist approach to fill the gaps in terms of paying attention both to 
institutional restraints upon regulators as well as impact of formal and informal 
structure upon firms, and to the regulator-firm interactions in enforcement process 
as well as their effects on competing for business and enforcing social regulation.  
Contrasting to the RC study, the enforcement study is rich in institutionalist 
ingredients. Typically, the enforcer is of various types and is affected by contextual, 
hierarchical and regulatory factors. Also the regulated firm is of various types and is 
affected by intra-firm, inter-firm and extra-firm factors. Their bilateral relations and 
interactions have various characteristics. There are relevant enforcement effects. 
However, the scholars do not always seem to be aware of the involvement of 
institutionalism, as the above-mentioned facets are yet to be inter-related5. While 
borrowing a building block from the existing enforcement theories, I am going to use 
historical institutionalism to fill the identified gap in terms of systemising relevant 
facets of the enforcement dimension. 
 
2.2   Mary Douglas’ Culture Theory 
Notwithstanding explaining the reciprocal relationship between institutions and 
regulatory players, historical institutionalism does not really help to explain why 
some types of firms are attracted to some types of regulator and vice versa. To 
develop this explanation, I turned to Mary Douglas’ Culture Theory, drawing on her 
                                                 
4
 For details, see Chapter I. 
5
 For details, see Chapter II. 
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grid-group typology to illustrate the various features of different regulatory 
authorities and firms and to analyse their bilateral relations and interactions.  
The central tenet of the grid-group typology is that individuals in a society are 
subject to two types of social control over their choices and interactions. One is the 
group. The ‘group’ functions endogenously within the boundary of the society and is 
measured by the degree to which individuals cooperate.  The other is the grid. The 
‘grid’ is comprised of the rules imposed by the exogenous structure of the society. It 
is measured by the degree to which those rules are coercive or permissive. The 
scale of each control varies from low to high. At the high end is a clear definition of 
the social roles of individuals. At the low end social roles are ambiguous. Putting the 
two types of control together yields four archetypes of societies: Positional, Enclave, 
Individualist and Isolate (see Diagram I6). Each society represents one type of 
cultural bias 7 . Positional, Individualist and Enclave respectively exemplify Max 
Weber’s three types of rationality that are based on bureaucracy, market and 
religion community. The Positional is characteristic of strong grid and group. All 
constituents are assigned with respective roles. Their behaviours and interactions 
are governed by both endogenous and exogenous rules. All groups are contained 
by larger groups. The authority is exercised on the grounds of inequality of the 
constituents. The Individualist is characteristic of weak grid and group. All 
boundaries are provisional and negotiable. The interaction between constituents is 
characteristic of competition. The success is assessed according to the wealth and 
power an individual can achieve. The Enclave is typical of strong group but weak 
grid. Internal roles and relationships lack explicit definition and hence are open to 
negotiation. No individual is granted the authority to control another. Disagreements 
between the members tend to be kept underground. The members are likely to be 
dissidents of the main society. The Isolate is characteristic of strong grid but weak 
group. Its constituents are generally ignored. Their opinions are not invited or taken 
seriously. It is a society where one avoids responsibility and pressure8. The culture 
of each society is self-defined and competes with each other. The culture is 
                                                 
6
 The version adapts from Douglas (2006a) pp2-6. This article is a comprehensive summary of the Culture 
Theory given by the author herself. 
7
 For the original version, see Douglas (1982) pp183-254. For a summary of the theoretical development, see 
Douglas (2006a). More introduction to the theory, see also Douglas (2006b). 
8
 Thompson et al (1990) proposed a fifth type, i.e. hermit, which is subject to zero grid and zero group (pp7). But 
Douglas (2006a) considered hermit as one version of the Isolate. The author agrees with Douglas’s classification.  
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incorporated in the respective institutions and sustains as long as the institutions 
persist9. 
                                                 
9 For critiques of the Culture Theory, see Ostrander (1982), Douglas (1986), Thompson et al (1990), Rayner 
(1992) and (1993), Tansey and O’Riordan (1999) 
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The typology is considered as an influential approach to explain regulation (Baldwin 
and Cave: 1999, pp31; Hood: 1998: pp7; and Baldwin, Cave and Lodge: 2013, 
pp50-51). Indeed Douglas commented culture as ‘a general regulatory mechanism 
for human behaviour’ (1985, pp3). It has been applied to characterise regulatory 
styles in a number of contexts (1994; 1995 and 1998; Hood et al: 1999; Hood et al: 
2001; Haines: 2003; Evans: 2008: and Lodge et al: 2008). However it has not yet 
been applied in the context either of RC or of enforcement. Based on this typology, 
it can be argued that regulatory authorities have different institutional features in 
terms of vertical oversight (grid) and horizontal inter-agency cooperation (group). I 
extend this application of grid-group theory of regulation to the context of RC, and 
argue that regulators have different interests and strategies of RC which yield 
different outcomes of RC. Meanwhile, different types of firms respond in different 
ways to formal and informal controls. The relevance of institutionalism is that when 
the regulating and regulated sides meet, their bilateral relations and interactions 
vary in different institutional contexts. It thus helps to address the gap between the 
literatures on RC and enforcement respectively, indicating how the effectiveness of 
different strategies of RC may vary depending on the ‘fit’ between the regulator and 
the firm. 
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3. Outline of Main Argument 
Drawing on historical institutionalism and the Culture Theory, and using the notion of 
a ‘regime’ outlined by Hood et al (2001), I develop the ER Framework.  The details 
are set out in Chapter III, but the main elements are as follows.  
First, an important dimension of RC is that regulators use various types of 
enforcement regimes to compete for various types of firms. Enforcement regimes 
have institutionally different characters, in that they enforce social rules and 
compete for business in different ways. Furthermore, firms have different responses 
to formal and informal rules, as we know from the literature on compliance.  Taking 
into account the differences both in regulatory approaches and responses to 
regulation suggests that it is naive to expect that governments can rely simply on 
formal rules to ensure success in regulatory competition. Instead, how enforcement 
is practiced at the micro level fundamentally affects the outcome of strategies of 
regulatory competition that rely principally on rule-setting at the macro level. 
Secondly,  the varying outcomes of regulatory competition in situations where the 
rules are the same can be explained through the notion of the ‘match’ and 
‘mismatch’ of  enforcement regimes’ and firms’ preferences. For a regime, winning 
business is not a one-time deal but entails a long-term regulatory relationship and 
interactions between the regulator and regulated. Drawing on the empirical 
fieldwork, I argue that regulators’ enforcement regimes are restrained by resources 
and cannot satisfy demands or ensure the compliance of all types of firms. 
Accordingly they target and compete for preferred type of business. The fieldwork 
also shows that firms vary in the type of enforcement regime that they prefer. To the 
extent that they can gain information about the different approaches of local 
regulators, they seek locations that mostly satisfy their demands and avoid those 
that do not. Regulatory competition is thus analogised to a marriage: each seeks out 
the type of partner they most want to be with.  The result can either be a match or 
mismatch of preferences.  Further, the indicative evidence is that the match or 
mismatch affects the outcomes of regulatory competition in terms of the types of 
businesses attracted to a regime and the effect of enforcement.   
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To summarise, this thesis presents a qualitative empirical research on the topic of 
regulatory competition in order to provide a key to the puzzle I have faced for many 
years. With significant findings from my fieldwork, I realised that existing theories 
were inadequate to account for the empirical phenomenon of RC which I observed. 
Therefore, I suggest that we should think of regulatory competition in terms of 
regulators and firms each finding a partner to form a marriage, and that critical in 
that matching process is the nature of the micro-level enforcement regime. Using 
Mary Douglas’ Cultural Theory combined with historical institutionalism, which I term 
the ‘cultural institutionalist’ approach, I develop a theoretical framework, namely the 
ER Framework to analyse the fieldwork and arrive at this conclusion. The thesis 
adds to our knowledge about the dynamics both of regulatory competition and of 
enforcement regimes, and helps to fill the gap that exists between the literatures in 
these two areas. The insights from this thesis could also be used in further empirical 
studies on the impacts of micro-level enforcement regimes for regulatory 
competition to assess the significance of the match or mismatch between 
enforcement regimes’ and firms’ preferences in determining which regulatory 
regimes succeed in the competition for business and which fare less well. 
  
Chapter I Theories of Regulatory Competition 
 
 
This chapter is a systematic review of existing literature about regulatory 
competition (RC). The theories are scrutinised referring to the research question of 
this thesis: If rules are the same, how do regulatory authorities compete for firms to 
come to their jurisdictions? This literature review is to shed light on the inadequacy 
of existing theories of RC of which the enforcement dimension is still an uncharted 
area for interrogation.  
 
Bearing in mind the ultimate purpose, this review is made selectively. The literature 
is chosen according to two main criteria: one criterion is the relevance of the subject 
matter. The subject matter must be the rule, public policy or institutions with 
regulatory purpose. Its goal is related to the attraction of business in a narrow 
sense, and to the economic interest in a broad sense. The other criterion is positive 
research only, no normative or prescriptive studies. The focus here is on the 
fundamental factors of RC such as the regulating and regulated sides as well as the 
measures used for competition and outcomes of RC. It is not whether RC is ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’, or finding solutions for problems incurred. The selected literature is to be 
reviewed with uneven weight, dependent on the relevance of their themes and 
methods. 
 
The phenomenon of RC has been studied in diverse ways, most of which are 
contextually based. Some ways appear to be reconcilable, and some share limited 
commonality. The literature review is structured through juxtaposing six contrasting 
theories of RC, with relevant literature grouped into them. These theories are 
considered to roughly take two institutional lenses: economic and sociological. The 
first two theories use economic lens, while the last four use sociological lens. The 
review is carried out specifically for each theory, so as to reveal the respective focus 
and analytical approach. The review ends with a conclusion, which sheds light on 
the gaps and limitations of existing scholarly understandings about the empirical 
phenomenon of RC. 
 
 
1.  A Driving Force to Satisfy Firm’s Preferences 
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The theory of RC is widely acknowledged as originating from Tiebout’s ‘Pure Theory 
of Local Expenditure’ (1956) 1 . This economic view was designed for the local 
governments of the USA to better satisfy the preferences of mobile consumer-
taxpayers. ‘The consumer voter may be viewed as picking that community which 
best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. This is a major difference 
between central and local provision of public goods. …The consumer-voter moves 
to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences. … 
The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, 
the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position.’ (pp418) 
Moreover, to introduce the market-like mechanism was to force the local 
governments to compete so as to improve their efficiency. ‘On the production side it 
is assumed that communities are forced to keep production costs at a minimum 
either through the efficiency of city managers or through competition from other 
communities.’ (pp422) Given the government was assumed to be driven by 
maximising revenue, and the consumer-voter could ‘vote by foot’, the government 
was forced to compete through efficient responses to the consumer-payer’s 
preferences. Tiebout’s theory is contentious. A key question is: Does the 
government compete to satisfy the firm’s preference? Why or why not? 
 
1.1 ‘Yes’ 
For the ‘yes’ answers, the explanations are given from three points-of-view: the 
regulating side, the regulated side and the tripartite.  
 
Regulating Side Morriss summarised three motives for politicians and 
bureaucrats to attract business and to develop local economy (2010: pp105-112).  
The first was the public interest motive of increasing citizens’ wealth. The second 
was the motive of producing public good. The third was the personal interest motive 
of enhancing personal well-being. This included both tangible benefits from taking 
bribes and psychic benefits of being in office to satisfy their policy preferences. This 
categorisation covers most varieties of governmental officials’ interests in RC, 
including revenue maximisation (Tiebout: 1956; Cary: 1974; Romano: 1985; and 
Bratton et al: 1996), incentives for re-election (Harrison et al: 2006; Bradbury: 2006; 
Mertha: 2006; and Konisky: 2007) and rent-seeking (Bratton and McCahery: 1996, 
pp214).  
 
                                                 
1
 Bernholz and Vaubel (2007) had a different opinion. See pp1. 
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Regulated Side Hirschman (1970) argued that the regulated side could exert 
influence upon the regulating side based on three types of measures - namely 
loyalty, voice and exit. Indeed, voice and exit have become basic concepts in 
describing the influence of the firm in RC contexts. Governments’ competitive 
adjustments of regulations were arguably driven by the demands of home and 
foreign firms. If firms believed it in their interest to comply with low or high regulatory 
standards, they were likely to use exit to less green or greener jurisdictions as 
leverage to ensure governments would listen seriously to their voice (Porter: 1990; 
and Konisky: 2007). Murphy (2005) selected six American business cases to 
illustrate three general trajectories in the context of global RC for business. These 
trajectories were: firstly, production process standard became laxer, while market 
access standard stricter. Secondly, firms with monopoly and oligopoly status 
manoeuvred regulations to reflect their interests. They inclined to make domestic 
rules complicated in order to maintain their industrial advantage while deterring 
foreign competitors. Finally, firms with low asset-specificity drove regulation towards 
laxity, while multinationals pushed regulations of varied jurisdictions to converge. He 
bridged a gap in terms of establishing a correlation between regulatory trajectories 
and industrial interests and features. However, the link is weak as he did not 
elaborate on how the firms’ preferences are transformed into the changed 
regulations and how the changes contribute to the advantage of particular regulatory 
regimes.  
 
Tripartite  Paul (1996) mapped a tripartite driving force behind RC in the 
EU packaging waste market. When the Netherlands and Germany adopted high 
packaging and recycling standards, unregulated France, the UK, Belgium and Italy 
reacted similarly, based on identical social, economic and political considerations. 
The environment-protecting groups were concerned about the possible reception of 
packaging waste from the regulated countries. The firms cared about potential loss 
of the packaging market to the Dutch and German environment-friendly competitors. 
Both groups lobbied their national governments to enact packaging regulations. All 
these governments responded positively and identically. They counted on the firms 
to formulate and implement the regulations. The firms were supportive because they 
could pass the additional cost on to the consumers, given that the regulations took 
effect not on production but on consumption.  
 
Paul’s description of the tripartite incentives behind RC in the packaging market of 
the EU is very similar to Vogel’s account about the tripartite driving forces 
underpinning the raise of environmental standard of the State of California in the 
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context of domestic economic integration, which was dubbed as the ‘California 
effect’ (1995; and Vogel and Kagan: 2004). The major differences between the two 
are: Vogel emphasises that the impact of economic integration primarily depended 
upon the preferences of wealthy and powerful states or countries; and that the firms 
in wealthy and powerful jurisdictions used strict regulations as the pivot to their 
competitive advantages2. 
 
In brief, the explanations for ‘yes’ answers are apparently premised upon the 
assumptions that all types of player - the government, the firm, the consumer, the 
public interest group and the jurisdiction - behave like the market player. Each has 
its specific interest to pursue, manifested as its behaviour rationally driven by its 
interest. When the government’s incentive (incidentally) agrees with the firm’s 
interest and at best, the public’s, the government demonstrates active and efficient 
responses to the firm’s preferences. Notwithstanding that some scholars identified a 
range of interests on the regulating side as well as the preferences on the regulated 
side, most research is one-sided and disconnected from each other.  
 
1.2 ‘No’ 
The opposing argument is that RC is not a driving force to satisfy firm’s preferences. 
In Canada, whereas provincial governments were engaging in RC for developing 
local economy, attracting business only constituted a small part of their agendas 
(Kenyon and Kincaid: 1991; Brown: 2006; Olewiler: 2006; and Morriss: 2010, 
pp112). It was bundled with the goals of sustainable development involving 
environment protection, public health, education and fiscal policy. A balanced 
economic and social development was perceived as necessary to construct an 
overall local ‘competitiveness’ – that is ‘the ability to compete successfully’ (Brown: 
2006 quoting Porter: 1990). Moreover, domestic political institutions mattered. 
Provincial governments responded primarily to local interests and secondarily to RC 
for business. The stronger support particular policies got from the voters, the less 
likely the governments changed them, even if they faced RC for attracting business 
(Harrison: 2006). Furthermore, governmental engagement to RC was not stable. As 
the ruling parties’ ideologies changed, so would the governments’ interests in RC. 
Along with shifts of political power, came changed ideologies and interests of 
provincial governments (Harrison: 2006).  
 
                                                 
2
 More account can be found in the section of RC as ‘One Form of Inter-Jurisdiction Interdependence’. 
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The landscape of China is somewhat similar. Zhang illustrated how the change in 
national government’s strategies reshaped the inter-city relations in a region in 
China - the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) (2006). He compared the national 
governmental strategies before and after the year 2000 to demonstrate the 
difference. Before 2000, the YRD benefited from the privileged policies granted by 
the national government as an early mover of opening to foreign investment for 
economic development. The appointment and promotion of mayors was based 
primarily upon their achievements in advancing local gross domestic product (GDP). 
These policies engendered intense inter-city competition in the region. After 2000, 
the national government switched its emphasis towards narrowing down regional 
development disparity. The YRD no longer enjoyed privileged policies and faced 
increasing competition from other regions. The promotion of mayors was also 
changed and became based on their achievements in sustainable development. 
The municipal governments in the YRD decided to form regional alliances so as to 
maintain their established advantage as well as to compete as a whole against other 
regions. 
 
A number of studies have also been done within the EU. The EU landscape is rather 
complex. Scholars identified factors that withheld the governments of the member 
countries from RC. Some factors were legal and institutional, typically those in 
company law. They included reincorporation costs, pattern of corporate regulation, 
complex normative landscape, path dependence and institutional structure. Others 
were political, such as protectionism and impact of interest groups; lack of 
innovative incentives due to insufficient rent seeking by bureaucrats; and worries 
about possible centralisation by the EC to remedy externalities caused by RC 
(Romano: 1996; Hertig: 2001; McCahery and Vermeulen: 2001; Kahan and Kamar: 
2002; Heine and Kerber: 2002; and Riketts: 2004).  
 
Though they are specific to particular regions, the explanations share one point: the 
government bears little resemblance to the market player. It needs to balance varied 
policy goals and is restrained by myriad forces embedded in domestic political and 
legal institutions. Moreover different governments have different ideologies and 
interests. These factors withhold the government from competing to satisfy the firm’s 
preferences. 
 
1.3 Summary 
The theory of RC as a driving force for the government to satisfy the taxpayer’s 
including the firm’s preferences derives from Tiebout’s marketplace analogy. 
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However it is contentious that RC can be a driving force in this regard. The 
proponents share Tiebout’s assumption of the government as identical to the market 
player, who is interpreted as driven by self-serving interests. Their arguments drawn 
from the three perspectives of the regulating and regulated sides and tripartite 
demonstrate the logic of a marketplace transaction - a deal is struck when the 
trading parties’ interests match. Except from this logic, they do not seem to have 
adequate explanations. The opponents disagree that the government, like the 
market player, is an independent decision-maker. They emphasise the significance 
of institutional constraints upon the government and hint that varied institutions 
entail varied governments’ choices and decisions. Comparatively, the opponents’ 
explanations are more sufficient and hence more convincing than the proponents. 
Whereas the contentious camps denote the varieties of the government’s responses 
and of the firm’s preferences, there is no comprehensive framework to interpret 
them. This is a gap in this group of literature (Radaelli: 2004).  
 
 
2.  A Race in the Marketplace 
Deriving from Tiebout’s marketplace analogy, RC is compared to a ‘race’ 3 . It 
assumes that governments compete like firms for attracting mobile business. The 
meaning of the term ‘race’ is never explicit. Nor are those for the pertinent labels 
used to denote the directions of the ‘race’, namely ‘race to the bottom (RTB)’ and 
‘race to the top (RTT)’. Radealli (2005), Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) and Murphy 
(2005) question the preciseness of the ‘race’ comparison as well as the pertinent 
terms of RTB and RTT. Yet these terms have been used in a taken-for-granted 
manner.  
 
The RC aiming at attracting firms has been vulnerable to persistent normative 
scepticism. The scepticism follows the route of the government’s over-value of 
business interest and economic development at the expense of social interest and 
sustainable development. Consequently, the central concerns are shaped and 
structured less about the race per se, but more about the directions of the race, or 
RTB and RTT. RTB and RTT can be either a measure or an outcome, namely a 
spill-over of business attraction. In either case, RTB appears to be equivalent to 
adjustments towards loose, low, weak regulatory standards and requirements, 
whereas RTT means the opposite. The literature on RTB particularly involves strong 
judgmental and prescriptive implications. Indeed, concentration on the directions of 
                                                 
3
 Cary (1974) could be the first one to make the comparison. The usage of the term ‘race’ is not exclusive to the 
economic theory.  
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RC has left the marketplace analogy focused restrictively on lax rules at the 
expense of other methods for business attraction. This review omits normative and 
prescriptive debates and focuses on positive (parts of) literature. Positive studies 
cover both economic and social regulations. Since the review in the first group of 
theories has answered the ‘why’ question, this section is to answer the ‘how’ 
question. It discusses the measure and the outcome of RC for attracting business. 
 
2.1 Competing Measures and Outcomes 
The measures of RC for business attraction are generally instrumental. They include 
change and adjustment of rules and enforcement stringency, and deployment of 
land and other resources and incentives. The outcomes of RC, or the effect of these 
measures, in terms of business attractiveness and enforcement desirability, are in 
question.  
 
Adjustment of Rules The adjustment of governmental rules is held as a 
fundamental measure, indicated by the concept of RC defined by numerous 
scholars. Sun and Pelkmans (1995) defined it as the ‘alteration of national 
regulation in response to actual or expected impact of internationally mobile goods, 
services, or factors on national economic activities’. Armour referring to Tiebout 
(1956) and Esty and Gerardin (2001) defined RC as ‘national legislatures compete 
to attract firms to operate subject to their laws’4 (2005). Deakin (2006) defined it as 
‘a process whereby legal rules are selected and de-selected through competition 
between decentralized, rule-making entities, which could be nation states or other 
political units such as regions or localities’. Baldwin and Cave’ definition expanded 
the scope (1999), hence RC is ‘the competitive adjustment of rules, processes, or 
enforcement regimes in order to secure an advantage’ (pp180). Woolcock took a 
step to clarify the terminology (1996): ‘Competition among rules can be seen as a 
general term covering regulatory competition, institutional competition, regulatory 
arbitrage and regulatory emulation (pp297) … Institutional competition is essentially 
the same as regulatory competition’ (pp298). 
 
The adjustment of rules often involves the change in the stringency of rules. Lax 
rules are arguably effective for attracting business. Cary (1974), Bratton and 
McCahery (1996) attributed Delaware’s success to its lax corporate law, and to 
legislative and administrative capture by managers at the expense of shareholders’ 
interest. Among his opponents, Dodd and Leftwich (1980) argued that Delaware 
                                                 
4
 Armour (2005), see definition on pp5 and referred Note 13 on pp37 
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was successful in attracting (re)incorporation because of its low operational and 
financial cost. Subramanian (2002) held that the effectiveness of lax rules to large 
industries disappeared over the long-term. Besides, over-protection of managers 
from takeover might discourage them to (re)incorporate in a state which was 
infamous for lax law. Writing in the EU context, Jackson and Pan (2008) also 
challenged the American corporate lawyers’ view about the effectiveness of lax 
rules in inducing capital. Based on finding of the securities market, they argued that 
variation in regulatory stringency was not a factor for affecting capital raising 
practices. The capital practices responded to Pan-European requirements rather 
than to various rules of member states. In addition, increasing market integration 
might diminish further the need to consider the stringency of rules. Simmons pointed 
out that, given a more reliable financial regime and hence lower probability of risk, 
capital would flow into the countries with strict rules (2004).  
 
Adjustment of Enforcement Stringency  Empirical finding from different 
environmental sectors in the USA suggested that competing states interacted 
informatively and strategically through environmental enforcement in order to attract 
business. The finding from surface-mining regulation suggested that the stringency 
of state enforcement was systematically affected by that of its rivals. States 
lessened enforcement when their stringency was higher than their rivals. But they 
did not make adjustments when their stringency was lower than their rivals (Woods: 
2006). In contrast, the finding from federal air, water and hazardous waste control 
regulations indicated that states responded to their rivals when the rivals’ 
enforcement stringency put them either at a disadvantage or at an advantage 
(Konisky: 2007). The researches by Post (2004) and Knill, Tosun and Heichel 
(2008) highlighted the enforcement deficit in developing countries as a means to 
safeguard their regulatory advantages 5 . Nevertheless Coffee (2007) had an 
opposite opinion about enforcement stringency. He argued that, in the financial 
sector, stringent enforcement could enhance attractiveness to business by lowering 
the cost of information asymmetry. It did deter some firms, but these were the very 
types unwanted, given their primary purpose was profiting from speculation6.  
 
Land and Other Incentives   Land as a valuable resource is not mobile and 
stays in particular geographic locations. Apart from being a necessary factor for 
production in its own right, land is where mobile resources - capital, labour, 
                                                 
5
 As these researches were done in the light of economic integration, more details will be given in the section of 
RC as ‘A Form of Interdependence’.  
6
 See more in the section about enforcement stringency versus regulatory attractiveness in Chapter II. 
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technology and equipment – can be placed (Dye: 1990, pp24). The World Bank 
regarded land as a regulatory indicator for foreign direct investment (FDI) (2010). 
Oman’s research about the RC in the coastal cities in China exposed that 
concession in land lease, tax incentives and fast approval schemes were the 
principal instruments deployed by the governments (2000). Unlike tax incentives, 
the deployment of which was under the control of the national government, land was 
up to the entire discretion of municipal governments. Therefore, the outcomes of RC 
were: (1) there was neither noticeable drive-up in tax holidays nor drive-down in 
environmental or labour standards. Yet land was used up quickly for 
accommodating factories with overseas investment. At the same time, regional 
disparities between the coast and inland deepened. (2) The approval scheme for the 
projects with overseas investment turned out to be not always efficient because of 
the arbitrary behaviour of the agencies charged with approval authorities. (3) There 
were additional problems in administrative practice, typically rent-seeking, 
corruption, poor transparency and accountability. 
 
In brief, the measures of RC suggested by the scholars are generally regulating-
sided and instrumental. Among the instruments, both adjustments of restrictions and 
provisions of favourable conditions are deployed for business attraction. Lax rules 
and enforcement are arguably able to allure business but are likely to scare away 
capital and firms which will bring desired benefits. While favourable conditions are 
likely to be appealing to business, the agencies’ behaviour and practice can be 
counter-productive. The above analysis suggests that a pure focus on competitive 
instruments may miss out other noteworthy issues. As noted by Baldwin and Cave 
(1999), both enforcement regime and process deserve attention for business 
attraction. However so far, there has been no scholarly attention identified. 
 
2.2 Regulatory Advantage and Its Attributes 
When RC is compared to a race in the marketplace, the winner has regulatory 
advantage over his competitor in attracting business. This is typified in the American 
corporate law competition (especially Romano: 1985). Regulatory advantage is an 
additional outcome of RC for business attraction. However the terms such as 
‘regulatory advantage’, ‘regulatory attractiveness’, ‘competitive advantage’ and 
‘comparative advantage’ are used frequently by the scholars without differentiation. 
What do they mean exactly? How are they similar to and different from each other?  
 
Baldwin and Cave suggested that regulatory advantage is equivalent to the 
provision of a more favourable business environment than competitors.  It is not 
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necessarily based upon low compliance costs (1999, pp180). They did not 
differentiate types of regulatory advantage. If we refer to Porter (1990), there are 
two types of advantage: comparative and competitive. ‘Comparative advantage … 
rests on endowments of resources such as labour, natural resources, and financial 
capital. … (F)actor resources themselves have become less and less valuable in an 
increasing global economy.’ Instead, competitive advantage ‘depends on creating a 
business environment, along with supporting institutions, that enable the nation to 
productively use and upgrade its resources’ (pp xi-xii). Porter’s definitions show that 
the concepts of comparative and competitive advantages are significantly different. 
Yet the concepts are not defined for a regulatory context. Although RC theorists are 
keen on distinguishing RTB and RTT, they generally use the term ‘competitive 
advantage’ on both occasions. This shows a lack of precision about the outcome of 
RC in existing theories. To define and differentiate the mentioned concepts requires 
additional work.  
 
While admitting Delaware’s advantage to be determined by its lax corporate law, 
Romano gave particular note to the arguable attributes of that advantage (1985):  
Responsiveness Governments’ responsiveness to tax-paying entities is 
intrinsic to the marketplace analogy. Underpinned government’s responsiveness is 
its interest of maximising revenue (Tiebout: 1956). The American corporate law 
competition typically exemplifies these features in attracting business (Cary: 1974; 
Romano: 1985; and Bratton et al: 1996). Yet the speed of responsiveness in terms 
of efficiently and continuously adapting corporate law to firms’ needs underpinned 
Delaware’s success (Romano: 1985; and Morriss: 2010, pp115). Delaware 
government was precisely responsive to corporate managers. Lax state legislations 
and low standards entitled managers’ unilateral control of corporate conduct, thus 
freedom from the monitoring by shareholders, public opinion and judicial review. 
With such unrivalled favourable conditions to managers, Delaware was successful 
in attracting large numbers of firms (Romano: 1985; and Macey and Miller: 1987).  
 
Nevertheless, the government responds not only to firms but also to citizens and 
public interest groups. The matters in this regard are typically social regulations 
such as environment, labour, health and safety. The government’s responsiveness 
implies the adoption of high social standards and hence more regulatory cost to the 
firm (Baldwin and Cave: 1999: and Bratton et al: 1996). Yet complying with high 
social standards can be the firm’s strategy for pursuing competitive advantage 
rather than a negative burden (Porter: 1990; Vogel: 1997; and Coffee: 2007). 
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Facing an increasingly globalised economy, national governments respond also 
towards the conditions and exigencies of the international market. Global mobility of 
business and competition in the international market is likely to make national 
governments assess or adjust regulatory standards, alter or withdraw restrictive 
rules, demolish or create regulatory regimes. National governments may also 
persuade or press the governments of foreign countries to adopt similar rules in 
order to protect the competitive advantage of domestic firms (Bratton et al: 1996; 
and Esty and Geradin: 2001). 
 
Innovation Romano held that Delaware did enjoy the advantage of a first-mover 
in innovatively producing corporate law (1985). Given the first-mover advantage, it 
was difficult for late-moving states to grab the lion’s share of Delaware in the 
corporate law market. Continuous enhancement further heightened Delaware’s legal 
asset specificity. Hence it was hard for other states to replicate. Carney (1996) 
observed that the diffusion of the innovation of American corporate laws across the 
USA was driven by two interest groups: corporate lawyers and managers. Since the 
lawyers faced more collective problems than managers, changes in corporate laws 
were more manager-sponsored and entitled greater managerial flexibility. Ayres 
(1996) however argued that competing states might not respond or innovate 
efficiently. He used three models to demonstrate the hypothetical possibilities. The 
‘patent’ model showed that states might lack incentive to innovate laws, as 
innovative states would not be rewarded by a return on their investment. Unlike 
intellectual property, legal innovations were not protected and easily copied by and 
dispersed among competitors. The ‘yachting’ model illustrated that a leading state 
might strategically emulate inefficient legal innovations in order to protect its first-
mover advantage from being overtaken by a threatening rival. The ‘bluebook’ model 
demonstrated that the dominant state might promulgate sub -optimal codes so as to 
create more litigating business for lawyers as well as to make more difficulties for 
duplication by its competitors7. 
 
Certainty  Delaware was considered to be a first choice for potential 
(re)incorporating firms, because the access to its legal system meant a certainty of 
reducing transaction costs in doing business and winning potential litigations 
(Romano:1985). The state government was prudent in terms of maintaining the 
stability of standards and codes so as to avoid scaring away firms. Delaware had 
accumulated abundant case law and expert judges in the corporate law area. These 
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 For further details about regulatory innovation, see the section of RC as ‘One Form of Inter-Jurisdiction 
Interdependence’. 
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resources assured firms of big predictability of legal decisions. Indeed, certainty of a 
legal regime was an advantage for off-shore financial centres (Morriss: 2010, 
pp112). Regulatory certainty was identified as more essential than flexibility in 
attracting foreign investment in the utilities sector (Levy and Spiller: 1994). It was a 
trait of supportive governmental institutions.  
 
Cooperation Delaware enhanced its advantage by further cooperation on the 
regulating side. The opinions from the bars inside and out of the state about the 
reform of the corporate law were collected. The courts’ hitherto unpublished 
viewpoints were circulated. Votes for revising standards and codes were invited 
(Romano: 1985). 
 
2.3 Summary 
The theory of RC as a race in the marketplace generally draws the regulating side 
perspective. It addresses the types of measures for attracting business as well as 
the arguable attributes of the outcome of regulatory advantage. The concept of 
regulatory advantage seems to imply more tension among competing rivals than the 
term of business attraction. The definition of regulatory advantage lacks precision. 
Also its assumption that the government is competition-driven like the market player 
is vulnerable. In spite of the weakness, relevant positive literature makes a 
contribution to our understanding about RC by providing a straightforward structure 
about the nature, measure and outcome of RC. 
 
 
3. An Intra-Government Contest8 
The theory of RC as an intra-governmental contest again evolves from Tiebout’s 
theory (1956). It involves the competitions between both vertically and horizontally 
arrayed governments. Intra-governmental RC derives the tension from constitutional 
arrangement for authority allocation, structure and relations inside the federal 
system (Dye: 1990; Kenyon and Kincaid: 1991; Bratton et al: 1996; Esty and 
Geradin: 2001). Sometimes the tensions persist, mirrored by conflicts between the 
governmental institutions. At other times, the tensions are resolved through 
coordination or the intervention by the federal government (Scott: 1996, pp382). 
When RC happens in the rule making and implementing processes, it seems to be 
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 These authors dub this sort of RC as ‘intergovernmental’. Considering the RC are engaged by the governments 
within one national or federal system, I dub it ‘intra-governmental’, in order to highlight explicitly the ‘active 
rivalry’ (see Kenyon and Kincaid:1991, pp30 Note 1) between these governments and their agencies as well as 
the significant implications of governmental institutions to the RC. 
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more or less underpinned by the players’ concerns about authoritative ‘turf’. The 
empirical contexts are not necessarily federal. The emphases include how 
governmental institutions affect RC; and how varying authoritative structures of 
competitors engenders varying outcomes of policies and regulations. 
 
In the rule-making arena, Scott (1996) considers that the distinctions in the 
telecommunications policies of the USA and the EU cannot be sufficiently explained 
without referring to their institutional structures and processes of liberalisation. The 
USA and the EU had distinctive constitutional structures (allocation of authorities), 
institutional arrangements (governmental relations and practices), and policy 
articulations (values and objectives). Hence in their process of liberalising 
telecommunications, the institutional participants in the RC were different. So were 
their institutional resources, instruments and strategies that could be deployed to 
push forward their positions. The functioning of these factors eventually led to 
distinctive regulatory outcomes. 
 
In the rule-implementing arena, Bradbury contrasted the enforcement effectiveness 
of the state agencies with that of the federal agencies (2006). Looking at the 
regulatory sector of occupational health and safety, he found that the enforcement 
carried out by state agencies was associated with fewer workplace fatalities than 
that by federal agencies. He gave two explanations for the difference. One was that 
inter-agency competition gave state governments more incentives to undertake 
enforcement efficiently. Inefficient enforcement was likely to entail de-elections of 
politicians as well as the exit of citizens and industries. Another was that state 
agencies were better attuned to the local business environment than their federal 
counterparts. This led to lower monitoring cost and more efficiency. The result was 
regarded as consistent with Tiebout’s federalism.  
 
Mertha’s research concerned how Chinese bureaucratic structure and implementing 
processes counter, distort or achieve legislative goals (2006). Wherever RC existed, 
it was likely to have increased enforcement action. Trade mark regulation was 
delegated to two separate governmental agencies. This overlapping and redundant 
arrangement triggered inter-agency competition. Both agencies actively engaged in 
enforcing activities, even inviting the foreign firms whose trademarks were abused 
to join their raids of violators. Due to endogenous competition as well as exogenous 
participation, trademark regulation was rewarded with efficient and effective 
compliance. In contrast, copyright and patent regulations were enforced by a single 
bureau. The enforcement was overridden by the agencies’ economic interests. As a 
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consequence, both regulations ended in failing legislative goals. Mertha highlighted 
adequate consideration of bureaucratic institutions as indispensable to study 
China’s law and policies. He credited Lieberthal and Oksenberg for lending the 
analytic approach of fragmented authoritarianism – a characterisation of China’s 
bureaucratic institutions (1988) - to the scrutiny of RC and enforcement outcomes.  
 
The implications of RC underpinned by incentives of authoritative ‘turf’ are that the 
constitutional and institutional arrangements are both the constraint and the 
resource for intra-governmental RC. The impact of these arrangements upon the 
players attracts disproportionately more attention than the other way around. 
Governmental organisations are assumed to be authority-seeking, which sets the 
tone for their relations and interactions. The interest and behaviour of the players in 
the same institutions appear to be homogeneous and vary only with the types of 
institutions to which the players belong. Mertha’s RC reveals the existence of 
fragmentation inside the authoritarian institutions. Exploring the implications of 
fragmentation in the enforcement regime could be an alternative factor to explain 
the dynamics and effects of RC. The scrutiny of RC concentrates on the regulating 
side. RC is irrelevant to business attraction. The RC outcomes in both rule-making 
and rule-implementing are concerned about regulatory dynamics. Particularly, RC 
between enforcement agencies is related to enforcement effect.  
  
 
4.   A Form of Jurisdictional Interdependence 
When RC is theorised as one form of regulatory interdependence between 
jurisdictions, the lens zooms out, and the contention between business attraction 
and social concern is brought to attention. This theory assumes that RC for 
business attraction is no more than an economic regulation goal, which is 
intertwined with the pursuit of social regulatory goal. Such an assumption enables 
this group of theories to capture the real world more authentically than those based 
purely on an assumption of economic rationality.  
 
In the context of regulatory interdependence, the entities can be provinces of a 
federation or countries which are brought closely together by cross-border trade 
integration (or globalisation). Yet the governments of the interdependent 
jurisdictions are identified as the implicit competitors9. For the empirical studies on 
                                                 
9
 See Kenyon and Kincaid (1991) pp30 Note 1. The author referred to U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental relations (1991) to classify the horizontal competition, namely interstate and interlocal 
competition, into ‘active rivalry’ and ‘implicit competition’. The latter type is ‘the manner in which the free 
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intra-country and inter-country interdependence, it is a common concern as to 
whether inter-location competition for economic development is destructive to the 
environment, healthcare and labour. Conclusions are made in terms of the direction 
of the race, downward, upward or sideways. Yet intra-country interdependence 
focuses more on the externality of competition for investment. Empirical research 
about inter-country interdependence usually involves a high regulating country 
(HRC) and a low regulating country (LRC). At the centre is the HRC’s concern about 
a possible undercut of its competing advantage by LRC trading partners. A 
dimension is even developed to address the undue enforcement of high regulatory 
standards in LRC.  
 
4.1 Intra-Country Interdependence 
Harrison defined policy competition as one of the two forms of provincial 
interdependence in the Canadian federation (2006)10 . One form is competition-
driven, and the other is idea-driven. Competition-driven interdependence is mobility 
induced. It is observed when the provinces respond to the cross-border mobility of 
individuals, goods or investment. The involved issues are analogous to those 
incurred from the threat of Hirschman’s ‘exit’ (1970). The dynamic is directions of 
the race: race to the bottom (RTB), to the top (RTT), or neither11.  
 
The other form is idea-driven. When the provinces react to the cross-border transfer 
of information and norms, the interdependence takes the idea-driven form.  The 
idea-driven dynamics are dubbed as emulation, learning and benchmarking, which 
are underpinned by the citizens’ ‘voice’ (Hirschman: 1970). Policy innovation and 
diffusion appertain to the idea-driven category12  (Harrison: 2006; Morriss: 2010, 
pp115). Walker (1969) defined an innovation as ‘a program or policy which is new to 
the states adopting, no matter how old the program may be or how many other 
states may have adopted it’ (p881). He explained the diffusion of innovations among 
the states as determined by the perceptions and attitudes of key decision- makers of 
individual states as well as by the inter-state communications through the 
information networks comprising of professional associations, research centres and 
                                                                                                                                          
movement of goods, services, people, and capital constrains the actions of independent governments in a federal 
system.’ 
10
Harrison, Kathryn (2006) pp1-23. The policies under scrutiny have apparent regulatory purposes and hence the 
competitions based on them are considered as RC.  
11
 For empirical examples, see Theories 1 and 2.  
12
 For details, see Harrison (2006) pp14-16. The author distinguishes the literatures on policy innovation, 
diffusion and yardstick competition. For yardstick competition considered by some as a voter-mobilised political 
competition, see also Bernholz and Vaubel (2007) and Elhost (2005); as measurer of efficiency, see Baldwin and 
Cave (1999) pp239-247. Since yardstick competition is not the subject matter of this thesis, this group of 
literatures is considered as not pertinent and hence omitted. 
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cosmopolitan cities. Alternative to inter-location communications, Breton suggested 
competition as a drive underlining such diffusion (1991, pp39). He argued that the 
potential threat of business’ ‘exit’ from irresponsive locations to responsive ones 
made innovations diffuse among the American state and local governments. This 
position is shared by some regulation scholars. Black et al (2005) defined regulatory 
innovation as the use of new solutions to address old or new problems. It was from 
invention, diffusion and change. It had an impact upon the regulatory functions 
secondary to the institutional structure and organisational process. It should not be 
assumed to be always successful. The authors summarised the literature about the 
relationship between regulatory innovation and competition as twofold: regulatory 
innovation is often seen as essential to facilitate industrial innovation and economic 
competitiveness. It is also seen as improving regulatory effectiveness in terms of 
reducing compliance cost and providing flexibility for firms to make innovative and 
competitive strategies. 
 
The interactions of Canadian provincial governments towards minimum wage 
standards (MWSs) are an example of idea-driven interdependence (Green and 
Harrison: 2006). In the absence of threatening mobility of goods, capitals or 
individuals, the governments used other provinces’ MWSs as benchmarks to 
evaluate the reasonableness of their own. They ended up with adjusting their MWSs 
towards the national average level. Eventually MWSs of all provinces converged.  
 
In brief, intra-country interdependence involves not only the regulating sides’ RC for 
business attraction but also social concerns. This context involves diffusion of 
regulatory ideas, including regulatory innovation and good practice. Innovation is a 
form of interdependence, arguably alternative to competition. It is not an attribute of 
regulatory advantage. Competition-driven and idea-driven forms of interdependence 
can co-exist and co-function. Inferably, both the measure and outcome of RC are 
related to social concerns besides economic concern of attracting business13.  
 
4.2 Inter-Country Interdependence 
Using a hypothetical approach, Lazar dubbed three ‘modes’ of regulatory 
interdependence as competitive, coordinative and informational (2006). He 
demonstrated under each mode how an HRC and a LRC acted and reacted, and 
thus engendered distinctive outcomes in their investment attraction, wage and 
environment regulations. Under competitive mode, both countries adopted and 
                                                 
13
 For more empirical findings, see the first part explaining the ‘No’ answers in Theory 1.  
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adjusted policies in their attempt to establish advantage over the other. Under 
coordinative mode, both countries tended to agree to adopt the same policy, which 
however engendered different distributional consequences. Under informational 
mode, one country’s choice and experience generated cross-border externalities 
and gave the other country chances to assess, learn and emulate. Each of the three 
modes had its own internal strategic structures for trade-offs between the three 
regulations. Typically in competitive and coordinative modes, the structures were 
shaped through upgrading or downgrading specific standard(s) by the countries vis-
à-vis each other. All three modes shared such similar consequences that the better-
off of one goal was at the expense of the worse-off of other goals. Lazar noted that 
in reality, the three modes could be interwoven and there could be incentives for 
weak enforcement. 
 
Lazar’s three modes of regulatory interdependence are generally agreeable to 
Harrison et al’s empirical accounts for competition-driven and idea-driven forms of 
interdependence (2006). Meanwhile its coordinative form is open to the refinement 
by the empirical studies of Vogel (1995) and Heritier et al about inter-country 
interdependence (1996). These scholars’ studies show that when the examined 
countries adopt standards of distinctive strictness, the coordinative mode of 
interdependence may involve unilateral coercion. Vogel’s ‘California effect’ features 
a predominance of the preferences of HRCs in the interplay of HRCs and LRCs. 
Wealthy and green HRCs are likely to impose a high environmental standard upon 
LRCs. The purpose is to ‘level the playing field’ so that HRCs can protect their 
competitive advantage from being undercut by LRCs. Heritier et al’s study 
incorporates a vertical dimension into the description about coordinative mode of 
interdependence (1996). In the process of making European clean-air policy, HRCs 
like the UK, Germany and France competed to win over the EC to adopt their 
regulatory regimes, culture and practices. Thus they could minimise the cost of 
institutional and legal adjustment; maintain competitive conditions for domestic 
firms; and expand the market of environmental technology for domestic firms. LRCs 
were left only with the chance of adjusting their national standards according to 
European legislation. Indeed ‘California effect’ is prevailing universally with the 
increasing economic interdependence (Vogel and Kagan: 2004). 
 
The concern about the enforcement of high regulatory standards in LRCs is an 
additional dimension of a coordinative form of interdependence. Post (2004) 
highlights the gap between the adoption of EU environmental law on paper and in 
practice by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the context of their 
                             
36 
applications for the EU membership. The adoption of low environmental standards 
by these eastern and central European countries was considered as threatening to 
their industrial competitiveness by the EU producers and as deplorable by the EU 
environmentalists. Although the eastern and central Euroean countries signed to 
comply with EU environmental law, they did not implement it duly. The main 
handicaps included inadequate enforcement capacity, weakness of domestic non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), modest public interest in environmental issues, 
and a lack of technical and financial resources in many domestic industries.  
 
Contrasting to Post’s multi-variate examination, Knill, Tosun and Heichel focus on 
scrutinising the practice of the environmental enforcement (2008). The countries are 
Mexico and Hungary, with the background of the regional integration of the EU and 
the Northe American Free Trade Agreement. The findings are: when they were 
intended to compete against the HRCs in the same regions, the enforcement 
practice of both LRCs involved a strategic dimension. In Mexico, the national 
regulatory agency created a ‘realistic’ standard for enforcement practice. The 
enforcers applied differential monitoring approaches towards multinationals and 
small and middle sized enterprises (SMEs) – strict to the former and lax to the latter. 
Similarly, in Hungary, waste water regulation emulated the high German standard 
rather than the comparable low Portuguese and Greek specifications. The outcome 
was that there were persistent deficit in enforcement. The enforcers were also found 
to make an unofficial differentiation in implementing water and environmental 
regulations towards multinationals and domestic companies – strict to the former 
and loose to the latter. In both cases, the authors emphasise that the agencies’ 
undue enforcement is underpinned by their mindfulness of maintaining ‘competitive 
advantage’ for attracting business; and that strict implementation upon 
multinationals is used to disguise their actual under-fulfilment of obligations to the 
regional agreements.  
 
In both intra-country and inter-country contexts, the first-order player is a jurisdiction, 
with second-order players as societal, namely the government, the market and the 
public. Whereas players are from diverse sides, the regulated side is generally 
sidelined. Regarding intra-country interdependence, idea-driven form intertwines 
competition-driven form, which means measures and outcomes of RC are complex. 
Regarding inter-country interdependence, the research highlights HRCs’ 
competition to protect their regulatory advantage on the one hand. On the other 
hand, it draws attention to HRCs’ possible coercion in converging cross-border 
regulatory - typically social - standards as well as to LRCs’ deficit in enforcing these 
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imposed high social standards. This enforcement dimension is generally missing in 
the intra-country context. It is inferable that in the intra-country context, while the 
measure of RC involves social concerns and innovation, the outcome is sustainable 
economy.  In the inter-country context, it lacks explicit information about the 
measure of business attraction. For the outcome of regulatory advantage, it is 
inferable that HRCs’ resource is ‘wealth and green’, whereas LRCs’ is undue 
enforcement of social regulation.  
 
4.3 Summary 
The theory of RC as a form of jurisdictional interdependence has wider zoom. The 
competing entity is of various sorts. The competed-for target is not given particular 
attention. RC is considered as intertwined with social concerns. Interdependent 
regulatory entities have different relations: competitive, coordinative and 
informational. This relational difference implies different measures and outcomes of 
RC. Both the measure and outcome of RC involve not only business attraction but 
also social effect typically environmental and labour protection. Unlike Theories 1 
and 2, this Theory 3 is attentive to both economic and social regulations. It not only 
reveals the tension between economic and social regulations on the regulating side 
but also alerts to the significance of enforcement dimension of RC. Notwithstanding 
the alert to the enforcement dimension, the interrogation is limited to stringency 
versus laxity. 
 
 
5.   A Contest of Home-Based Legal Institutions  
Scholars also understand RC as a contest between institutions based in different 
countries. Specifically, international arbitration lawyers are viewed to be the carriers 
of their home legal institutions. Their competition for international business is viewed 
as one between the home institutions. Such a theory of RC implies that the selling 
by competitors is not only ‘law as a product’ (Romano: 1985) but the whole 
institutions that are involved in the production. 
 
Dezalay (1996) scrutinised the competition between the American and French 
lawyers for international arbitration business. He observed that such a competition 
involved not only the actors’ professional expertise, strategic behaviour and rules, 
but also their social networks and practices, judicial and political systems, cultural 
forms and symbolic discourses. Eventually, it was a competitive interaction between 
two institutions of legal practice: the American Cravathian model of lawyering and 
the French grands corps model. The models bore the similarities of the lawyers’ 
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positions. The American lawyers played a central part in the regulatory processes of 
the state, politics, business and academy arenas. In contrast, the French elite 
group, which rooted its professional bonding in training of grandes ecoles, played an 
intermediary role between the state and the market. At the same time, the models 
were distinctive in the symbolic meanings of the lawyers. Whereas the American 
lawyers were viewed to represent the rule of law, the French represented the rule of 
the state. The RC between the two groups was asserted to engender the effect of 
destablising government-centric governance and constructing transnational social 
structures.   
 
Dezalay’s research concentrates on regulatory intermediates as institutional players. 
While competing for business, they deploy the norms, cultures and practices of the 
home institutions. Although Dezalay touches upon the point that the players with 
different origins construct an additional social structure beyond their institutional 
endowment, he does not go further to explore the implications. This research 
concentrates on the regulating side and its measure. It ignores the regulated side 
and the outcome. 
  
 
6.  A Distinctive Feature of International Rule-Setting 
In the final theory, RC is observed as a distinctive feature of the governing 
institutions over international business and economics. The players are those with 
diverse and contesting interests: technocrats, NGOs, firms and nation-state 
governments. They manoeuvre various resources, instruments, mechanisms, 
networks and processes so as to win the upper hand in setting trans-national 
regulatory rules. The focus is to interpret the interplays of the involved diverse types 
of players, as well the functioning of various mechanism and social structures. An 
additional concern, if any, is the changing directions of international regulatory 
standards. 
 
While RC is omnipresent in the global governing institutions, it co-exists with other 
interactive forms. Picciotto (1996) deems RC as symbiotic to regulatory 
coordination, both of which are socially constructing interactions and processes. He 
examined the change of international regulatory arrangements in sectors of industry 
property protection, patent, tax treaty, competition law, banking and financial 
markets. The conclusion was that competition in the forms of tensions, frictions, 
contradictions and battles between country-based interest groups and alliances 
posed the necessity of international coordination. Successful coordination 
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constructed new international arrangements, and in turn, opened playing fields for 
new rounds of competition. Such a symbiotic view about RC and coordination 
agrees with that concerning the co-existence of competitive, coordinative and 
informational modes in the context of jurisdictional interdependence. Braithwaite and 
Drahos created the term ‘webs of influence’ to describe the mixture of contests of 
players, principles (reciprocity, transparency, deregulation, ratchet up and race, 
etc.), and mechanisms (coercion, modeling, coordination and capacity-building) in 
setting international business regulations (2000). Govaere and Demaret (2001) used 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) TRIPS Agreement to exemplify the exercise of 
regulatory coercion. They argued that the TRIPs granted protection to the private 
interests of the intellectual property right (IPR) holders in the developed world rather 
than to benefit signatory countries. To incorporate it in the world trade governing 
system resulted not from RC or coordination between governments but from 
coercive imposition of the governments of developed countries under the pressure 
of their domestic firms. Eventually the TRIPS regulated not the RC between 
governments but competition between firms. Morriss shared the same point by 
asserting that the RC fostered by the world trade rules suited the interests of the 
USA and the EU to win over the developing countries (2010, pp125-6). Heyvaert 
argued that contemporary environmental rule-making was of a transnational nature, 
where large regional regulator like the EU and private regulator had dramatically 
changed the RC scenario (2013). Consequently, environmental RC was less like to 
RTB or RTT. Instead it shifted towards the credibility of the regulatory regime and 
procedural quality, with attention paid to the design and mode of instrumentality and 
implementation.      
 
These studies show that RC is rather complicated in the international business and 
economic scenario. According to Picciotto (1996), traditional diplomacy led by the 
governments of nation-states was replaced by regulatory interactions starred by 
regulatory intermediates, namely business lawyers, accountants, economists, and 
corporate managers. He used the concept ‘networks’ to describe the growth of the 
diverse, loosely connected and semi-legitimised international communities of 
technocrats. While these technocrats engage in competition and coordination, they 
generated norms and symbols that helped to structure markets, social consensus 
and eventually, institutions for international business regulation. The web 
Braithwaite and Drahos delineated for each of the thirteen chosen domains was 
contextually complex and paradoxical.  They suggested that an understanding of the 
web required less of a law-like and more a clinical-diagnosis-style of thinking. Given 
the non-linear dynamics of the processes, some regulations ratcheted up, some 
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down, some in the middle of deregulation, and some limitedly globalised (2000). All 
studies show concerns about power asymmetry involved in the processes of the RC 
as well as the regulatory outcomes.  
 
Generally, in the international rule-setting scenario, various societal groups deploy 
their resources to inject their interests into setting international economic and 
business rules. Due to power asymmetry, some interest groups are more likely to 
succeed to achieve their goals than others. Depending also on the context, the 
roles, relations and interactions between contesting parties, including the 
governments and the firms, can be complex and paradoxical. Contesting parties 
may coordinate and cooperate in order to win over common rivals and to get 
commonly desired regulatory results. Observing the RC context, each involves a 
distinctive community with its specific social constituent and structure, which has its 
own game to play and follows its own rule. The regulatory outcomes engendered 
from distinctive RC contexts are identified as distinctive. Overall, in this theory, 
demarcation between the regulating and regulated sides is blurred. All types of 
players seem to be on both sides. The scholarly major attention is in characterising 
the tension of the interacting players, which implies RC measure. While the RC 
outcome is mentioned, it is interpreted in terms of the direction of change of the 
standard. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
The six theories of RC draw upon two institutional lenses - economic and 
sociological. Based on the above literature review, it is recognised that these two 
lenses underpin different understandings about the empirical phenomenon of RC. 
Theories through economic lens emphasise players’ impact upon RC outcomes but 
ignore institutional impact upon players. On the contrary, those through sociological 
lens emphasise institutional impact upon players but ignore players’ impact upon 
RC outcomes. None emphasises the reciprocal impacts between institutions and 
players. Nor does any pay attention to enforcement dimension which involves the 
bilateral interactions and preferences between the regulating and regulated sides. 
Different understandings pay different attention to the regulating and regulated sides 
and demonstrate different understandings about the nature, measure and outcome 
of RC. Theories 1 to 4 share the same theoretical origin, namely Tiebout’s theory of 
public economics (1956). This is likely to be an explanation as to why these 
understandings appear to be more agreeable to each other than they do to Theories 
5 and 6. Nevertheless, while Theories 1 and 2 emphasise the regulating side’s 
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influence in RC for business, Theory 3 and 4 pay attentions to institutional restraints 
on the regulating side, which are shared with Theory 5 and 6.  Table 1.1 provides a 
glimpse of the six theories of RC. These theories can be summarised based on the 
fundamental factors of RC as follows:  
 
The nature of RC  Scholarly understandings in this regard are generally 
irreconcilable. In spite of sharing the same assumption of the regulating side as self-
interest driven as well as the same interest in winning RC as the outcome, the first 
four theories have different concerns. Theories 1 and 2 are mostly interested in 
giving the competing instruments and attributes of regulatory advantage. In contrast, 
Theories 3 and 4 concentrate on the institutional endowment and restraint of RC. 
Theories 5 and 6 are distant from all first four. They are different from Theories 1 
and 2 in that they do not perceive the regulating side as self-interest driven. Nor do 
they specify the winning of RC. Instead they pay attention to characterising the 
social networks and institutions involved in setting the trans-national rules of the 
game. They are also distinctive from Theories 3 and 4 in accounting for 
governmental institutions. All theories are contextual.  
  
The regulating side Although most theories consider the government as the 
regulating side, competing entities vary according to RC contexts. Mentioned 
competing entities include governments at various levels in decentralised 
institutions, including the front-line enforcement agency, HRC and LRC. They also 
include professionals, technocrats and multinationals. There is no theory that 
systemises the characteristics of the competing entity. While the scholars argue for 
and against the competing entity as the marketplace player, they actually lack 
consistent knowledge as how differently regulatory authorities compete for business 
if rules stay the same. Indeed, the contextual specificity of the competing entity 
reflects the same characteristic of current RC theories.  
 
The regulated side Most theories do not pay particular attention to the targets of 
RC. Theories 1 and 2 are the only ones that give explicit account for the competed-
for target, namely the tax-payer or the firm. In contrast, although Theories 3 to 6 
imply business attraction and economic development, they do not give serious 
account of the targeted business. Theories 3 and 4 are generally one-sided – 
concentrating on governmental institutions. While Theories 5 and 6 focus on social 
institutions that embed the involved players, the regulating and regulated sides are 
mixed. Notwithstanding their contrasting accounts, none of the theories 
systematically scrutinises the regulatory characteristics of the firm as the competed-
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for target. It is noted that the ‘race’ analogy is not an exception. However, Murphy’s 
argument about rule-changing directions is made based on firms’ industrial rather 
than regulatory features (2005). This implies that while the scholars argue about RC 
for attracting business, neither those for nor those against show any knowledge 
about how the firms act and react in an RC context.  
 
RC measures  The RC measures implied in existing theories can be 
characterised as a recipe book. Some are instrumental, some are institutional; some 
emphasise understanding, some behaviour; some pay attention to standard-setting, 
some to enforcement stringency; some focus on economic regulation only, some 
alert to the relevance of social concerns; some refer to the government generally, 
some to a particular group or organisation, be it formal or informal; some focus on 
competitive mode only, some associate it with other regulatory modes, such as 
coordinative and informational. All theories are disconnected from each other. This 
characteristic reflects the patchy, disconnected and sometimes conflicting scholarly 
accounts for the empirical phenomenon of RC.  
 
RC outcomes  The scholarly accounts in this regard show that business 
attraction as an RC outcome is given secondary attention compared to others. 
Comparatively, more attentions are paid to local revenue increase; change of 
standards, typically RTB, RTT; regulatory advantage; authoritative superiority; 
enforcement effect; social welfare; policy diffusion and convergence; and 
supremacy in setting global business rules. This aspect implies that RC for 
attracting business involves more normative concern than positive analysis. It is an 
under-developed theme in existing RC study.  
 
To conclude, this literature review shows that our knowledge about RC is neither 
comprehensive nor accurate. With no interrogation into enforcement dimension, we 
have no idea if rules stay the same, how different regulatory authorities compete for 
business to come to their jurisdictions; what commonly shared institutional factors 
underpins interests and strategies on the regulating side; why firms choose 
particular locations to conduct business; and why locations are so different in 
economic and social outcomes in the context RC. There is no theory that provides 
comprehensive and accurate account for the empirical phenomenon of RC. These 
theories are irreconcilable and disconnected with each other. The scholarly 
accounts about RC pay more attentions to contextual than to fundamental factors. 
Relevant debate about RC does not have a coherent and systematic framework. 
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The void of this framework makes current debate not only miss the point, hence our 
knowledge about RC is confusing, but also is poorly oriented for future research.  
 
This thesis will fill the mentioned gap by proposing an enforcement regime (ER) 
framework. This framework will advance scholarly understandings about RC 
coherently and systematically. It will focus on fundamental rather than contextual 
factors of RC and consequently will be reconcilable and connected with existing 
theories. It will fill the gap by drawing attention to the dimension of micro-level 
enforcement regime in the context of RC. It emphasises the reciprocal impacts 
between institutions and players. It highlights the significance of match and 
mismatch of preferences of the regulating and regulated sides so as to unveil likely 
causes of contrasting economic and social effects. It aims at giving an adequate 
account to the empirical phenomenon of RC.  
 
Suggested by its name, the ER Framework will focus on the enforcement dimension 
of RC, the significance of which has been identified by RC scholars but not yet 
interrogated. To account for RC based on interrogating enforcement dimension is an 
originality of the ER Framework. This dimension is missing in existing RC literature 
but available in the subject of regulatory enforcement. Therefore, it is necessary to 
refer to relevant regulatory enforcement literature to borrow a building block for the 
forthcoming theoretical framework.  
  
Theory Lens Nature of RC Types Regulating 
Side 
Regulated 
Side 
Measure of RC Outcome of RC 
1 Economic A Driving Force to 
Satisfy Firm’s 
Preferences 
- Local 
governments 
Taxpayer 
incl. firm 
Cost-efficient provision of public goods; Lax  
rules or enforcement; Response to tax-
payer’s exit & voice, arguably to firm’s and 
interest group’s voice  
Attracting tax-payers, incl. firm; 
increased revenue 
2 Economic A Race in the 
Marketplace 
- Decentralised 
governments at 
any level  
Firm Lax corporate law; adjustment of rules or 
enforcement stringency; land and other 
incentives; responsiveness; innovation; 
certainty; cooperation 
Regulatory advantage in attracting 
business; RTB or RTT 
3 Sociological An Intra-
Governmental 
Contest 
RC in rule-setting Decentralised 
governments at 
any level 
n/a Constitutional / institutional arrangement & 
structure 
Authoritative superiority in making 
and changing rule 
RC in enforcement Enforcement 
agencies 
n/a Structure of delegated authority  for 
enforcement; politician’s concern about 
election; agency’s familiarity to local 
environment 
Authoritative superiority; 
enforcement effect 
4 Sociological A Form of Inter-
jurisdiction 
interdependence 
Intra-
Country 
Competition-
Driven 
Provincial 
governments 
n/a Response to voter’s concern about the 
impact of business attraction to social 
welfare 
No RTB; regulatory advantage 
typified as balanced pursuit of 
economic & social regulatory goals 
Idea-Driven n/a Learning, emulation, benchmarking Convergence of rules 
Inter-
Country 
Competitive HRC vs LRC  n/a HRC: coercion of high standards; LRC: lax 
wage and environmental standards & 
enforcement 
HRC’s home industrial advantage; 
LRC’s business attraction & entry 
to HRC market 
Coordinative n/a HRC: power & high green standard; LRC: lax 
enforcement 
Economic integration; HRC’s 
victory of levelling playfield by 
imposing high standard 
Informational n/a HRC: setting norm; LRC: learning Regulatory diffusion 
5 Sociological A Contest of Home-
Based Legal 
Institutions 
- Int’l arbitration 
law firms 
n/a Expertise and embedded institutions Int’l arbitration business share 
6 Sociological A Distinctive Feature 
of Int’l Rule-Setting 
- National govs, 
NGOs, firms & 
technocrats 
n/a Networks; coordination; ‘Web of influence’ Supremacy in setting global 
business rules 
 
Table 1.1  Six Contrasting Theories of RC  
 
  
Chapter II Enforcement Dimension 
 
 
The forthcoming framework will focus on the competition between different 
enforcement regimes (ERs) for different firms, which involves the enforcer and the 
regulated firm acting and interacting vis-a-vis each other, and which emphasises the 
reciprocal impacts of institutions and regulatory players’ actions and interactions. 
However, as shown by the RC literature review, the RC scholars have ignored   
differences within the types of regimes and firms as well as their behaviours and 
interactions. They also emphasise either the institutional impact upon players or vice 
versa but not both. In contrast, the enforcement scholars pay attention to the 
different types of enforcers and regulated firms; their behaviours and interactions; 
and reciprocal impacts between institutions and players. Thus enforcement studies 
can lend a building block to the ER Framework. Specifically, the review of 
enforcement literature is to contribute to the forthcoming framework in two senses. 
In a narrow sense, it will suggest the relevant aspects to address the relation and 
interaction of the enforcer and the regulated in the enforcement process. In a broad 
sense, it will propose a comprehensive analysing structure ranging from the 
affecting factors to the entailed effect of the two players’ types, behaviours, relations 
and interactions in enforcement context. Therefore, the review of enforcement 
literature will offer not only analytical structures to the ER Framework but also a 
descriptive structure for the empirical research. 
 
The literature under review is selective. Only those studies that are positive 
(interpretative and predictive)1, using the socio-legal approach and focusing on the 
enforcer-regulatee interaction in enforcement practice are taken as relevant. The 
literature review is organised as follows: It first reviews the behaviours, types and 
affecting factors for the enforcer and the regulatee respectively. Then it examines 
the issues involved in the bilateral relations and interaction of the two-sided players. 
It is followed by notes about the enforcement effects that are likely to be relevant to 
business attraction, which is related to RC.  It ends by specifying the factors, 
weaknesses and gaps of relevant regulatory enforcement literature.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 These studies roughly belong to private interest theories. See Yeung (2004) pp7. 
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1.  Regulating Side: Enforcer’s Behaviour, Type and Affecting Factor 
A general survey of the selected literature finds that the enforcer’s behaviour mostly 
scrutinised by the scholars is the enforcer’s exercise of discretion and choice of 
enforcement strategy. Concerning the enforcer’s discretion, the scholarly attentions 
are the balance between sufficient delegation of authority to respond to potentially 
conflicting objectives and the control of abuses of authority (Bardarch and Kagan: 
1982; Silbey: 1984; and Hawkins and Thomas: 1984). Concerning the enforcer’s 
strategy, the scholars note varied choices and use various terms to name them, 
such as approach, tactics, strategy and style. The scholars concentrate on 
addressing the combination, degree and balance of compliance/ cooperation and 
deterrence/ sanctioning for the purpose of achieving desirable corporate compliance 
(Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986; Vogel 1986; Hutter: 1988 and 1997; Aoki and 
Cioffi: 1999; May and Winter: 2000; and Kitaruma: 2000).  
 
Braithwaite, Walker and Grabosky considered that enforcers’ behaviour is too 
complex to be characterised through a single continuum of persuasion versus 
prosecution or compliance versus deterrence. They broadened the range of the 
continuum so that it had instead the extremities of cooperative fostering self-
regulation and detached command and control. Accordingly they created a 
taxonomy of enforcers based on their enforcing strategies (1987). There were seven 
different types of enforcers. The Conciliator was not concerned about enforcing the 
law but emphasised achieving regulatory goal through conciliating conflicting 
parties. Benign Big Gun had enormous power but rarely used it. Diagnostic 
Inspectorate was a decentralised authority. It not only alerted the regulatee of a 
regulatory violation but also provided technical assistance to solve identified 
regulatory problem. Fostering the regulatee’s self-regulation was part of its strategy. 
Detached Token Enforcer had the least stable interaction with the regulatee. It did 
not encourage the regulatee’s self-regulation.  Detached Modest Enforcer adopted 
an arms-length approach but was rulebook-orientated. It inclined to target repetitive 
offenders. Token Enforcer was a proactive prosecutor. Yet its prosecutions 
produced only token penalties. It was neither adversarial nor close to the regulatee. 
Modest Enforcer was punitive and deterring. Its style was the nearest to Bardach 
and Kagan’s ‘unreasonable regulation’ (1982 and 2006).  
 
While the above-mention researchers address the enforcer’s behaviour and types, 
others pay attention to the factors affecting the enforcer’s behaviour. These factors 
are identified as belonging to either the contextual category, the governmental 
system, or the regulatee’s behaviour. 
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Contextual factors Regulatory context or environment is considered to be a 
determinant in the development of different styles of enforcement. Contextual 
factors include political, social and economic factors as well as their changes (for 
example Shover et al: 1984; Hutter; 1993; and Lo and Fryxell: 2003). They function 
at macro and/or micro level. When macro context is concerned, the main issue 
seems to be to what extent the enforcement outcome is in congruence with the 
legislative expectation. The effect is scrutinised by drawing a vertical perspective. 
For example, Hutter (1993) was concerned about the effect of the change in social 
and political environment for enforcing the law. Her focus was the difference 
between the contexts of law-making and of enforcement practice. The enforcing 
agencies were likely to respond to the change of regulatory environment. Hence the 
practice of enforcement would give a different effect from that expected by the 
legislature. When micro context is concerned, the main issue seems to be the 
difference in enforcement styles (Lange: 1999a). The perspective is local and 
sometimes comparative, with the issue and effect of particular micro contexts 
examined and even compared. Although the scholars have shown their awareness 
of both macro and micro contexts, most studies focus on one particular level. 
 
Governmental system When governmental system is mentioned, three levels 
are identified in the analyses: institutional, organisational and individual. 
Institutionally, the entire governmental system is under scrutiny. Governmental 
institutions are taken as a determinant of bureaucratic discretion, and the impact of 
the discretion concerns the inducement of foreign investment to the utilities sectors 
(Levy and Spiller: 1999). Bureaucratic discretion is defined as an issue of credible 
commitment. With varied governmental institutions, countries demonstrated varied 
capacities in constraining bureaucratic discretion. Hence they generated varied 
effects for foreign investment. 
 
Organisational factors are argued to affect the adoption of enforcement approaches. 
These factors include regulatory tasks such as inspection (Shover et al: 1984); role 
and procedural clarity, resource adequacy (Lo and Fryxell: 2003); standards and 
procedures tailored to local context; coordinative, technological and organisational 
support by the higher authority (Tang et al: 1998). Varied organisational factors 
engender adoption of varied enforcement approaches by the regulatory authorities 
in varied locations.  
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Individually, the inspector’s experiences and perceptions about the regulatee and 
local regulatory programs determine his enforcement stance and strategy towards 
the regulatee (Shover et al: 1984). For example, if the inspector was suspicious of 
the regulatee and perceived a high probability of deliberate non-compliance, he 
tended to choose vigorous means to enforce regulation. An individual inspector’s 
belief and perception was subject to the influence of the collective stance and 
history of his organisation.  
 
The demarcation of institutional and organisational factors tends to be blurred. For 
example, bureaucratic commitment is considered as an institutional issue by some 
scholars but an organisational issue by others (Levy and Spiller: 1999; and Tang et 
al: 1998). When Black (1998a) discussed the significance of the regulator’s 
conversations with the regulatee in interpreting and implementing rules, she held the 
construction of an effective conversational relationship relied on both organisational 
and institutional factors such as commitment, access, authority, trust and 
accountability. Indeed, the mentioned issues can be both institutional and 
organisational, depending on the specific context of the research. Overall, the 
scholars take either a focused perspective to address governmental institutions or a 
general perspective by mentioning multiple dimensions. 
 
Regulatee-related factors Some factors are identified as related to the regulatee 
and have an effect upon the enforcer’s behaviour, namely the choice of enforcement 
approach. For example, Black (2001) summarised the scholarly viewpoints about 
the correlations between the characteristics of regulated firms and enforcers’ choice 
of enforcement approaches. The more frequent contact between the enforcing 
officers and the regulated firms, the higher homogeneity of the regulated industries, 
the more likely enforcers were to adopt conciliatory approaches.  
 
The regulated firm’s size is identified as a typical factor that the enforcer takes into 
consideration when choosing enforcement approaches.  The enforcer is more likely 
to use a sanctioning approach towards small firms than big firms, even in a 
compliance-oriented regulatory environment. The main reasons are that firstly, 
enforcing officers are likely to have more contact with big firms than small firms. 
Since big firms tend to last longer than small firms, they have more chances than 
small firms to make long-term and repetitive contact with enforcing officers. 
Secondly, big firms tend to be more concerned about their reputation than small 
firms. Thirdly, big firms have more sufficient capacities and resources than small 
firms to afford compliance costs. Finally, big firms are more capable of challenging 
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enforcing officers’ decisions, either through contacting senior level officials or 
mobilising political process (Black: 2001 quoting the literature including Black: 1976; 
Reiss: 1984; Shover et al: 1984; Hawkins and Thomas: 1984b; Grabovsky and 
Braithwaite: 1986; Gunningham: 1991; and Hutter: 1997).  
 
To summarise, the enforcer’s behaviour is related to his exercise of discretion and 
his choice of enforcement strategy. Accordingly, enforcers are perceived to be 
varied in types. The factors that affect the enforcer’s behaviour appertain to 
regulatory context, governmental institutions, and the regulatee’s industrial and 
corporate features. The contextual factors are identified to emphasise the normative 
values such as democratic access and public interest in enforcement practice. The 
less normative concern such as economic development seems to be of limited 
interest to the scholars. When governmental system is concerned, institutions, 
organisation and individual are the three dimensions considered to shape the 
enforcer’s behaviour. Varied institutions, organisations and individuals are likely to 
engender varied enforcers’ behaviour. It is prudent to claim bureaucratic system as 
a significant determinant of the enforcer’s behaviour, typically enforcement 
approach or discretional exercise. However, contextual and governmental factors 
are not clearly related. It is not clear whether contextual factors are exogenous or 
endogenous of governmental institutions. The regulatee-related factors are linked to 
the enforcer’s choice of strategy. They imply the main purpose and goal of 
regulatory enforcement. The positive study of correlation between the firm’s size 
and the enforcer’s behaviour is restricted in the explanation of the rationale. So far 
other implications are not explored. For example, does the enforcer have preference 
towards the firm? If so, do all enforcers prefer big firms to small ones and well-
complying ones to ill-complying ones? Why or why not? Although positive study 
about the affecting factors of the enforcer’s behaviour is one theme of regulatory 
enforcement theory, it is not the mainstream. In particular, institutional and 
organisational analyses are limited. Overall, there is no comprehensive framework 
to systemise the enforcer’s behaviour, the type and the identified affecting factors. 
 
 
2. Regulated’s Side: Firm’s Behaviour, Type and Affecting Factor 
The regulatee’s behaviour in the enforcement context is represented by his 
compliance, which shows his awareness, motivation and sense towards regulatory 
enforcement. The scholars demonstrate notable interests in classifying regulatees 
based on their varied behavioural characteristics in the enforcement context. Their 
primary purpose is to prescribe effective strategies to enhance the compliance of 
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the varied regulatees. There have been at least three sets of taxonomies of 
regulatees. Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) classified regulatees in terms of amoral 
calculators, political citizens and incompetent organisation. Baldwin and Cave 
(1999) distinguished them in four groups: well-intentioned and well-informed, well-
intentioned and ill-informed, ill-intentioned and ill-informed and ill-intentioned and 
well-informed. Vickers et al (2005) classified small-sized firms into four types - 
avoiders/outsiders, reactive minimalists, positive respondents, and proactive 
learners. In spite of using different criteria, the classifications of the regulatees 
through these typologies are roughly agreeable. However, how they are agreeable 
is not articulated. 
 
The enforcement faced by the regulatee is identified as falling into three categories: 
intra-firm, inter-firm, and extra-firm. The factors affecting the regulatee’ behaviour 
has been scrutinised from these three perspectives.  
 
Intra-firm In the intra-firm perspective category, the main affecting factors 
include the regulatee’s understanding, industrial feature and size. The regulatee’s 
understanding towards regulation affects his behaviour. Winter and May found that 
Danish farmers’ awareness of rules were critical to their compliance with agro-
environmental regulations (2001). Their social and calculus motivations were 
equally influential to compliance. Inspectors’ formalism was helpful to some extent, 
but coercion would cause backfire. Similarly, when Australian taxpayers perceived 
the provision of public goods as fair and legitimate, they were willing to honestly 
declare income. If they were allowed to think morally rather than feel oppressed or 
controlled in auditing process,  then taxation would achieve the most desirable effect 
(Braithwaite et al: 2007; and Feld and Frey: 2007).  
 
The firm’s industrial feature appears to be correlated to its stance of self-regulation 
and regulation. Genn (1993) interviewed the managers of 40 industrial and 
agricultural sites in England and found that self-regulation was effective only in the 
largest and most hazardous companies, regardless of the intensity of the inspectors’ 
efforts. Other companies had limited knowledge and comprehension about 
regulations and standards. Besides, most of them adopted temporary compliance 
when the inspectors visited. Genn’s conclusion is not entirely agreeable with the 
finding by Gray and Shadbegian (2005). The latter scholars tested the compliance 
and sensitivities to enforcing inspections of the plants and firms in the paper industry 
in the USA. The finding was that older and larger plants were less likely to comply 
with environment regulation. Compared with plants owned by smaller firms, plants 
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owned by larger firms were less sensitive to inspections but more sensitive to other 
enforcing actions. 
 
The firm’s size seems to be the most noteworthy affecting factor. The scholars tend 
to agree generally that the firm’s size corresponds to its complying behaviour. In 
spite of some disagreement about big firms’ behaviour (Haines: 1997; and Black: 
2001), the scholars generally share a poor impression of small firms’ -- reactive, 
opportunistic and organisationally incompetent (Kagan and Scholz: 1984). For 
example, the research by Fairman and Yapp (2005) showcased that the SMEs 
asked the inspectors to explain what exactly they should do and then did what they 
had agreed with the inspectors. This demonstrated that the SMEs were heavily 
reactive. Vickers et al were more optimistic (2005). They investigated the responses 
of the small and micro enterprises in the food and clothing manufacturers of the UK 
to the statutory health and safety requirements. The findings were specifically: about 
63% of enterprises were not aware of the legislation; 64% found the enforced 
requirements burdensome; more than 90% did not consider compliance as difficult 
and a majority welcomed consultant-like inspectors; and 60% agreed that 
investment in health and safety would benefit the business financially. The authors 
argued that well designed and implemented regulation could yield their desirable 
compliance. The provision of information and advice was as necessary as 
inspections and punitive means. 
 
Although the scholars have identified multiple intra-firm factors to explain the 
regulatee’s behaviour, they hardly do it systematically. Remained myths include: 
how to systematically characterise the regulatee’s reaction to enforcement based on 
its understanding, industrial and corporate features? 
 
Inter-firm Inter-firm perspective examines the affecting factors based on 
industrial and trade relationships. These factors not only determine the behaviour of 
particular groups of firms but also are related to private enforcement. In the former 
case, Haines introduced the perspective of contracting hierarchy to investigate the 
inter-firm mechanism (1997). Using corporate response to death at worksites in 
Australia, she indicated that the position a company held in contracting hierarchy, 
which corresponded to the size of a company, bore a strong correlation to its 
behaviour and compliance with occupational health and safety regulation. Large 
companies were high in the hierarchy and tended to comply well. Small ones were 
low and lacked compliance. However she iterated that the possession of power in 
the hierarchy could not guarantee either improving compliance or evading social 
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responsibility. For firms of all sizes, the first things under consideration were market-
related factors such as intra-industry competition, contract price and changes in 
demand.  
 
Some scholars have alerted to the significance of the inter-firm factors to effective 
enforcement (Ayres and Braithwaite: 1992). Relevantly, private enforcement through 
industry-wide informal mechanisms and networks is suggested by the scholars to 
enhance corporate compliance. The main issues in debate are the strength of 
private enforcement versus public enforcement and enforcement stringency versus 
regulatory attractiveness. Gunningham (1991) examined and compared the effect of 
private ordering in the commodities and futures markets of Sydney, Hong Kong and 
Chicago. Through interviewing the main players in the field, the author concluded 
that informal mechanisms were far more important in maintaining market order and 
sorting out trade disputes than rules issued by the government. Informal 
mechanisms include peer group pressure, fear of exclusion, leverage of large 
institutional clients, and transparency of particular dealings and opportunity of pay-
back for repetitive players. He highlighted the point that the functioning of 
governmental regulation filtered through formal and informal enforcement networks 
and structures. The ultimate regulatory effect relied on how the mentioned 
structures and mechanisms received, transformed and implemented the regulation.  
 
There are opponents arguing against the superiority of private enforcement. For 
example, Jackson and Roe (2008) held that public enforcement was at least as 
important as private enforcement in regulating the financial market. They justified 
the standpoint based on measuring the used resources by public agencies against 
the outcome of financial regulation. The finding was that the real resources of public 
agencies - staffing and budget levels - were significantly correlated to the robust 
development of the stock exchange market.  
 
It is noted that most empirical findings about private enforcement come from the 
financial sector. Strictly speaking, the above mentioned private enforcement is but a 
combined version of public and private enforcement. Whereas the literature 
highlights the role of private enforcement, public regulation stands at the backdrop. 
This reminds us that, when observing private enforcement, one should look at a 
broader context and structure that private enforcement situates. Some questions 
arise such as: how do public and private enforcement interplay? Does private 
enforcement affect all regulatees alike? 
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Extra-firm Extra-firm affecting factors are mainly related to the regulatee’s 
reaction towards formal and informal enforcement. In the governmental enforcement 
context, scholarly concern seems to be related to the contingency occurred in the 
process of enforcement. One example is the note about the regulatee’s creative 
compliance. In this regard, the regulatee circumvents the scope of the law, which, 
while not breaching the letter, does dishonour the spirit (McBarnet and Whelan: 
1991). Another example is the finding of the negotiation basis in the firm’s 
compliance. The research by Fairman and Yapp (2005) showcased that the SMEs 
in the food industry in the UK complied not with law but through negotiations with 
the inspectors. The contingency in the enforcement process will be further 
addressed in the following enforcer-regulatee bilateral perspective. 
 
The informal enforcement is related to social activism faced by the firm in a context 
of global economic integration (Vogel: 2008) 2 . The scholars are particularly 
concerned about multinational companies’ compliance with social and 
environmental regulations in developing countries which have limited regulatory 
capacity (Braithwaite: 2005; and Graham and Woods: 2006). Meanwhile, they 
acknowledge that corporate self-regulation, market-based mechanisms, industrial 
association’s code of conduct and informal rules are likely to function for enforcing 
these regulations (Potoski and Prakash: 2005; Auld, Bernstein and Cashore: 2008). 
Firms may voluntarily comply with social norms so as to avoid additional regulation, 
to protect their reputations and brands or to reduce problems with trading partners 
such as information asymmetry or opportunism (King, Lenox and Terlaak: 2005; 
Vogel: 2008). It is inferred that the trans-national informal regulation is likely to 
complement the weak regulatory capacity of the host developing countries 
(O’Rourke: 2003). It also invokes us to consider the possible functioning of plural 
legal norms. These norms are playing an active role in regulating trans-national 
industrial production and supply chains (Snyder: 1999). Relevant questions include: 
How to characterise the firm’s reaction towards informal enforcement?  
 
 
3. Two Sides Together: Relation and Interaction 
Like their behaviour, the relationship and interaction of the enforcer and the 
regulatee are affected by the previously mentioned factors. At the same time, they 
have particular characteristics and implications for enforcement practice.  
 
                                                 
2
 Considering the relevance, the social regulation enforced by the third party in domestic context is omitted.  
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3.1 Bilateral Relation 
The enforcer-regulatee relationship suggests two implications upon enforcement 
practice. One implication is that the relational distance premises the formality of the 
enforcer’s choice of enforcing approach. Another implication is that the relational 
characteristics determine the familiarity and predictability of enforcement practice to 
both players.  
 
Relational distance between regulator and regulatee Black (1976 and 1980) 
invented the concept of relational distance. It was ‘measured by the scope, 
frequency and duration of interaction between people, and by the nature and 
number of links between them in a social network’ (1980, pp4). He predicted that the 
use of law varied in line with the relational distance of the involving players. Law 
was more likely to be introduced to deal with the dispute between the players with a 
bigger relational distance. In contrast, non-legal means were likely to be used on 
similar occasions if the players were relationally closer. This view was tested by the 
enforcing styles of the police. The finding was that the police tended to adopt more 
conciliatory rather than penal styles when they were familiar with the people 
involved. 
 
Black’s theory was tested by Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986) in studying the 
probability of using prosecutions by Australian regulatory agencies. They 
hypothesised that (1) an agency with a high percentage of staff coming from the 
regulated industries would prosecute less than those whose staff were recruited 
from elsewhere; (2) agencies which regulated a relatively few number of firms would 
prosecute less than those that regulated a higher number; (3) agencies which 
regulated a single industry sector would prosecute less than those that regulated 
multiple sectors; (4) agencies whose inspectors had frequent contact with the same 
firms would use less formal sanctions than those with less personal contact. Their 
research findings supported strongly Hypotheses (2), (3) and (4), but there was 
comparatively weaker support for Hypothesis (1). Even so their findings about an 
agency with a high percentage of staff coming from the regulated industry could be 
considered as industrial capture of the regulatory agency. The findings imply a 
correlation between the regulator-regulatee relational distance and the frequency of 
use of formal sanctions. Hence they further strengthen Black’s theory of relational 
distance.  
 
Characteristics of enforcer-regulatee relationship  Hawkins and Thomas (1984b), 
drawing on an organisational perspective, defined enforcement as a developing and 
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implementing process, with interactions between regulatory agency officers and the 
regulated, legislators and professionals. They used two concepts to explain the 
characteristics of the process of enforcement: bargaining and social construction. 
Bargaining was fundamental to the enforcement process. This was because both 
the regulatory agency and the regulated were concerned about conserving 
resources and minimising interference with established routines. Bargaining in the 
form of negotiation could shape a process where both parties could benefit from 
compliance. It also influenced the choice of compliance and deterrence strategies 
by the regulatory agency. Social construction was about the interpretation of reality 
by the members of bureaucracy. It helped to explain why and how enforced rules 
were modified by the inspectors’ interpretations, taking into account their 
relationships with the regulated. Both the processes of bargaining and social 
construction could lead to institutionalisation of the shared values. In turn, these 
values shaped and structured enforcement practice as well as the players’ 
behaviours. These scholars’ theory was generally agreeable with Lange’s field study 
on the enforcement of waste regulation (1999b). Her findings were that regularised 
enforcement process built a social life of the enforcer and the regulatee. Through 
informal negotiation and social construction, the two players shared working group 
norms, customary norms and agreements. It became difficult to distinguish clearly 
between compliance and non-compliance.  Indeed, the enforcer-regulatee social life 
at the lowest hierarchical level was perceived as ‘an enforcement system’ that 
localised law (Lange: 1996) 
 
Hawkins and Hutter (1993; and Hutter: 1997) argued that the relationship between 
the regulatory agency and the regulatee was of reflexive, serial, incremental and 
long-term characteristics.  The interactive process was about negotiation, with the 
degree and scope contested by both players. The relationship and interaction had 
specific settings, which were jointly shaped by both sides. On one side, the 
enforcing officials’ competence and stance towards regulation mattered. They 
constructed working definitions of compliance, which were derived mostly from legal 
and regulatory definitions and reflected the regulatory environment surrounding 
regulatory activities. On the other side, the myriad of behaviour and actions taken by 
the regulated had diverse impacts upon the relationship and interaction. 
Accordingly, the inspector formed judgments about the regulatee’s compliance at a 
particular site and time. Established relationships and interactive processes were 
likely to generate an effect that was familiar and predictable to both players. 
However, a change of individuals on either side could entail changes in that 
established relationship and interaction. 
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The end of the study on the enforcer-regulatee relationship is enforcement and 
compliance. In this regard, the scholars tend to assume that the two parties are of 
equal and reciprocal standing. It is arguable that this assumption is applicable to all 
contexts. Although relational distance is a topic of enforcement theory, the relevant 
literature is limited in number. Apart from relating to the enforcer’s style, relational 
distance is not related to other aspects of enforcement or regulatory activity. Are 
there other implications for the enforcer-regulatee relationship in enforcement 
context? Additionally, if the working definition of compliance is based on the 
agreement between the enforcer and the regulatee, what does it imply for their 
status in the bilateral relationship? How much certainty can such working definition 
engender? How to characterise the enforcer-regulatee social life in different 
contexts? 
 
3.2  Bilateral Interaction 
The scrutiny of bilateral interaction of the two players is based on enforcement 
arrangements, enforcement practice and variation in legal implements.   
 
Enforcement arrangements  The scholars use a comparative method to 
address the influence of enforcement arrangement and approach upon the 
regulatee’s motivation, behaviour and interaction. May (2005) showed how different 
enforcement arrangements, together with social considerations, shaped and 
structured different compliance motivations of the regulatees. Compliance 
motivations were typically deterrent fear and civic duty. The former was associated 
with a sense of being caught for regulatory violations and the latter saw compliance 
as an obligation. From the examples of the agro-environmental regulation in 
Denmark and the USA, the author discovered that Danish farmers had a high sense 
of civic duty and a low sense of deterrent fear. American marine firms had exactly 
the opposite senses. American homebuilders shared more similar motivations with 
Danish farmers than with American marine firms. He held that a high sense of civic 
duty reflected an accommodative enforcement arrangement, whereas a high sense 
of deterrent fear corresponded to a legalistic one. The author defined regulatory 
interaction in terms of societal contract and social contract. The Danish one was a 
societal contract and the American, a social contract. At the heart of a societal 
contract was a set of shared norms about acceptable behaviour between the 
regulator and the regulatee, and rules formulated and negotiated through the 
involvement of the farmer union. Each party was bound by the contract to exercise 
his respective obligations according to the norms and rules, and each was aware 
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that the other did the same. Societal contract was applied to the whole sector. 
Inspection served as a forum and reminder of the norms and inspectors only visited 
farms occasionally. In contrast, social contract was based on shared terms about 
what to do. The shared terms regarded specifically how provisions and codes 
applied to particular situations. They emerged from repetitive interaction and 
negotiation between the regulator and the regulatee. Social contract was 
underpinned by a give-and-take reciprocity. In the USA, homebuilders did what was 
agreed by the negotiations in order to acquire the certificate of occupancy; so did 
the inspectors, but their actions were for the purpose of avoiding the paperwork 
burden and any possible regulatee’s complaint to their superiors. Social contract 
applied to individual firms. Unlike homebuilders, the marine firms faced a typical 
situation of American legalism. The relationship was coercive. The regulator dictated 
the terms of permits and the regulatees self-reported their data. Violations found 
were publicised and the violators fined. Since the regulator and regulatee had 
limited interaction, there was no way for the two parties to negotiate norms or terms. 
The research implies that the regulatee’s motivations are highly shaped by the 
enforcement arrangement. They are also conditional upon the specific social 
settings within which both players are embedded.  
 
Enforcement practice  Larson examined how distinctive enforcement practice 
institutionalised legality distinctively and in turn shaped distinctive legal 
consciousness and behaviour of the participants (2004). He assumed regulation as 
a social process through which the market player was embedded in the social 
structure. The author examined securities regulation in Fiji and Ghana. The two 
countries had identical laws but different implementation practices. The regulatees’ 
behaviour demonstrated distinctive characteristics. Specifically, in Fiji, securities 
regulation concerned the transaction process of the stock exchange. The enforcing 
agency had a more visible presence in the daily exchange operation. In Ghana, 
regulation was carried out by means of auditing the outcomes of the exchange. The 
enforcing agency was more detached from the daily operation. The operation and 
competition behaviour of the brokers in these two countries was different. Those in 
Fiji were more formal rules oriented, whereas those in Ghana developed stronger 
norms functioning on the trading floor.  
 
The above empirical studies demonstrate that enforcement arrangement and 
practice are likely to shape and structure the regulatee’s motivation, action and legal 
consciousness towards regulation and law. Such effect of enforcement arrangement 
and practice seems to function in a specific ‘field of action’ (Larson: 2004, pp737). 
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The ‘field of action’ comprises of the particular industrial sector; the interactive 
process of the enforcer and the regulatee; and the relevant rule. The two players’ 
behavioural and interactive modes as well as the norm and code are 
institutionalised in the field of action.  
 
Variation in legal implementation Heimer’s research pinpointed institutional and 
organisational factors in explaining why hospitals varied in implementing medical 
law (1995). The author assumed legal and medical institutions as represented by 
their respective professionals. If the medical professional was involved in the law-
making process and was successful in injecting their interest in the law, the 
legitimacy and autonomy of specific medical practice was ensured. Medical law was 
likely to be welcomed by the medical sector. Meanwhile, if hospitals had the 
convention of including legal workers in the routine of processing organisational 
issues, the legitimacy of the medical practice was further ensured. Hence the 
organisation was in the right position to request resources. With the preconditions at 
both legislative (macro) and operational (micro) dimensions satisfied, medical law 
was able to be implemented by hospitals. If the two conditions were not satisfied 
simultaneously, the outcome would be under-implementation of law. This study 
exemplifies how the implementation of law is determined by inter-institution 
competition in the rule-making process and by inter-institution cooperation in the 
rule-implementing practice. 
 
In Heimer’s research, the regulatee has multiple entities. He is the individual 
(professional), the organisation (hospital) and the institutions (medical). The choice 
of the regulatee is examined through the role of the individuals (medical and legal 
professionals), which is shaped by the interest and concern of their respective 
institutions and affects the institutional and organisational decision-making. Unlike 
other literature, Heimer defined the regulating and regulated systems as separate 
institutions. The involved individuals do not share the same institutions, but interact 
on behalf of their respective institutions at the macro and micro levels. Her 
perspective can be accurately described as inter-institutional (regulating and 
regulated) and intra-institutional (organisational). This perspective captures the 
tensions between law making and implementation as well as the competition for 
legitimacy and autonomy between legal and non-legal systems. This dual-level 
analysis broadens the vision for observing organisational decision-making. It 
interconnects the decision-makings at two levels through the common concerns of 
legitimacy and autonomy and hence the effect of legal implementation.  
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4. Enforcement Effects 
The enforcement effect that has concerned scholars the most is corporate 
compliance. The effect of business attraction is very limitedly explored by current 
positive enforcement studies. Bearing in mind the theme of the forthcoming 
framework, particular attention is paid here to the effects that are identified as 
(potentially) correlated to business attraction. Accordingly, the following effects and 
their related causal factors are identified. 
 
Bureaucratic discretion vs certainty and flexibility  Discretion is arguably inevitable 
for regulatory enforcement, but it is necessary for effective enforcement (Hawkins 
and Thomas: 1984b; and Black: 2001). This was because the enforcement agency 
faced various regulatory goals, and the practice to achieve them demanded a 
balance between certainty and flexibility. Such balance required discretion. The 
effect of discretion is one focus for the scholars. Hawkins and Hutter (1993) iterated 
that the street-level inspectors for the occupational health and safety and 
environmental regulations in England and Wales were highly discretional. 
Enforcement practice was of ‘individualised, fragmented and ad hoc’ characteristics. 
Similarly Lovat (2004) alerted that the inspectors of the environmental regulatory 
agency in Scotland exercised diverse discretion. Consequently enforcement 
practice was not standardised and lacked certainty. He considered the problem was 
caused by lack of clarity in legislations.  
 
Levy and Spiller (1999) argued that bureaucratic discretion was associated with 
both regulatory certainty and flexibility, and a balance of the two was helpful to 
promote foreign investment in the utilities sector of a country. Hence whether and to 
what extent the balance was likely to be struck was premised upon the control of 
bureaucratic discretion. Discretion, as well as its restraint, was derived from the 
governmental institutions of a host country, which Levy and Spiller named as 
institutional endowment. If a country’s institutions could not restrain discretion 
appropriately, they could not simultaneously create regulatory certainty and 
flexibility. In this case, regulatory certainty should be given the priority. This study 
adopts an institutionalist approach to characterise bureaucratic discretion constraint. 
It does not address the issue of discretion in an enforcement context. Nevertheless, 
it is relevant in terms of relating the constraint of bureaucratic discretion to the 
attraction of foreign investment in the utilities sector.  
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Responsiveness vs easiness-seeking and differentiation  The scholars pay 
attention to the effect exerted not only by congruent interests but also contrasting 
demands and requirements upon the enforcer’s choice of enforcement approaches. 
Silbey (1984) and Cranston (1986) noted an easiness-seeking characteristic in the 
complaint handling by the consumer protection agencies in the USA and the UK. 
Specifically, when the agencies faced conflicting requests from the relevant parties, 
they tended to choose the easiest way to sort out the disputes. The easiest way, 
usually in the form of economic compensation, cost the agencies limited resources 
and required low expertise and a short time to handle and complete a case. Also the 
cost was low for consumers and businesses, since they could avoid legal 
proceedings. The empirical studies highlight that when faced by diverse demands 
the enforcer may be driven to respond in a tactical rather than regulation-binding 
fashion.  
 
Scholz and Wei elaborated the characteristics of the enforcer’s responsiveness in a 
broader context (1986). They made a comparison between the responding 
structures of the federal and state agencies in enforcing the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act regulation in the USA. They found that the federal and state 
agencies shared similarities such as (1) responding significantly to state-level 
political signals (e.g. national policy, congressman’s and interest groups’ concern) 
and task signals (e.g. budget, duty, goal and routine); (2) consistently responding to 
the demands of interest groups (labour complaint) with daily enforcement contacts; 
(3) responding instrumentally (through serious citations and penalties) to task 
changes (workplace accident and unemployment rates) and symbolically (through 
inspections and non-serious citations) to political changes (ideologies of parties and 
elected officials). Meanwhile, state agencies were more responsive than federal 
agencies to political and task signals and changes. The general implications of the 
characteristics of bureaucratic responsiveness are that: (1) different enforcing 
agencies do not make the same responses, even though they face the same 
regulatory environment; (2) the enforcing agency inclines to respond more 
attentively to the local issues rather than federal issues.  
 
Generally speaking, the enforcer’s responsiveness in the above positive research 
has a theme distinctive from responsive enforcement in prescriptive studies. The 
positive researchers concentrate on the diversity and complexity of demands and 
requests faced by the enforcer. Their interest lies primarily in describing the 
characteristics and showing concerns about the implications of the responsiveness. 
In contrast, prescriptive researchers focus on the variety of the regulatee’s attitudes 
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and accordingly propose the strategy and tactics for the purpose of bringing about 
desirable corporate compliance (for example Ayres and Braithwaite: 1992; 
Braithwaite: 2006; and Baldwin and Black: 2008). Comparatively the positive 
research is less developed than the prescriptive research about regulatory 
responsiveness. Indeed, the prescriptive research seems to represent current 
mainstream theory of regulatory enforcement, given the primary concern of 
compliance and deterrence. So far, we understand limited implication of the 
enforcer’s responsiveness other than enforcement effect. Since a positive study of 
regulatory responsiveness demonstrates the potential of capturing broad-ranged 
and diversified factors and contexts, it deserves consideration for a topic that 
addresses other than compliance and deterrence.  
 
Enforcement stringency vs regulatory attractiveness Dowell et al (2003) 
inquired the correlation between the adoption of stringent environmental standard by 
a firm and its market value. Based on analysis of the American multinationals in 
developing countries, they found that the firms who adopted stringent environmental 
standards had much higher market values and were more competitive than those 
which did not. Thus they suggested developing countries should avoid using lax 
environmental enforcement when attracting foreign investment. Otherwise they 
would end up attracting poor-quality investment and uncompetitive firms. Coffee 
(2007) examined and compared the effect of high-intensity enforcement in the 
financial markets of the common-law countries. The enforcement exercised by the 
American public and private agencies was outstanding in terms of its stringency 
enforcement. At first glance the enforcement appeared to deter foreign investors. A 
closer look suggested that the deterred firms were mostly those aiming to speculate. 
At the same time, the strong enforcement reduced the cost of information 
asymmetry and equity capital. Thus high-intensity enforcement of the financial 
market of the USA filtered out the undesired types of firms and attracted the well-
behaved firms.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This literature review shows that regulatory enforcement theories have formed 
comprehensive knowledge about the enforcer’s and the regulatee’s types, 
behaviours and interactions as well as the affecting factors and enforcement effect. 
This knowledge about the reciprocal impacts between institutions and players has 
the following factors, weaknesses and gap. 
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Analytical framework  Existing enforcement studies are comprehensive. The 
scholars emphasise both the impact of institutions upon players and vice versa. 
They also pay sufficient attention to the dimension of the relation and interaction of 
the regulating and regulated sides. Notwithstanding that, there is potentially a 
connection and correlation between affecting factors, enforcement process and 
enforcement effect, this connection or correlation is not yet established. This implies 
that in spite of being a potential building block, relevant enforcement theories are yet 
to form a coherent analytical framework.  
 
Formal versus informal enforcement structures Two enforcement structures can 
be identified from the literature: formal and informal. Formal enforcement structure is 
represented by the governmental system. It contains three dimensions: the 
institutions, the organisation (enforcing agency) and the individual (inspector). 
Informal enforcement structure is represented by intra-firm, inter-firm and informal 
control mechanisms. Formal and informal structures affect the outcome of 
enforcement and compliance. In spite of existing elaboration of both structures, the 
linkage between the dimensions inside each structure as well as that between the 
two structures is weak. Whether an informal enforcement structure complements or 
distracts a formal one is unclear.  
 
The regulating side The enforcer is typified according to his behaviour. Yet the 
typification is so descriptive that its criterion is confusing and its range is unknown. 
The affecting factors to the enforcer’s behaviours are identified to belong to various 
sorts - contextual, institutional, organisational and individual. However, the 
connection is weak between different types. The enforcer’s response is mostly 
related to his enforcement strategy. There is limited scrutiny of the correlation 
between his response and interest. Also, it is arguable that enforcers’ response is 
homogeneous: most significantly and consistently to his task, and variously to the 
regulatee’s behaviour. Meanwhile, in spite of identifying the regulatee as one 
affecting factor, there is no exploration of what characteristics the enforcer prefers 
the regulatee to possess. Generally speaking, although the enforcer’s behaviour, 
type and affecting factors are addressed comprehensively, the analyses are not 
systemised.  
 
The regulated’s side  The scholars show interest in creating typologies of 
the regulatee’s behaviour in the enforcement context. Although these typologies are 
generally not in conflict, how they agree is unclear. Additionally, the scholars 
address the affecting factors of the regulatee’s behaviour from multiple 
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perspectives. Yet they do not systemise the regulatee’s reactions towards intra-firm, 
inter-firm and extra-firm enforcement. Nor do they explore how public and private 
enforcement structures interplay, or how various types of firms react variedly 
towards private and informal enforcement.  
 
Bilateral relation and interaction The enforcer-regulatee relational distance is 
solely relevant to the enforcement strategy. A process of bargaining and social 
construction between the enforcer and the firm is a prerequisite for institutionalising 
shared values so as to provide a familiar and predictable process. Nevertheless, the 
implication of this bilateral relation, other than to the enforcer’s style, is limitedly 
explored. It is questionable that a change of individual on either side always 
engenders a change in the bilateral relationship - for instance, in a highly 
institutionalised setting. The literatures addressing the bilateral interaction 
demonstrate rich institutional ingredients. These are typically enforcement 
arrangements, institutionalising shared values, and the players interacting vis-a-vis 
each other on behalf of their respective institutions. Yet the relevance of 
institutionalism is not articulated. It is vague as to which player determines the 
enforcer-regulatee bilateral relation and interaction.  
 
Enforcement effects      Most scholarly concern about enforcement effect is 
regarding the regulatee’s compliance. A few theories suggest a correlation between 
enforcement and business attraction. Some causal factors of enforcement effect 
have similar meanings as those mentioned for the RC outcome in the RC literature. 
These include certainty, flexibility (similar to efficiency), and responsiveness. The 
identified similarity is yet to bridge the gap between the two themes of regulatory 
enforcement and RC. 
 
To conclude, although existing theories about the enforcer’s and regulatee’s types, 
behaviours and interactions are comprehensive, their weaknesses need to be dealt 
with, gaps to be filled and analyses to be systemised. The two-sided perspective 
and players’ behavioural and interactive dimension complement what is missing in 
the RC literature. So do the emphases of the differences in enforcers and firms as 
well as the reciprocal impacts between institutions and players. These will contribute 
a building block not only to substantiating and structuring the forthcoming ER 
Framework but also to structuring the descriptive analysis in the empirical research. 
Notwithstanding the enforcement literature review’s contribution, like the RC 
literature, it lacks a coherent analytical framework to inter-relate all factors. 
Consequently, neither RC nor enforcement subject can contribute such a framework 
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to the ER Framework. To develop the framework, it needs to develop an analytical 
framework to address the dual themes of RC and enforcement.  
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Chapter III  Analysing Micro-Level Enforcement Regime of Regulatory 
Competition 
 
In this chapter, I introduce my theory of regulatory competition (RC). Focusing on 
micro-level enforcement dimension, I suggest that a better way of understanding RC 
is to think of regulating and regulated sides as finding a partner to form a marriage. 
It is necessary to take into consideration the varieties of regulatory authorities and of 
regulated business firms; their likely relations and interactions after winning 
business; as well as the match and mismatch of their preferences. In this way, we 
can better understand why, while rules stay the same, locations have such varying 
regulatory results. I argue that an important dimension to RC is the competition 
between different types of micro-level enforcement regimes for different types of 
firms. Assuming rules stay the same, depending match or mismatch of regimes’ and 
firms’ preferences, enforcement regimes have differential results of business 
attraction, enforcement effect and regulatory advantage. 
I present my theory through the so-called ER (enforcement regime3) Framework. 
The ER framework comprises four parts. The first part is about the regulating side, 
or the competing entity, represented by the regime and its agency. The framework 
suggests that regimes are different institutionally – displaying different combinations 
of vertical oversight and horizontal inter-agency cooperation. It is those institutional 
differences that determine the different interests and performances of regimes and 
their agencies in the context of RC. The second part draws attention to the 
regulated side, or the competed-for target, the firm. It illuminates that firms have 
various cognitions about the controls from formal and informal enforcement 
structures and behave accordingly. The third part introduces an original idea - 
‘match and mismatch of preferences’. It suggests to think of RC in terms of the 
regime and the firm finding a partner to form a marriage and then to be aware of the 
match and mismatch of their preferences. Winning business is never a one-time 
game but entails a long-term regulatory relationship. Both regime and firm have 
preferences and are selective for its partner and marriage. Match or mismatch of 
their preferences affects their long-term relation and interaction. The last part further 
analyses the match and mismatch of preferences by examining its three effects: 
                                                 
33 Hereinafter simplified as ‘the regime’. ‘The regime’ in this thesis refers to micro-level enforcement regime 
unless otherwise specified. 
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business attraction, enforcement effect and regulatory advantage. With match and 
mismatch of preferences, (1) regimes and firms either or not mutually choose each 
other. Hence regimes either succeed or fail in business attraction; (2) Formal and 
informal structures either complement each other or not. Hence regimes have 
different enforcement effects; (3) regimes achieve various regulatory advantages, 
exemplified as different economic and social achievements. These three effects are 
also the outcomes of RC.  
 
1. Regulating Side: Different Regimes and Agencies 
The regime is the RC entity. Borrowing from the definition of regulatory regime by 
Hood et al (2001), the regime is defined as ‘the complex of institutional geography, 
rules, practice, and animating ideas that are associated with’ particular regulation-
implementing activities in the RC context. The institutional geography of the regime 
is on a micro scale, with fragmented front-line enforcement agencies4 executing 
specific task and general purpose vis-à-vis the regulated firm. Its incentive structure, 
formal and informal rules of the game affect the RC measure, enforcement process 
and outcome. Its practice and animating idea concerns the rigour, strategy and 
characteristics of implementing rules. The definition implies that on the one hand, 
the regime, with its representative player - the agency, is influenced by institutions; 
on the other hand, the action and interaction of the regime with its agency and the 
firm have impact upon institutions which is embodied as RC outcome. 
Regulatory institutions can be understood in vertical and horizontal forms, which 
correspond to the grid and the group. The grid means the oversight by the 
governmental authority at superior levels of the hierarchy5. The superior authority 
delegates varied tasks for the regime to implement. This vertical top-down control 
can be both monitoring and mediating6. It both constrains agencies’ discretion and 
provides agencies resources to fulfill contesting regulatory goals (Levy and Spiller: 
1994). It is regarded as exogenous to the regime. The regime is accountable to the 
superior authority for its achievements related to the regulatory goals. The group 
                                                 
4
 Hereinafter simplified as ‘the agency’ 
5
 The oversight is not restricted to governmental oversight and can involve all sorts. Yet this framework 
simplifies the types of oversight by focusing on the mentioned type only.  
6
 Hereinafter simplified as ‘the oversight’ 
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means the cooperation between agencies. It is considered as endogenous to the 
regime. 
Agencies are classified into two groups according to their duties. One group inclines 
to be restrictive, the other facilitative (Baldwin and Cave: 1999). Those which 
enforce social regulations such as labour, environmental protection and product 
safety belong to the restrictive group. Those who promote business and economy, 
such as granting favourable conditions, licenses and permits, appertain to the 
facilitative group. The relations between the two groups of agencies are likely to be 
in opposition, considering their converse duties. However, their relations can also be 
cooperative, depending on the particular institutional context. It is noted that this 
way of classifying agencies is based on simplified assumptions. An agency can be 
delegated with both restrictive and facilitative tasks. The agencies which enforce 
social regulations are not necessarily restrictive, and those which grant permits and 
favourable conditions are not necessarily facilitative. Also the agencies in the same 
restrictive or facilitative group do not necessarily have less tension than those 
belonging to these two groups. To adopt these simplified assumptions is necessary 
to develop a narrowly focused analysis. 
Regimes have different institutional features. This is because their vertical oversight 
and horizontal inter-agency cooperation are different, so are vertical and horizontal 
combinations. With different vertical and horizontal combinations, we can find four 
archetypes of regimes: Positional, Isolate, Individual and Enclave. Each type has it 
distinctive feature. For a Positional (high-grid-high-group) 7  regime, both vertical 
oversight and horizontal inter-agency8 cooperation are strong. For an Isolate (high-
low) regime, the oversight is strong but the inter-agency cooperation is weak. This 
status is exactly opposite to that of an Enclave (low-high) regime. In an Individualist 
regime, both the oversight and the inter-agency cooperation are weak (low-low) (see 
Diagram III).  
 
                                                 
7
 Hereinafter simplified by omitting the words ‘grid’ and ‘group’ 
8
 The term ‘inter-agency’ narrowly refers to ‘between the two types of agencies’.  
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Institutionally different, regimes and their agencies are different in performances, 
interests and strategies in the context of RC. Different features in this regard are 
shown in Table 3.1.  
In a Positional (high-high) regime, both the restrictive and facilitative practices are 
well monitored, coordinated, information-sharing and hence are performed in a 
balanced manner. The overall enforcing image of the regime is as a facilitative and 
reasonable enforcer. It resembles the diagnostic inspectorate in Braithwaite et al’s 
term (1987), who encourages the regulatee’s self-regulation and provides technical 
assistance to solve regulatory problems. The interest of the regime in engaging with 
RC inclines to be high. The facilitative and restrictive agencies are mutually 
supportive in order to achieve the dual goals of business attraction and social 
enforcement. Both are confident in their competence and commitment and optimistic 
in being the winner.  Its major competitive strategy is unlikely to be instrumental, i.e. 
down-play restriction or up-play facilitation. Instead, a likely choice is to improve the 
efficiency of regulatory practice and process through innovation.  
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 Positional 
(high grid high 
group) 
Isolate 
(high grid low 
group) 
Enclave 
(low grid high 
group) 
Individualist 
(low grid low 
group) 
Distinctive 
Feature of 
Regime 
(Oversight & 
inter-agency 
cooperation)  
Strong oversight 
& strong inter-
agency 
cooperation 
Strong 
oversight but  
weak inter-
agency 
cooperation 
Weak oversight 
but  strong inter-
agency 
cooperation 
Weak oversight 
& weak inter-
agency 
cooperation 
Distinctive 
Feature of  
Agency 
(institutional 
constraint & 
inter-agency 
cooperation) 
Well-constrained; 
& cooperative 
Well-
constrained but 
uncooperative 
Ill-constrained & 
cooperative 
Ill-constrained & 
uncooperative 
Characteristics 
of Agencies’ 
overall 
Performance 
(Harrison 
[2006] and 
Lazar [2006]) 
Committed & 
balanced  
facilitation & 
restriction; 
coordinative & 
information-
sharing   
Over-
restrictive & 
under-
facilitative; 
uncoordinate
d & lack of 
information-
sharing 
Over-facilitative 
& under-
restrictive; 
coordinative, 
information-
sharing & 
sheltering 
Uncommitted  & 
ill facilitation & 
restriction; 
individualised, 
fragmented  ad 
hoc (Hawkins 
and Hutter 
[1993]) 
Overall Image 
of Regime in 
Braithwaite et 
al’s Taxonomy  
(1987) 
Diagnostic 
inspectorate 
Token enforcer Conciliator Modest enforcer 
Implications of RC 
Interest in RC High Low High Low 
Major 
Competitive 
Strategy 
Improve practice 
and process 
- Lax enforcement - 
Label Adherent Uncoordinated Conciliative Detached 
 
Table 3.1   Distinctive Features of Different Types of Regimes and Agencies 
 
In an Isolate (high-low) regime, with strong oversight and constraint on discretion, 
the two agencies are well-disciplined. However they are lacking of mutual 
coordination and information sharing. Concentrating on their own duties, their 
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practices follow separate tracks that orient towards converse regulatory goals. The 
regime tends to be under-facilitative and over-restrictive. The general enforcing 
image of the regime is roughly like a token enforcer (Braithwaite et al: 1987), who is 
neither adversarial nor close to the regulated. Considering under-facilitation and the 
lack of cooperation between the two agencies, the regime is unlikely to be interested 
in competing for business. Hence the overall interest in RC is low.  
In an Enclave (low-high) regime, with weak oversight, the two agencies are highly 
discretional and cooperate closely. The regime is over-facilitative and under-
restrictive. The agencies are likely to share the belief that business attraction 
creates benefits, either for self-serving and/or for the interest of local community 
(Morriss: 2010). Towards this end, they trade off their duties. They coordinate and 
share information efficiently to perform the role of a conciliator (Braithwaite et al: 
1987). Based on the agencies’ incentives, the regime has a high motivation to 
compete for attracting business. Its major competitive strategy is instrumental – 
through lax enforcement. The regime is ready to be a ‘haven’ to shelter interested 
firms.  
In an Individualist (low-low) regime, with weak oversight and poor inter-agency 
cooperation, both restrictive and facilitative agencies have excessive discretion and 
ill perform their duties. They act like market-players, competing with each other to 
maximise self-serving interests. Typically, both agencies compete for resources 
such as revenue. The facilitative agency may try to get a reward for its achievement 
of business promotion. Thus it is likely to overstate favourable conditions in order to 
lure potential investors. The restrictive agency may make extra gains from 
administration fees and penalty charges upon the firm. Thus it tends to fine the firm 
arbitrarily. The overall image of the regime is a modest enforcer (Braithwaite et al: 
1987), who is punitive and deterring and is the nearest to Bardach and Kagan’s 
‘unreasonable regulation’ (1982 and 2006). The two agencies’ practices are 
individualised, disorganised, fragmented, ad hoc and random (Hawkins and Hutter: 
1993). It is unlikely for them to be committed to RC. Well-informed firms are scared 
away by the agencies’ instrumental and poor performance.   
In order to highlight the fundamental features of the varied types of regimes, the 
regimes are relabelled. In line with the overall enforcing images of the regimes, the 
high-high regime is dubbed the Adherent, the high-low the Uncoordinated, the low-
high the Conciliative, and the low-low the Detached. 
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To summarise, with different combinations of vertical oversight and horizontal inter-
agency cooperation, regimes are different institutionally. They and their agencies 
perform differently, have different interests in RC and use different competitive 
strategies. Competing for business is rarely the only regulatory goal for a regime. 
There is always a tension between attracting business and enforcing social 
regulation. External RC is not necessarily a drive for all regimes alike to attract 
business. Instead, agencies’ interests, strategies and performances matter. Whether 
RC rules are enforced and goals are achieved as desired by macro-level rule 
makers rely on micro-level regimes’ actual practices. An awareness of different 
types and practices of micro-level regimes helps to advance our understanding that 
RC at macro level through rule setting is fundamentally affected by micro-level 
enforcement of these rules.  
 
2. Regulated Side: Different Firms 
The firm is the target of RC. It is subject to formal and informal controls, controls 
from the government and the market9. Formal control is typically social enforcement 
of the regime. It is the grid. Informal control is typically social enforcement of the 
firm’s business partner. It is the group. Firms are different in their cognitions and 
behaviours towards formal and informal enforcement. They can be classified into 
four archetypes accordingly (see Table 3.2).  
Generally speaking, a Positional (high-high) firm is well aware of its market as well 
as regulated positions. It is active in complying with regulatory standards and 
sensitive to facilitation by the government. Meanwhile it complies with non-
governmental norms and codes. An Isolate (high-low) firm is aware of its regulated 
position. It complies with governmental regulatory standards because it has to. Yet it 
does not expect governmental facilitation, nor does it like non-governmental 
controls. An Enclave (low-high) firm wants minimum governmental regulations but 
maximum governmental facilitation. It complies with industrial norms only when they 
are necessary to do business. An Individualist (low-low) firm prefers no controls at 
all.   
 
                                                 
9
 Both formal and informal controls can be enforced by other entities. However this framework simplifies this by 
concentrating on that exercised by the regime and the firm’s business partner. The firm’s business partner is likely 
to enforce industrial norms also, yet this framework pays major attention to social norms.  
 72 
 Positional 
(high grid high 
group) 
Isolate 
(high grid low 
group) 
Enclave 
(low grid high 
group) 
Individualist 
(low grid low 
group) 
Typical 
Preference for 
Control 
Formal High standard & 
high gov’l 
facilitation 
High standard Min. gov’l control 
& high gov’l 
facilitation 
Min. gov. control  
Informal  Compliance with 
industrial & social 
norms 
Min. non-gov. 
control 
Compliance with 
industrial norms 
as required by 
trading partner  
Min. non-gov. 
control  
Features in an Enforcement Context 
Behavioural Feature Proactive & 
Mindful of self-
image 
Reactive Profit-Driven, 
strategic and 
rational 
Avoiding 
Type in 
Category 
of 
Vickers et al  
(2005) 
Proactive learner Positive 
respondent 
Minimalist Avoider/ outsider 
Baldwin and 
Cave (1999) 
Well-intentioned 
& well-informed  
Well-intentioned 
& ill-informed 
Ill-intentioned & 
well-informed 
Ill-intentioned 
and ill-informed  
Kagan and 
Scholz (1984) 
Political citizen Organisational 
incompetent 
Amoral 
calculator 
Organisational 
incompetent  
Features in an RC Context 
Position towards 
Regime’s RC  
Active Inactive Active Inactive 
Lobbying Goal High & converged 
home, regional & 
intn’l standards to 
maintain 
industrial 
advantage 
Technical 
barriers for  
foreign 
competitors  
Min. regulatory 
burden & social 
responsibility, 
max pro-business 
support 
Firm’s 
sovereignty & 
anti-globalisation 
Impact upon Regulatory 
Standard in Murphy’s 
term (2005) 
High & converged 
product & 
process 
standards 
Diverse and 
complicated 
domestic 
standards 
High product 
standard & low 
process standard 
No standard 
Stereotyped Example A big firm from a 
HRC 
A domestic 
SME in a HRC 
An SME in LRC A small holding 
selling home-
made produce 
Attempt to Expand 
Business 
High Low High Very Low 
 
Table 3.2   Distinctive Features of Different Types of Firms 
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Specifically, in the context of enforcement, a Positional firm tends to view complying 
with regulation as obligatory. It is proactive in understanding and abiding 
regulations. Accordingly, It is well-intentioned and well-informed, a proactive learner 
or a political citizen (Baldwin and Cave: 1999; Vickers et al: 2005; and Kagan and 
Scholz: 1984). In an RC context, it poses as an active driving force for the 
government to engage RC, believing that high regulatory standards are conducive 
to create and maintain its industrial advantage and positive social image. Under its 
influence, both product and process standards are likely to increase (Porter: 1990; 
and Murphy: 2005). A typical example is a big firm in a high-regulating country 
(HRC) (Vogel: 1997). The firm is highly likely to expand its business. 
An Isolate firm is likely to be reactive in an enforcement context. It tends to be well-
intentioned and ill-informed (Baldwin and Cave: 1999). Its regulatory problem is 
likely to be related to organisational incompetence (Kagan and Scholz: 1984). Its 
compliance with regulation relies on specific enforcement. It is likely to improve 
compliance if the agency’s strategy is carefully chosen and to ill comply if 
governmental and non-governmental enforcement is lenient. Hence it can be 
roughly classified as a positive respondent (Vickers et al: 2005). In an RC context, it 
is inactive but may accept high regulatory standards. This is because of active 
enforcement or because of its belief that high standards offer protection from the 
threat of market access by foreign competitors. If this type of firm is influential, 
domestic standards will be diverse and complicated and deter the entry of foreign 
competitors (Murphy: 2005). A typical example can be a small and medium sized 
enterprise (SME) in a HRC. This type of firm does not tend to grow its business. 
An Enclave firm is rational, strategic and profit-driven. In an enforcement context, it 
is ill-intentioned and well-informed (Baldwin and Cave: 1999). It is a minimalist 
(Vickers et al: 2005) or an amoral calculator (Kagan and Scholz: 1984). It actively 
supports the government’s engagement to RC. It lobbies the government to 
minimise regulatory burden and maximise business facilitation. Under its influence, 
product standards may upgrade but process standards will downgrade (Murphy: 
2005). This is because its business partner actively enforces high product standards 
and thus it demands competitors’ to also comply so as to avoid their undercut of its 
competitive edge. Conversely, process standards incur extra cost and hence affect 
its competitiveness. A typical example is an SME in a LRC. Its probability of 
increasing investment is high. 
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An individualist firm is an outsider to both enforcement and RC (Vickers et al: 2005). 
It is ill-intentioned and ill-informed (Baldwin and Cave: 1999). It is likely to be 
organisationally incompetent (Kagan and Scholz: 1984). It affirms its sovereignty as 
an independent decision-maker and is anti-globalisation. Reflecting its own 
interests, there should be little regulation. A typical example is a small-holding 
selling its home-made produce in a local village market on a Saturday morning. 
Such a firm is unlikely to be capable of developing business.  
In order to highlight the features of these varied types of firms, the firms are 
renamed to highlight their distinctive features. The high-high firm is labelled as the 
Proactive, the high-low the Reactive, the low-high the Profit-Driven, and the low-low 
the Avoider. 
To summarise, the firm faces social controls from the government and the market, 
or formal and informal enforcement structures. They have different cognitions and 
behave differently towards formal and informal rules. To understand the different 
types of firms is helpful to understand their different behaviours and choices in the 
contexts of RC. 
 
3. Two Sides: Match and Marriage 
RC for business involves two sides. The regime competes and the firm is competed 
for. I suggest that a better way to understand RC is to think of it like two sides 
finding a partner to form a marriage. Winning business is never a one-time deal but 
entails a long-term regulatory relation and interaction between the two sides. It is 
based on their thoughtful decisions and involves their mutual selection and match of 
their preferences. Then how do the two sides’ preferences match or mismatch 
specifically? What does a marriage within a specific regime look like? What is the 
impact of a marriage with match and mismatch of their preferences? This section 3 
will answer the first two questions and leaves the following section 4 to address the 
last question. 
 
3.1 Match and Mismatch of Preferences 
Both the regime and the firm are aware of the length of a marriage and thus mindful 
about choosing a suitable partner for marriage. To form a marriage involves choice 
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and decisions from both sides. The two sides’ choice and decisions depend on their 
individual preferences as well as match and mismatch of their preferences.  
On the one hand, the regime has preference and is selective for the firm. The 
regime is selective because of its institutionally endowed resource and restraint 
(Levy and Spiller: 1999). Its resource and restraint are peculiar. It can only satisfy 
the demand and enforce the compliance of a particular type of firm, but cannot 
satisfy demands or enforce compliance of all types of firms. With peculiar resources 
and restraint, the regime has preference for a particular type of firm. It accepts the 
behaviour of a certain type of firm while being intolerant to those of others. Being 
selective, it targets on and admits the type of firm whose demand it is likely to satisfy 
and whose compliance it is likely to be able to easily enforce. It declines the entry of 
the type of firm whose demand it cannot satisfy or whose compliance it is difficult or 
unable to enforce. Different regimes have different preferences. Some are selective 
and less tolerant. Others are less selective and more tolerant. 
On the other hand, the firm has preference and is selective for the regime. The firm 
has it own understanding about formal and informal enforcement. It is mindful of the 
regime’s enforcement style and has preference in this regard. Facing various types 
of regimes with various enforcement styles, the firm chooses its partner and 
marriage based on its preference. It chooses the regime whose practice best suits 
its demand and avoids the one whose style it dislikes.  
Since both the regime and the firm have preferences, it is an issue as to whether 
their preferences match or mismatch.  Match is two sided, relying on the individual 
preferences of the two sides. It is a match when the regime and the firm are the 
preferred and desirable type, each of the other, so that they mutually attract and 
choose each other and would like to get married. Mismatch is one sided. It is a 
mismatch when the regime likes the firm but the firm dislikes the regime or vice 
versa.   
As illuminated before, regimes and firms are different in types. So are their 
preferences for the other side. The following sections illuminate specific preferences 
of regimes and firms as well as specific match and mismatch of preferences.  
 
3.1.1 Regimes’ Preferences of Firms 
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Regimes’ likely preferences of firms can be figured out from their respective 
expectations about its enforcement versus the firm’s compliance and to its business 
attraction versus the firm’s demand satisfaction (as shown in Table 3.3).  
 
 Adherent 
(high grid high 
group) 
Uncoordinated 
(high grid low 
group) 
Conciliative 
(low grid high 
group) 
Detached 
(low grid low 
group) 
Preferred Reaction 
from Firm in RC 
terms 
Preferences 
satisfied  
reasonably & 
fairly 
- Preferences 
satisfied 
extraordinarily 
Tolerance to 
high regulatory 
cost  
Expected Reaction 
from Firm in 
Enforcement Terms 
(May: 2005) 
Civic duty or 
give-and-take 
reciprocity 
- Give-and-take 
reciprocity 
Deterrent fear  
Favourite Corporate 
Compliance 
Strategy 
Enforced self-
regulation (Ayres 
and Braithwaite 
[1992]) 
- Creative 
compliance 
(McBarnet and 
Whelan [1991])  
Obedience 
Favourite  
Corporate Type  
Big & with HRC 
origins 
- SME with LRC 
origins 
- 
Likely Preferred 
Type of Firm 
Proactive All types Profit-driven, 
Reactive & 
Avoider 
Reactive & 
Avoider 
 
Table 3.3 Regimes’ Likely Preferences of Firms 
 
The Adherent regime wants its balanced restriction and facilitation to be appreciated 
by the firm. This is based on the regime’s emphasis on the shared values of the 
agency and the firm. Hence, it prefers the type of firm which views the regime’s 
performance as satisfying the firm’s demands and enforcing governmental rules 
reasonably. Also the regime expects the firm to react to enforcement with a sense of 
civic duty, or at least with a give-and-take reciprocity (May: 2005). Its favourite 
corporate compliance strategy is enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite: 
1992). The favourite corporate feature is where the firm is large and originates from 
HRC. Thus the likely preferred type is the Proactive firm. Its preference implies an 
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emphasis on the quality of investment10. Its desired type of firm must also enhance 
rather than impair its reputation of good commitment to social regulation. It is the 
most selective regime. 
The Uncoordinated regime does not have a particular preference for the type of firm. 
This is inferred from its lack of interest in business attraction and its uniform 
command and control strategy towards firms of all sorts. It is the least selective 
regime.  
The Conciliative regime prefers the firm that appreciates its extraordinary 
performance in satisfying the firm’s preferences. It wishes the firm to have a sense 
of give-and-take reciprocity. Hence the agency can benefit from this exchange. It 
prefers the firm that has extraordinary pro-business demand and is strategic or even 
creative in compliance (McBarnet and Whelan: 1991). This type of firm shares the 
regime’s strategic feature. The SME with LRC origins is a favourite of the regime, 
because this type of firm is keen on lax enforcement. Notwithstanding its 
preference, the regime welcomes any type of firm that is strategic and welcomes lax 
regulation. Therefore the Proactive firm is off the list.  
The Detached regime prefers the type of firm that tolerates high regulatory cost and 
seldom challenges the agency’s decisions. It expects the firm to have deterrent fear 
and be obedient to the agency’s arbitrary and punitive actions. The likely chosen 
firms are those the agency can bully: The Reactive and the Avoider.  
To summarise, regimes are different in preferences and targets for firms. 
Comparatively, the Adherent regime is the most selective, the Uncoordinated the 
least, the Conciliative the most tolerant and the Detached the most manipulating. To 
understand different regimes’ preferences helps to understand why locations are 
different in attracting businesses as well as in the types of attracted business. 
 
3.1.2 Firm’s Preference of Regime 
Firms’ likely preferences of regimes can be figured out based on their respective 
expectations about the regime’s support, reputation, value, enforcement style and 
strategy (see Table 3.4). 
                                                 
10
 For more details, see relevant section in Chapter II. 
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 Proactive 
(high grid high 
group) 
Reactive 
(high grid low 
group) 
Profit-Driven 
(low grid high 
group) 
Avoider 
(low grid low 
group) 
Preferred Support 
from Regime  
Efficient and 
well coordinated 
No adversary Business first No request 
Preferred Regime’s 
Reputation 
Competitive & 
well-reputed 
Low Competitive &  
low-profiled 
No request 
Expectation of 
Appropriateness  
High Low Very low No request 
Expectation of 
Instrumentality  
Low Low Very high No request 
Preferred 
Enforcement Style 
Rule-bounded, 
standardised, 
reasonable & 
stable 
Easily-followed 
& coherent 
interpretation & 
implementation 
Lax & negotiable Minimum 
Favourite 
Enforcement 
Strategy 
Responsive 
regulation 
(Ayres and 
Braithwaite 
[1992]) 
Education & 
persuasion 
Deceptive (Post 
[2004])  or lax 
enforcement 
Laxest 
Likely Chosen 
Type of Regime 
Adherent Adherent & 
Conciliative 
Conciliative Concliliative 
 
Table 3.4   Firms’ Likely Preferences of Regimes 
 
The Proactive firm has the strictest criteria for a regime. It prefers a regime to 
provide fair and well-coordinated support and to be competitive. The regime should 
have a good reputation and manifest a social rather than strategic sense. It provides 
a rule-bounded, standardised, reasonable and stable enforcement performance. Its 
favourite enforcement strategy is responsive regulation. Accordingly the Adherent 
regime is the likely and sole preference. 
The Reactive firm has low expectations of any governmental support, reputation and 
value. Yet it prefers a regime in which the agency’s interpretation and 
implementation of the rules is easily followed and coherent, and its enforcing 
strategies are educational and persuasive rather than coercive and punitive. Hence 
the Adherent and Conciliative regimes are likely to be its preferences. 
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The Profit-Driven firm prefers a regime that puts the business first. It wishes the 
regime to be competitive but of low-profile, which is typically strategic. It desires 
enforcement to be lax, negotiable and even deceptive. Its ideal choice is certainly 
the Conciliative regime. 
The Avoider firm prefers a sympathetic regime. It has no demand for the regime’s 
reputation and value, but has a high need for lax enforcement. In a world with 
omnipresent regulation, the Conciliative regime is the nearest type that the Avoider 
can find to provide shelter to maintain its freedom.  
To conclude, firms are selective but in different ways. An attention to firms’ different 
preferences for the regime is helpful to understand why particular firms choose 
particular locations to conduct business. 
 
 
3.1.3 Match and Mismatch of Preferences 
As illustrated before, regimes and firms and firms have different preferences and 
choices.  Exactly which types of regime and firm match can be figured out and 
illustrated in Table 3.5. 
Firm Regime 
Adherent Uncoordinated Conciliative Detached 
Proactive F & R R - - 
Reactive F R F & R R 
Profit-Driven - R F & R - 
Avoider - R F & R R 
 
Table 3.5   Matches of Preferences by Regimes and Firms 
Note:  F = Firm’s preference;   R = regime’s preference;   ‘-‘ = no preference by either.   The highlighted 
parts mean a match of preference. 
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Four pairs of regimes and firms have mutual preferences, which mean their 
preferences match. The preferences of the Adherent regime and the Proactive firm 
match. So do those of the Conciliative regime and the Profit-Driven, Reactive and 
Avoider firms. Though the Uncoordinated and Detached regimes are open to all, 
they are not preferred by any type of firm. The four matches mean that these 
particular types of regimes are likely to be popular and attractive to those particular 
types of firms. The rest are mismatches, i.e. either these types of regimes are not 
attractive to business or those types of firms are not attractive to regimes. With 
match of preferences of the two sides, the Adherent regime and the Conciliative 
regime are likely to achieve the regulatory goal of business attraction. With 
mismatch of preferences of the two sides, the Uncoordinated and Detached regimes 
are unlikely to achieve the goal of winning business. 
It is noteworthy that existing RC scholars appear to pay attention to the regulated 
side’s   preference only. They emphasise the regulating side’s competition in order 
to satisfy various demands and preferences of the regulated, such as Tiebout 
(1956), Romano (1985) and Vogel (1997). But they generally overlook the regulating 
side’s preference as well as match and mismatch of the two sides. An explanation is 
that RC scholars assume that only the regulated side is selective, while the 
regulating side is not. The above elucidation shows that conventional assumption is 
inadequate and inaccurate.  
Match or mismatch of the two sides’ preferences determines whether there would 
be a marriage and if any, whether their marriage is appealing or pleasant. It is 
noteworthy that empirically, match of preferences does not always entail a marriage, 
nor does mismatch mean no marriage. The explanations are firstly, match or 
mismatch of preferences is institutional, while empirically either side’s choice is 
likely to be cognitive. Hence either the regime or the firm’s choice can be irrational 
(Simon: 1957). Secondly when choosing locations, firms usually take many factors 
into consideration together, regulatory and non-regulatory; rules, favourable 
conditions and enforcement practice. Some may put more weight on non-regulatory 
rather than regulatory factors, or on regulatory factors other than enforcement 
practice, and hence choose places which seem to mismatch their preferences. 
Thirdly, either side may have insufficient or inaccurate information about the other 
so that it makes a wrong choice of partner. Finally, when there is regulatory change, 
either side is likely to be affected and may change its behaviour responsively. Their 
preferences no longer match mutually and hence their selections are not 
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synchronised. Match and mismatch of preferences will affect the marriage between 
the regime and the firm, which will be elucidated in the following section.   
 
3.2 Marriage: Different Bilateral Relations and Interactions 
To win business means to begin a marriage - the regime and the firm forms a long-
term regulatory relation and interaction with each other regularly.  Different regimes 
are different in their regulatory relations and interactions with regulated firms. 
Equality, accountability, fairness, listening with empathy, consistency and 
predictability could form a marriage made in heaven. But in the real world marriages 
are various and not all pleasant.  
Talking about the agency-firm relation first. The agency-firm relation involves 
relational distance, bargain and social construction 11 . Regimes have different 
features in these regards. The Adherent and the Conciliative regimes are featured 
by cooperative agencies. Accordingly, the agency-firm relational distance is 
generally close; their bargaining power is symmetric; and their agencies are active 
in social construction. By the same token, in the Uncoordinated and the Detached 
regimes, the agency-firm relational distance is far; their bargaining power is 
asymmetric; and their agencies are inactive towards social construction.  
Now coming to the agency-firm interaction. The agency-firm interaction involves 
interactive logic, regularity of working arrangements, institutionalisation of shared 
values, power structure and enforcement strategies. Regimes have different 
features in these aspects, as illustrated in Diagram IV and Table 3.6. 
The Adherent regime commits itself to the social interest at large, rather than to that 
of itself, which is usually embodied in the regulatory goals being set officially. This is 
inferred from the regime’s features toward strong oversight and inter-agency 
cooperation. Strong oversight is necessary to maintain the equilibrium of enforcing 
social and economic regulations. It restrains the agency-firm interaction from being 
either too facilitative or too restrictive. Hence it is a warrant for social desirability. 
With inter-agency cooperation, the agencies tend to regularise the enforcement 
arrangement. The arrangement may take the form of societal or social contract 
(May: 2005). Correspondingly the degree of institutionalising the values shared 
between the agency and the firm is high, as are their mutual trust and accountability 
                                                 
11
 For details, see the relevant section of Chapter II. 
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(Black: 1998a). Meanwhile, the agency differentiates between firms in line with their 
compliance. It deploys responsive strategies to enforce the rules (Ayres and 
Braithwaite: 1992). The agency listens to the firm’s ideas and feedback and if 
necessary, corrects and improves practice. The firm is likely to be loyal to the 
regime (Hirschman: 1970). Based on the above analysis, it can be inferred that the 
Adherent regime expects desirable social effect and shows strong business 
facilitation. 
 
The Uncoordinated regime is not interested in social construction in the agency-firm 
interaction, inferred from its features of strong oversight but weak inter-agency 
cooperation. Albeit that strong oversight entails desirable social effect, weak inter-
agency cooperation costs business attraction. The agency’s regularised 
arrangement tends to be characterised as broad-brush and irresponsive. The 
degree of institutionalisation of the agency-firm shared values is likely to be low as is 
their mutual trust and accountability (Black: 1998a). The agency does not 
differentiate firms according to their compliance status. It deploys command and 
control strategy uniformly (Ayres and Braithwaite: 1992). The agency generally 
ignores the firm’s comment and complaint. The firm is likely to exit the regime 
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(Hirschman: 1970). Generally the Uncoordinated regime engenders desirable social 
effect at the expense of business facilitation. 
 Adherent 
(high grid high 
group) 
Uncoordinated 
(high grid low 
group) 
Conciliative 
(low grid high 
group) 
Detached 
(low grid low 
group) 
Relational Distance Close Far Close Far 
Distribution of Power  Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric 
Active Degree 
towards Social 
Construction  
Active Low Active Low 
Logic of Interaction in 
historical institutional 
terms 
Social 
appropriateness  
Social 
appropriateness 
Instrumentality Instrumentality 
Type of Regularised 
Arrangement in 
May’s Term (2005) 
Societal/ Social 
contract 
(Broadbrush & 
irresponsive) 
Societal/ 
Social contract 
Legalism 
(unreasonable 
[Bardach and 
Kagan {1982}]) 
Trust and 
Accountability (Black: 
1998a) 
High Low High Low 
Degree of 
institutionalisation 
of Shared Values 
Very high/ High  Low Very high/ 
High 
Very Low 
Differentiation 
towards Firms 
Yes No No Yes 
Adapted Major 
Enforcement 
Strategy in Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s Terms 
Responsive 
regulation 
Command and 
Control 
Bi-partisanship Random ‘Big 
Gun’ 
Firm’s Voice 
(Hirschman:1970) 
Heard and 
feedback 
Ignored Decisive Not listened 
Firm’s Choice 
between Exit & 
Loyalty 
(Hirschman:1969) 
Loyalty Exit Loyalty Exit 
Social Effect Desirable Desirable Undesirable Undesirable 
Business-Attracting 
Effect 
Strong Weak Very strong Very weak 
 
Table 3.6   Agency-Firm Relations and Interactions 
Note:  The content in the bracket means that it is extra to the given source. 
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The Conciliative agency follows the logic of instrumentality in the agency-firm 
interaction. This means that the regime is committed more to its own self-interest 
than to any regulatory goal set by its superior authority. This is inferred from the 
regime’s features of weak oversight and strong inter-agency cooperation. 
Regardless of contradictory duties, agencies are facilitative and flexible. The 
agency-firm interaction is likely to be dysfunctional in enforcing social regulation. 
The restrictive agency may adopt a form of societal or social contract to regularise 
working arrangements (May: 2005). It does not differentiate firms in terms of their 
compliance. ‘Bipartisan’ is the description of the agency’s enforcement strategy 
(Ayres and Braithwaite: 1992). The institutionalisation of the agency-firm shared 
value is at a high degree as are their mutual trust and accountability (Black: 1998a). 
The roles of the two players are not the regulator and the regulated, with the firm 
being allowed full access to decision-making. The agency’s practice is tailored to the 
firm’s idea. The firm is likely to be loyal to the regime (Hirschman: 1970). While 
social effect of the regime is undesirable, business facilitation is very strong. 
The Detached agency follows the logic of instrumentality in its interaction with the 
firm. It inherits the regime’s institutional features of weak oversight and weak inter-
agency cooperation. There is no regular working arrangement and the agency’s 
style is unreasonable and punitive (Bardach and Kagan: 1982; and May: 2005). The 
degree of institutionalisation of the agency-firm shared values is very low as is their 
mutual trust and accountability (Black: 1998a). The agency differentiates between 
firms not according to their compliance but to their bargaining powers. It bullies the 
weak SMEs but minds the strong and big firms, because the latter can challenge its 
decisions and will complain to the superior authority (May: 2005). It deploys a ‘Big 
gun’ randomly in order to make profit. The agency never listens to the firm’s opinion. 
Hence it may encounter the firm’s backfire. The firm tends to exit the regime 
(Hirschman: 1970). Bearing in mind that the agency’s enforcement style is not 
based on the regulatee’s compliance, this regime is likely to have undesirable social 
effect and very weak business attraction.  
The regime’s and firm’s relation and interaction offer a window as to how their 
marriage may look. On the one hand, some regimes are more business-friendly 
than others and not all regimes are suitable for conducting business. On the other 
hand, some firms are better behaved than others and not all firms comply with rules 
voluntarily. Different regimes prefer different types of firm to others, so do firms. 
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Underpinned by match or mismatch of their preferences, the bilateral relation and 
interaction entail RC outcomes. 
 
3.3 Summary 
I suggest that RC is better understood in terms of the regime and the firm finding a 
partner to form a marriage, bearing in mind that winning business entails long-term 
regulatory relation and interaction for both regulating and regulated sides. It involves 
the two sides’ mindful decisions and preferences as well as the match of their 
preferences. The regime’s preference relies on the regime’s resources and 
restraints. The firm’s preference is related to its demands. Different regimes and 
firms have different preferences, which either match or mismatch. Since different 
regimes have distinctive enforcement styles, the marriage of each type of regime 
has its particular features in relation and interaction with the firm. To understand RC 
in terms of match of preferences helps us to understand why no location is able to 
win business of all sorts or to enforce compliance of firms of all sorts; why an area is 
particularly popular to business; and why firms avoid some locations to conduct 
business. The impact of match and mismatch of preferences will be elucidated in 
the following section. 
 
4. Effects of Match and Mismatch 
This section further clarifies the implications of match and mismatch of preferences 
by elucidating corresponding regulatory effects, or RC outcomes. Forming a lasting 
regulatory relation and interaction with each other, the regime generates regulatory 
effects such as business attraction, social enforcement and regulatory advantage. 
Business attraction is an economic effect. It is only achieved when the preferences 
of the regime and the firm match. Enforcement effect is social. It relies on the joint 
functioning of formal and informal enforcement structures. Regulatory advantage is 
mostly economic, although its refined terms, i.e. comparative and competitive 
advantages, involve social concerns and are related to business attraction and 
social enforcement. All three effects intertwine with each other and all are 
considered as integral outcomes of RC. 
RC outcomes depend on both regulating and regulated sides. Match or mismatch of 
preferences of the two sides is considered as underpinning the RC outcomes of any 
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specific regime. It takes two sides rather than the regime on its own to achieve 
economic and social goals. In spite of being the major player of RC, the regime is 
unlikely to succeed in business attraction or social enforcement without the 
participation of the firm. Indeed, the regime’s practice is always affected by that of 
the regulated firm.  With no firm’s recognition and appreciation, the regime cannot 
be popular or attractive to business and certainly cannot gain regulatory advantage. 
Without the firm’s self-enforcement or social enforcement by the firm’s business 
partner, at best it is costly for the regime to enforce corporate compliance and at 
worst the regime fails social enforcement. Taking into consideration the firm’s 
participation requires a wider perspective and is necessary for a balanced and 
accurate understanding of RC. It is distinctive from conventional RC theories, which 
consider the RC outcomes as generally related to the institutions and used 
instruments on the regulating side.  
 
4.1 Business Attraction 
The first effect of match or mismatch of preferences, also an RC outcome, is 
business attraction. Business attraction is likely to happen if the regime’s and the 
firm’s preferences match so that each side chooses the other to form a pleasant 
marriage. A location with match of preferences of the two sides is likely to be a 
winner of RC for business and achieve economical goals. The Adherent and 
Conciliative regimes are such examples. It is noteworthy that both regimes are 
business-friendly. Business attraction is unlikely to happen if the two sides’ 
preferences mismatch. Since one’s style is not suitable for the other, either does not 
choose the other as partner. Even if both choose each other to form a marriage by 
chance, the marriage with mismatch of preferences is not pleasant to one side at 
least. Either the regime faces a misbehaving firm, e.g. an Adherent regime with a 
profit-driven SME from LRC, or the firm is subject to an unfriendly or even adverse 
regime, typically a well-intentioned and well-informal big company in an 
Uncoordinated or a Detached regime. Bilateral relation and interaction involve 
tension and dispute (for details, see Table 3.6).   A marriage with mismatch is costly 
to both sides and is economically and/or socially undesirable. 
As clarified in the previous section about match of preferences, regimes and firms 
are concerned about mutual choice, preference and attraction. Different types of 
regimes and firms are different in attraction. Some types of regimes are not 
attracting, typically the Uncoordinated and the Detached, but some are, such as the 
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Conciliative and the Adherent. While most types of firms are attracted by very pro-
business regimes, empirically for instance the Conciliative Delaware (Cary: 1974; 
and Romano: 1986), some firms are attractive to those with high standard, like the 
Adherent California (Vogel: 1997). It is precise if we say: To the firm, Conciliative 
and Adherent regimes are more attractive than the Uncoordinated and Detached. 
To the Adherent regime, the Proactive firm is the most attractive. To the Conciliative 
regime, the Profit-driven firm has the highest attraction. Comparatively, the 
Conciliative is the most attractive of all types of regime.  
Depending on match or mismatch of preferences, business attraction is also 
institutional rather than instrumental. A regime may succeed by taking competitive 
measures to attract business. However it must be competitive institutionally by 
matching the firm’s particular preference to succeed. A lasting success in business 
attraction relies on the match of preferences of the regime and the firm. 
Institutionally mismatching the firm’s preference, a regime is unlikely to maintain 
success based only on account of its competitive measures. 
 
4.2 Enforcement Effect 
The regime’s preference implies its acceptance and tolerance of the firm’s social 
behaviour. Bearing in mind regimes are of different types, different regimes agree 
and accept different types of firms’ social behaviours. A marriage between the 
regime and the firm entails joint functioning of formal and informal structures that 
generate regimes’ overall enforcement effect. Formal structure is typically shaped 
by the agency’s restrictive practice. Informal structure takes effect through the firm’s 
self-enforcement and compliance of social norms enforced by its business partner. 
However, formal and informal structures do not always function in harmony. 
Regimes’ enforcement effects are different. Depending on the specific type of 
regime, the firm’s social compliance enforced by its business partner is encouraged, 
ignored, discouraged or distracted by the agency’s practice (see Table 3.7).  
 88 
 
 Adherent Uncoordinated Conciliative Detached 
Formal 
Enforcement  
Responsive Irresponsive Negligent Dysfunctional 
Informal 
Enforcement 
Encouraged Ignored Discouraged Distracted 
Overall 
Enforcement Effect 
Efficient Burdensome Lax Deterrent 
 
Table 3.7 Regimes’ Enforcement Effects 
 
The Adherent regime’s restrictive performance is responsive, fair and balanced 
against business facilitation. The firm’s social compliance is appreciated and 
encouraged. The enforcing practices by the regime and the firm’ business partner 
complement mutually. The regime’s overall enforcement effect is efficient. In the 
Uncoordinated regime, the restrictive agency’s performance is irresponsive and 
broadbrush-styled. The firm’s social compliance enforced by business partner is 
ignored by the agency. The enforcing practices by the regime and the firm’ business 
partner are in parallel rather than complementary. The regime’s overall enforcement 
effect is burdensome. The Conciliative Regime trades off its restrictive duty for 
achieving the business attracting goal. Hence restriction is negligent. Also the firm 
complies with social norms and codes only if they are necessary for doing business.  
The enforcement by the regime discourages the firm’s social compliance. The 
regime’s overall enforcement effect is lax. The Detached regime does not perform 
enforcement appropriately. The firm’s good compliance is not recognised justly by 
the agency. The regime’s dysfunctional practice distracts the enforcement of the 
firm’s business partner. This regime’s overall enforcement effect is deterrent. 
Generally, enforcement effect is most desirable when formal and informal structures 
are functioning complementarily and is most undesirable when formal structure 
distracts informal one.  
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4.3 Regulatory Advantage 
Regulatory advantage is mostly related to facilitative practice and concerned with 
fulfilling the economic goal of business attraction. A location with regulatory 
advantage is competitive for business, while one without is not. The concept of 
regulatory advantage has two refined derivatives - comparative advantage and 
competitive advantage. A location with comparative advantage is likely to fail social 
goal and have social effect undesirable to rule makers. In contrast, an area with 
competitive advantage achieves both economic and social goals and shows 
economic and social effects desired by rule makers. Regulatory advantage implies a 
comparison between different types of regimes in the context of RC for business. 
 
4.3.1 Regulatory Advantage 
The concept ‘regulatory advantage’ is defined by referring to Romano (1985), Porter 
(1990) and Baldwin and Cave (1999). It means an institutional superiority of the 
enforcement regime in attracting business. It is noted that favourable conditions are 
competitive instruments that are imposed by the regime. Like the rule to the regime, 
favourable conditions per se are not the resource of regulatory advantage, rather 
their deployment is. The deployment of favourable conditions is bounded by the 
institutions of the regime.  
After defining ‘regulatory advantage’, an immediate question is what are its features 
and how can we compare regulatory advantages of various regimes.  RC and 
enforcement scholars have suggested attributes of regulatory advantage. Being 
modified, the attributes are restrictive and facilitative responsiveness, flexibility and 
certainty (Levy and Spiller: 1994; and Romano: 1985 (see Table 3.8). All are related 
to the agency’s practice.  
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Institutional Characterisers Adherent Uncoordinated Conciliative Detached 
Restrictive  
Responsiveness 
H L L VL 
Facilitative H L VH VL 
Flexibility H L VH VL 
Certainty VH L H VL 
Regulatory Advantage H L VH VL 
 
Table 3.8   Ranking Results of Regulatory Advantages 
Note: V=very, H=high, and L=Low 
 
The Adherent regime is ranked ‘high’ for flexibility, restrictive and facilitative 
responsiveness. The deployed enforcement strategies are responsive and 
reasonable. The restrictive and facilitative duties are performed in balance. The 
agencies work efficiently and cooperatively. These aspects are not ranked as ‘very 
high’. The reason is that, comparatively speaking, the regime is more facilitative and 
less restrictive than the Uncoordinated regime, while less flexible and efficient than 
the Conciliative regime. Because of the agency’s well-organised practice and well-
constrained behaviour, it is scored ‘very high’ for certainty. The sum of the rankings 
is ‘high’.  
The Uncoordinated regime is ranked ‘low’ for responsiveness, flexibility and 
certainty. The restrictive and facilitative agencies do not cooperate with each other. 
Though both agencies are well-restrained in exercising their duties, the facilitation is 
not active and the restriction is broadbrushed. Weak inter-agency as well as lack of 
agency-firm social construction affect certainty. The regime is of limited attraction to 
business. Accordingly, its regulatory advantage is ranked ‘low’. 
The Conciliative regime is ranked ‘very high’ for facilitative responsiveness and 
flexibility, ‘low’ for restrictive responsiveness and ‘high’ for certainty. Facilitation is 
tailor-made and restriction is overwhelmingly minimised. The agencies are 
cooperative in satisfying the firm’s demands. They are extraordinarily flexible and 
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efficient. The certainty is not as high as the Adherent regime. It is certain that the 
agencies are highly supportive to the firm, but the agencies’ over-flexibility may 
arouse pre-emption from superior authority. This regime is generally ranked as ‘very 
high’ in regulatory advantage. 
The Detached regime does not perform facilitation or restriction adequately. Driven 
by their self-interest maximisation, the agencies are not responsive to the firm. The 
flexibility and certainty are very low, given the random, unstable and unreasonable 
working style of the agency. It scares away business. The overall advantage of this 
regime is ‘very low’. 
With ranking results known, the regimes can be compared. The Concilitative regime 
is the champion with the highest-scored regulatory advantage. The runner-up is the 
Adherent regime, with a ‘high’ score. With a ‘low’ score, the Uncoordinated regime 
does not have regulatory advantage and does not attract business. The Detached 
regime gets the lowest score, and can be said to be at a regulatory disadvantage. 
These results contribute to our understanding as why, subject to the same rules, 
some locations are popular to business while others are not. 
 
4.3.2  Comparative and Competitive Advantage 
Evoked by Porter’s conceptions (1990), regulatory advantage is refined as 
comparative advantage and competitive advantage. Both emphasise an extra 
resource for business attraction - regulatory innovation12. Furthering the definition of 
regulatory advantage, comparative advantage is defined as an institutional 
superiority of the enforcement regime based on strategic actions.13 The strategic 
action, with the feature of instrumentality, is exemplified as the regime’s alignment of 
practice and deployment of resources aimed at winning competition for business, at 
the expense of social regulation.  
In contrast, competitive advantage is an institutional superiority of the enforcement 
regime based on legitimate improvement. This definition emphasises legitimacy14. 
Legitimate improvement is exemplified as the regime’s value of self-image and 
reputation in achieving economic and social goals. The regime’s innovation aims at 
                                                 
12
 For details, see Section 1.4.1 of Chapter I. 
13
 For the logic of instrumentality, see the section about economic institutionalism in the Introduction. 
14
 For the logic of social appropriateness, see the section about sociological institutionalism in the Introduction. 
 92 
generating productivity. It supports the firm to save compliance cost and sharpen 
competitive edge. Bettering agencies’ performance and cooperation is to enhance 
both social and economic interests. Consequently, legitimacy engenders desirable 
effect for both business attraction and social enforcement.  
Accordingly, comparative and competitive advantage can be understood through 
three essential features: innovation, legitimacy and instrumentality. Table 3.9 shows 
these features of each type of regime. Their sum reveals which regime has what 
type of regulatory advantage.  
 
Characterisers Adherent Uncoordinated Conciliative Detached 
Innovation Y N Y N 
Legitimacy Y Y N N 
Instrumentality N N Y Y 
Advantage Competitive No advantage Comparative Disadvantage 
 
Table 3.9   Regimes’ Regulatory Advantages 
Note:   Innovation, legitimacy and instrumentality are evaluated in terms of yes (Y) and no (N).  
 
The Adherent regime involves innovation and legitimacy but not instrumentality. The 
agency is willing to learn to improve business attraction and enforcement effect in a 
balanced fashion. The agency manifests a sense of legitimacy in both facilitative 
and restrictive performance. Economic and social regulations are exercised in a 
balanced fashion. The regime despises the logic of instrumentality. The 
Uncoordinated regime does not involve innovation or instrumentality but legitimacy. 
The agency is unlikely to improve business attraction or enforcement effect. 
Although having a strict sense of correcting wrong-doings, the agency lacks any 
sense of facilitating business. Legitimacy is over-emphasised in its restrictive 
performance at the cost of upsetting business. The economic regulatory goal is not 
achieved, but the social goal is. The Conciliative regime involves innovation and 
instrumentality but no legitimacy. The agency is keen on learning to improve 
business attraction, most likely at the expense of restrictive performance. Hence its 
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action is strategic. The agency is extraordinarily pro-business in order to maximise 
benefit in this regard. Towards this end, it manifests a worldview of instrumentality 
where there is little room for legitimacy. The economic regulatory goal is achieved 
but the social one is not. The Detached regime involves instrumentality but no 
legitimacy or innovation. The agencies are driven by tangible economic gain. Hence 
both restrictive and facilitative performance is destructive to both business attraction 
and enforcement effect. Neither economic nor social regulatory regulation is 
exercised properly. 
Therefore, the Adherent regime has competitive advantage, whereas the 
Conciliative regime the comparative advantage. The Uncoordinated regime has no 
advantage and the Detached regime has disadvantage. It is noteworthy that the 
regime with competitive advantage is less attractive than the one with comparative 
advantage. An explanation is that a regime with competitive advantage is more 
selective and less tolerant to inappropriate corporate conduct than one with 
comparative advantage. Understanding the difference between comparative and 
competitive advantages helps us to understand why some competitive locations 
have desirable social effect while some do not. 
 
4.3.3    Summary 
The RC outcome of regulatory advantage is also an effect of match or mismatch of 
preferences. It is mostly related to regulatory facilitation and concerns the economic 
goal of business attraction. A location with regulatory advantage is attractive to 
business. Its social effect is likely to be undesirable if the advantage is comparative 
or desirable if the advantage is competitive. The concepts of regulatory advantage, 
comparative advantage and competitive advantage contribute to our understanding 
as to what factors underpin the difference between competitive and uncompetitive 
locations as well as between their desirable and undesirable social effects. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I propose my main argument about RC through the so-called ER 
Framework. Focusing on the dimension of enforcement, I alert that enforcement of 
rules at micro level will fundamentally affect RC through rule-making at macro level 
because micro-level regimes and firms are of various types. I suggest that a better 
way of understanding RC for business is to think of it like the regulating and 
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regulated sides finding a partner to form a marriage. Winning business is never a 
one-time deal but entails long-term regulatory relationship and interaction between 
the regulating and regulated sides. Bearing in mind regimes and firms are of various 
types, their preferences are different, and so are their marriages. Depending on the 
match or mismatch of the two sides’ preferences, regimes have differential 
regulatory effects, typically RC outcomes of business attraction, enforcement effect 
and regulatory advantage. Next I will use the ER framework to interpret the findings 
of my fieldwork in China and pay attention to whatever outstanding issues for the 
framework to explain. 
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Chapter IV   Introduction to Empirical Research 
 
 
The ER Framework was developed after the field research for the purpose of 
making sense of the findings from my empirical research. Further, the empirical 
research provides a chance to see whether the framework is convincing to interpret 
the empirical phenomena of RC. The empirical research begins with introducing the 
observational focuses and the macro and middle contexts of micro-level regimes. It 
follows by reporting four case studies. Each of the four cases roughly indicates one 
type of regime according to its grid (vertical official oversight) and group (horizontal 
inter-agency cooperation), as typified by the ER Framework. Thus the reader can 
easily follow specific interpretations about specific cases. 
 
This general introduction has both methodological and empirical purposes. The 
methodological purpose is to clarify how the ER Framework will be used for 
interpreting the empirical research and why the sample country, cities and cases 
were chosen. The empirical purpose is to descriptively analyse macro, middle and 
micro regulatory contexts of the subject of the case studies – the micro-level regime. 
Knowing the macro and middle regimes, is to know the RC and enforcement 
contexts, the benchmark of legitimacy of RC for attracting business, regulatory 
goals, preference on the regulating side, information and idea exchange, formal and 
informal enforcement structures. The analysis of the contexts makes it possible to 
understand that RC through making rules at macro and middle levels is closely 
linked to the enforcement of those rules at micro level; that the micro regimes’ are 
not always responsive upwardly as wished by rule-makers at macro and middle 
levels; nor are their regulatory outcomes always desirable to the governments at 
macro level. Differing from macro and middle levels, the micro regime involves the 
frontline agencies and firms, which act and interact vis-a-vis each other. It is the 
right level to use the ER Framework for interpreting the empirical phenomenon of 
RC. 
 
 
1. How to Use the ER Framework 
Like the ER Framework, the four case studies borrow their structure from the 
regulatory enforcement literature review. They all begin with determining the type of 
regime according to its ‘grid’ and ‘group’ properties. Then it reports faithfully and 
systematically the findings from triangular sources concerning the players’ 
understanding, actions and interactions. Specific findings are noted in the 
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corresponding terms of the ER Framework. In this way, the readers can understand 
the theoretical implications of the specific finding. Next, it summarises the empirical 
findings by using the terms of the ER Framework to emphasise their theoretical 
implications. Finally, any finding which appears to disagree to specific argument of 
the framework is singled out for specific scrutiny. If an explanation can be made 
convincingly for this specific disagreement, the ER Framework can be concluded as 
plausible to interpret the empirical phenomenon of RC. The case studies will cover 
the following aspects and focuses of attention15. Their theoretical implications will be 
noted specifically in the text.  
 
Regulating side The focuses of attention are the representative agency’s 
upward accountability and inter-agency cooperation; interest and strategy of RC; 
preference of firm; commitment and balance of practicing facilitation versus 
restriction; differentiation in business attraction and enforcement. It is noted that the 
agency’s upward accountability and inter-agency cooperation are the ‘grid’ and 
‘group’ respectively, which are institutional. The focus on them implies an attention 
to the institutions on the regulating side. 
 
Regulated side     The focuses of attention are the firm’s size and investment 
origin; preference of regime; stance toward formal and informal control; intentioned 
and informed manner. 
 
Two-sided Marriage and Match   The focuses of attention are the agency-firm 
relational distance; status, mode, interest, value, trust and accountability in bilateral 
working contact; regularity and irregularity of arrangements including regulatory 
incident and problem; effect of firm’s voice; firm’s tendency of exit or loyalty. 
Wherever possible, judgment is involved for facilitative and restrictive 
responsiveness; certainty and flexibility; innovation, legitimacy and instrumentality. 
The implications of the regime-firm match are to be articulated. 
 
RC outcomes   The focuses of attention are the regime’s open profile and the 
structure of domiciled firms. The indicators for business attraction, enforcement 
effect and regulatory advantage are to be articulated, which include the match of the 
types of regime and firm; and efficient, burdensome, lax or deterrent performance. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 These aspects and focuses are covered by the questionnaires used in the interviews. See the questionnaires in 
Appendix II. 
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2. Sample Country, Cities and Cases 
Involved in the empirical research are the sample country (macro), city (middle) and 
sub-city jurisdiction (micro). China is chosen as the sample country because it 
evidently has prevailing inter-jurisdictional RC for foreign investment16 and is the 
most successful developing country in attracting foreign investment17. The foreign 
investment sector is chosen to typically demonstrate issues that are relevant to RC 
for attracting business. The foreign funded electronics and toy manufacturers are 
chosen as the sample sectors under scrutiny. The two industries typically reflect the 
distinctive stances and strategies towards attracting foreign investment of the 
Chinese national government and its agencies18. The rationale of the sample choice 
is that, if the empirical finding in the typical foreign investment sector does not 
challenge the ER Framework, it is convincing to claim the plausibility of the 
framework.  
 
Two coastal cities are chosen for the empirical research. One is the city of 
Shenzhen, in the Province of Guangdong in southern China (the Pearl River Delta) 
and the other is the city of Suzhou, in the Province of Jiangsu in eastern China (the 
Yangtze River Delta). Since the two cities are located in different regions of the 
country, the information collected from them is significant in terms of both contextual 
difference and contextual comparison. Notwithstanding China’s overall 
achievement, there is considerable regional disparity in the way and effect of 
competing for foreign investment. The two chosen cities are active in competing for 
foreign investment and are widely acknowledged as the most successful among all 
Chinese cities in this regard19. Being in the economically developed eastern and 
southern regions, they are obliged to compete for quality rather than ordinary foreign 
investment. Accordingly, they are regarded as representative of RC and advantage. 
The rationale underpinning the selection of these cities is that, if in the most 
advantageous areas the micro regimes, namely sub-city jurisdictions (SCJs), are 
found to have different RC and enforcement practices and outcomes, it is more 
likely to find that the micro regimes in less advantageous areas are different in RC 
and enforcement practices and outcomes. Thus to choose cases from 
                                                 
16
 For more details, see a later section of this chapter. Interview CAZD 
17
 For relevant information, see <Foreign Direct Investment: The China Story> at the website of the World Bank 
Bank http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2010/07/16/foreign-direct-investment-china-story. For relevant 
research about foreign investment in China, see Fetscherin, Voss and Gugler (2010) 
18
 For more details, see the Appendix I. 
19
 Reference includes a research carried out by the Institute of Industrial Economics of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science and the China Business in 2006 with a finding that Shenzhen and Suzhou were voted by multi-
internationals as the Number One investment-worthy cities respectively in the south and east China 
(http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/kggsjz2006/index.shtml) 
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advantageous areas is helpful to examine the plausiblity of the ER Framework. 
Whereas the cases are selected from the well-acknowledged advantageous cities, 
at first glance, they appear to be selected based on the outcome of RC so that the 
selection is suspect of reverse engineering20. Yet a more careful check will find that 
the cities themselves are not the sample cases, but their SCJs are. The cities serve 
no more than the middle-level context of the sample cases. Therefore the selection 
is free from such worries. 
 
The SCJ is the sample case 21 . The SCJs involved in the case studies are 
incidentally chosen because they are the abodes of the accessible informants22. All 
the SCJs are randomly selected. They are indicative and none is representative of 
the archetyped regime. Random selection avoids systematic bias of empirical 
research (King, Keohane and Verba: 1994). The SCJs are of myriad types – special 
investment zones (SIZs) and non-SIZs; entities established by the governments of 
different levels – national, provincial and municipal; and empowered with integrated 
or fragmented regulatory authorities and targets. Each SCJ has its particular local 
context and ‘rules of the game’. The agencies and regulated FOEs have distinctive 
cognitive, behavioural and interactive features. The empirical research of the SCJ 
concentrates on the enforcement practice and process of the agencies, as 
addressed by the ER Framework. All governmental agencies based in an SCJ make 
up the regime. Meanwhile, the general-purpose agency, not the specific-task 
agency, is considered as the representative of the regime. 
 
The distinction of the type of regime is made according to its official accountability. 
An SIZ has stronger ‘grid’, while a non-SIZ does not. In this research, an SIZ is 
defined as all types of zones that are approved to establish by the Chinese national 
government for the primary purpose of competing for overseas investment. 
Examples of SIZ are export processing zone, free trade zone and high-tech 
development zone23. A zone that is set up by a sub-national government even for 
the same purpose in a similar name is not an SIZ. An SIZ is entrenched with 
municipal, provincial and national governments’ special commitment and is 
particularly accountable for its business-attracting achievement. It is subject to wide 
exposure and imposed accountability for its performance to the authorities above 
municipal level. The achievement of an SIZ is reported with updated information 
                                                 
20
 For the problem incurred in this regard, see King et al (1994). 
21
 This part focuses on addressing the institutional properties of cases. Concerning how these cases, namely 
SCJs, became the subject of scrutiny, see the section about the method of empirical research in Appendix I and II. 
22
 For the details about the informants, see the following section and the Appendix I. 
23
 See the official website of the CADZ. 
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regularly at the official website of the China Association of Development Zones 
(CADZ). In contrast, a non-SIZ at the sub-city level is generally accountable to the 
village, town or county authority. Its performance is mostly unknown to the public. 
Attracting business is only one of the regime’s regulatory goals, for which it is not 
particularly accountable. 
 
 
3. A Snapshot of Hierarchy of Regimes 
Foreign investment is regarded as a trade-related issue by the Chinese national 
government as well as by the WTO24. Foreign investment had been introduced to 
promote the country’s exports. By 2010, more than 50% of the country’s trade and 
84% of its processing trade were contributed by foreign invested manufacturers25. 
Accordingly, foreign investment was governed by the foreign trade regime of China. 
The WTO Trade Policy Reviews 2006 (WT/TPR/S/161/Rev.1) identified the foreign 
investment enforcement regime 26  of China as characteristic of hierarchy. This 
hierarchy comprised three layers of regimes, at macro (national), middle (provincial 
and municipal) and micro (sub-city, namely county, town and village) levels. 
Correspondingly, there were three levels of enforcement agencies27. 
 
At the macro level, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) was the specific agency 
that was delegated with the main authority for promoting and facilitating foreign 
investment, as well as formulating, implementing and coordinating all foreign 
investment related rules, including laws, regulations and policies28. Other national 
agencies involved in implementing foreign investment rules included the National 
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the General 
Administration of Customs, and the Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection 
and Quarantine (AQSIQ) (see Table 4.1). These agencies were all constituents of 
the national or central government, namely the State Council. As the highest-level 
executive, the State Council was accountable to the national legislature, namely the 
National People’s Congress.  
 
 
                                                 
24
 See the website of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) at http://www.gov.cn/fwxx/bw/swb/index.htm; and 
the WTO Trade Policy Review 2006 WT/TPR/S161/Rev.1  
25
 The WTO TPR 2010 Part 3 ‘Foreign Investment Regime’ pp21-22 
26
 Hereinafter simplified as ‘the regime’  
27
 Hereinafter simplified as ‘the agency’ 
28
 See WT/TPR/S/161, pp40-43. Hereinafter, law, regulation and policy of all sorts are referred simply as ‘rule’.  
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Regulator Main responsibility 
    Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) Policy coordination and implementation for 
all trade-related issues   
Policy Research Department Proposing trade policy 
Department of Treaty and Law Formulating laws and regulations related to 
trade, international economic cooperation 
and foreign investment;  facilitating bilateral 
and regional trade negotiations and IPR 
related issues; and dispute settlement 
negotiations 
Department of Foreign Investment 
Administration 
Guiding foreign investment, formulating 
relevant laws and regulations, and 
administering foreign-invested projects 
Bureau of Fair Trade for Import and 
Export 
Bureau of Industry Injury Investigation  
Formulating anti-dumping, countervailing, 
and safeguard regulations, and taking 
relevant measures 
Bureau of Quota and Licence Affairs Administering import and export quotas 
Investment Promotion Agency Promoting foreign investment 
     Trade Development Bureau Promoting international trade 
National Development and Reform 
Commission   
Guiding overall economic reforms;  
formulating policies for economic and social 
development, such as industry policy and 
energy policy;  and restructuring the 
investment regime 
   Ministry of Finance Fiscal policy, tariff, government 
procurement, tax policy  
   People's Bank of China (the Central 
Bank) 
Overall monetary and exchange rate 
policies;  regulating inter-bank lending 
market and inter-bank bond market;  
managing the State treasury;  and 
maintaining financial market and banking 
system stability 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) 
Subordinate execution body of the Central 
Bank on exchange rate policies 
Ministry of Land and Resources Natural resources   
General Administration of Customs Enforcing customs legislation, levying and 
collecting customs duties and other taxes, 
and preparing and submitting customs 
statistical data 
State Administration of Taxation Taxation policies   
National Bureau of Statistics Macroeconomic development statistics  
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Regulator Main responsibility 
State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce 
Facilitating fair trade, protecting consumer 
benefits, registering enterprises, including 
foreign-invested enterprises, supervising 
trade marks, and market regulation, etc. 
General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) 
China Standardization Administration (SAC) 
China National Certification and 
Accreditation Administration  
Standardization, quality certification, testing, 
surveillance, and metrology 
State Intellectual Property Office (SOIPP) Proposing guidance, plans, and policy 
recommendations on IPR protection work;  
supervising the disposal of major IPR 
infringement cases;  communicating and 
coordinating with foreign investment 
enterprises;  enforcing IPR laws, and 
conducting international exchanges and 
cooperation 
State Food and Drug Administration Supervising the safety management of food, 
health food, and cosmetics; and regulating 
drugs 
Legislation Affairs Office of the State 
Council 
Drafting laws and regulations 
National Bureau of Energy* Formulating energy development strategy, 
plan and policy 
Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT)* 
Carrying out research; proposing industry 
development strategy; formulating and 
implementing industry and sectoral plan, 
policy and regulations 
Ministry of Human Resource and Social 
Security (MOHRSS)* 
Drafting labour laws, policies, standards and 
regulations; managing social security 
Ministry of Environmental Protection* Drafting and implementing laws and 
regulations concerning environmental 
protection 
 
Table 4.1   National Enforcement Agencies of Foreign Investment Rules 
 
* Source: WTO Secretariat, based on Chinese Government online information. 
* Added by the author. These were established in the institutional change between the WTO TPRs in 
2008 and 2010. 
 
At the middle and micro levels, the composition and structure of the agencies 
roughly mirrored those at the national level. There were a few exceptions. For 
instance, the General Administration of Customs and AQSIQ were national 
agencies. Whereas the practice of their sub-national branches was based locally, 
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they were independent from sub-national governments. The sub-national agencies 
at the same levels were the constituents and affiliates of the governments at 
corresponding levels29. These agencies were obliged to implement the rules set by 
their sub-national legislatures and governments. At the same time, they 
implemented the specific rules that were set by the corresponding superior agencies 
(see Diagram V). 
                                                 
29
 See Mertha (2006) 
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Diagram V  Vertical Governmental Relations Exemplified by Two Enforcement Agencies 
Note:   
1. This diagram adapts from the Figure 5.3 China’s anti-counterfeiting bureaucracy of Mertha (2005) 
pp190. The agencies that are chosen as examples are edited and different from Mertha’s diagram.   
 2. The relations within the organisational system of the Customs refer to the information at the official 
website of the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China at 
http://www.customs.gov.cn/default.aspx?tabid=7973. The levels of customs´ jurisdictions are not 
corresponding to those of the sub-national governments 
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4. Macro Regime   
Identified in the Table 4.1, the national agencies were not directly involved in RC 
inside China 30 . Instead, they played dual roles: the rule maker and the rule 
implementer. As the rule maker, the agencies set national rules and strategies for 
foreign investment attraction. As the rule implementer, they practised downwardly 
and outwardly. Downwardly, they monitored the implementation of sub-national 
governments’ activity. Outwardly, they reacted to foreign trading partners’ voice 
strategically. 
 
4.1 Setting Benchmark for Legitimacy 
The national government formulated not only administrative rules but also some 
laws. Its affiliated agencies issued departmental rules31. These rules took force in 
the whole country. Governing the foreign investment affairs, there was no general 
foreign investment law but a synthesis of specific national rules32 . These rules 
included the <Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint-Ventures>, <Law on Chinese-
Foreign Contractual Joint-Ventures>, <Law on Foreign Capital Enterprises>,  
<Provisions on Foreign Invested Investment Companies>, <Company Law>, 
<Contract Law>, <Insurance Law>, <Arbitration Law>, <Labour Law>, <Provisional 
Regulations on Value-Added Tax>, <Provisional Regulations on Consumption Tax>, 
<Provisional Regulations on Business Tax>, and <Law on Protection of Investment 
by Compatriots from Taiwan>33. The specificity of the rules implied more practicality 
for implementation than articulating the ideology34.  
 
The national government articulated the ideology particularly in non-legal forms. 
This was incarnated in a set of strategies, typically, the <11th Five-Year Layout for 
Using Foreign Investment>, <Guiding Catalogue of Industries for Foreign 
Investment> and <Catalogue of Favoured Industries for Foreign Investment in 
Middle and Western Regions> 35 . Indeed, these strategies set the national 
benchmark for judging the legitimacy of foreign investment related practice. 
                                                 
30
 The Investment Promotion Agency affiliated to the MOFCOM was competing with other countries for foreign 
investment.  
31
 See WT/TPR/S/161, pp36 
32
 ‘Laws and regulations’ are the terms used by the WTO in its Trade Policy Review 2006. I use the term ‘rule’ 
to refer to all sorts of regulatory documents issued by the Chinese government.  
33
 The WTO TPR 2008 Part 3 gives the source as ‘Invest in China’ at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/ 
Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/t20060620_50886.jsp [11 February 2008] 
34
 Black (1999) 
35
 Since both sampled cities of the case study locate in the successful eastern coastal region, the information for 
western and central regions is generally limited. 
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In 2006, for the first time, the national government explicitly redefined the objectives 
of foreign investment tasks in the <11th Five-Year Layout for Using Foreign 
Investment> 36 . The Layout was drafted based on consulting 40 members and 
affiliates of the State Council including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, 
Commerce and the People’s Bank; 11 trade associations; the development and 
reform organisations of local governments; and some research institutes, 
enterprises, experts and scholars. The Layout became a new part of the five-year 
layout of the national economy37. The five-year plan was the plan for developing the 
national economy within a specified five years. It stipulated the nation’s key 
construction projects, productivity distribution and major proportionality of the 
national economy, as well as the goals and directions in the five-year duration.  
 
The Layout charted the ‘guiding ideology and general strategic goal’ for attracting 
foreign investment for the years between 2006 and 201038. The main points were: 
‘Push further the use of foreign investment to change fundamentally from ‘quantity’ 
to ‘quality’, so as to truly shift the keystone of the use of foreign investment from 
supplementing the shortage of capital and foreign currency to fetching in advanced 
technology, managerial skills and high-quality talents. Attach more importance to 
ecological construction, environmental protection, and a comprehensive and saving 
utilisation of resources and energy. Truly marry the use of foreign investment with 
the improvement of national industrial structure and technological standard.’ ‘Try 
hard to divert the foreign investment from simple processing, assembling and low-
standard manufactures to the new areas such as research and development, high-
end design… etc. Propel our country to become one of the global making bases for 
the products with high added value… Further strengthen the economic globalisation 
and international competitiveness of the east coastal area.’   
 
The guidelines of the Layout were reflected in the relevant laws enacted later. 
Typically, <Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Funded Enterprises> 
                                                 
36
 Herein after simplified as ‘the Layout’. More specific details will be given in the following sub-section. 
Drafted and promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission on 9th November 2006. For the 
full text, see http://finance.people.com.cn/BIG5/8215/74587/74589/5068303.html. This document is named as 
‘Layout’ rather than ‘Plan’ as before 2006 in order to highlight the change in the Chinese government’s 
perception in terms of attaching more importance to the basic role played by the market in allocating resources 
while emphasising the governmental role as macro regulator and strategy setter. For more details, see 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/54239/54241/3779457.html.  
37
 The ‘Five-year plan’ is part of the plan for the national economy of China. For details, see ‘China’s Ten Five-
Year Plans and Eleventh Layout’ at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2006/2006-02-21/8/692907.shtml.  
38
 See Preamble and Part Two of the Layout at 
http://finance.people.com.cn/BIG5/8215/74587/74589/5068303.html.  
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and <Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint-Ventures Using Chinese and 
Foreign Investment>, both of which were enacted on 16th March 2007. Article 3 of 
the former stipulated ‘A foreign-funded enterprise to be established must benefit the 
development of China's national economy and be capable of gaining remarkable 
economic results. The state encourages foreign-funded enterprises to use advanced 
technology and equipment, engage in the development of new products, realise the 
upgrading of products and the replacement of old products with new ones, 
economise energy and raw materials, and it is also encouraged to establish foreign-
funded enterprises which are export oriented.’ Article 5 stated that the application to 
establish an enterprise will be declined if it is ‘not in keeping with the requirements 
of China's national economic development’ or ‘may result in environmental 
pollution.’ Article 3 of the latter stated: ‘Joint ventures established within China's 
territory should be able to promote the development of China's economy and the 
raising of scientific and technological standards for the benefit of socialist 
modernisation. The industries in which the establishment of joint venture is 
encouraged, permitted, restricted or prohibited shall follow the provisions of the 
state on guiding the direction of foreign investment and the guiding catalogue of 
foreign-funded industries.’39 
 
The Layout further specified the main foreign investment tasks for different regions 
of the country40. For the successful south and east coastal regions, the main tasks 
included firstly, ‘to be the first to accomplish the transformation in the use of foreign 
investment from ‘quantity’ to ‘quality’’, and ‘to strengthen international 
competitiveness and sustainable development capacity.’ Secondly, ‘to optimise the 
structure of the origin of foreign investment, actively enlarge the investment scale 
from the developed economic entities that possess advanced technologies and 
management skills such as the European Union, North America and Japan, etc.’ 
Thirdly, ‘to reduce the affairs required by the administrative examination and 
approval, and faithfully standardise and simplify working procedures so as to create 
a fair and predictable policy environment for the enterprises.’ Fourthly, ‘to actively 
push forward general construction for customs clearance, so as to improve 
efficiency.’ Lastly, based on the evolution and change of the economic situation, 
dynamically adjust <Guiding Catalogue of Industries for Foreign Investment>. 
 
                                                 
39
 For details, see respectively 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/internationalpolicy/200703/20070304465919.html and 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/internationalpolicy/200703/20070304465395.html 
40
 Since both sampled cities of the case study locate in the successful eastern coastal region, the information for 
other regions is generally omitted. 
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The <Guiding Catalogue of Industries for Foreign Investment>41 was supplementary 
to the Layout in thumbnail terms. It classified the industries into three categories: 
encouraged, restricted and prohibited. The industries that encouraged foreign 
investment mainly included new energy, new materials, biological pharmaceuticals, 
high-end manufacturing and information industries. Multi-nationals were encouraged 
to establish their research and development (R&D) centres as well as to extend their 
industrial chains in China. The Catalogue shared the guiding role of the Layout. This 
was evident in the relevant enactments and rules. For example, Article 4 of <Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Funded Enterprises> stated: ‘Trades in 
which the establishment of foreign-funded enterprises is forbidden or restricted shall 
be determined and established according to the provisions regarding state guidance 
for foreign investment orientation and guiding catalogue of industries for foreign 
investment.’ The Catalogue was also a more dynamic instrument than the Layout. 
Whereas the Layout was updated once in five years, the Catalogue was revised 
more frequently. The national government made three revisions of it between 2002 
and 200742. In September 2010, the head of the Foreign Investment Bureau of the 
MOFCOM released that the Catalogue was under revision. 
 
The national government kept updating the general guideline and strategy in order 
to catch up with the changing regulatory conditions dynamically. The update of the 
Layout and the Catalogues were examples. In addition, it issued new rules 
whenever it perceived it to be necessary. For instance, on 6th April 2010, it issued 
the <State Council’s Opinions in Further Making Good Use of Foreign Investment>. 
To strengthen the implementation of the opinions, the national government issued 
an additional document to clarify the authorities delegated to specific ministries43. 
 
4.2 Downward Monitoring 
The national government’s downward monitoring was a feature of RC. This feature 
manifested in reiterating its standpoint regarding competitive measures and 
administrative procedures. For the former, the national government discouraged the 
use of favourable financial conditions and low labour and environmental standards, 
especially in the successful south and east regions. For the latter, it encouraged the 
improvement of the credibility, operational transparency and efficiency of 
subordinate governments.  
                                                 
41
 Simplified as ‘the Catalogue’. For the full text of the 2007 revision which went into effect on 1st December 
2007, see http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/2007ling/W020071107537750156652.pdf. 
42
 See http://www.ce.cn/macro/more/201009/16/t20100916_21823075.shtml. 
43
See http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-04/13/content_1579732.htm and http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-
08/19/content_1683980.htm. 
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Witnessing some cities in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) competing for foreign 
investment by minimising land prices and tax rates and admitting polluting 
projects44,  the national government issued <The State Council’s Instructive Opinion 
about Further Propelling Reform, Open-Up, Economic and Social Development in 
Yangtze River Delta> on 7th September 2008 45 . In Article 11(39), the Opinion 
affirmed ‘standardising the behaviour of promoting business and investment, 
adopting comparatively unified policies governing the land and taxes, and creating a 
fair and open investment environment.’ It was acknowledged as the national 
government’s formal ‘call to end the vicious competition for foreign investment’ in 
this region46. While the national government tightened restrictions for the developed 
south and east regions, it allowed the governments in the less developed middle 
and western regions the discretion to further open policies towards foreign 
investment. These included the continuous application of favourable income tax 
rates to the enterprises that met the governmental requirements. The aim of the 
relaxed rule was stated as ‘to orient the transfer and increase the foreign investment 
into the middle and western region.’47  
 
The <Labour Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China> promulgated in June 
200748 was well-acknowledged to provide more specific and practical protection to 
the employees than the 1995 <Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China>49. On 
6th April 2010, the national government officially declared a revision of the 
<Catalogue of Favoured Industries for Foreign Investment in Middle and Western 
Regions> 50 . In the revised Catalogue, the national government added labour-
intensive manufacturing with environmental friendliness into the category of the 
encouraged industries of these two less successful regions. Meanwhile, it kept on 
requesting the successful south and east regions to discourage labour-intensive 
manufacturing and to embrace technology-intensive industries. This revision 
                                                 
44
 See <Why to Set ‘Threshold’ for Foreign Investment Attraction? A Reflection of Role of Foreign Investment> 
at   http://media.163.com/05/0601/15/1L5VPM1B00141E4V.html.  
45
 For the full text, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-09/25/content_10107100.htm. This rule is 
referred hereinafter as ‘the Opinion’. 
46
 See <State Council Issues Opinion to Call ‘Stop’ to Vicious Competition for Foreign Investment in Yangtze 
River Delta> http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-09/25/content_10107179.htm.  
47
 See the Article II (8), (9) and (10) of the Footnote  
48
 See http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/internationalpolicy/200703/20070304475283.html  
49
 ‘How to Interpret New Labour Contract Law’ see http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2007-
07/16/content_6380415.htm.  
50
 For details, see <State Council’s Opinions about Making Better Use of Foreign Investment> at 
http://wzs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/zhp/t20100426_342583.htm. 
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exemplified the national government’s lively monitoring and differential interventions 
in foreign investment attraction in the successful and less successful regions.  
 
In a direct sense, the national government emphasised a stringent ban on the entry 
of polluting industries in the Layout51. In an indirect sense, it listed 113 cities as the 
Key Environmentally Protected Cities and accordingly applied the highest relevant 
standards52. In the list were the municipalities, provincial capitals and industrial 
centres. The two sample cities for using the ER Framework, namely Shenzhen and 
Suzhou, were included in the list.  
 
The national government had decentralised most approval authorities. The limited 
authorities it reserved were (1) approving the projects with an investment amount 
over 300 million USD in the encouraged and permitted categories; (2) verifying the 
projects that were specified particularly in the <Catalogue of Investment Projects 
Subject to Governmental Verification>. Nevertheless, it was still active in monitoring 
the subordinate governments’ operation. This was embodied in the 2010 <State 
Council’s Opinions about Further Making Good Use of Foreign Investment>53.  It 
requested the middle-level governments and agencies to optimise the examination 
and approval system in terms of simplifying the processes, minimising the covered 
subjects and shortening the processing time. The national government strongly 
promoted an on-line examination and approval system so as to make the agencies’ 
actions and behaviour transparent, standardised, legally-binding and simple 54 . 
Particularly, the customs were asked to make a great effort to improve the efficiency 
of customs clearance. 
 
4.3 Outwards Reaction 
The WTO TPR 2006 commented that the fast change of rules was typical of ‘the 
complexity’ of the Chinese foreign investment regime. It attributed frequent rule-
change to the national government’s quick response to the contingency of 
globalised economic conditions. An FOE interviewee gave an example as to how 
quick a rule-change could be55. In 2008, alarmed by the increased inflow of trans-
border mobile capital that seemed to speculate on the stocks, real estate and 
household materials, the National Foreign Currency Regulatory Bureau, the 
                                                 
51
 See http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/70392/5068395.html. 
52
 See <State Council Issues 11th Five-Year Layout for National Environmental Protection> 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2007/11-26/1087490.shtml. 
53
 See http://wzs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/zhp/t20100426_342583.htm. 
54
 See http://wzs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/zhp/t20100426_342583.htm. 
55
 Interview EJSI2E 
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MOFCOM and the General Customs jointly issued the < Measures for Online 
Inspection of Foreign Currency Collection and Settlement of Export Proceeds>56. 
This regulation was announced on 2nd July and went into effect on 14th July. 
Accordingly the FOEs had to put their export earnings in their export accounts for 
the regulators to verify the authenticity before being able to further use them. The 
FOE interviewee commented a change like this, while being unpredictable, was not 
unusual. 
 
The national government demonstrated sensitivity to particular concerns expressed 
by the main trading partners of China, typically the USA and the EU57. Referring to 
the Layout, the likely underpinning reason was that the national government 
regarded the USA and the EU not only as the most desired overseas investment 
origins but also as the major markets for China’s export products. The government 
was attentive to these big trading partners’ concerns in order to quickly ameliorate 
negative impacts upon their investment to China and their imports of Chinese-made 
products. Some examples indicated the characteristics of the outward response by 
the national government. One regarded the labour issue and the other regarded the 
product safety issue. 
 
On the occasions when American multinationals were under domestic criticism for 
their labour abuses in China, the Chinese government and the governmentally-
controlled media were strongly on the firms’ side. One example was that on 1st 
February 2009, the Pittsburgh-based National Labour Committee published an 
investigation report to criticise the deplorable working conditions of a Taiwanese-
owned factory, which was producing computer keyboards for IBM, Microsoft, Dell, 
Lenovo and Hewlett-Packard58. In two weeks, the Electronic Industry Citizenship 
Coalition, of which all the named and shamed companies were members, 
responded by initiating a third-party audit59. Leaving the result aside, on 25th March, 
the Beijing-based Xinhua News Agency 60  published a so-called ‘special report’ 
giving a notably different account of the story. It asserted the National Labour 
Committee’s report as being ‘susceptible to distortion and exaggeration.’ It 
concluded by quoting anonymous experts’ views that some foreign groups were 
                                                 
56
 For the text in English, see 
http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe_en/laws_en/laws_detail_en.jsp?ID=30600000000000000,15&type=&id=3.  
57
 Mertha’ research was an example of the China’s legislature’s response to the USA’s pressure to improve 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection.  
58
 See <High Tech Misery in China> at http://www.nlcnet.org/reports?id=0006.  
59
 See <Tech Coalition Launches Sweatshop Probe> at http://news.cnet.com/8301-1001_3-10164325-92.html  
60
 This news agency has a similar status as the BBC in the UK. But rather than independent, it is acknowledged 
as an agency of the national governmental voice. 
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keen on ‘exposing the dark-side of the labour rights protection for the sake of 
relieving domestic employment pressure.’61 True or not, this example showcased the 
importance attached by the government to the interest of the multinationals. There 
was another example in this regard. Foxconn, the world’s largest maker of electronic 
components as well as the largest contracted manufacturer of the Apple IPhone, 
IPod and IPad62  had 15 workers who committed suicide between January and 
November 201063. Soon after the press conference held by Foxconn’s Chairman 
Terry Gou on 26th May64 and the entry of the investigation group led by the National 
Federation of Trade Unions and the MOHRSS on 28th May65, the major Chinese 
media agencies got an order from the Central Propaganda Department to refrain 
from uttering negative words against Foxconn66. These examples showed that the 
national government inclined to sympathise with and comfort the big high-tech 
multinationals regarding labour issues. Likely, its intention was to avoid negative 
impact upon the inflow of the most desired sort of foreign investment and sale of 
Chinese-made products caused by a deplorable labour protection image.  
 
In contrast, the national government seemed to be limitedly tolerant towards product 
quality and safety issues. A typical example was the national government’s reaction 
towards Mattel’s recall of Chinese-manufactured toys. In August and September 
2007, Mattel, the biggest toy seller in the USA, recalled more than 18 million toys 
because they contained either magnets that had the potential of being swallowed or 
they had excessive lead in the paint67. The national government reacted in four 
ways. The first way was that the AQSIQ immediately organised an investigation and 
declared the result. It tracked down the liable enterprise with investment originated 
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 <Special Report: Survey of ‘Sweatshop’ in Dongguan Exposed by the USA’> 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2009-03/25/content_11057607.htm. 
62
 http://www.foxconn.com/CompanyIntro.html and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foxconn.   
63
 See <Steve Jobs Says Apple is ‘All Over’ Foxconn Suicides> http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-
business/7798741/Steve-Jobs-says-Apple-is-all-over-Foxconn-suicides.html and <Foxconn’s New Suicide Fear, 
14th Worker Died> http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/7929938/Foxconn-faces-fresh-suicide-
fears-as-14th-worker-dies.html. For broad reports, see <Comprehensive Report about Workers’ Suicides in 
Foxconn> http://www.worldjournal.com/pages/wjtopics?widget=search_content&tags=topic523&id=+1-
%E5%AF%8C%E5%A3%AB%E5%BA%B7%E5%93%A1%E5%B7%A5%E8%B7%B3%E6%A8%93%E4%B
A%8B%E4%BB%B6%E7%B6%9C%E5%90%88%E5%A0%B1%E5%B0%8E  
64
 See <Foxconn CEO Officially Meet the Press> at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37354853/ns/business-
world_business  and <Chinese Factory Asks ‘No Suicide’ Vow> 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37354853/ns/business-world_business  
65
 <Investigation Group from National Government Entered Foxconn This Morning> 
http://xinmin.news365.com.cn/jd/201005/t20100528_2720514.htm  
66
 <’Foxconn Effect’ Central Propaganda Department Bans Report> 
http://www.worldjournal.com/view/full_news/7918090/article-
%E3%80%8C%E5%AF%8C%E5%A3%AB%E5%BA%B7%E6%95%88%E6%87%89%E3%80%8D-
%E4%B8%AD%E5%AE%A3%E9%83%A8%E7%A6%81%E5%A0%B1%E5%B0%8E-?instance=hot  
67
 http://news.wanju.cn/12_15169.html  
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from Hong Kong and banned it from exports. The police department was invited to 
find out the paint maker and arrest three responsible persons of the contracted paint 
supplier. The production of the toy-maker was stopped totally. The Hong Kong boss 
committed suicide, followed by dissolution of the company and redundancy of 2,500 
workers. The second way was that on 27th August, the AQSIQ issued an 
unprecedented rule titled <Provision of Recall of Toys for Children>, which took 
immediate effect68. The third way was that the national government pressurised 
Mattel into apologising for its ‘exaggeration’ about the safety problems of Chinese-
made toys 69 . The fourth way was that the national government summoned a 
television-telephone conference on 23rd August to arrange a country-wide special 
campaign to examine the quality and safety of products70.  On 21st November 2007, 
the AQSIQ summoned another television-telephone conference to arrange a 
country-wide special campaign to examine exported toys 71 . The goal was to 
‘safeguard the national image and reputation.’ The AQSIQ then dispatched working 
groups to monitor the process of the campaign to the six main production bases, 
namely the provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shangdong, Zhejiang and the cities 
of Shenzhen and Shanghai. The consequence was that more than 3,000 export-
oriented enterprises were scrutinised. Among them, more than 600 toy-producers’ 
export licences were revoked due to their ‘incomplete quality control system and 
unstable product quality.’72 
 
According to an interview with an official from the AQSIQ73, the country-wide special 
campaigns were not only triggered by Mattel’s recalls74. There were many other 
incidents and complaints about Chinese-made products sold in the USA and Japan 
both earlier and later. These included pet food, seafood, automobile tyres, 
toothpaste, beach buggies, and heat-resistant pans. Meanwhile, a big safety 
scandal was exposed concerning melamine-stained baby milk powder that was 
made and consumed domestically 75 . The report about the babies’ kidney 
dysfunction caused by drinking the poisoned milk powder was first publicised 
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 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-09/03/content_735585.htm  
69
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-09/22/content_6767059.htm  
70
 http://www.sda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0339/25318.html  
71
 http://jyjgs.aqsiq.gov.cn/gdwx/200711/t20071122_55010.htm  
72
 See <Over 600 Toy Enterprises Revoked Export Licences in Special Examination> at 
http://huahuangjituan.cn/exports6/jck1060.htm  
73
 Interview AQSIQ1. This interview was made during the seminar of China’s Toy Safety Regulation in the 
Peking University, Beijing, China in September 2008. The seminar was funded by the LSE Seed Fund for 
China’s toy safety research programme.  
74
 Interview AQSIQ1. For more details, see <Who is Damaging ‘Made in China’?> at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-08/09/content_6500995.htm. 
75
See <NZ Official Blew Whistle on Milk Scare> http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/628081 
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overseas by the producer’s New Zealand’s shareholder Fontarra. The national 
government worried about the magnitude of overseas negative opinions towards the 
quality and safety of the Chinese-made products. ‘The reports are detrimental to the 
image and reputation of Chinese-made products. They will leave the importing 
countries excuses to set up technical barriers against Chinese-made products.’ At 
the same time, ‘other countries will take over the market share from China.’ Bearing 
in mind that 80% of processing export was generated by FOEs76, the government’s 
response showcased its tough standpoint towards product safety.  
 
To summarise, the characteristics of the national government’s outward response 
are: firstly, the national government held overseas concerns about labour and 
product safety issues as relevant to foreign investment attraction. The labour issue 
was relevant as long as an FOE hired local workers. The product safety issue 
became involved when the product was made by an FOE and sold in a developed 
country. Secondly, the national government attached an uneven importance to the 
labour and product safety issues. Indeed, while the labour issue is related to the 
process standard, it is less visible than the product standard, to which the quality 
and safety issues appertain. This implies that the government was more attentive to 
product than process standard in its responses to overseas concerns. Thirdly, the 
national government’s sensitivity and tactics reflected its foreign investment 
strategy. It tended to be soft towards the constituents of the multinational industrial 
chains and big FOEs in the high-tech sectors, typically the electronics 
manufacturers but it was tough towards those in the low-tech sectors, typically toy 
making. Finally, if necessary, the national government intervened right to the bottom 
in order to demonstrate its seriousness about the overseas voice. This was typically 
represented as an organised and highly targeted ad hoc enforcement campaign.  
 
4.4 Summary 
The national government and its affiliated agencies play dual roles in exercising 
foreign investment duties: the rule maker and the rule implementer. Playing the 
former role, they cooperate closely and set the benchmark to gauge the legitimacy 
of the subordinate governments’ practice. Thus being selective and making a 
differentiation according to the firm’s industry, investment origin and size as well as 
balancing between promoting business and enforcing social regulation are 
representative of legitimacy. Playing the latter role, they are active in monitoring and 
correcting the subordinate governments’ undesirable practice. The concerns 
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national government show in the lower-level implementation practice suggest its 
recognition that the success of RC through rule making at macro level would be 
fundamentally affected by implementation practice at lower level. This implied that 
macro-level RC through rule-making is closely linked to micro-level RC through rule 
enforcement. Meanwhile they react quickly to overseas voice or change of 
conditions. Considering the high accountability, exposure and coordination, macro 
regime and agencies are characteristic of high grid and high group, namely 
Adherent. The macro context reveals that when competing for foreign investment, it 
clarifies the preferred type of investors, sets the benchmark for legitimacy and 
regulatory goal, attaches importance to formal (vertical dimension of governmental 
hierarchy) and informal (horizontal cross-border supply chain) enforcement 
structures as well as alerts the significance of rule enforcement at lower levels. 
 
 
5. Middle and Micro Regimes 
Similar to their counterpart at macro level, the agencies at middle and micro levels 
were both the rule maker and rule implementer, but differently, the rules made by 
these agencies were valid only within their respective jurisdictions. Additionally, their 
implementation involved horizontal competition. Bearing in mind the national 
government’s active top-down monitoring, middle-level competition necessarily 
demonstrated a concern for legitimacy.  
 
5.1 Jurisdictional Disparity 
Jurisdictional disparity was noteworthy at middle and micro levels. This disparity 
could be said to be a joint outcome of the deliberation of the national government 
and the authorities of sub-national governments.  
 
The national government inclined to implement unprecedented policies exclusively 
in specified zones on a ‘trial’ and ‘gradual’ basis in order to easily observe their 
effect77. After the trials, the government would decide whether to turn these policies 
into formal rules to take force in the whole country. On a small scale, the national 
government approved the establishment of a special economic zone, free trade 
zone, export-processing zone, economic and technological development zone. Their 
establishment was to experiment with foreign investment related policies with 
various emphases. Establishment of the SIZs was learned and copied by the 
provincial, municipal and even village governments. Yet, the main purpose of these 
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 See WT/TPR/S/161/Rev.1, pp29 
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sub-national governments was not experimental but determining: to attract overseas 
investment. On a large scale, the national government allowed the southern and 
eastern coastal regions to reform and open up for foreign investment as early as 
the1980s and 1990s, but only did the same to the central and western regions after 
200078. All these trials had caused jurisdictional disparity, fragmentation and gaps in 
the foreign investment achievements.  
 
Immediately under the national level, the 31 provincial governments implemented 
national rules as well as the provincial legislations that were promulgated by their 
respective People’s Congresses 79 . At the same time, they and their affiliated 
agencies tailor-made provincial rules according to the conditions of their specific 
provinces. The provincial regulations took effect within the geographical borders of 
their respective provinces and the localities of lower administrative levels, namely 
cities, counties, towns and villages. Under the provincial level, the 49 municipal 
governments implemented national and provincial rules and the municipal 
legislations that were made by their People’s Congresses, which were the lowest-
level legislative bodies. Meanwhile, they and their affiliated agencies made 
municipal rules that took sole effect upon their territories of the cities and localities at 
sub-city levels. At sub-city level, the counties, towns and villages were not entitled 
with legislative power, but they and their affiliated agencies were allowed to make 
local bespoke rules.  
 
5.2 Inter-City Competition with Legitimacy 
Based on a broad search of the internet, it was evident that the competition for 
foreign investment continued to prevail throughout the country. Such competition 
was mostly reported as happening between the cities. For example, Suzhou was 
reported as the city that by 2006 had attracted the most foreign investment80 . 
Shanghai had become the city with most regional headquarters of multinationals as 
well as foreign funded research and development (R&D) centres in mainland China 
by September 201081. Chengdu endeavoured to be the city for attracting the most 
foreign investment in the western region82. Chongqing received the most amount of 
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 For details, see http://www.chinawest.gov.cn/web/index.asp.  
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 The term ‘provincial’ refers to the administrative class, to which the provinces and autonomous regions 
belong. 
80
 See <Suzhou - City Attracted Most Foreign Investment in China – Promoting Business in London> at 
http://business.sohu.com/20060504/n243110659.shtml.  
81
 See http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-10-22/100034524.html.  
82
 See http://www.weste.net/2010/8-23/09282428924.html  
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actual operational foreign investment in 2009 and 201083. These examples showed 
that the quantity of attracted foreign investment was still significant to the cities in 
both the advantageous south and east regions and less advantageous middle and 
western regions. Meanwhile, the structure of the foreign investment, in terms of the 
investment origin and destined industrial sector, was emphasised. Specific single 
projects with an amount more than 50 million USD in the advanced manufactures 
such as telecommunications, computer and related electronics, and 
pharmaceuticals were regarded as symbolic for enhancing the cities’ prestige84. 
These examples suggested that the cities shared the similarity of using foreign 
investment intentionally and purposefully according to the strategic goals set by the 
national government. The implication was that they were attentive to legitimacy 
when competing for foreign investment.  
 
The governments of the sample cities and their provinces were found to be trying to 
attune to the regional strategy set by the national government. This was highlighted 
by two sorts of governmental actions. One sort was general, exemplified by the 
governments’ endeavour to replace the unwanted types of FOEs by the wanted 
types. The governmental aggressiveness was embodied in slogans such as ‘empty 
the cage for big birds’ 85, ‘creating forest to attract phoenixes’86 and ‘twin transfers’87. 
For example, the Guangdong provincial government declared using ‘carrot plus 
stick’ to drive labour-intensive manufacturers from the Pearl River Delta (PRD) to 
the peripheral east, north and west areas of the province88. To accommodate the 
transferred FOEs, the provincial government established 23 Transferred Industrial 
Parks in these peripheral areas. The ‘empty the cage’ slogan was quoted often by 
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 See <Western-Region Version of Attracting Foreign Investment: Chongqing Topped Actual In-Use Foreign 
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Transfer’ Strategy, New Engine for Upgrading Guangdong> http://www.gd.xinhuanet.com/zt08/shzhyi/  
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 <Big Obstacle for Industrial Transfer? Try  Carrot Plus Stick> 
http://gd.news.163.com/08/0116/10/42AQ3CJI003600SK.html  
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Shanghai89. In contrast, in Jiangsu Province, most cities including Suzhou tended to 
be reserved 90 . The aggressive actions did not seem to please the national 
government. The People’s Daily published an editorial on 27th December 2008 to 
criticise ‘some locations’ for being biased in perceiving labour-intensive small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to be of low productivity and an obstacle to 
industrial upgrade. ‘Emptying the cage’ was too harsh for SMEs to survive 91 . 
Identified from this sort of action were the various understandings of the provincial 
and municipal governments about the national foreign investment strategy of using 
foreign investment. It also demonstrated innovation and cross-learning about how to 
deliver the strategic task among the cities and provinces as well as how to satisfy 
the national government’s verification of legitimacy.  
 
Another sort was specific but also showcased the concern for legitimacy. The cities 
claimed to be the best or the first in creating certain regulatory effects, typically of 
labour protection, product safety and environmental protection. The minimum wage 
standard (MWS) could be used as an indicator of the labour protection standard. 
Setting and adjusting MWSs was made compulsory for middle-level governments by 
the MOHRSS at the end of 200392. It was meant to provide a ‘legal reference’ for 
protecting ‘the labourers’ legal rights of attaining pay.’93 However, the middle-level 
governments used the MWS as an instrument to adjust the labour resource and 
foreign investment94. The year 2008 witnessed coincidental uplifts of the MWSs 
country-wide. The MWS set by the Guangdong provincial government had been one 
of the highest. Their growth rate of MWS was 20% for 201095. An official with the 
MOFCOM justified the active uplift by the Guangdong provincial government as the 
prerequisite for attracting engineers and skilful workers to the advanced 
manufacturers96. Among the cities, Shenzhen was undoubtedly the most active in 
lifting the MWS. Being the first city to set the MWS in 1994, it continued to raise the 
                                                 
89
 See <Shanghai Industries Empty the Cage for New Birds, Nantong Jiangsu Sets up Nests for Phoenixs> at 
http://218.247.239.222/quy/106607.shtml and <Empty the Cage for New Birds at the Side of Huangpu River> 
http://www.chinasecurities.xinhua.org/xwzx/13/200908/t20090827_2193928.htm.  
90
 One exception is Wuxi, see <Ecological Crisis Forces Taihu to Speed up Empty the Cage for New Birds> at 
http://finance.ifeng.com/huanbao/zrst/20091009/1312299.shtml.  
91
 See <Local Cage-Empty for New Birds Seem to be Harsh> at 
http://bbs1.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?view=2&pageNo=1&treeView=0&id=90091604&boardId=1.  
92
 See <Decision on Minimum Wage> at http://www.51labour.com/lawcenter/lawshow-29331.html.  
93
 For more details about the MWS system, see <A Short Introduction to China’s MWS System> at 
http://www.51labour.com/html/3/3023.html  
94
 See <Jiangsu Be the First to Raise MWS – Arousing Heated Discussion about ‘Salary Raise’> 
http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/xin_wen_zhong_xin/2010-01/29/content_18527599.htm. 
95
 See <Guangdong’s MWS Raised to 1100 Yuan Excluding Overtime Subsidy> 
http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14770/21733/11524048.html  
96
See <Does Guangdong’s MWS Determine Future Trend of Chinese Economy?> 
http://news.51labour.com/show/95882.html.  
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MWS in almost every year. In 2010, the MWS rose to 1,100 RMB yuan 
(approximately £100) per month97. This was the second highest MWS among the 
big cities, after Shanghai’s and equalled those of Guangzhou and Hangzhou98. 
According to the government spokesman, the active up-lift of the MWS by 
Shenzhen was to enhance the attractiveness for labour resource so as to ameliorate 
the difficulty of recruitment faced by some enterprises. Comparatively, the city of 
Suzhou and Jiangsu Province were more reserved in setting higher MWSs than 
their counterparts in south China. Although Jiangsu was the first to begin raising the 
MWS in 2010, its growth rate was 12%99. The provincial government explained that 
while it cared about the workers’ income level, it was equally concerned about the 
difficult economic situation faced by the export-oriented enterprises. Hence the 
government would like to maintain a balance in satisfying the contrasting interests of 
the two parties.  
 
During the post-Mattel inspection campaign, the cities were in competition regarding 
product safety and quality. This was also symbolic of the concern of legitimacy. 
Suzhou claimed to be ‘the first’ to impose an all-out control method upon the export-
oriented toy manufacturers. The method imposed the registration of raw and 
auxiliary materials contracted processing sites; personnel holding essential posts; 
and the controls over product design, essential processes of production, quality and 
safety of final and returned products100. Shenzhen emphasised ‘100% completion of 
all assigned tasks’ in the Special Examination Campaign at the end of August 2007. 
The AQSIQ’s branch in Shenzhen enforced 100% of toy-makers to establish quality 
archives as well as to sign a <Quality Control Liability Statement>101. Also, the 
municipal government invited a group of 22 envoys from 14 countries, including the 
USA, Germany and Argentina, to visit some randomly chosen enterprises to test the 
quality and safety of their products which resulted in a positive comment upon the 
Shenzhen-made products being quoted by the American envoy102. The government 
then claimed to adopt ‘famous name-brand strategies’ and establish the ‘Mayor’s 
Quality Award’ to enhance the faith of overseas and home consumers in the 
                                                 
97
 See <Shenzhen Press Conference for Adjusting MWS 2010> 
http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/xxgk/xwfyr/wqhg/wbh_20100609/.  
98
 http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/sz/fsz/cyc/jqhd/201006/t20100609_1545950.htm  
99
 See supra Note 
100
 http://www.aqsiq.gov.cn/zjxw/dfzjxw/dfftpxw/200712/t20071203_56546.htm  
101
 See <Toy Sector Makes Effort to Create Good Image for ‘Made in Shenzhen’> at 
http://www.szciq.gov.cn/zxzz/ShowArticle.aspx?id=11791.  
102
 See <Make All-Out Efforts to Create Capital of Safety and Credibility> at 
http://www.szlh.gov.cn/main/zfjg/zfzcbm/jmj/gzdt/55103.shtml  
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products made in Shenzhen. It declared to ‘make all-out efforts’ to turn the city into 
‘the capital of (product) safety and credibility’103.  
 
Environmental protection was emphasised in the context of RC. This emphasis 
demonstrated the middle-level governments’ concern about legitimacy in the context 
of competing for foreign investment. The Vice Governor of Jiangsu affirmed in 
January 2007 that nowhere was allowed to lower the environment and safety 
thresholds for projects funded by overseas investment, or to accept polluting 
enterprises during industrial transfers. Any project that was found to be allowed in 
with a lesser pollutant threshold would be ceased and removed. The person 
accountable would be penalised according to relevant rules 104 . The Shenzhen 
government shared a similar stance. In 2009, the Director-General of the 
Environmental Protection Bureau pledged good service to the FOEs so that they 
could survive the financial crisis while maintaining environmental standard 105 . 
Though both places made similar emphases, the enforcement of environmental 
regulation by Shenzhen was not as good in practice as that by Suzhou. This was 
because Shenzhen’s actual achievement in environmental protection was ranked 
the lowest in the mid-term self-assessment report for the 11th Five-Year Layout106. 
This disparity necessitates further analysis at the frontline or micro level.  
 
5.3 Implementation at Micro Level 
Through a closer look, provincial achievement was a sum of those of its cities, while 
a city’s success was a sum of those of its SCJs. The SCJs were the micro-level 
regimes. The SCJs included both SIZ and non-SIZs. Non-SIZs were the county, 
town, village and their approved industrial zones of various types107. The SCJs were 
disparate in how the rules were implemented. Some regimes carried out 
implementation conscientiously in line with the rules set by the higher-level 
governments. Some treated the rules enacted by higher-level governments as 
secondary to their own concerns. The successes of provincial and municipal RC 
were generally showcased by those of the SCJs with business clusters. The lack of 
success of SCJs was kept quiet. This implied that at micro level, the governments 
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 See supra note  
104
 See <Jiangsu: Discretional Lowering ‘Environmental Entry Threshold’ Subject to Regulatory Liability> at 
http://env.people.com.cn/GB/1072/5308343.html.  
105
 See <Attitude towards Environment: Facing Financial Crisis Correctly – A Challenge as Well as an 
Opportunity> http://jnhb.fu08.cn/hangqing/9928.html.  
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 http://cn.chinagate.cn/economics/2008-09/25/content_16532857.htm  
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 For example, <Promoting Foreign Investment in Suzhou: Governments Play Well Role of ‘Servants’>  
http://www.topfo.com/Elite/Cases200707/CS-000020070706_137182.shtml; <Overseas Investors Cluster in 
Chongqing Industrial Parks> http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/cq/2010-11/01/content_21279879.htm  
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followed their own ‘rule of the game’ rather than always paying attention to 
legitimacy. 
 
According to public media, the non-SIZs at the sub-city level varied dramatically in 
their strategies and achievements in attracting business. For example, the Taicang 
County in Suzhou took pride in its success as ‘the home to German invested 
enterprises’108. Since the first German invested enterprise was established in 1993, 
the county had been concentrating on attracting foreign investment originated from 
Germany. The county council believed that the German invested enterprises were 
characteristic of intensive use of land, high production output, environmental-
friendliness, high added-value, rich technology and humane management skill. 
From the FOEs’ perspective, quoting the remark of the general manager of the 
Emag (Taicang) Company, ‘The council understands very well what we demand. 
They are ready to help us and work very efficiently.’ Few other counties in Suzhou 
had also established German Industrial Parks in order to copy the success of the 
Taicang County. However there was little reported about their achievements.  
  
Another example was about ‘emptying the cage’ by the Huaqiao Town, Kunshan 
County of Suzhou. This town expelled more than 40 SMEs that were labour-
intensive, energy-consuming and polluting. Rather than promoting new foreign 
manufacturers, the government was targeting the development of modern tertiary 
industry109.  
 
The third example was negative. In 2008, the council of Muyang County was 
embarrassed to be one of the lowest for generating GDP in the province. It adopted 
a strict liability scheme. Under this scheme, the officials of all towns and villages had 
to take part in the ‘competition of Introducing 100-Million-Yuan Projects’ 110. The 
leaders of the town and village councils who failed to achieve the goal within the 
designated timeframe would be removed from their post. 14 had been driven out of 
office by the end of August 2010. The actual consequence was that, after the check-
in ceremonies, the settler investors were no longer welcomed or cared about. The 
promises of a zero price for land lease and other financial conditions were not kept. 
The construction of factory plants was delayed and sub-quality. Many enterprises 
could not begin production as scheduled. Then the government began driving away 
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 See <Why ‘Golden Phoenixes’ Choose to Settle in Taicang New Zone? Analysing Cluster of German 
Enterprises> http://www.cnssz.com/cnssz/germany/xwnews.asp?newsid=458.  
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 http://kunshan.house.163.com/news2/110408/1/785986-1.shtml 
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 See <Another Type of ‘Empty Cage for New Birds’ in Muyang: 100 Sub-County Units Compete in Business 
Promotion> at http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/20100831/12538578718.shtml.  
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the enterprises in the names of ‘breaching the investment plan; no actual investment 
as agreed; change of plan or industrial upgrade: Tens of FOEs had been forced to 
leave.’ Meanwhile, according to the <List of Large-Scale Enterprises of Muyang 
Economic Development Zone>, nearly two thirds of the incumbent 132 enterprises 
were undertaking high-pollution and low-class productions, such as textile, industrial 
chemical and wood processing. A local native told the reporter that a nearby metal-
processing factory did not work during daytime but at night in order to avoid 
environmental inspection. ‘You will see thick yellow smoke emitting after it is dark.’  
 
5.4 Summary 
Being both rule maker and rule implementer, the middle-level and micro-level 
governments play differently from the national government. They govern smaller 
and various jurisdictions. The middle-regimes not only compete for foreign 
investment with each other, but also effect innovation and cross-learning in order to 
claim legitimacy for their implementation activities. Bearing in mind the national 
government’s active intervention, jurisdictional disparity and competitors’ emphases 
of legitimacy, middle-regimes are high in grid and low in group. Hence they are 
Uncoordinated. The middle-context offers details about the country-wide RC; inter-
city learning and innovation to attain legitimacy for enforcing rules; and variations 
between cities in their understandings concerning how to attract quality foreign 
investment.  
 
A province or a city’s achievement is the sum of its SCJs. The non-SIZ examples 
are sourced from the same province111. They showcase that foreign investment 
attraction is predominated by micro-level regimes. Unlike the SIZs, non-SIZs are 
most distant from the probing of the national government so that they have the most 
freedom in deciding and following their own ‘rules of the game’. Bearing in mind the 
variations of SCJs, or micro regimes, it is difficult to determine the grid and group of 
micro regimes based on a cross-regime perspective. Thus it is necessary to 
investigate each individual micro regime in order to capture their specific 
characteristics. Micro regime is the frontline of rule implementation.  Investigations 
into the micro regime level is the most likely to show what exactly makes the local 
jurisdictions so different in their positions, strategies and achievements in attracting 
foreign investment. 
 
 
                                                 
111
 The first and second counties belong to the same city, namely Suzhou. 
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6. Conclusion 
This introduction to the empirical research begins the empirical part of the thesis. In 
method, it clarifies the way to use the ER Framework to interpret the empirical 
phenomenon of RC and the reasons for choosing the sample country, cities and 
cases. It sets the scene for scrutinising the micro regimes in the subsequent case 
studies by descriptively analysing the macro, middle and micro contexts of the 
sample country. It clarifies that to attract quality foreign investment is the national 
RC strategy, goal and preference; that innovatively improving regulatory process 
and practice are legitimate, while reliance on lax rules and favourable conditions for 
RC are instrumental; that top-down monitoring and cross-border supply chains are 
formal and informal enforcement structures; and that competition happens at sub-
national levels, which involves inter-location learning, innovation and legitimacy 
claiming. It alerts to the sharp distinctive practices and features between macro, 
middle and micro levels of enforcement regimes. Typically, while the macro-level 
regime appears to be Adherent, middle-level regimes seem to be Uncoordinated, 
and micro-level regimes are of various types. It also draws attention to the concerns 
that the national government showed in the lower-level implementation practice. The 
different practices as well as the national government’s concern suggest their 
recognition of the success of RC through rule making at macro level will be 
fundamentally affected by implementation practice at micro level. It is now the turn 
of the case studies, which will dissect the relevant aspects and characteristics of the 
micro regimes. 
 
  
Chapter V The Adherent Regime 
 
 
This case study puts the two samples into the Adherent category on the basis of 
their high grid and high group characteristics.  The grid and group characteristics 
also draft the institutional features of the regimes. Next is to present the observed 
characteristics and findings of each sample systematically according to the ER 
framework. It finishes by addressing outstanding issues so as to reach a conclusion 
about the plausibility of the framework in interpreting the empirical phenomenon of 
RC. 
 
The two cases chosen are Wangda in the city of Shenzhen and Gongcheng in the 
city of Suzhou. Both are nation-class special investment zones (SIZs), established 
primarily for the purpose of attracting foreign investment. Each has a general-
purpose regulatory agency – the Regulatory Committee1, which is considered as the 
representative of the regime. The committees are accredited by the respective 
municipal governments to be the specialised agencies for regulating the SIZs. The 
committees are routinely accountable to their respective vice mayors for their 
performance.  Both SIZs have high profiles in the public media. As members of the 
China Association of Development Zones (CADZ), their achievements are updated 
regularly at the CADZ official website2. These are symbolic of high grid. Meanwhile, 
the regimes of Wangda and Gongcheng demonstrate the following respective 
‘group’ characteristics.  
 
The Wangda regime is in charge of the largest nationally approved SIZ in 
Shenzhen. The committee shares all regulatory authority with other local agencies. 
Thus, inter-agency cooperation is a huge and demanding routine task for the 
committee with respect to responsive and efficient problem-solving and facilitation 
provision. The current director-general (DG) is forceful in improving the inter-agency 
cooperation, which he perceives as essential to building a desirable environment for 
attracting investment. Thanks to his efforts and based on tangible means, inter-
agency cooperation has reached a desirable standard. This suggests high group. 
Therefore, Wangda is classified as an Adherent regime.  
 
                                                 
1
 Hereinafter simplified as ‘the committee’ 
2
 For the detailed information about CADZ, see its official website at www.cadz.org.cn.  
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Gongcheng is widely acknowledged as one of the most successful SIZs in attracting 
overseas investment in the country. It was established based on an agreement 
between the national leaders of China and a newly industrialised country (NIC) and 
designed to pose as a role model for attracting overseas investment. The committee 
has full local authority for governing the zone. Most inter-agency coordination occurs 
inside the committee. Meanwhile, the committee adopts a pragmatic stance in order 
to gain the cooperation from non-affiliated national agencies. This is evident of high 
group.  
 
 
Case 1:  Wangda of Shenzhen 
 
1.     The Regime 
1.1.    Profile of Wangda 
Wangda was the only SIZ in the city that had abundant land able to accommodate 
large-scale manufacturers. But its use of land was careful and purposeful - reserved 
for high-tech projects with big investment originated from the USA and the EU. It 
welcomed big investors only, namely with a single investment minimum of USD 50 
million3. By the beginning of 2008, there were more than 91 enterprises involving 
foreign investment – with a minimum 25% overseas capital4. All were set up in 
Wangda after 2001. The average investment amount for each enterprise was 
USD50 million. Originally most foreign investment came from Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan. Since 2005, the foreign investment from the EU and the 
USA grew rapidly. The year of 2007 witnessed the establishment of a 
pharmaceutical enterprise funded by investment from France. It involved an 
investment volume of 70 million euro for the first stage. Its three main industries 
were electronics, bio-pharmaceuticals and advanced engineering 5 . Wangda’s 
deployment of land showcased its legitimacy, because it was in accordance with the 
national strategy to target the most desirable foreign investment. The structure of 
the domiciled firms was evident of Wangda’s regulatory attraction to big firms from 
high-regulating countries (HRCs). 
 
1.2.    Organisational Peculiarity of the Committee 
1.1.1. Role of leadership 
                                                 
3
 Interview GISC 
4
 Interview GISC 
5
 Interview GISC; information at the official website of Wangda 
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The director-general (DG) was the leader in chief of the committee6 . He firmly 
believed that a leader’s role was crucial to the business-attracting achievement of a 
jurisdiction. On the one hand, the leader’s standpoint toward foreign enterprises was 
of concern to overseas investors. ‘The investors of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan 
are particularly attentive to who the chief leader is when deciding their destinations. 
They have a deep understanding about ‘the culture of the chief’ of our bureaucratic 
system.’ On the other hand, how the leader valued the goal of business attraction 
affected the organisational performance. ‘Our system has no mechanism to 
motivate the officials to be committed to the goal (of overseas investment 
attraction).' The DG was motivated not only by his accountability to the mayor but 
also by the joy of personal success. Therefore, ‘the team relies on the chief leader 
to motivate them. It takes me around two years to train them to perform as I wish. 
Negligence is absolutely intolerable. I have removed two section chiefs from office 
because of their negligence.’ Nevertheless, the DG was pessimistic about the 
sustainability of the improved performance and commitment: ‘When one day I am 
not the DG, the idea and performance (of the committee) will certainly change.’  The 
significance of the leadership to current and future staff’s commitment implied that 
the Wangda regime was characterised by individualisation.  
 
1.2.2   Inter-agency relationship  
The committee’s authority, delegated by the municipal government, was very 
limited. In a strict sense, it did not have full regulatory authority over any affairs 
related to foreign investment7. It could not issue the permits or qualifications for land 
lease, construction plan, fire-fighting facilities, favourable conditions, labour 
recruitment and environmental restriction. The committee’s partial authority used to 
be its blame-shifting excuse to decline facilitating the domiciled enterprises, but the 
current DG held a different stance, ‘We must be devoted to establishing cooperative 
relationship with other agencies. Only in this way can we overcome our authoritative 
handicap and provide a favourable business environment.’8 It was because of the 
DG’s personal understanding, Wangda developed inter-agency cooperation and a 
strong interest in competing for business. 
 
To improve the business environment was the ultimate goal of the DG-oriented 
coordination9. A more specific goal was to make the other agencies be committed to 
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7
 Interview EJSS2 and GIDG 
8
 Interview GIDG 
9
 Interview GIDG 
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provisions of responsive facilitation as well as of efficient and effective problem-
solving whenever needed by the domiciled enterprises. The improvement in 
coordination began with the committee’s active building of friendships with other 
agencies. Friendship was based on tangible means such as providing an extra 
budget for the agencies; reimbursing the individual officers’ extra expenses; and 
gifts or cash on the occasions of traditional festivals. Over a few years, the 
committee had established friendships with relevant agencies. When the committee 
contacted the relevant agencies for the problem-solving need, it was generally easy 
and quick to acquire desirable assistance from those agencies. The finding here 
implied that the general-purpose agency was vital in actualising inter-agency 
cooperation; and that it might need to use tangible means to lure agencies to 
cooperate.  
 
The committee’s coordination with the customs was noteworthy10. The customs was 
a key target for the committee’s coordination because of its complete discretionary 
power over the FOEs’ imports and exports. Some FOEs used to be reluctant to 
recommend Wangda because of the poor support from the customs11. But they 
generally acknowledged that the customs’ practice was improving. And the 
improvement involved the DG’s personal efforts 12 . He spent a whole year in 
persuading the Wangda and the seaport customs to cooperate in order to sort out 
the delays of shipments that had frustrated the domiciled FOEs for years. The 
background was that, despite both being branches of the Shenzhen Customs, the 
Wangda and seaport customs had no connected jurisdictions. The Wangda 
customs’ jurisdiction was restricted to the territory of Wangda. Any problem 
occurring outside the zone was regarded as irrelevant to its discretion. The 
domiciled FOEs needed to use the seaport to import and export commodities. This 
appertained to the jurisdiction of the seaport customs. Because the Wangda and the 
seaport customs adopted different formalities, procedures and styles, what was 
approved by the Wangda customs was often disagreed and unaccepted by the 
seaport customs. Consequently there were constant delays for the FOEs in shipping 
their products overseas. Thanks to the DG’s endeavour, the two customs became 
cooperative. They agreed to adopt mutually accepted formalities and procedures 
and became facilitative to the FOEs of Wangda.  
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 Interview GIDG 
11
 Interviews EHSS1/2 
12
 Interview GIDG 
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Apart from the committee-led coordination, the other agencies did not all 
communicate13. For example, the land planning and land use agencies did not talk 
to each other. They had conflicts in determining the purpose of specific areas of 
land. Some agencies routinely coordinated. The labour and the enterprise-licensing 
agencies collaborated in an annual review in order to enforce the enterprises’ 
compliance with labour law. The tax agency, the customs and the enterprise-
licensing agency shared a database to manage the enterprises’ records of paying 
tax and tariff. They adopted the same credit-rating criteria to classify the enterprises 
according to their records. Those classified as ‘Type A’ had high credibility in paying 
tax and tariff. Those classified as ‘Type D’ were the opposite. These agencies 
consequently deployed corresponding strategies in regulating the enterprises. Their 
arrangements were regularised and approaches responsive.  
 
 
2.   The Agencies 
2.1   Facilitation 
The DG and his staff showed strong interest in competition14. In their opinions, 
competition for overseas investment was necessary to fulfil the committee’s goal of 
economic development. Given the limited availability of foreign investment, locations 
must compete in order to succeed. However, the agencies did not have the same 
sense of competing for business. Nor were they equally committed or responsive to 
the facilitation to domiciled FOEs. The agencies’ commitment and responsiveness 
appeared to be related to their facilitative or restrictive duties. The enterprise-
registering agency, which was in charge of promoting business and reporting 
economic statistics, was more facilitative to FOEs than the agencies in charge of 
land, labour and environmental protection. The agencies’ mindfulness was shown 
by their responses in terms of problem-solving for the troubled FOEs. The FOEs’ 
informants’ general comments were that the committee’s help was the quickest and 
most effective.15 The customs was moderate in speed and solution. The land and 
labour agencies were slow and ineffective. Meanwhile, the FOEs reckoned the 
agencies’ help was related not only to their procedures and the staff’s competence 
but also to the stance of their chief leaders. This implied that individualisation was 
also characteristic of the task-specific agencies. 
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 Interview GIDG and GISC 
14
 Interview GIDG and GISC 
15
 Interviews EHSS1/2 and  EJSS1/2 
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Twenty-five miles from the city centre and surrounded by agricultural fields, Wangda 
had no geographic advantage compared to other SIZs of Shenzhen16. The DG 
emphasised the provision of excellent service not only as the strategy to make up 
for the geographic weakness, but also the innovation to attain regulatory 
advantage17. The staff were requested to work as the subordinates of the FOEs so 
as to satisfy the FOEs’ demands whole-heartedly.  
 
The emphasis on efficiency was featured throughout the committee’s service18. The 
‘promise scheme’ meant that the committee made precise promises to complete 
specific tasks within specified days for the FOEs. First-instance problem-solving and 
information-giving were another key point. Express approval procedure was a type 
of service provided by the committee to a new investor. It enabled the investor to 
build up the factory plant, recruit and train workers and begin production quickly so 
as to be first in the fast-changing demands of the market. For each investment 
project, a responsible person was appointed to track the whole process from sorting 
out the application formalities to the beginning of production.  
 
Another emphasis was certainty and predictability. According to a section chief’s 
(SC’s) observation19, the foreign investors expected to face a risky environment 
when choosing China. They were prepared for the risk engendered by the weak 
legal system and changeable policies but were concerned about the support 
provided by specific local authorities. Adversary, arbitrary and bribe-requesting 
authorities were the risks far more difficult to manage. Disciplined, supportive and 
helpful local authorities gave the foreign investors’ confidence in coping with the 
regulatory problems caused by a weak legal system and changeable policies.  
 
In contrast, the committee held favourable conditions and lax regulation engendered 
undesirable rather than desirable effect for attracting foreign investment 20 . ‘Big 
FOEs care less about favourable conditions than SMEs. Although labour and 
environmental laws are strictly enforced in the zone, it does not discourage them. 
They prefer Wangda to inland cities, since the policy- implementation of the latter is 
unpredictable, even though it appears to be laxer. Big FOEs are particularly 
concerned about the predictability of policy- implementation.’ The agency’s 
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 Information from the official website of Wangda 
17
 Interview GIDG 
18
 Interviews GIDG, GISC and EJSS1 
19
 Interview GISC 
20
 Interviews GIDG and GISC  
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understanding about respective preferences of big firms and SMEs as well as its 
actual enforcement of social regulations revealed its preference for big and well-
complying firms as well as its balanced performance of business attraction and rule 
enforcement. 
 
2.2 Restriction 
Wangda was a key member of a hi-tech and bio-chemical industrial base in the 
municipal government’s plan21. It allowed entry exclusively to the high-tech, energy-
saving, high value-adding and environment-friendly industries, preferably from 
HRCs. The committee’s treatment of FOEs was congruent not only with the 
differential position of the municipal government but also with the national strategy.  
 
The committee and other agencies treated the domiciled enterprises differentially 
according to size22. To begin with, the committee declined the entry application of 
small and medium sized investors. According to the committee’s experience, big 
enterprises cared about their reputations and were voluntarily law-abiding. SMEs 
had the common problem of ill compliance, since they always tried to minimise cost. 
Big enterprises were also preferred because of their greater contributions to the 
local economy in terms of generating more revenue, creating more jobs, bearing 
more social responsibility and generating more exports. The agencies were more 
supportive to big domiciled enterprises in terms of investing more time and effort on 
the big enterprises’ affairs and responding quicker to their demands. For example, 
the power supply agency invited only the big FOEs to discuss the allocation of 
power consumption. It minimised power cuts for them during periodical tight supply.  
 
Most agencies adopted the strategy of compliance-based convenience. This 
strategy functioned in two stages 23. At the entry stage, the committee took into 
consideration the applicant’s investment origin. It took an openly rejecting stance 
towards small and medium size investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The 
committee learned from its experience that the FOEs with investment origins from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea had poor law-abiding records in contrast to 
those from Japan, the EU and the USA. Some Taiwanese and Hong Kong 
companies did not pay social insurance or delayed paying wages to their workers. A 
Korean company carried out body searches on the workers. This selective strategy, 
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 Interview GISC; information at the official websites of Wangda and Shenzhen municipal government 
22
 Interview GIDG and GISC 
23
 Interview GISC 
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taken at the entry stage, ensured easier enforcement at a later stage as well as 
long-term effectiveness.  
 
At the post-entry stage, the committee collaborated with other agencies to 
differentiate the well-complying enterprises from the ill-complying ones and to adopt 
concordant enforcement strategies24. The committee took all possible opportunities 
to alert the FOEs to abide by the laws so as to benefit from the convenience of 
trusting and friendly strategies. The agencies were considerate, friendly, and more 
supportive to the FOEs that complied faithfully with Chinese laws and voluntarily 
engaged in social campaigns such as poverty relief. They were tough and stringent 
towards ill-complying enterprises. To the repetitive violators, the committee and 
other agencies together took stringent measures to correct their wrong behaviours.  
 
To summarise, Wangda’s facilitation and restriction demonstrate the following 
general characteristics: Under the leadership of the general-purpose agency, 
Wangda is active in competing for quality foreign investment. The agencies perform 
both facilitative and restrictive duties appropriately and cooperatively. Its RC 
strategy is based on innovation, efficiency and responsiveness. Certainty and 
predictability also underpin its regulatory advantage. It does not rely on favourable 
conditions or lax enforcement to attract business. It is selective to new entrants, 
targeting big and well-complying high-tech firms with origins of HRCs. This 
selectivity ensures the best use of its land and desirable enforcement effect. Its 
enforcement arrangements are regularised and its approach is responsive to the 
firms’ sizes, compliance records and social commitment. It institutionalises the 
shared value of compliance-based convenience over the jurisdiction. Generally, 
Wangda’s RC strategy adheres to the national strategy. Its facilitative and restrictive 
performance is balanced and involves legitimacy but no instrumentality. 
 
 
3.     The FOEs 
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the compliance with formal rules by the 
domiciled FOEs was evidently correlated to corporate size, investment origin and 
industry. As for informal rules, big FOEs seemed to be active in self-enforcing 
informal high standards25.  The Japanese FOEs not only abided by Chinese rules 
but also followed self-imposed norms26. The latter included international standards 
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such as that of International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), and the 
technical norms of major buyers such as Sony and Hitachi. A big Hong Kong 
printed-circuits producer voluntarily invested a huge amount of money to invent a 
recycling system to process its industrial waste27 . It was acknowledged by the 
municipal government as one of ten models of a recycling economy. The chief 
engineer was invited by the Ministry of Science and Technology to set the national 
standard for processing industrial wastes. The Guangdong Provincial Environmental 
Bureau also consulted him about recycling technologies. The finding indicated that 
the firm’s size and investment origin mattered. The firms that were big or came from 
HRCs self-enforced higher informal standards. They contributed to Wangda’s 
positive enforcement effect in product quality and environment protection. 
 
 
4.     Agency-FOE Interaction 
The agencies and the FOEs generally had close contact with each other28. The 
FOEs could call any staff member of the committee for inquiry and help. But they 
used the telephone to contact specific officers of other agencies only when familiar 
with them29. The reason was that the officers regarded using the telephone as a 
sign of insufficient respect. This implied that, whereas the FOEs enjoyed a 
symmetric status in their close relations with the general-purpose agency, they were 
in an asymmetric status in their far relations with some task-specific agencies. Some 
FOEs preferred to use written letters to contact the agencies. A Japanese FOE 
always wrote letters for inquiries and archived them together with the agencies’ 
feedback, which were referred to as official norms30. This exemplified the firm’s 
effort of being well intentioned and well informed so as to prove compliance with 
regulations as required. 
 
The committee invited the FOEs to hold meetings for the purpose of friendship-
building, information-giving, and communication31. The committee hosted an annual 
party before the Chinese New Year’s Day. The agencies such as the enterprise-
licensing and environmental protection held lectures for the FOEs to ensure 
preparation of necessary documents in time for the annual reviews. The committee 
organised a routine symposium attended by the FOEs and all relevant RAs once 
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every six months. The meetings were purposeful for both problem-targeting and 
enhancing agency-FOE dialogue. The customs organised meetings to inform the 
FOEs of new rules and procedures before their implementation. The tax agency 
notified the FOEs about the latest changes in tax policies, such as tax exemption, 
offset and rebate. Generally, the agencies’ meetings had specific purposes and the 
FOEs considered them as worthwhile. These meetings were part of the agencies’ 
social construction. They helped not only to enhance bilateral accountability and 
trust, but also the formal enforcement effect. 
 
The committee visited the FOEs to listen to their voices32. It got the FOEs’ feedback 
about policy changes; acquired their comments on the agencies’ performance; 
investigated and solved the problems encountered by the FOEs; and collected first-
hand information for research purposes about business situations. It also showed off 
the FOEs to potential investors and high-ranking officials. These visits were given 
early notice. Other agencies visited the FOEs mostly for inspection purposes. For 
example, the customs made routine checks a few times a year in order to verify 
whether the FOEs’ imported materials and equipments were actually being used for 
the claimed production rather than sold secretly. It might make spot checks on the 
FOEs’ exported products to verify whether the kind and amount were being declared 
truthfully. Unlike the routine checks, the spot checks were not given early notice. 
Some well-complying FOEs regarded these visits as not all worthwhile 33 . ‘We 
voluntarily abide by the regulations even without inspection. Yet the value of the 
inspections was that in case of a potential problem it would be discovered in good 
time for correction.’ In the FOEs’ opinion, too close a contact by agencies tended to 
be burdensome; and spot checks were likely to be unnecessary for well-complying 
firms.  
 
Most problems were related to production disruption caused by water supply 
shortage, power outage, labour dispute, fire-fighting disqualification, anti-social 
event, and disapproval by the customs, the AQSIQ or the tax agency. On the FOE 
side, the problems were usually caused by their misunderstandings of the rules or 
by overlooking some issues34. Not all FOEs complied with the rule. One example 
was that an Italian furniture maker, one of the earliest settlers in the zone, had a few 
strikes because of its refusal to pay social security for the workers. It also rejected 
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law-bounded solutions proposed by the committee and the labour agency35. On the 
agency side, some agencies’ procedures lacked transparency. Their administrators 
did not adhere to the procedures. Also different agencies might give contradictory 
interpretations of the same issue. For example, the provincial product safety bureau 
regarded the ingredients of a Japanese FOE’s product as safe, contrary to the 
opinions of the corresponding agencies of the municipal and county levels36. These 
problems cost the FOEs repetitive visits before they successfully got official 
approval. The findings about regulatory problems suggested the FOEs were various 
in their understandings towards regulation. Hence the regime could not enforce 
rules effectively on all types of firms. Meanwhile, the agencies varied in constraint, 
commitment and cooperation. Consequently, their performance was characteristic of 
uneven responsiveness, reasonableness and certainty. 
 
A Hong Kong high-tech enterprise told a story about how it nullified an unreasonable 
penalty of RMB 3 million yuan (roughly GBP 300,000) decided by the Wangda 
customs37. The FOE imported large quantities of raw materials for manufacturing 
export-oriented products. According to the old customs regulation, the import was 
exempt from tariff. The regulation changed in terms that rather than paying no tariff 
at all for imported materials, enterprises should pay a tariff first and apply for a 
refund later. However the FOE was unaware of the change and kept on following 
the old regulation for more than a year. The Wangda customs regarded the 
company as having committed an illegal operation and made a decision to penalise 
the FOE. The coordination manager declined to accept the decision and argued 
injustice. ‘The customs rather than my company should be mainly liable for the fault. 
While we were unaware of the regulatory change, the customs did not stop us from 
following the old regulation but allowed us to continue for more than a year.’ Unable 
to get justice from the Wangda customs, the coordination manager went to its 
superior. For the first time she visited the Chief of the Tariff Section of Shenzhen 
Customs to present the evidence. The section chief (SC) was convinced by the 
evidence and issued an order to the Wangda customs to annul the penalty. 
However, the Wangda customs refused to implement the order. The coordination 
manager revisited the Shenzhen Customs. The SC advised to increase the 
company’s registered investment amount, so that the company became legally 
entitled to a laxer regulation, which was still the same as the old one. The 
coordination manager followed the advice, and quickly attained a new license with 
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the increased investment amount. The Wangda customs still insisted on its original 
decision. The manager went to the Shenzhen Customs for a third time. The SC 
proposed a third solution. Namely the company paid the penalty first and requested 
the refund later. ‘I know it is almost impossible to attain a refund. Hence I requested 
a deadline for the refund. Unable to promise a date, the SC compromised and 
authorised an additional order to command the SIZ customs to withdraw its penalty.’ 
The Wangda customs this time obeyed the order. The company finally won the 
dispute with the local customs and rescued itself from a huge economic loss. ‘This is 
an absolutely unique case. But if you are expert, no need for bribery or networking, 
you can win and they will respect you.’ Later, the coordination manager was invited 
by the Wangda customs to be an external supervisor for its anti-corruption 
performance! 
 
When the problems could not be sorted out desirably, the FOEs invited the 
committee to step in as a mediator38. The committee’s administrators or SCs would 
communicate with the relevant agencies for solutions. For more difficult problems, 
the DG became personally involved. One example was that in 2004, the municipal 
legislature enacted a land plan, specifying that the land for which had been leased 
to a Hong Kong manufacturer since 2001 should be used for commercial 
purposes39. This legislation outlawed this FOE’s use of the land. The DG and the 
FOE’s coordination manager frequently contacted the legislature, the mayor and the 
leaders of the land and planning bureaus to resolve the problem. After three years 
of lobbying, the legislature eventually corrected the land plan in 2007, re-legitimising 
the FOE’s industrial usage.  
 
The above two stories about the wrong decisions made by the task-specific agency 
and legislature show that, wrong regulatory decisions can be corrected through 
persistent dialogue, communication and bargaining by the FOE. Facing the 
problems, the FOE trusts the effect of its voice. Its power is symmetric with the 
agencies. The correction of the wrong decisions not only improves the agencies’ 
accountability to the FOE, but also enhances the FOE’s loyalty to Wangda. 
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5. Findings 
Institutional features     Wangda is classified as an Adherent regime, taking into 
consideration of its high grid and high group properties – routine and specific 
accountability and notable inter-agency cooperation.  
 
Regulating side   The Wangda agencies are well constrained but vary in 
commitment and interest in competing and supporting business. The DG of the 
general-purpose agency plays a vital role in motivating the agencies’ commitment 
and improving their performance. Overall, facilitation has become more responsive, 
efficient and predictable than before, with innovative quick-responding schemes now 
in operation. They are selective about firms and mostly prefer big high-tech 
investors from HRCs. They adopt differentiating strategies in enforcement according 
to the FOEs’ sizes, industries, investment origins and compliance records. Such 
strategies are in accord with the national strategies and benefit both the agencies 
and the FOEs in responsive and flexible terms. In general, facilitative and restrictive 
performances are balanced and innovative.  
 
Regulated side The desired type of FOEs is attracted to Wangda as planned 
and the population is on the rise. It is evident that they are typically big high-tech 
investors from HRCs - well-intentioned, well-informed, and voluntarily self-enforce 
informal higher standards. They are very selective about the regime and prefer a 
regime that is characteristic of legitimacy, certainty and responsiveness. Not all 
domiciled FOEs are law-abiding, typically early-settler SMEs from low-regulating 
countries.  
 
Two-sided marriage and match   The agency-FOE relationship is close. This 
does not please all FOEs, since it costs time and human resource. The distribution 
of power is symmetric typically for the general-purpose agency and the FOEs, but 
asymmetric for some other agencies. Led by the general-purpose agency, most 
agencies are attentive to the FOEs’ voice and active in social construction. The 
bilateral interaction demonstrates the logic of appropriateness. Most working 
arrangements are regularised, typically in responsive enforcement. Mutual trust and 
accountability is evident. But agencies do not win trust from the FOEs evenly. Under 
the current DG, the general-purpose agency plays a leading role in engendering RC 
achievements. The general-purpose agency is most accountable and is trusted the 
most by the FOEs. Generally, the regime is suitable for big high-tech FOEs from 
HRCs and vice versa. The preferences of the regime and most desirable type of 
FOEs are a match. 
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RC outcomes    Wangda regime has been fulfilling the goal of attracting big FOEs 
from high-regulating countries. This indicates its achievement in business attraction. 
Meanwhile, there are enforcement problems within the regime. Some are caused by 
the agencies’ unreasonableness, irresponsiveness, poor coordination and 
commitment. Some are caused by the FOEs’ resistance to regulation. These 
problems are generally solved desirably based on purposeful and appropriate efforts 
of the involved firms and the general-purpose agency. The solutions enhanced the 
agency-FOE mutual trust and loyalty. The regime generally encourages and 
appreciates the FOEs’ self-regulation. Hence enforcement effect is considered as 
efficient. The regime has been evidently in using favourable conditions to attract the 
most desirable foreign investment. It demonstrates legitimacy rather than 
instrumentality in RC. Although certainty is likely to be affected if the DG and other 
individual leaders change, however Wangda demonstrates competitive advantage 
for quality foreign investment under current leadership at least.  
 
 
6.       Outstanding Issues 
It is recognised that most empirical finding for Wangda regime has been accounted 
for by the ER Framework. Nevertheless there are a few outstanding empirical issues 
that need to be addressed.  
 
First of all, in reality, the agencies are not evenly committed, cooperative or 
responsive. A typical example is that the locally based customs stuck to its 
unjustifiable decision to penalise the well-intentioned and ill-informed FOE in spite of 
the superior’s first correction. The ER Framework seems to give an even account for 
the agencies that share the same regime. The explanation is that the reality is quite 
complex, whereas the framework, like all others in social science, is a simplified 
reflection of the reality. The framework simplifies agencies into two sorts: facilitative 
and restrictive. Its focus surrounds two types of corresponding regulatory practice – 
facilitation and restriction. Empirically, the agencies’ commitment, cooperation and 
responsiveness are found to be more or less related to the facilitative or restrictive 
properties of their respective duties. This finding supports the rationale of the 
framework in this regard. As long as the agencies demonstrate generally shared 
characteristics, their diversity and exception are acceptable. Also, the general-
purpose agency is viewed as the representative of the regime, as accounted the 
framework. This point supports the interpretation of the framework.  
 
 137 
Secondly, individualisation of the regime is evident empirically but is missed from 
the ER Framework in two ways. In one way, the leader’s role is of vital importance 
to the performance of the regime. He not only improves inter-agency cooperation 
but also advances facilitative performance and corrects restrictive errors. The other 
way is that an individual’s significance is not only typical of the committee but also of 
most other relevant agencies. Any change in individual official is likely to engender a 
change in the agency’s practice. The explanation is that although the used historical 
institutionalism approach notes individualisation, the ER Framework does not pay 
particular attention to this issue. Characterising the agency in a collective rather 
than individual term based on the grid-group typology, the ER Framework does not 
treat the leader’s role exceptionally. Meanwhile, whether the significance of the 
leader’s role is the institutional peculiarity of Wangda regime or is a general trait for 
all Adherent regimes is still a question. Before examining another Adherent regime, 
a conclusion is yet to be made about the framework in this regard.  
 
Thirdly, strong inter-agency cooperation does not automatically happen in reality, 
but is initiated and enhanced through deliberate effort and tangible means by the 
general-purpose agency. The ER Framework only mentions strong inter-agency 
cooperation for the Adherent regime. It does not clarify how it happens. As self-
declared by the framework, the interpretation is meant to be simplified and heuristic 
rather than elegant. Thus the lack of clarification in this regard means at most that 
the framework is not sufficiently refined rather than being wrong.  
 
Fourthly, the close agency-FOE relation is considered by a few FOEs as being 
unnecessary in reality. The framework seems to be positive in this regard. The 
explanation is that the framework accounts for this relation rooted in enforcement 
rather than RC theories. Whereas the enforcement theories do not specify how 
‘close’ is close, it agrees with the factual non-punitive characteristic. Also, the 
characteristic and effect of frequent visits appear to be contextually specific to 
Wangda. Unless there is further finding from other Adherent regimes, relational 
characteristic and effect should not be generalised as a trait of the Adherent regime 
now, or viewed as an issue to the theory in this regard.  
 
Finally, relevant to the previous two issues, regulatory certainty of Wangda is 
doubtful in the long run due to potentially changing individuals. Doubtful certainty 
disagrees with the interpretation of the Adherent regime in the ER Framework. 
However, this disagreement will be acceptable if considering that at least the regime 
is of certainty under the current leadership, particularly the DG of the committee. 
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Indeed, the disagreement confirms that the framework is designed to be heuristic so 
that it is free from covering the dynamic caused by some fine factors such as 
individualisation, personal change and their impact. Based on its institutional logic, 
the framework can be stretched and interprets the individualisation-related 
uncertainty as an institutional peculiarity of Wangda regime. Without other Adherent 
regimes being found to be the same in suffering from low certainty, the interpretation 
of high certainty for the Adherent regime by the ER Framework should not be 
discounted.  
 
The above-mentioned identified empirical points are explicable. Some are caused 
by the simplicity of the ER Framework. Some remain to be further checked by other 
Adherent regimes. It is concluded that the interpretation made by the ER Framework 
is generally plausible. 
 
 
Case 2:  Gongcheng of Suzhou 
 
1.   The Regime 
1.1.   Profile of Gongcheng 
Gongcheng is considered as one of the best SIZs in attracting overseas investment 
in China40. It was established based on a joint agreement between the national 
governments of China and a newly industrialised country (NIC) in 1994. It copied the 
model of the free trade zone of the NIC and was renowned for its agencies’ rule-
bound practice 41 . Until the second half of 2008, most FOEs in the SIZ were 
undertaking hi-tech manufacturing. On average, an FOE had an investment amount 
of USD 30 million. Among the incumbent FOEs, 49% are funded with investment 
originated from the EU and USA, 20% from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, 18% 
from Japan and South Korea, 6% from Singapore and other countries 42 . The 
structure of the FOEs of Gongcheng indicated its extraordinary regulatory 
advantage in attracting the most desirable foreign investment as defined by the 
national strategy – big firms from HRCs. 
 
1.2 The Committee and Inter-Agency Cooperation 
The general-purpose agency, or the representative of the Gongcheng regime, was 
Gongcheng Regulatory Committee. It involved the experts dispatched from the free 
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trade zone of the NIC at an early stage43. The committee was delegated with all the 
authority that the municipal government could afford in order to govern the zone. 
Most relevant enforcement activities were carried out by the constituent 
departments and affiliated agencies of the committee. The only exception was the 
jurisdiction of the national agencies, including the local branches of the customs, 
AQSIQ, national revenue bureau and foreign currency regulatory bureau. 
 
Inter-agency cooperation did not seem to be an issue in the Gongcheng context44. 
However, the agencies varied in commitment. The DG admitted that the national 
agencies did not care about the FOEs’ satisfaction as much as the committee. 
Accordingly, the committee took a pragmatic stance. It satisfied the national 
agencies in both public and private fashions. It provided well-conditioned modern 
office buildings in which the agencies could work comfortably. It also developed and 
leased up-market residential flats for their staff. This convinced the national 
agencies that they were being treated as part of, rather than alien to, the 
Gongcheng governing body. Hence they had little excuse for non-cooperation with 
the committee. Some argued that the national agencies’ cooperation was partly 
caused by their awareness of the committee’s direct access and accountability to 
the national government 45 . Non-cooperation, if any, was likely to be reported 
upwards by the committee and hence incur the criticism of the national government. 
Yet this position was not supported by open finding. Leaving the true reason aside, 
the national agencies generally worked cooperatively as the committee wished.  
 
The committee had routine dialogue with the national agencies46. Once in every four 
months they informed each other of the working goals and schedules so as to take 
consistent steps. The national agencies also coordinated with each other47. For 
example, in 2007, the customs and the foreign currency bureau collaborated closely 
in order to enforce the national government’s command of controlling the 
speculation of inflowing overseas hot-money. The agencies issued a joint notice to 
inform the FOEs of the collaboration one week before their actual operation began. 
This finding showed that, in Gongcheng, inter-agency cooperation was strong and 
regulatory certainty was high. 
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2.       The Agencies 
2.1 Facilitation   
Gongcheng demonstrated strong interest in RC. The DG perceived ‘very intense 
competition for overseas investment,’ 48  and demonstrated a strong sense of 
maintaining the established advantage of Gongcheng: ‘We are striving for honour. 
To be the Number One is the goal set jointly by the two national governments.’ He 
held the leader’s role as minimal: ‘The Hong Kong and Taiwan businessmen care 
about who is the leader. The EU and the American investors care about the 
performance (of the agency). We are attentive to our performance like managing a 
renowned brand-name. It is not related to any individual or the change of the 
leader.’ 
  
The value that the agencies attached to the regime’s self-image and prestige was 
evident of their sense of appropriateness. Understanding of the different 
preferences of the desired and undesired types of firms underpinned the agencies’ 
competing strategy and performance. The interviewed FOEs confirmed the support 
given by the administrators of the committee was generally sufficient49. It rarely 
involved the officers at upper levels. The freedom from the effect of individual 
change in the agencies’ performance showcased institutionalisation of commitment 
in the regime.  
 
The committee emphasised a fast and standard delivery of service to new investors 
and incumbent FOEs 50 . It considered efficiency, certainty and innovation were 
essential to satisfy the taste of the desired type of foreign investors. Serious about 
the firms’ voice, the committee organised a survey in 2007 and got replies from 
about 20 domiciled multi-nationals. Each respondent had factories in at least two 
places in China. They ranked Gongcheng as the best place in the country in 
satisfying the multi-nationals. A Japanese interviewee confirmed the result by giving 
an example of the time taken for an enterprise to change the registration of its 
ownership51. While the Gongcheng committee took 10 minutes, the authorities of 
other jurisdictions in Suzhou took three years, and those in Shanghai four years. 
‘Big FOEs mind efficiency and certainty. That is what we emphasise and we try our 
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best to do. Although the FOEs are upset by changeable policies, they are satisfied 
with our performance.’52 Gongcheng won its FOEs’ appreciation and trust. 
 
For new entrants, the committee adopted fast-track approval to satisfy them53. To 
establish a new enterprise with an investment amount more than USD 30 million, 
the committee requested the investor only to register the project. It freed the 
investor from the approval procedure. The committee only initiated the approval 
procedure for a project of less than USD 30 million. Yet this procedure could be 
finished at one stop. For domiciled enterprises, the committee emphasised 
professionalism in its working arrangement. The officers stayed at arms-length from 
the enterprise – a distance neither too close, to avoid intrusions, nor too far, as the 
officers were ready to help in case of need54.  
 
The committee had the authority to decide its own privileged conditions and it had 
used this authority to attract the desired type of foreign investment55. These included 
a two-year tax holiday for the desired types of FOEs, settlement subsidies for expert 
engineers, and venture capital funding for the projects with technological inventions. 
The committee had an expert commission to assess the qualifications of the FOEs 
for the tax holidays, subsidies and funding. The expert commission reviewed the 
FOEs’ qualifications on a yearly basis. Nevertheless, the committee considered the 
financial incentives to be of limited appeal. ‘Financial incentives interest the 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan but not those from the EU and the 
USA.’ The finding here indicated that Gongcheng had aligned self-determined 
favourable conditions with the national strategy appropriately. It implied that its 
success in attracting big firms from HRCs was based on competitive advantage. 
 
2.2 Restriction 
The stance of the committee towards the FOEs was identified as different 
depending on their size, industry, investment origin and compliance 56 . It had 
express procedures for the big enterprises which were reckoned to be the main 
contributors to the Gongcheng revenue. It also held that stringent enforcement of 
the labour and environment regulations benefited the attraction of big investors. ‘Big 
FOEs do not mind labour and environmental cost. This cost is visible and 
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manageable.’ 57  This finding indicated the regime’s understanding of balanced 
facilitation and restriction.  
 
The committee set the entry threshold according to the industry 58 . It adopted 
strategies that mirrored the municipal government’s ‘empty the cage for big birds’. It 
emphasised the promotion of foreign investment that funded the manufacturers of 
the most advanced technologies in the country. These manufacturers featured 
owning IPR, constant and huge funding for research and development (R&D), and 
maintaining a high requirement of advanced educational backgrounds for their 
employees. The committee offered privileged financial incentives to the FOEs with 
IPR and R&D centres, but not to those without. For the old labour-intensive 
enterprises, the committee allowed them the freedom to choose to stay or exit, 
rather than directly driving them away. Most enterprises chose to move to partner 
jurisdictions of Gongcheng. In this way, they avoided the high labour and land cost 
of Gongcheng, while enjoying a similar regulatory model as Gongcheng. 
Environment protection was enforced from the start. Consequently Gongcheng was 
a pollution-free zone 59 . The finding suggested that while being selective about 
industries as required by the municipal government’s strategy, Gongcheng 
implemented it in a business friendly and considerate manner. This exemplified how 
it ensured legitimacy in practice as well as enhanced the firms’ loyalty.  
 
Though the committee claimed to treat the FOEs equally regardless of their 
countries of origins, its preference of Japanese, EU and American investors and 
disfavour of Taiwan and Hong Kong investors was widely known 60 . The FOE 
informants held that the underpinning reason was that Japanese, the EU and USA 
FOEs were faithful law-abiders. They treated their workers well in terms of hiring 
them permanently and supplying them with good living conditions and other welfare 
benefits. In contrast, the Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore FOEs were mean to 
their workers in terms of paying low wage, social security, pension and housing. 
Although the committee’s preference for the investors from EU, the USA and Japan 
was based on the FOEs’ compliance, it was not free from doubt. An informant of a 
Chinese diaspora’s enterprise complained: ‘They should support us more, because 
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we are Chinese.’61 This finding indicated that firms were various in their intentions in 
the context of enforcement. 
 
The customs regulated the FOEs based on categorisation62. The FOEs in Category 
A were given the most trust, with their imports and exports examined with minimum 
frequency. Those in Category B, C and D were faced with more frequent checks of 
their imports and exports. Likewise, the local revenue department had internal 
criteria to assess the tax-paying credibility of the FOEs. Its staff were more friendly 
to those with good credibility than to those with a poor one. The agencies referred to 
relevant law and rules to penalise the FOEs that conducted illegal business. ‘Their 
use of penalty targets for what had been done wrong rather than for who did it. It is 
fair.’63 This FOE’s positive comment showed that the agencies and the FOEs shared 
the value of responsive enforcement. 
 
 
3.     The FOEs 
The FOEs’ compliance with formal rules was evidently correlated to their investment 
origins64. When the Labour Contract Law was promulgated in 2007, it did not cause 
a stir for the Japanese, European and American companies, but upset some Hong 
Kong and Taiwanese companies. This implied that Japanese, European and 
American companies had voluntarily adopted high labour standards, whereas Hong 
Kong and Taiwanese companies had previously adopted low labour standard. The 
committee enforced the minimum wage standard (MWS) set by the municipal 
government. It was one of the highest in the country. This high labour standard 
attracted skilful workers to Gongcheng and made the supply of labour abundant. A 
Taiwanese manufacturer then circumvented the new law by hiring 6,000 temporary 
workers from the job agency in order to avoid spending on long-term workers’ 
welfare.  
 
All informants’ FOEs were upstream producers. They did not directly export but sold 
on their products to end-product manufacturers. They adopted the buyers’ imposed 
product norms. One informant’s Japanese company was a norm-setter for its 
industry 65 . Given Gongcheng as a pollution-free zone, the voluntary self-
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enforcement of environmental norms was not apparent. Even so, the Japanese 
company adopted ‘Product Environment Management System’. It was committed to 
applying recycling technology in both development and production processes and to 
manufacturing products with environmentally-safe substances66.  
 
Generally, the firms from HRCs and LRCs were evidently different towards formal 
enforcement. Those from HRCs had voluntarily adopted social standards that were 
higher than formal ones. Those from LRCs struggled to meet the requirements of 
the new stricter labour law. A big firm from LRC even took strategic actions in order 
to avoid the labour regulation. Nevertheless, all firms complied with the norms 
imposed by their buyers. This implied the significance of informal enforcement 
structure. 
 
 
4.       Agency-FOE Interaction  
Most agencies’ working arrangements were regularised, simple and stable. The 
committee departments and the national agencies adopted the ‘promise scheme’67. 
They promised the FOEs to complete processing the FOEs’ affairs and to reply to 
the FOEs’ inquiries and requests within a specified time. This scheme assured the 
FOEs efficiency and certainty. Meanwhile, the departments of the committee that 
directly handled regulatory affairs appointed special coordinators to communicate 
with specific FOEs. Typically, the Marketing and Economic Development 
Department of the Committee was in the frontline for handling the FOEs’ inquiries 
and complaints. It was responsible for problem-solving, including coordinating with 
other departments and agencies. More than 30 persons worked as special 
coordinators and project managers who were assigned the permanent task of 
looking after specific enterprises. Both the special coordinators and project 
managers were accountable to the section chief (SC) of the Marketing and 
Economic Development Department. Under ordinary circumstances, the special 
coordinators and project managers were the people of the committee that the FOEs 
contacted most often68. They were commented on by the FOEs as being committed, 
knowledgeable and helpful in terms of fixing the majority of concerned issues. In 
case they were incapable of solving specific problems, the FOEs were referred to 
the SCs.  
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 Interview EJSI2E. Corporate brochure on file with author 
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68
 Interview ETSI4E, EJSIE1 and ETSIE2 
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However, not all agencies were friendly, committed and responsive. Among the 
committee departments, the public fund and local revenue departments were the 
least friendly 69 . Among the national agencies was the revenue agency. Their 
unfriendliness was represented by their administrators’ impatient attitudes, their 
ambiguous instructions about procedure and requirements, and poor advance 
notice of policy changes. Due to ambiguous instructions, the FOEs’ personnel had 
to pay repetitive visits in order to sort out the same issues. Yet the national revenue 
agency showed some seriousness in considering the FOEs comments 70 . For 
example, it installed a queuing machine after the FOEs complained about the 
queuing chaos 71 . The FOEs were invited to give comments on the agencies’ 
performance once a year. But they tended to avoid criticising the administrators so 
as to avoid potential embarrassment for the long-term frequent contact. This 
showed the FOEs’ tolerance and loyalty to the agencies. 
 
The most used means in the mutual contact was telephone72. Each department of 
the committee and the national agency had a permanent hotline for receiving the 
FOEs inquiries and complaints. This showed symmetry in the agency-firm 
interaction. Meanwhile, the committee actively used the internet to inform the FOEs 
of policy changes before they took effect. For example, the committee announced 
an increase in the charges for water and electricity. It also publicised the information 
about the demands of certain commodities in the domestic market so that the 
interested FOEs could reference for selling their products domestically. The FOEs 
commented Gongcheng’s website as informative. 
 
The committee regularly organised symposiums to listen to the FOEs’ opinions73. 
The customs and the AQSIQ hosted meetings to inform the FOEs of policy 
changes. The local revenue department organised monthly meetings to notify new 
policies, changes in the rules and other noteworthy issues. Occasionally, it hosted 
special lectures concerning particular new rules. For example, in 2007 it invited an 
official from the Ministry of National Revenue to explain the changing trend of the 
corporate income tax law74. The lecture was followed by some seminars attended by 
legal experts to discuss the change. The FOEs were thus made ready before the 
new law was promulgated. The FOEs held these meetings as worthwhile. Except for 
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 Interview ETSI4E and EJSIE2 
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74
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the mentioned agencies, the other agencies seldom hosted meetings in order to 
minimise intrusion to the firms.  
 
With some exceptions, the agencies rarely visited the FOEs75. The vice DG of the 
committee who was in charge of marketing and economic development affairs 
visited the domiciled enterprises once or twice a year to understand the FOEs’ 
demands and difficulties76. The customs undertook an annual check to verify the 
authenticity of the FOEs’ declarations. The local revenue department visited the 
FOEs to alert them and to avoid any unintentional criminal offence. These visits 
were made after plenty of notice had been given77. The FOEs read the agencies’ 
rare visits as the agencies’ trust and appreciation in the FOEs’ self-regulation and 
acknowledgement of achieved positive effect.  
 
There seemed to be few problems encountered by the FOEs. Problems tended to 
occur when the FOEs were not quite adaptive to changed policies. The FOEs 
tended to communicate with the relevant agencies directly in case of problems. 
Usually they sorted them out through communicating with the special coordinators 
or project managers78. For example, a fired FOE employee made a grievance claim 
to the labour department of the committee. The special coordinator telephoned the 
human resource chief of the FOE to clarify the cause and procedure for dismissal. 
After hearing the explanation, the coordinator agreed that the cause for dismissal 
was acceptable but the procedure followed by the FOE was not correct. Thus the 
coordinator requested the chief to redo the procedure79. Although the agencies’ 
responses to solve the FOEs’ problems varied in speed, the help they offered was 
generally considered as effective by the FOEs. The finding of few problems implied 
that the agencies and the firms had reached an agreement about what each was 
obliged to do in the context of enforcement. This agreement was functioning like a 
societal contract. Both parties abode by it in their action and interaction. Formal and 
informal enforcement structures complemented mutually. In case of a problem, the 
two parties discussed to make a solution. Overall Gongcheng maintained positive 
enforcement effect. 
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5. Findings 
Institutional features      Gongcheng was typical of an Adherent regime. Its 
representative agency is accountable to the national government, has been trying its 
best to maintain the image as a role model in competing for quality overseas 
investment, and ensures strong inter-agency cooperation in delivering services and 
enforcing social regulations. These characteristics are evident of high grid and high 
group. 
 
Regulating side With a few exceptions, the agencies are evidently well 
disciplined, committed and cooperative. The regime maintains a high profile in 
competing for business with high quality, typically big high-tech investors from 
HRCs. It values its achievement as a glory and strives to maintain its distinguished 
reputation. Its competitive strategies are featured by a performance of 
responsiveness, efficiency, certainty and innovation. The agencies adopt 
differentiating stances according to the FOEs’ sizes, industries and compliance 
records. These stances are in line with the national strategies concerning overseas 
investment attraction as well as the Suzhou municipal government’s reserved 
attitude towards ‘empty the cage’. Thus they are legitimate. The enforced regulatory 
standards are high, yet domiciled FOEs’ choices are respected. This is symbolic of 
a balance between attracting business and enforcing rules. The agencies’ 
performance is mostly professional and institutionalised. The change of an individual 
official, including the leader, is not expected to bring about change in performance. 
The leader’s role, individualisation and the lack of long-term certainty, which are all 
characteristic of Wangda regime, are not identified in Gongcheng.  
 
Regulated side The domiciled FOEs vary in complying with formal and 
informal rules. Those from HRCs give highest comments on Gongcheng’s 
regulatory legitimacy, certainty and efficiency. They are serious in self-enforcing 
higher informal standards. These FOEs are well-intentioned and well-informed and 
are the preferred and attracted target of the regime. The FOEs from LRCs do not 
seem to be well-intentioned, which is demonstrated typically by their reaction 
towards labour regulations.  
 
Two-sided marriage and match The agency-FOE relational distance is at arm’s 
length. This allows the FOEs to be free from unnecessary disturbance whereas 
being assured of the agency’s ready help in case of need. The general-purpose 
agency is vital in shaping and structuring the investment environment and winning 
RC victory. The FOEs can access help from permanent hotlines at any time. The 
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receptionists and project managers of the agencies play the major role in 
responding to the FOEs’ voice and solving problems efficiently and effectively. The 
distribution of power is symmetric for both sides. Social construction engenders 
mutual trust, accountability and loyalty. Regularised arrangement institutionalises 
shared value. Generally, the preferences of the regime and the targeted firms are in 
perfect match. 
 
RC outcomes   The regime’s business-attracting achievement is outstanding. The 
problems encountered by the FOEs are not serious. The agencies’ rare visits imply 
their trust in the FOEs’ self-regulation. Formal and informal enforcement structures 
are functioning complementarily. This indicates efficient enforcement effect. 
Meanwhile, the structure of the domiciled firms is indicative of the regime being 
successful in attracting the most desired high-quality foreign investment. It can be 
viewed as a legitimate rather than instrumental use of favourable conditions. In 
general, the Gongcheng regime lives up to its reputation as a role model of 
competitive advantage. 
 
 
6.      Outstanding Issues 
Generally speaking, the empirical findings for Gongcheng agree with the 
interpretation for the Adherent regime in the ER Framework. However there are a 
few outstanding issues that need to be addressed. One issue is that the inter-
agency cooperation in Gongcheng is based on tangible benefits. Sharing 
commonality with Wangda, this characteristic has been explained in the Wangda 
case. The explanations for other issues are given below.  
 
One issue is that the case here implies that the Gongcheng regime is the most 
successful in business attraction. The ER Framework is not explicit as to whether 
the Adherent regime is the most successful type. But considered from the 
perspective of the RC outcome of competitive advantage, the framework does have 
an implication of be the most desirable type of regime in the context of RC and 
enforcement.  
 
The second is that empirically, the agency-FOE relation is at arm’s length, whereas 
the framework states it as close. This issue can be said as minor. This is because 
there is no explicit measurement for close and far distance. Instead, the agency’s 
enforcing style is a more reliable indicator. Judging by the agencies’ trusting and 
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non-penal attitude towards the FOEs, the bilateral distance is close. Hence the 
empirical finding does not disagree to the specific argument of the ER Framework.  
 
The last issue is that neither all agencies nor all FOEs have uniform characteristics 
as described by the framework. This issue is acceptable. As declared by the 
framework, the type of agency and firm is characterised as archetype. This means 
that the framework tolerates some exceptions in the real world.  
 
To summarise, based on the finding of the Gongcheng case, and the explanation of 
the outstanding issues, the interpretation by the ER Framework is generally 
plausible.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Wangda and Gongcheng are categorised as the Adherent regime based on their 
characteristics of strong upward accountability (grid) and strong inter-agency 
cooperation (group). Most observed characteristics of their agencies’ stances, 
strategies and performance towards foreign investment attraction and enforcement, 
the domiciled FOEs’ compliance with formal and informal rules, and the agency-
FOE bilateral relation and interaction, the match of the preferences of the regime 
and the FOE as showcased in the structure of domiciled FOEs are agreeable with 
the corresponding interpretation made for the Adherent regime by the ER 
Framework. The identified outstanding issues are explicable in terms of the 
simplified and heuristic limitation of the ER Framework. The framework interprets 
the players’ behaviour and interaction in archetypal and static fashions. 
Consequently, it is not a surprise to find it falls short in reflecting the reality where 
the agencies and FOEs do not behave and interact uniformly, and where inter-
agency cooperation does not happen automatically. Since there is no finding for 
individualisation in Gongcheng, individualisation, exemplified as the leader’s role, 
and uncertainty, caused by individual change, could be considered as an 
institutional peculiarity of Wangda regime. More empirical information is required 
from other sources in order to determine whether individualisation is an Adherent 
trait or not. Since the issue of individualisation is uncovered rather than interpretd by 
the ER Framework, this undetermined issue at most means that the ER Framework 
is limited rather than its interpretation is doubtful.  Generally speaking, the identified 
outstanding issues do not pose a challenge to the interpretation of the ER 
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Framework. Based on the findings of the two cases, it is concluded that the ER 
Framework is convincing in its account for the Adherent regime. 
 
  
Chapter VI The Uncoordinated Regime 
  
 
This case study first explains the reason for categorising the two samples as the 
Uncoordinated regime based on the grid and group characteristics, as well as the 
institutional features of the samples. The rest of this chapter is a detailed 
presentation of the observed findings based on the ER Framework and a brief 
scrutiny of the outstanding issues. It ends with a conclusion about the plausibility of 
the interpretation of the ER Framework. 
 
The two samples are Fujia of Shenzhen and Ximo of Suzhou. Both of them are 
nation-class special investment zones (SIZs) that were established for the primary 
purpose of attracting foreign investment. Their achievements are regularly updated 
at their own official websites, those of Shenzhen and Suzhou municipal 
governments and China Association of Development Zones (CADZ). For both 
zones, the Regulatory Committees1 are the specialised general-purpose regulators 
accredited by their respective municipal governments. The committees are 
considered as the representative agency of the regimes. The director-generals 
(DGs) are the chief leaders of the committees, who are regularly accountable to the 
vice mayors.  These characters show that Fujia and Ximo are of high grid. 
Meanwhile, they are different types of SIZs and have different group characteristics.  
 
Fujia is one of the earliest SIZs that was endowed a special tariff policy. Approved 
by the central government for the establishment, it used to serve as a role model of 
its type. Having drawn wide attention, the regime is further considered to be high in 
the ‘grid’. The performance of the committee is commented on by its older FOE 
residents as getting worse since the change of the DG. The committee and other 
relevant agencies lack coordination, which is a sign of low ‘group’.  
 
Ximo was established particularly for the purpose of attracting foreign investment in 
the high-tech sector. Its official profile emphasises the portfolio and achievement of 
high-tech business recruitment. This additionally indicates high ‘grid’. The committee 
departments and national agencies seem to mostly lack coordination, given their 
noteworthy disparate working attitudes, styles and arrangements. This implies low 
‘group’.  
 
                                                 
1
 Hereinafter simplified as ‘the committee’ 
                                                                                           
152 
 
Case 1:  Fujia of Shenzhen 
 
 
1. The Regime 
Fujia was one of the earliest SIZs approved by the national government. Its 
committee had served as a role model in successfully recruiting foreign investment 
to develop export-oriented manufacturing2. By the beginning of 2008, there were 
more than 60 FOEs of various sizes resident in the zone. It was almost fully 
occupied and had little space available for additional entrants. There were three 
main industries in the zone: the IT industry, with most investment originating from 
Taiwan, and the toy making and jewellery processing invested by Hong Kong 
businessmen. This structure of the firms indicated Fujia’s popularity among big low-
and high-tech investors from low regulating origins (LRCs). 
 
The committee was not delegated full authority to regulate the economic affairs of 
the zone3. The most essential authorities, including the registration to establish an 
enterprise, labour, lease of land and construction of factory plants, was ultimately in 
the hands of the corresponding county or municipal bureaus. In recent years, the 
committee had become inactive in communicating with the related agencies. ‘At 
least according to my experience, the committee does not coordinate with the 
customs or the AQSIQ’4. This indicated low group for the regime under current 
leadership. 
 
 
2. The Agencies 
2.1 Facilitation5 
Considering the little room left in Fujia for newcomers, it appeared to be 
understandable that the committee was not as active in attracting foreign investment 
as in the past. Nevertheless, the vice president of the biggest electronic FOE had an 
insider’s view regarding the committee’s changed stance. ‘The committee is an alien 
in the current situation of inter-city competition for foreign investment. The 
governments of Ningbo, Fuzhou and Xiamen6 work very hard to attract overseas 
                                                 
2
 Detailed information available at the official website of Fujia 
3
 Interview FTFDG 
4
 Interview ETSS 
5
 Interview ETSS  
6
 All are in the eastern region.  
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investors. I was surprised by a call from a vice mayor of Xiamen asking about the 
demand of my company in deciding our next destination. Such a commitment is 
impressive. Most bureaus of the Shenzhen Government perform well – committed, 
standardised and friendly.  Unfortunately the committee is not among them. The 
director-general (DG) is not concerned about the domiciled FOEs at all. If he meets 
me face-to-face, I am sure he doesn’t even know who I am. Since he came into 
office in 2002, the performance of the committee has changed fundamentally. There 
is no concern, understanding or support for us. The only remaining advantage of the 
zone is its special tariff policy.’  Based on the FOE’s comment, in spite of facing 
strong RC, the representative agency of Fujia became disinterested and 
uncommitted in competing for business. The regime demonstrated little regulatory 
innovation and superiority. Hence it had no regulatory advantage.  The relational 
distance between the agency and the firms was far. They lacked accountability and 
trust to each other. These problems occurred consequently to the change of 
leadership. This implied that Fujia was characteristic of individualisation. 
 
2.2 Restriction 
The committee was not identified as engaging in enforcement activities except for 
production safety inspection7. The production safety department of the committee 
and the national agencies did not treat the FOEs differently according to their 
industry. Typically, ‘they did not discriminate against the toy-maker.’ However, there 
was only one toy-maker in the zone and it was unusually the largest toy-maker in 
the city. It held the intellectual property rights (IPRs) for its brand and products. It 
took up the largest area of self-built factory plants and warehouses in the zone. Nor 
did the agencies show particular preference for investment origins. Most FOEs were 
funded by investment originated from Taiwan and Hong Kong. It was evident that, 
the representative agency practised restriction more actively than facilitation and 
that it had no preference for the type of firm. 
 
The product safety department did not differentiate the FOEs according to size and 
compliance in enforcement activities, yet the national agencies did8. ‘The customs 
and the AQSIQ are more supportive to big FOEs like ours. We deserve more 
support because of the ‘8-2 law’ - 80% of the revenue is contributed by the 20% big 
enterprises.’ The agencies adopted similar categorising schemes to encourage the 
FOEs to build and maintain high credibility for compliance. They rewarded the 
                                                 
7
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credible FOEs with more convenience and attention. The informant’s company 
belonged to Category A, which meant it had the highest credibility. ‘The customs 
discuss with me about a feasible solution to an unexpected problem and advise me 
how to avoid any reoccurrence of identical problems in the future.’ Contrastingly, the 
national agencies were punitive to the ill-complying FOEs. The agencies’ 
enforcement activities were indicative of uncoordination. The enforcement process 
involved various responsiveness, social construction, logic of actions and shared 
value with the firms. 
 
 
3.    The FOEs 
The FOEs’ compliance with informal rules was evidently imposed by their big 
buyers9. The informant’s company adopted ISO14000 in order to sell its products in 
the EU market. Meanwhile, ‘our contract with Wal-Mart stipulates that our 
implementation of the SA8000 (Social Accountability Standard 8000) is a 
prerequisite for the establishment of the partnership.’ In the first year of the contract 
going into effect, the FOE applied SA8000 exclusively in the workshop where the 
production was solely arranged for the products sold in Wal-Mart. After the first 
audit, ‘Wal-Mart requested us to apply SA8000 to the whole factory production. Now 
all our factories in China enforce SA8000.’  Wal-Mart made on-site audits annually. 
The auditors reserved total discretion in choosing whoever they wanted to ask about 
the actual working conditions and hours; the company’s practice about the worker’s 
health and safety; and the discrimination, discipline and compensation issues of the 
company. ‘We comply with higher labour standard. The Labour Contract Law does 
not incur problems for the company.’  
 
According to a special report by a local newspaper10, the toy-maker must comply 
with varied informal rules in order to sell products in its major overseas market – the 
USA. To attain the accreditation from the International Council of Toy Industry was 
fundamental. It must also get the qualification from Wal-mart for self-inspecting the 
qualities of its products. After the September 11 terrorist attack, the FOE had to 
meet the anti-terrorism requirement newly imposed by its American buyers. The 
requirement contained 74 terms regarding the use of communication technology 
and the management of human resources and financial accounts. These rules and 
requirements were much more stringent than relevant formal rules. The above 
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finding showed that big firms were subject to enforcement based on the supply 
chain. This informal enforcement structure was functioning effectively and caused 
positive effect typically in labour protection and product safety.  
 
 
4. Agency-FOE Interaction 
Most departments of the committee had no regularised arrangements with the 
FOEs11. ‘The committee does not have communication with us and does not help us 
at all.’ This was a sign of the representative agency’s indifference to the regulatees’ 
demands and non-commitment to facilitation. The product safety department, the 
customs and the AQSIQ were the few that did have working arrangements with the 
FOEs. ‘We contact the customs and the AQSIQ very frequently because of our large 
amounts of exports. The customs’ procedure is best arranged, compared with those 
of the AQSIQ, and the production safety department.’  The AQSIQ changed its 
working arrangement after the Mattel recalls. ‘It has strengthened tests and checks 
on all exported products, including those by non-toy manufacturers.’ For the toy 
FOEs, the AQSIQ extended the safety-control scope to their suppliers and sub-
contracted factories by means of registration12. For the non-toy FOEs, ‘the AQSIQ’s 
sample checks become more frequent and careful than before.’ The production 
safety department was active in examining the safety conditions of the FOEs every 
single day, since the municipal government urged the prevention of safety incidents 
following a casualty-involving disaster which happened in the city in early 200813. 
This practice was characteristic of irresponsiveness, rigidity and roboticism. The 
contrasting enforcement arrangements and styles of these agencies were additional 
findings of poor inter-agency coordination.  
 
Additionally these agencies’ working arrangements varied in efficiency 14 . The 
customs used an electronic data interchange system (EDI) to examine the FOEs’ 
declarations as well as to retrieve their import and export records. ‘It takes the 
customs only a few minutes to send us back the examined results. The process is 
simple, fast and more effective than the old scheme based on written forms.’ In 
contrast, ‘the AQSIQ adopts over-inclusive safety tests. We are not convinced of 
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 The information was published on the official website of the AQSIQ Shenzhen. The link is omitted in order to 
protect the identity of the FOE. 
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 The information was published on the official website of the FT committee. The link is omitted in order to 
protect the identity of the FOE. For the fire disaster, see the report at 
http://society.people.com.cn/GB/6933970.html.  
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their comprehension of high-tech electronic products – do they have similar safety 
issues as toys?’ Meanwhile, ‘the production safety department’s checks are 
burdensome and senseless. It actually discourages well-complying companies like 
ours.’ The agencies’ varied regulatory efficiency was additional finding for poor 
coordination. Efficient enforcement process received the FOE’s positive comment 
and willing compliance. Frequent and repetitive enforcement upset well-complying 
FOEs and was counter-productive. Variation of enforcement efficiency entailed 
various formal enforcement effects. 
 
The customs, the AQSIQ and the product safety departments hosted meetings to 
inform the FOEs of new rules and policies 15 . The customs and AQSIQ also 
organised symposiums to listen to the FOEs’ opinions about their operational 
procedures. ‘They are serious. They have modified procedures according to our 
proposals.’ The agencies’ meetings were not always necessary. ‘Some meetings 
addressing production safety issues are held under the order of the DG. They have 
no substantial purpose.’ Some meetings targeted particular problems and solutions. 
‘These are comparatively more meaningful.’ Varied agencies’ attentions to the firms’ 
voice implied their varied commitment and responsiveness.  
 
The mentioned three agencies visited the FOEs from time to time16. They gave early 
notice for most of their visits. Similar to the meetings, ‘not all visits are worthwhile. 
We welcome those that aim at solving particular problems, but not those that lack 
specific purposes.’ The FOEs also paid visits to the agencies. ‘Our administrators 
visit the agencies to handle relevant affairs. Our CEO occasionally visits the leaders 
of the customs and the AQSIQ to extend his appreciation and further our mutual 
understandings.’ The CEO did not visit the DG of the committee. ‘Unlike the 
customs and the AQSIQ, the committee was not interested in understanding our 
interests.’ The agency-firm bilateral visits indicated their relational distance and 
mutual trust.  
 
The informant commented that the AQSIQ staff were not as competent as the 
customs17. ‘The officers’ interpretations about the same rule are inconsistent. We 
follow the advice of one officer which we are told by another is incorrect. We have 
learnt to be careful to keep their advice in written form so as to minimise the 
incidents of this sort.’ She reckoned that not all other FOEs were as careful as her 
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company in this regard. This comment showed that the agency’s inconsistent 
interpretation of rules was a problem to well-complying firm. The firm managed to 
cope with this problem by requiring the agency to put its interpretation in written 
form. 
 
The informant gave an example of a dispute with the committee18. The cause of the 
dispute was the FOE’s use of the ground area beside the main entrance of the 
company’s building for temporarily storing the end products before being uploaded 
for export shipment. ‘The market demand is tremendous and our company is fully 
packed. There is absolutely not one inch of space left.’ The problem of the storage 
shortage began when the former DG was in office. The FOE asked the former DG 
about the proposed ground usage and got his permission. Indeed, ‘there was no 
available storage or warehouse in the zone, the area suggested by us was a part of 
our leased land, and the usage was at a corner which did not obstruct other 
companies.’ However when the DG changed, the committee’s position changed as 
well. The supervision department criticised the FOE for affecting the orderly 
appearance of the zone and threatened the FOE with a penalty if it did not cease 
the usage. ‘We asked the department to suggest an alternative storage place which 
we could rent. It couldn’t and claimed that to find a warehouse was none of its 
business.’ The FOE then filed a letter to the vice mayor in charge of Fujia to 
complain about the incident. The vice mayor quickly issued a comment, requesting 
the committee ‘to support rather than to make trouble for the FOE’. The committee 
department immediately stopped its action, with no explanation. Since then, neither 
did the committee department re-enforce nor did the FOE change its storage 
arrangement. This dispute between the representative agency and the firm indicated 
that Fujia was characterised by individualisation. The agency’s unresponsiveness 
and poor commitment to facilitation as well as the firm’s reliance upon the agency’s 
superior for solving the dispute were characteristic of an Uncoordinated regime. 
 
The toy-maker had encountered punitive actions from the customs for a while19. The 
company had managerial problems for years. It changed the general managers 
frequently. These general managers were Hong Kong natives. They had limited 
knowledge about Chinese regulations and had no clue how to comply with them. 
The persons who were hired to handle the customs affairs were not competent 
either. As a result, the toymaker often made mistakes in its customs declarations, 
                                                 
18
 Interview ETSS 
19
 Interview FTFDG 
                                                                                           
158 
typically declaring the wrong kinds, quantities and purposes for imports and exports. 
The customs became suspicious about the FOE’s intention. It then penalised the 
FOE with a fine and carried out frequent spot checks. The FOE’s general manager 
tried to communicate with the customs but failed to convince the customs of the real 
cause of the problem. Then the chairman of the FOE in Hong Kong contacted the 
former DG of the committee for help. The former DG had thorough knowledge about 
the background of the individual FOEs and was trusted by many as a friend. He was 
also highly regarded by the customs for his leadership qualities. Hence, the former 
DG contacted the leader of the customs to state the internal problems, the past 
record and background of the FOE. ‘An FOE like this one can’t be interested in 
smuggling. It has made a huge amount of investment in developing IPR products 
and leased most factory plants and warehouses in the zone.’ The DG was 
successful in persuading the customs to switch from its punitive stance to an 
educational approach towards this FOE. He also urged the FOE to improve its 
managerial strength and the competence of its customs-declarers. The story of the 
toy-maker implied that even a big firm could be organisationally incompetent and ill-
informed.  
 
 
5. Findings 
Institutional features      Fujia is classified as an Uncoordinated regime because of 
its high grid and low group properties. It is established for the special purpose of 
competing for overseas investment, with its representative agency accountable 
upwards for its achievement in this regard. Inter-agency coordination is poor. 
 
Regulating side The current DG and staff of the general-purpose agency 
shows non-commitment and disinterest in maintaining its advantage for attracting 
business.  They do not target or select firms. Although reaching the SIZ’s full 
accommodating capacity can be used as an excuse for being uncompetitive, it 
hardly poses as an excuse for the worsened facilitation for the incumbent firms and 
over-emphasis on social appropriateness. The committee’s indifference to the 
FOE’s voice and encountered problems showcases bad facilitation. All agencies are 
well-restrained but various in commitment, preference for firms, and balance of 
facilitation and restriction. Whereas the customs’ practice is committed, responsive, 
efficient, predictable and innovative, the production safety department of the 
committee is mechanistic, irresponsive, inconsiderate and burdensome. The AQSIQ 
is in the middle – on the one hand, it takes the FOEs’ opinions seriously and adjusts 
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its procedure accordingly; and on the other hand, it adopts an over-inclusive 
inspection strategy and its staff give inconsistent interpretation of rules.  
 
Regulated side The FOEs evidently abide the high regulatory standards as 
requested by their powerful business partners and affiliated international industry 
association. Notwithstanding the effective functioning of informal enforcement, the 
firm’s managerial incompetence undermines its compliance with formal rule. This is 
regardless of its good intention. 
 
Two-sided marriage and match  The agencies and the firms have 
various bilateral relational distances, distribution of power, social construction, 
regularised arrangement, trust and accountability. Such variety further  suggests 
poor inter-agency cooperation. Shared value is limitedly institutionalised. The firm’s 
loyalty varies upon the agencies. Generally, the bilateral interaction is characteristic 
of over-emphasis of legitimacy at the expense of flexibility. Regulatory problems, 
which are either the agency’s or the FOE’s fault, cannot be solved through bilateral 
communication or inter-agency coordination, but need to resort to external 
influences for solution. Whereas the representative agency does not show 
preference for the type of firm, the firm is dissatisfied by the agency. The FOEs 
domiciled in the SIZ before the leadership of the representative agency changed. 
The current leadership of the representative agency is responsible for the 
dissatisfying business environment. There is mismatch between the regime and the 
firm. 
 
RC outcomes  The structure of domiciled firms was formed before current 
leadership. It cannot be used as a reference for regulatory attraction. But based on 
the information from the informants and other public sources, the regime is generally 
not competitive or facilitative. At least, the regime shows little business attraction to 
big investors from HRCs. Whereas the FOEs adopted high social standards that are 
enforced by the supply chain, the representative agency shows no appreciation but 
adopts a broad-brush enforcement style. The general enforcement effect is 
burdensome. There is no finding for the regime to use favourable conditions 
strategically. Overall, the regime has little regulatory advantage. 
 
 
6.   Outstanding Issues 
Fujia is determined as an Uncoordinated regime, based on its high grid and low 
group. Generally speaking, it’s observed characteristics agree with the interpretation 
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by the ER Framework. A few observed issues are outstanding referring to the 
framework. These issues are explained below.  
 
Firstly, empirically this Uncoordinated regime has attracted so many FOEs that its 
territorial space is fully occupied. In the contrary, the ER Framework describes it as 
not attractive. The explanation is that, according to the informant, the Uncoordinated 
feature took shape only after the change of the DG of the committee. The empirical 
attractiveness is likely to be historical. By and large the current achievement should 
be attributed to the performance of the previous regime, which was arguably an 
Adherent type. Thus, this issue is explicable through a historical perspective. 
 
Secondly, the performance of the Fujia customs is of flexibility, certainty, facilitative 
and restrictive responsiveness and generates desirable enforcement effect. These 
characteristics are exactly opposite to what is interpreted by the ER Framework for 
the Uncoordinated regime. The explanations are that, on the one hand, the customs 
is not representative of the Fujia regime. Instead the committee, the general-
purpose agency, is the officially acknowledged specialist that represents the 
regime20. For the characteristics of the Fujia regime, one should examine those of 
the committee first and foremost, not those of another agency. On the other hand, 
the customs follows its own course by being facilitative and has no apparent 
coordination with the committee. The customs’ facilitation is contrasting to the poor 
facilitation of the committee and is indeed characteristic of an Uncoordinated 
regime. From this viewpoint, the empirical finding actually supports the interpretation 
of the ER Framework. 
 
Finally, empirically, big firms from low-regulating investment origins (LRC) vary in 
compliance with formal rules. Theoretically, this type of firm is not addressed by the 
ER Framework, which portrays four archetypes only. The archetype is one of the 
acknowledged limits of the framework. To fully capture the types of firms in a real 
world, future research needs to develop the framework in terms of characterising 
more types of firm, for example hybrid. However, the finding means the framework 
is limited, not wrong, since the framework does not interpret, rather than interprets 
incorrectly, the mentioned type of firm. 
 
The identified outstanding empirical issues are explicable. The explanations are 
made by emphasising historical dimension or the limited archetypes of the ER 
                                                 
20
 For reference, see the section about sample cases in Chapter IV. 
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Framework. To summarise, the Fujia case generally supports the ER Framework 
concerning the characteristics of the Uncoordinated regime. 
 
 
Case 2:  Ximo of Suzhou 
 
1. The Regime 
Ximo was a nation-class SIZ established for the purpose of promoting foreign 
investment in the high-tech industries21. The committee had full local authority to 
regulate the foreign investment issues in the zone. Except for the national agencies, 
the other 19 economic and social regulatory agencies were the constituent 
departments of the committee. Inter-agency coordination was limited according to 
the informants22 . A few departments were mentioned as exceptional. The land 
planning and construction departments contacted each other when their standards 
were in disagreement, which would cause the procedures of the construction plan of 
an informant’s company to grind to a halt23. The labour department invited other 
departments to join in the inspection 24 . The two examples were identified as 
different in nature. The former, which was for facilitative purpose, was ad hoc; 
whereas the latter, which was for restrictive purpose, was routine. Various working 
styles inside the general-purpose agency indicated a lack of coordination. 
 
According to the information given by its official website 25 , Ximo currently had 
abundant land available for accommodating large numbers of manufacturers. The 
industries involving foreign investment included computer and peripheral devices, 
integrated circuitry, electronic components and materials, semi-conductors, 
automobile components, marine devices, aviation materials, precise instruments 
and meters, and communication devices. Nevertheless, the informants revealed that 
there were also FOEs undertaking traditional manufacturing such as garment 
making26. The finding of Ximo’s superiority underpinned by abundant land and its 
admission of undesired low-tech industry indicated that the regime was disinterested 
in competing for quality foreign investment through targeting and innovation. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Information at the official website of Ximo 
22
 Interview ECS3I2E 
23
 Interview ETS3E3 
24
 Interview ETS3E3 
25
 The website address is omitted in order to protect the identities of the informants. 
26
 Interview ETS3E3 
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2.     The Agencies 
2.1  Facilitation 
According to the informants from an early-settler FOE, ‘the committee’s service is 
getting worse. What it has promised is not actualised. It promises to sort out the 
problems of power and water, but the supplies are as poor as ever.’27 Meanwhile, 
‘most section chiefs (SCs) and administrators don’t help. As a matter of fact, how 
helpful they are depends on your relationship with them.’ The worsening service 
upset the old established FOE: ‘We used to be active in introducing new investors to 
the zone. We have made contributions to its development. Now we don’t do it any 
more. We have no interest in contacting or interacting with the committee.’ As the 
agency became poorly committed and facilitation became individualised, the firm 
demonstrated less loyalty and more exit tendency. 
 
Asked what could underpin the change in the committee’s service, a cynical answer 
was ‘the committee doesn’t need to provide a good service to appeal to foreign 
investors, does it? The zone still has abundant available land, whereas others 
don’t.’28 A tolerant answer was ‘the committee has too many enterprises to serve. 
The workload is heavy. It cannot afford a quality service to all enterprises at all 
times.’29   This finding suggested that the agency was not committed to RC or 
facilitation. 
 
Notwithstanding the complaint about the downgrading of the committee’s facilitation, 
the informants still believed that an SIZ was better than a non-SIZ. ‘The officials are 
not corrupted.’ 30  The committee was comparatively centralised and specialised. 
Hence, ‘we know to whom and where we should approach for specific issues. We 
can find them in one shop.’31 Besides, the favourable conditions were still effective 
for the IT investors from Taiwan, which allowed the high-tech FOEs to enjoy 
complete exemption from corporate income tax for the first two operating years and 
half rate for the following three years32. The finding here indicated that the agencies 
were well disciplined. Also, favourable conditions rather than regulatory innovation 
were an attractor to high-tech investors from LRCs.  
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 Interview ECS3I2E 
28
 Interview ECS3I2E 
29
 Interview ETS3I3E 
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 Interview ECS3I2E 
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 Interview ETS3I3E 
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The committee organised the annual Spring Festival symposium for the FOEs’ 
bosses and general managers to make suggestions. However, ‘one cannot give a 
serious opinion on such an occasion.’33 The committee also hosted comprehensive 
coordination meetings once or twice a year. These were attended by the constituent 
departments. The officials listened to the FOEs’ comments and suggestions about 
living, working, transport conditions and social order. However the informants could 
not identify any positive effect from the meetings. An understanding informant 
commented: ‘our proposal is based upon our narrow interests. But the committee 
has broad concerns.’34 A cynical comment was, ‘I cannot figure out exactly what the 
committee is concerned about.’35  Being an exception, the customs listened and 
streamlined the procedure according to the FOEs’ suggestion36 . Generally, the 
agencies did not take the firms’ voice seriously. The two sides lacked mutual 
accountability and trust. 
 
2.2 Restriction 
The committee and other agencies did not demonstrate noteworthy differentiation 
between the FOEs regarding size, industry and compliance 37 . ‘They do not 
particularly treat the big FOEs better than the SMEs. Except for providing a ‘green 
passage’ to a very few extra-large FOEs like Foxconn38, they do not provide extra 
convenience for big companies.’ Nor did the agencies differentiate the FOEs 
according to industry. ‘They treat the hi-tech FOEs the same as the garment 
makers. Yes, it is unusual. The equal treatment makes the garment-making FOEs in 
other locations envious.’ The agencies penalised wrongdoers, but they did not 
reward the good ones with noticeable convenience. For instance, ‘though the 
customs categorises the enterprises according to compliance, the extra 
convenience which a Category-A enterprise like ours can enjoy is marginal. We pay 
less guarantee deposit but still need to go through the common formalities.’ 
However, the informant admitted ‘the formalities are simple.’  The agencies were 
identified to differentiate the FOEs according to investment origin. They preferred 
the American and Korean funded enterprises to the Taiwanese ones. ‘There are 
only a handful of American and Korean enterprises in the zone. They treat the 
workers better than the Taiwanese companies. The wages are higher and the meals 
are free.’  The finding here suggested that the agencies were irresponsive in both 
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 Interview ECS3I2E 
34
 Interview ETS3I3E 
35
 Interview ECS3I2E  
36
 Interview ETS3I3E 
37
 Interview ETS3I3E 
38
 For the detailed background of the FOE, see http://www.foxconn.com. 
                                                                                           
164 
facilitation and restriction. They had no preference for the firm’s industry but 
investment origin implied their disinterest in competing for high-tech firms on the one 
hand, and interest in easiness of enforcement on the other.  
 
 
3.   The FOEs 
The labour department enforced the 2007 Labour Contract Law strictly. It was more 
protective towards the FOEs’ workers than the employers. It invited the TV station to 
report the state of the workers in the FOEs. The reactions of the FOEs varied. The 
company of one informant chose to strengthen corporate self-enforcement39. ‘We 
have adopted more stringent norms to prevent labour incidents.’ The informants’ 
companies encountered labour disputes after the promulgation of the <Labour 
Contract Law> in 2007. ‘As the law entitles the workers to retrieve under-pay years 
back, the company has to spend a fortune to compensate the workers.’ 40   In 
addition, ‘the labour department adopted a scheme which enables the workers to 
litigate against their employers even if they cannot afford the litigation charge.’41 A 
neighbouring company took an entirely different strategy42. ‘To comply with the new 
law means higher labour requirements and cost, and hence more managerial 
challenge. The company chooses an easier way to do it.’ That FOE hired most 
workers for the short-term, which included three-month probation. Since the law was 
applicable only to long-term employment, to hire short-term workers saved the FOE 
large expenditure.  
 
To solve the disputes, the informant of one FOE stated, ‘we negotiate with the 
workers first. If unsuccessful, we resort to arbitration. We trust the justice and 
expertise of the tribunal.’43 Another FOE had a different view. ‘We sort out the labour 
disputes on our own. We don’t ask for help from the committee. They have no 
serious concern about us. Their solution is not speedy or desirable. They make us 
feel like they are the superior and we are the subordinate. It is a favour not a duty 
for them to help us, and we should be grateful for their help.’44 
 
Whereas the agencies demonstrated unbalance practice for facilitation and 
restriction, they typically enforced labour regulation stringently. The firms’ reactions 
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 Interview ETS3I3E 
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 Interview ECS3I2E  
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to the labour enforcement were various. So were their trusts in the agencies’ 
competence. Formal enforcement effect tended to be positive. Some firms improved 
self-regulation, while some took strategic measures to take the advantage of legal 
loophole.  
 
 
4.   Agency-FOE Contact 
The committee departments had different working styles. The social security 
department and the human resource market agency were infamous for bad working 
attitudes45 . The economic and trade department and the scientific development 
department were among the few that were friendly and worked efficiently. An 
explanation was that their achievements were symbolic to that of Ximo’s business 
attraction46. The customs, the labour department and the construction department 
were helpful. The labour administrator gave explicit advice as to how to formulate 
labour contracts and to proceed to arbitration. If necessary, the SC offered expert 
consultation. The construction department had clear on-line information about 
applying for self designed and built factory plants. Also ‘The administrator noted all 
the problems and corrections on the documents at the first submission. This saves 
me from repetitive visits before finalising the submission to apply for the construction 
permit.’47 It was evident that the agencies varied in commitment which seemed to be 
related to their respective duties. This varied agencies’ commitment implied 
uncoordination.  
 
One informant complained about the committee’s unpredictable implementations. 
‘The committee issues a new policy in mid-year stating that the policy went into 
effect from 1st January. We have to trace back and correct what we have done in 
order to ensure compliance.’ 48 She considered the committee’s pronouncement was 
not unusual. ‘The committee does not clarify its rules in written form. The officers 
are free in giving words. We are confused by what and how to comply.’  Because of 
the representative agency’s inconsistent policy making and interpretation, certainty 
was at issue. 
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 Interview ECS3I2E and ECS3I3E 
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 Interview ECS3I2E 
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 Interview ETS3E3  
48
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There were exceptions 49 . The labour department gave notice of forthcoming 
meetings by fax. The FOEs could use the economic and trade department’s 
websites to send its latest statistics, such as the production and export volumes. 
The production safety department specified explicit requirements for what the FOEs 
should and should not do and requested the FOEs to self-enforce those 
requirements. If the production safety department discovered problems, it requested 
the FOEs to present written statements about the problems and their corrective 
actions. The environment department made an annual review of particular electronic 
FOEs in order to evaluate the ambient air quality and to ensure no impairment to 
workers’ health. The customs’ working arrangement was clear and easy to follow50. 
Its examining procedure was ‘efficient and humane.’ The AQSIQ did not change its 
working arrangement with the electronic FOEs after the Mattel recalls51. As the 
FOEs already followed the higher quality standards imposed by the big partners, 
they did not have any problems passing the AQSIQ’s tests. Generally, the 
mentioned restrictive and national agencies had regularised arrangements. Such 
arrangements assured the firms of certainty, efficiency and business friendliness. 
They entailed positive formal enforcement effect. The formal enforcement effect was 
complemented by the firms’ compliance with informal regulation, which was 
however not awarded responsive enforcement by the agencies. 
 
Particular agencies organised purposeful meetings for the FOEs to attend52. One 
was to notify the FOEs of the agencies’ implementation methods. These included 
the method and procedures on labour and environmental protection, technological 
research and development, and production safety. Another was for training. The 
agencies entrusted special training institutes to irregularly lecture the FOEs about 
formal rules. These meetings were regarded as worthwhile by the FOEs and 
engendered positive enforcement effect. 
 
Most agencies made few visits to the FOEs53. The customs, the labour department 
and the production safety department were the expected visitors.  The customs 
made routine inspections once or twice a year. The labour department made spot 
checks on the FOEs’ compliance irregularly. The officers randomly picked workers 
to inquire about their working conditions, pay and other welfare issues. The checks 
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might be attended by the director-general (DG) of the committee, who brought TV 
reporters to film the activity. Each year, the production safety department selected 
12 key enterprises and visited one each month. The visitors came in a group, 
attended also by the police, transport regulatory agency, urban management 
agency and the FOEs’ production safety managers. They investigated the safety 
facilities and conditions of the enterprises, diagnosed potential safety risks, 
suggested corrections and alerted the FOE participants to reflect and improve the 
state of their companies. The informant held the agencies’ visits functioned as an 
alert. While the agencies varied in their interactions with the firms, the mentioned 
agencies were committed to social construction. This social construction enabled 
both parties to share the value and logic of appropriateness. It entailed positive 
formal enforcement effect. 
 
 
5. Findings 
Institutional features      Ximo is categorised as an Uncoordinated regime based on 
its characteristics of high grid and low group. It is specifically and openly 
accountable for the achievement of competing for high-tech industries. The 
coordination between facilitative and restrictive agencies is typically poor. 
 
Regulating side    The general-purpose committee as a whole does not show 
commitment or interest in RC for the targeted type of firm as required by its 
regulatory goal. Its possession of abundant land makes it unrivalled by surrounding 
jurisdictions. Though not openly disclosing, the regime actually admits low-tech 
traditional manufacturers. Its facilitation is getting worse and it does not seem to 
take the FOEs’ voice seriously. Certainty it is undermined by the committee’s 
changeable policies and its staff’s inconsistent interpretation and facilitation. These 
indicate the regime’s poor commitment to the official business-attracting goal. 
Contrary to the disinterest in facilitation, restrictive regulation is paid extraordinary 
attention. It is generally carried out in active, stringent and coordinative manners.  
Nevertheless, the restrictive agencies do not differentiate the FOEs according to 
corporate size, industry or compliance. Hence both facilitation and restriction lacks 
responsiveness.  
 
Regulated side The firms from low-regulating origins vary in their intentions 
and reactions towards formal enforcement. Facing the enforcement of the new 
labour law, some enhance self-enforcement but others play strategically. The few 
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firms from high-regulating countries (HRCs) demonstrate good intention and 
voluntary self-enforcement. 
 
Two-sided marriage and match The agency-firm distance and social 
construction varies depending on the agencies’ duties. The distant and arrogant 
facilitative agencies are ‘opted out’ by the FOEs in the bilateral interaction. In 
contrast, the restrictive agencies are active in regularising enforcement arrangement 
and institutionalising shared values and logic of appropriateness. These include the 
national agencies, particularly the customs, whose performance is predictable and 
efficient. Nevertheless, the FOEs have contrary opinions. Some consider the 
restrictive performance worthwhile and expert. Some view the agencies as 
untrustworthy and unaccountable. The representative agency is responsible for the 
worsening facilitation and regulatory environment. Whereas the representative 
agency is not selective about firms, incumbent firms are unimpressed of the 
business facilitation. This indicates a mismatch between the agency and the firms. 
 
RC outcomes  The structure of the domiciled firms shows that Ximo is 
particularly attractive to those from LRCs - an undesired result according to the 
national foreign investment strategy. These firms make up the majority of the 
resident population. Such an attraction is mostly based on its high-tech favourable 
conditions. This implies the regime’s limited business attraction to the desirable type 
of firm. The agencies’ impose stringent, expert and coordinated enforcement of 
labour regulation. However their enforcement does not show responsiveness, 
indicated as the agencies’ depreciation of firms’ good compliance. This is evident 
that formal and informal enforcements are not complementary. Considering also the 
lack of legitimacy and innovation, the Ximo regime lacks regulatory advantage to 
quality overseas investment.  
 
 
6.    Outstanding Issues 
Most observed characteristics of the Ximo regime are agreeable with the 
interpretation as the Uncoordinated by the ER Framework. There are a few 
outstanding issues requiring explanations. These explanations will by and large 
support such a conclusion that the empirical finding of the Ximo case is plausibly 
interpreted by the ER Framework.   
 
Firstly, the Ximo agencies seem to exercise restrictive duties in a coordinated, 
expert and fair manner. This manner seems to be contrary to the interpretation of 
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the ER Framework, which is uncoordinated. The explanation is that, the mentioned 
characteristics are of the restrictive agencies only, not of both facilitative and 
restrictive agencies. The description about weak inter-agency cooperation by the ER 
Framework for this regime is between the two types of agencies: facilitative and 
restrictive. With a simplified assumption, the framework does not pay attention to the 
cooperation within each type of agency. Therefore, the empirical finding does not 
challenge the framework’s interpretation.   
 
Secondly, empirically the regime attracts many high-tech firms from LRCs, whereas 
the ER Framework interprets the Uncoordinated regime as of little attraction to any 
types of firms. One explanation is that current industrial structure is likely to form 
when the regime was active in competing for foreign investment, or when it was not 
an Uncoordinated. The information given by the early-mover FOE supports this 
explanation. Another explanation is that the regime is empowered to grant 
favourable conditions. These conditions rather than the agency’s performance are 
found to be appealing to those from LRCs. This finding supports such a note by the 
thesis that regulatory practice, including enforcement, is only one factor that affects 
the firm’s choice of destination. Therefore, the empirical finding does not disagree 
with the specific argument of the ER Framework. 
 
Finally, the restrictive agencies are found to prefer the firms from HRC to those from 
LRC. This is because the former voluntarily self-enforce high labour standard, 
whereas the latter are strategic in feigning compliance to the labour law. In contrast, 
the ER Framework interprets that the firm’s compliance with informal rule is not 
appreciated by the regime. The explanation reminds that in fact, no agency awards 
or encourages well-intentioned and well-complying firms in any substantial way. 
This found fact means that the empirical finding is not disagreeable with the specific 
interpretation of the ER Framework. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Categorised as Uncoordinated regimes based on their high grid and low group 
properties, both Fujia and Ximo demonstrate in fact characteristics that are mostly 
agreeable to the hypotheses made by the ER Framework. Their agencies are well 
constrained, irresponsive and not selective about business, show little interest or 
commitment to competing for foreign investment, do not deploy entitled favourable 
conditions strategically, are more active in exercising restrictive duties than 
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facilitative tasks and practise regulations in their individual rationales and styles. The 
preferences of both regimes and their respective domiciled firms clearly mismatch. 
At the same time, the two regimes are found to have characteristics that are 
different from the interpretation of the ER Framework. Typically, both SIZs have 
been successful in attracting foreign investment with varied industries and 
investment origins. These outstanding issues are explicable through a historical 
perspective or the heuristic property of the framework. At least so far, based on the 
empirical findings as well as the explanation of the outstanding issues, it is 
concluded that the ER Framework is plausible in its interpretation of the 
Uncoordinated regime.  
  
Chapter VII The Conciliative Regime 
 
 
The cases involved in this study are the Lufei Village1 in the city of Shenzhen, and 
the Tuqing Town in the city of Suzhou. To interpret them by the ER Framework 
comprises three stages. The first stage is an initial classification of the two cases 
based on a simple grid and group analysis. This analysis also briefly depicts the 
institutional features of the two cases. It is followed by a second stage in which a 
detailed report is made for the evident characteristics of the Conciliative regime. The 
final stage is a summary of the empirical findings as well as addressing any 
necessary outstanding issues. 
 
Despite being of different levels2, the Lufei and Tuqing councils are the sub-city 
governments that govern local economic and social issues. They are viewed as the 
representative agencies of the regimes. They are not specialist regulatory 
authorities for foreign investment attraction. Officially, foreign investment attraction 
is no more than one regulatory goal for Lufei and Tuqing to account for. Neither 
regime is required to give particular attention to this goal. Particular attention if any 
is entirely their own decision. Therefore, both are considered as low in grid. The 
Lufei regime is represented by its village council. Its inter-agency cooperation has 
been enhanced in order to ensure general provision of business facilitation. Hence, 
Lufei is viewed as high in group. Similarly, The FOEs in Tuqing are governed by its 
town council. Most relevant agencies are the departments of the council. They are 
highly cooperative and committed to the fulfillment of foreign investment attracting 
and business facilitating goals. Hence the group is high.  
 
 
Case 1:  Lufei of Shenzhen 
 
1.    The Regime 
1.1 Profile 
The Lufei Village had a low-profile in foreign investment attraction. There was rare 
public information, including media coverage, for this small village. Such a low 
                                                 
1
 The name of ‘village’ was replaced by ‘Street’ in the urbanisation led by the municipal government from 2003 
(See <Shenzhen Becomes the First City without a Village> at 
http://gd.news.sina.com.cn/news/2010/09/06/991111.html). In order to avoid the confusion, this thesis still uses 
the old name to refer to this specific community at the microscopic level. 
2
 The village is lower by one administrative level than the town. For more details about the administrative levels, 
see the DiagramV in Chapter IV. 
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profile implied low accountability for its practice and freedom from monitoring by 
those outside the locality. According to the native informant3 , the most current 
incumbent FOEs were run by Hong Kong investors. They were SMEs that 
undertook traditional manufacturing such as making toys, clothes, handbags and 
shoes. This structure indicated that Lufei was particularly attractive to SMEs in low-
tech industries from low regulatory origin (LRC). 
 
1.2 Organisational Peculiarity 
The village council was the lowest-level government in the bureaucratic hierarchy4. 
The council’s budget for public administration was allocated by the higher-level 
government 5 . Meanwhile, it sourced extra income from assorted administration 
charges, including land leasing. The resident FOEs were their income source6. The 
specific collection was carried out by an economic entity fully owned by the council – 
the Economic and Trade Development Company (ETDC). The shareholders of the 
ETDC were the native villagers, some of whom were the council officials. Once a 
year, the ETDC issued dividends to these shareholders. The source of the dividends 
was the charges levied on the FOEs, particularly those undertaking three types of 
processing (TTP), namely processing with the raw material, according to the sample 
and by assembling the components provided by overseas clients, and 
compensation trade7. A TTP enterprise did not pay tax to the national or municipal 
revenue bureaus but paid administration fees to the local authority8. This implied 
that TTP enterprises were an extra revenue source of the regime; and that the 
regime’s competition for TTP enterprise was underpinned by its self-interest in 
maximising organisational revenue. Meanwhile, paying such an administration fee 
implied that the firm could evade taxes. In the case of Lufei, it was the ETDC that 
collected the fees, based on the FOEs’ production contracts. The ETDC dispatched 
a factory director (FD) to each TTP-type FOE9. It was mandatory for the TTP-type 
FOE to accept and pay the FD. The FD was a native villager who was a shareholder 
of the ETDC. He played the role of a contract-monitor rather than a manager in the 
FOE. He was the person who bound the council and the FOE financially. This 
implied that the agency-firm relation was not regulatory but based on business 
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4
 See Diagram V in Chapter IV. 
5
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6
 Interview THLG1 
7
 Hereinafter three types of processing and compensation trade are simplified as ‘TTP’.  
8
 See <Shenzhen Municipal Government’s Provisions on Enhancing Regulation on ‘TTP’ Enterprises> at 
http://www.law-lib.com/lawhtm/1995/25907.htm.  
9
 For details and arguments about this FD-dispatching scheme, see <Shenzhen Longgang Street’s Office 
Dispatches Natives to be Factory Directors in Enterprises> at 
http://big5.cri.cn/gate/big5/gb.cri.cn/8606/2005/11/15/641@781739.htm. Interview THLG1A 
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contract or bi-partisanship. The FD-based arrangement institutionalised shared 
value of the regulating and regulated sides.  
 
The informant’s Hong Kong Company registered as a TTP-type10. The TTP was the 
prevailing form used by the FOEs when the country began opening up to foreign 
investment in the early 1980s. The investors from Hong Kong mostly adopted the 
TTP form to undertake traditional manufactures. In the middle 1990s 11 , the 
municipal government declared its strategy to discourage the TTP-type FOEs 
because of their limited contribution to economic development in terms of adding no 
value to importing capital, advanced technology and management. Consequently, 
the special investment zones (SIZs) permanently suspended the approval of the 
TTP-type. Many TTP-type FOEs had left the city for less open and developed 
locations. According to the data from the Shenzhen Bureau of Industry and 
Commerce Administration, by 2008, there were about 600 toy FOEs remaining. 
Nearly all of them resided in the suburban villages, with some categorised as the 
TTP type12. This indicated the difference in enforcement between the SIZ and non-
SIZ. The informant’s company had kept the TTP status since its establishment in 
1991. With this status, the FOE stayed under the protective umbrella of the village 
council. ‘It saves the need to coordinate with assorted governmental agencies. 
Mostly, we need to face one agency – the village council.’13 In itself, this implied that 
it was easier and cheaper for bribery. Also ‘it frees our company from paying tax. 
Thus we can retain our profit at maximum.’  This showed the SME’s intentions of 
maximising profit and escaping from formal control. 
 
1.3 Inter-Agency Relationship14 
The departments of the council coordinated with each other. This was evident of 
high group. Some coordination was aimed at self-serving goals. For instance, the 
power supply department had an agreement with the production safety department 
for the compulsory use of a designated switch for self-installed electricity 
generators. The FOEs with self-installed generators must buy from the power supply 
department to use the designated switch. Otherwise their applications for using the 
generators would be disapproved by the production safety department and 
consequently they could not carry out production.  
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The coordination with the customs was more difficult than that between the 
departments of the council. However in recent years, the council was successful in 
bringing the customs in line with its pro-business track. The customs’ practice had 
become predictable. It usually notified the council before its visit, so that the council 
could in turn alert the FOE. The customs might still conduct a spot inspection if it 
received a report of an FOE’s illegal operation. However an unannounced visit like 
this rarely happened.  
 
Generally, Lufei’s high group characteristic involved the agencies’ manipulation and 
ill constraint. Inter-agency coordination led by the representative agency was aimed 
at strengthening facilitation and relaxing restriction. 
 
 
2.      The Agencies 
1.1. Facilitation15 
Though the TTP-type FOEs were contributors to the villagers’ income, the authority 
did not always support them. Typically before 2007, the council’s labour department 
took the worker’s side whenever settling disputes with the employers. The council 
did not communicate or coordinate with the customs, as it claimed whatever the 
customs decided was its own business. The council was not concerned about the 
FOEs’ exit, since it expected newcomers to take up the vacancy. Since the 
promulgation of the 2007 labour law, many FOEs experienced strikes and failed to 
survive, and many factory buildings were left vacant. With the very limited entry of 
new FOEs, the village revenue dropped considerably. The council began to realise 
that to fill the vacancies with bigger FOEs was nigh on impossible. The village could 
not afford to compete for the big investors, due to its shabby factory plants, limited 
available land and other resources. Meanwhile, unlike the TTP-type SMEs, big 
FOEs contributed to the municipal and national revenues and generated no direct 
benefit for the village. Thus the council made a dramatic change in its standpoint. It 
switched from an indifferent stance to a position of befriending the SMEs, 
particularly the TTP-type. It not only engaged in actively supporting the domiciled 
FOEs but also opened arms widely to embrace new entrants of TTP-type investors. 
The finding from a historical perspective further suggested that Lufei’s competition 
and preference for overseas SMEs was driven by revenue maximisation. Opposite 
to the national and municipal strategies, Lufei’s strategy was characteristic of 
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instrumentality and illegitimacy. Meanwhile, the prevalence of labour disputes and 
strike indicated the SMEs’ poor compliance of labour regulation.  
 
The council’s new arrangement and practice became extraordinarily friendly. The 
council emphasised building friendships with the FOEs. The friendliness and 
support could be read in the attitudes and actions of the officers of all ranks in the 
council - from the chief councilor to the administrator. The labour department 
switched sides and became supportive to the employers rather than the workers. 
The council’s relationship with the customs became notably closer so as to be 
protective rather than restrictive to the FOEs. The regime’s switch of stance and 
practice from restriction to business facilitation and even protection aimed at 
pleasing the type of firms that was undesired nationally and municipally. It was 
indicative of Lufei’s strategic choice as well as Lufei being dissident to the national 
strategy. 
 
1.2. Restriction16 
The council did not discriminate between FOEs with regard to their size, industry, 
investment origin or compliance. Regarding the size, all FOEs domiciled in the 
village were SMEs. Compared with big FOEs, they lacked resources and were 
vulnerable to regulatory change. Some were too weak to survive a strike. They 
relied heavily on the council’s support. SMEs were more loyal to the village than the 
big companies. Big ones were in a strong bargaining position and more likely to be 
targeted and attracted to rival jurisdictions. Therefore, it was safer for the regime to 
have SMEs. Regarding the industry, a long stay of the TTP-type FOEs of traditional 
industry was to the financial benefit of the council and the whole village at large. 
Regarding the investment origin, the SMEs from LRCs seemed to suit better the 
council’s instrumental strategy of foreign investment attraction. The council did not 
mind being the home of the SMEs all owned by Hong Kong businessmen. 
Regarding the compliance, the council inspected the ill and well complying FOEs 
alike. The informant complained about the inspections and would rather have no 
inspection at all. Lufei evidently preferred SMEs, which was the exact type 
discriminated by national and municipal governments. The regime and the domiciled 
SMEs - the main industrial population – were mutually dependent and loyal. Ill-
complying firms’ benefited from the agencies’ favour to escape from targeted and 
responsive enforcement. The Lufei regime benefited from extra organisational 
revenue generated by the most undesired type of firms. 
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3.   The FOEs17 
Following the promulgation of the <Labour Contract Law> in 2007, there was a 
sharp increase in strikes and labour disputes. This finding indicated the domiciled 
firms’ adoption of low labour-protecting standards. The labour department of the 
council was protective of the FOEs. An example was that, when a strike for a pay 
rise happened in the factory next-door to the informant’s, the labour officers 
immediately came to the site. They requested the workers to first return the extra 
money which had been paid by their boss on festive occasions before proceeding to 
seek a solution for a pay rise. Due to this tactic played by the labour officers, the 
strike very soon ended, with the workers’ aim aborted. The informant’s company did 
not have any strikes because ‘I have a friend who used to work in the municipal 
Labour Bureau. He advised me how to manipulate the structure of the worker’s 
income. Hence I save expenditure on paying the worker’s social security and other 
welfare.’ Unfortunately the trick was identified by two clever workers who sued the 
company at the tribunal. The informant won the battle, ‘because I know more tricks 
than they, and my labour-expert friend helped me.’ The finding here indicated that 
the agencies and the firms were in a bipartisanship in enforcing labour law. 
Whereas the firms complied poorly, the agencies manipulated interpretation and 
implementation. The agency-firm bipartisanship was based on illegitimate logic and 
engendered negative formal enforcement effect. 
 
On average, the informant’s company had serious problems twice a year. The main 
causes for the problems were the FOE’s ill compliance to the new labour law and 
smuggling. In spite of the support and coordination given by the council, the FOE 
had to rely on its own capacity to seek solutions when a crime such as smuggling 
was spotted. ‘Our company was reported by an employee for using tariff-free 
imported materials to produce machines sold domestically instead of exporting 
them. It took me personally to sort out the problem with the customs.’ To desirably 
sort out a problem like this meant to acquire a light penalty. ‘It relies on bribery. It 
cost the company one million RMB yuan (approximately GBP 100,000) to be freed 
from the penalty. It is expensive, but it still costs less comparing with the amount of 
fine that possibly could have been incurred.’ The informant methodically switched off 
her mobile around 5pm each weekday, ‘or I will receive calls from the customs to 
request arrangements for entertainment and relaxation at night.’ These included 
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dinners, sporting events and massages. ‘I ask the factory director to answer their 
calls, accompany them to the activities and pay the bills.’18  This finding indicated 
that the involved FOE was typically well-informed and ill-intentioned. Its committed 
crime could be so serious that the general-purpose council was unable to protect it. 
But the task-specific agency was so ill-restrained that the FOE could get away from 
penalty through bribery. The agency-firm interaction was characteristic of illegitimate 
and instrumental logic. There was no finding for the FOE’s appropriate self-
regulation. Rather the negligent agencies’ performance encouraged its incompliance 
and misconduct. 
 
 
4.      Agency-FOE Contact 
The council and the TTP-type FOE were bound through the FD19. The bilateral 
relationship was evidently close. Yet the FD’s role was tricky. If too loyal to the FOE, 
he would be complained about by the ETDC. But if too loyal to the ETDC, he made 
the FOE feel betrayed. Thus the FD had to take care in balancing his relationships 
with both sides. Nevertheless, the FD was likely to abuse his position. An example 
was given about the FD of a neighbouring FOE. Over the years, the FD had claimed 
large amounts of money from the Hong Kong boss in the excuse of bribing a 
councilor to attain certain approvals. The boss eventually found out that while the 
approvals were still difficult to be attained, the FD, whose explicable income was 
solely sourced from the company, had bought a nice new car and built a new house. 
This indicated that the close agency-firm relationship was not free from 
manipulation, bearing in mind the ill restraint of the agency. 
 
The informant had spent a great deal of money in order to keep her FD faithful to 
the company20. She had not only set an unusually high salary but also offered extra 
subsidies to the FD. For instance, she bought a car for the FD and paid tuition fees 
for the FD’s daughter. The FOE’s generosity was rewarded by the FD’s 
commitment. She helped the FOE in maximising the support from the important 
agencies, namely the labour department and the customs. Based on the successful 
experience, the informant recruited a second FD. This one had personal 
connections with the police office and power supplier. These were the two agencies 
whose support was now considered as necessary to the FOE. The FOE’s way of 
treating its FD typically indicated a trading partnership for the firm and the agency, in 
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which the two parties enjoyed symmetric distribution of power. The ill-intentioned 
and well-informed FOE was able to ‘buy’ extra facilitation and lax restriction through 
investing in this partnership. 
 
The council had close contact with the FOEs21. They notified the FOEs by fax and 
letter to self-examine their compliance with specific regulations and to submit written 
reports about the results. The customs also used the same contact forms to propel 
the FOEs’ self-regulation. The agencies hosted meetings to inform of new 
regulations and incidences, such as fires, labour disputes and smuggling. Although 
the agencies requested the FOEs’ bosses to attend, the FOEs usually dispatched 
the FDs on their behalf. ‘It is worthwhile to learn new regulations, but not to hear 
similar stories again and again.’ The labour department regularly organised training 
courses to educate the FOEs of labour law and regulations. Aware of the 
vulnerability of the FOEs in the light of the 2007 <Labour Contract Law>, the labour 
department organised training programmes for the employers to manipulate their 
practices so as to best protect their own interests 22 . The agency-firm contact 
demonstrated lax enforcement and hence negative effect. The agencies allowed the 
firms to self-report their compliance, in spite of the firms’ bad record. Their 
educations were either ill-structured, so that the investors were disinterested in 
attending, or manipulating, so that ill-intentioned firms could get well-informed about 
creative compliance.  
 
The departments of the council frequently visited the FOEs23. The councilor visited 
in order to show his concern for the FOEs. The labour department carried out 
regular on-site inspections. The inspections mostly concerned the labour contract in 
terms of whether the content was agreeable with the law and whether or not the 
wage was set lower than the city’s minimum wage standard (MWS). Typically the 
visits were paid after only giving short notice. The FOEs did not consider the 
council’s visits as worthwhile. ‘Most visits lack specific purpose. They are repetitive 
and bring unnecessary burden to us. Particularly, the boss has to be present for the 
visits by the labour department and the customs.’ Asked about the FOE’s visits to 
the council and other agencies, the informant replied, ‘I do not visit them unless for 
solving serious problems. I ask the FD to sort out all affairs. But I personally deliver 
the gifts and money on traditional festivals.’  The finding suggested that the 
agencies’ social construction was ill designed and did not yield positive enforcement 
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effect. The firms did not trust the agencies’ accountability and played tactically in the 
bilateral interaction. 
 
The informant gave an example of a problem incurred from a production safety 
inspection24. The inspectors were declined entry by the gatekeeper because the visit 
had not been notified beforehand, nor did the inspectors present their identity cards. 
The immediate effect was that the FOE received a written notice claiming it had 
failed to meet the fire-fighting criteria and its production was illegal. The FOE had to 
halt its production while fixing the problem. It took the FOE much time and money to 
invite the inspectors to revisit the factory before issuing the approval. The long-term 
effect was that the FOE’s breach of the fire-fighting regulation was tolerated ever 
since. When the interview was held inside the factory, the informant pointed out the 
places that were not compliant to the fire-fighting regulation25. A building claimed for 
office use only was built with more floors than permitted and was used for living 
purposes. The informant’s relatives had set up their homes inside the building. They 
had turned the ground floor into a fully-equipped kitchen and used the upstairs as 
flats, comprising of en-suite rooms and lounges. A self-equipped power generator 
was installed with insufficient space left for the objects surrounding it. An outdoor 
area at one side of the factory plant was transformed into a welding workshop. A 
roof was built across the top of the factory plant and the enclosure wall. Between the 
paralleled supporting pillars of the roof were installed rails to run a crane. When 
asked what the production safety officer would do if seeing these problems, the 
informant replied, ‘money talks.’  This finding showed that the agency-firm 
interaction was based on the logic and shared value of illegitimacy and 
instrumentality. The ill-constrained agency first abused authority and then was 
negligent after taking bribery. Meanwhile, the firm was ill-intentioned to bribe the 
agency. The enforcement effect was negative. 
 
 
5.   Findings 
Institutional features  Lufei was categorised as a Conciliative regime 
because of its low grid, namely keeping a low and invisible profile, and high group, 
namely constructing inter-agency cooperation for over-facilitation and under-
restriction. 
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Regulating side The representative agency has peculiar institutional binding 
with domiciled TTP-type FOEs. This type of FOE is the major source of the village’s 
extra revenue as well as being the discouraged type according to the municipal and 
central government’s foreign investment strategies. The agency’s competition for 
and preference of the TTP-type is primarily driven by its revenue-maximisation. 
Towards this end, it switches from an indifferent stance towards domiciled FOEs to 
an innovative, efficient, predictable, responsive, coordinative and facilitative 
performance. Restrictive practice is lax and secondary to facilitation. With the FOEs’ 
bribery, the agencies either manipulate the interpretation and implementation of law 
to the FOEs’ benefit, or neglect the FOEs’ crime and misconduct. Consequently, the 
wrongdoers are able to escape penalty.  
 
Regulated side The informant FOE is typical of an ill-intentioned and well-
informed SME from a LRC. Its characteristic is exemplified in its creative and ill 
compliance with the labour, customs and production safety regulations. Its favour of 
Lufei showcases that on the one hand, its choice of investment destination is of 
strategic characteristic; and on the other hand, this regime is proved to be a haven 
for regulatory misconduct.  
 
Two-sided marriage and match  The agency-firm bilateral relation is 
characteristic of bipartisan rather than enforcer-vs-regulatee. The distribution of 
power is symmetric between the two sides. Social construction and regularised 
arrangement institutionalises the shared value of instrumentality and illegitimacy for 
both sides. The regime shapes Lufei’s peculiar business environment, both 
unfriendly before and excessively friendly later. Although the FOE evidently does 
not trust the agencies, it is loyal to the regime and has not the slightest idea to exit. 
The preferences of the regime and the firms match well with each other. 
 
RC outcomes  The dominant TTP-type in its industrial structure, as well as 
the lax enforcement effect, strongly suggest that the Lufei regime is a regulatory 
haven for misbehaving SMEs from LRCs. Driven by revenue maximisation, the 
regime is instrumental and has established comparative advantage. 
 
 
6.      Outstanding Issues 
The characteristics of the Lufei regime generally agree with interpretation of the 
Conciliative in the ER Framework.  Typically it is more loyal to its organisational 
interest than to that of society at large, and protective and attractive to the profit-
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maximising type of firm that is disfavoured by the national and municipal 
governments. It facilitates business at the expense of restriction. At the same time, it 
is different from the interpretation in the ER Framework in two aspects: revenue-
maximisation driven and bribery-involving instrumentality. These two are not 
interpreted as the traits of the Conciliative regime by the framework. The 
explanations are: concerning the revenue-maximising drive, the ER Framework 
emphasises the regime’s traits of self-commitment and self-accountability and no 
commitment or accountability to the mainstream society. Being simplified, the ER 
Framework does not pay attention to the drive of the regime’s prior commitment and 
accountability. Notwithstanding this inattention of the framework, the empirical 
finding only gives more fleshy details about the regime’s drive. These details do not 
disagree with the simplified account by the framework. Concerning the involvement 
of bribery in the agency’s instrumentality, this is arguably a trait of the Conciliative 
regime. Being a trait or not will be shortly found out by the second case of this study. 
Apart from these two explicable outstanding issues, the ER Framework is concluded 
as plausible in interpreting the Conciliative regime as based on the Lufei case. 
 
 
Case 2:  Tuqing of Suzhou 
 
1.     The Regime 
The Town Council of Tuqing designated an industrial zone of 70 square km to 
accommodate the domicile of FOEs26. By the second half of 2008, there were more 
than 300 FOEs settling in the zone. The investors were from the USA, EU, 
Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The investment originating 
from Taiwan was the biggest, with those enterprises making up one third of the 
FOEs. Most of them were engaged in the production of IT components. On average, 
an FOE had an investment amount of USD 4 million and 5-6 years of production 
history. Originally most FOEs undertook traditional industries such as toys, building 
components and garments. Currently they were out-numbered by modern 
manufactures, such as IT, model casting and power wiring. This industrial structure 
indicated that Tuqing was particularly attractive to SMEs in both low-tech and high-
tech sectors of LRCs. 
 
The town council was not a specialist regime for attracting foreign investment. It had 
sufficient authority to regulate local issues. Although some information about 
                                                 
26
 Information sourced from the official website of the Tuqing Town Council; Interview LZSC 
                                         
182 
business attraction was given at its official website, its accountability was broader, 
including comprehensive issues. This was a sign of low grid. Its constituent 
departments were the enforcers. Their coordination was mostly intra-organisational, 
except for the national agencies. The national agencies were commented upon as 
being supportive to the FOEs27. This was evident of high group. The agencies made 
coordination for specific purposes. For example, when an FOE was shutting down, 
relevant departments and agencies held meetings to decide what issues should be 
dealt with as a priority. They usually paid off the workers’ wages first so as to 
prevent potential social unrest28. 
 
 
2.        The Agencies 
1.1.     Facilitation29 
The council staff shared a strong interest in competing for foreign investment. 
According to the informant of the council, ‘There is evident competition for foreign 
investment between different locations. Currently, the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) is 
more attractive than the Pearl River Delta (PRD) to foreign investors. This is 
because the officials of all ranks here are more committed to attracting foreign 
investment.’ Asked about the motivation for the competition, the informant 
answered: ‘the fulfillment of regulatory goals set by the higher-level government; the 
commitment to the well-being of the hometown; and professionalism.’ He voluntarily 
emphasised from a personal standpoint: ‘I would not render 1% effort if I could 
commit myself 100%.’ An additional informant said that the bonus paid for the 
successful foreign investment promoter awarded by the council was high30. It was 
proportionate to the investment volume that he introduced. 
 
The council used both ex ante and ex post measures in competing for foreign 
investment 31 . Ex ante measures included attracting overseas investors from 
successful rival cities and adopting a differentiating strategy in foreign investment 
attraction. Ex post measures were good service and taking the FOEs’ voice 
seriously. These measures indicated that Tuqing’s business-attracting strategy and 
achievement were based on innovation. 
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Attracting Overseas Investors from Rival Cities  The council adopted two 
sorts of strategies to attract overseas investors from rival cities. One was to attend 
the investment promotion fairs regularly organised by the municipal government of 
Suzhou in the PRD cities including Shenzhen. These fairs were headed by the 
mayor and attended by the leaders of counties, towns and villages. The officials 
held face-to-face conversations with the interested investors, and tried to persuade 
the investors to visit their jurisdictions. ‘The leaders and officials understand the 
difficulty of persuading an investor to come to Suzhou. Thus, they are friendly and 
supportive to the domiciled FOEs.’ The agencies’ participation and value for 
achievement in RC explained their loyalty to incumbent firms. 
 
The other was to market the town to the overseas investors through its long-term 
offices based in rival cities. The offices were established for the particular purpose 
of attracting the investors who had factories locally. The informant himself worked in 
the council’s office in Shenzhen during 1991 and 1995. He established contacts with 
local Taiwan and Hong Kong business associations, through which he made himself 
known to the investors. He then persuaded the investors to visit his town. He 
accompanied the interested investors to the Tuqing Town, showcasing the local 
infrastructures and introducing them to his colleagues. The itinerary, including inter-
city flight, local accommodation, transport and meals, were all arranged and paid for 
at the expense of the council from a special fund set up for the purpose of foreign 
investment attraction. ‘All the Taiwan and Hong Kong FOEs established here during 
the first years were introduced by me.’ The informant’s consistent commitment was 
rewarded by promotion. He currently held two managerial positions. As a 
government official, he was the section chief (SC) of the department responsible for 
foreign investment attraction. As a businessman, he was the general manager of the 
town-owned ETDC32. 
 
Differentiating Attracted Objects The council had never been in head-on foreign 
investment competition with SIZs. ‘We benefit from the achievements of the big 
brothers.’  The frontline competitors, or the big brothers, were the national-class 
SIZs, such as Gongcheng and Ximo 33 . Because of their foreign investment 
achievement, one of the country-wide biggest clusters of IT industry came into being 
in the city. ‘They target the big companies. We take the smaller partners of the 
bigger ones.’  The council was self-defined as a satellite to the SIZs and opened its 
doors widely for the small sub-contractors of the big FOEs that settled in the SIZs. 
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Given its lower costs for land and labour as well as its short distance to the SIZs, the 
town became a favourable destination for the SMEs. Tuqing’s target on SMEs was 
characteristic of instrumentality. 
 
Good Practice and Service  Similar to the other successful sub-city 
jurisdictions (SCJs), the council emphasised good practice, which was typical of 
proper constraint of agencies and regulatory certainty. ‘In Suzhou, we share this 
view commonly: standard bureaucratic practice and uncorrupted competent officials 
account for us in outdoing the PRD in competition for foreign investment.’ The 
council emphasised good service as of vital significance to the success of its foreign 
investment attraction. Good service was represented in two ways. One way 
concerned the approval of a new project with foreign investment. The council 
provided a one-stop shop and speedy service to new investors. To ensure express 
approval of a big project, the councillors undertook any necessary coordination with 
the municipal government. This indicated facilitative responsiveness and efficiency 
based on inter-agency cooperation. The other way concerned post-approval 
support. The council made the staff’s mobile numbers available so that the FOEs 
were able to find the relevant officers immediately in case they were needed. The 
council provided round-the-clock support to the FOEs. The informant and his 
departmental staff worked all year around except for one day – the Chinese New 
Year’s Day. This showcased the agency’s extraordinary commitment to business 
facilitation. Moreover, it adopted a person-to-firm scheme for working contacts with 
the FOEs. Accordingly, the council specified explicitly which officer was responsible 
for the well-being of which FOE. As the departments, other agencies and the FOEs 
all knew precisely who the responsible officer was, the FOE’s demands and the 
council’s feedback were traceable. Negligence could be quickly identified and 
corrected. Thus the officers’ commitment was effectively monitored. Such a person-
to-firm scheme was institutionalised in the organisational performance and free from 
personnel changes. Generally, the agencies’ practice was characteristic of 
consistent commitment, facilitative responsiveness, efficiency, certainty and 
innovation. It underpinned Tuqing’s regulatory advantage. 
 
Listening to FOEs’ Voice The council made it a rule to listen to the FOEs’ voice. 
It invited the FOEs’ comments and suggestions both regularly and irregularly. Twice 
a year the council hosted symposiums to learn the FOEs’ opinions and proposals. 
All the councillors and the FOEs’ general managers attended them. Irregularly, the 
council issued questionnaires to gather the FOEs’ opinions about particular issues. 
For instance, the FOEs were asked for their comments on the application for 
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business visas to Hong Kong and Macao. The council gathered the FOEs’ opinions 
and sorted out the common difficulties. The council also gave feedback to the FOEs 
about the outcome of their suggestions. For instance, it informed the FOEs that a 
particular department had streamlined its procedure as a result of their suggestions. 
The council had improved the street lampposts, sewage system, social order, 
environmental hygiene, water and power supply, and other facilities. It stressed the 
cooperation of the FOEs as integral to the building of a good community. Taking the 
firms’ voice seriously, the regime won the firms’ loyalty.  Developing together a 
shared community institutionalised their shared values, bound and benefited both 
interests. 
 
1.2.    Restriction34 
The council was absolutely informed of the national and municipal strategies 
regarding foreign investment attraction. Nevertheless, it held its position of treating 
all FOEs the same. ‘Enterprises should be treated equally, no matter the size, 
investment origin and compliance.’ Regarding the size, ‘All enterprises begin from 
small. The government should help a small enterprise to grow big and a big one 
even bigger. We understand the challenge faced by big enterprises. We also 
sympathise with the SMEs’ struggle for survival.’ With regard to investment origin, 
‘we note the cultural differences in the FOEs from different home countries. Yet we 
are the host and should be hospitable to all our guests.’ Regarding the compliance, 
‘we give warnings to the poorly-complying FOEs to correct their wrong doings. But 
we do not discriminate against them. In no way should we be adverse to any FOE.’ 
Labour regulation was used as an example. ‘We follow the rule of ‘no complaint, no 
investigation.’ It meant that the labour department was not active unless receiving a 
complaint about an FOE. If the department regarded the FOE as wrong, it would 
request the FOE to correct it. If the FOE continued the wrong doing, the department 
would penalise it. However, the informant declined to answer as to how the wrong-
doer was penalised. It was inferred that the penalty was more likely to be token. If 
the penalty were serious, the informant would have addressed it frankly. Lenient 
enforcement was considered as inappropriate in current regulatory context. Tuqing’s 
business attraction apparently followed its own rule of the game. This rule was not 
aligned with national and municipal governments’ and hence was illegitimate. Its 
practice was unbalanced, typical of over-facilitation and under-restriction. 
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There were more details for the council’s stance towards industry. ‘We decline all 
heavy metallurgical projects, including those with a pollutant process.’ The regime’s 
ban on pollutant industries was based on protecting local environment rather than 
complying with national strategy. This stance was confirmed by its support for low-
tech and labour-intensive firms. Specifically, the council demonstrated an 
exceptionally embracing stance towards the toy industry, even though it was aware 
of the industry being a discouraged category. In the informant’s words, ‘the 
differentiation is made by the national and municipal policies. We do not 
discriminate industries. We support all industries alike.’35 To explain the reason, ‘it is 
enough for them to face a negative policy environment, severe market competition 
and rapid upgrade pressure.’ Tuqing’s attitude towards the toy industry was 
extraordinary. As a matter of fact, the Tuqing town was one of the very few sub-city 
jurisdictions of Suzhou with the presence of toy FOEs. When the author was 
referred by a municipal governmental official to the county council, the immediate 
superior of the Tuqing Town Council, the county official phoned numerous times to 
repetitively emphasise that the existence of a few toy-makers in his territory was 
against its wish. ‘We do not encourage the toy industry at all.’ Whereas the 
existence of the toy industry seemed to be a shame to its superior, Tuqing was 
looking after the toy manufactures as usual. This suggested that the Tuqing regime 
was dissident in a broad regulatory context. 
 
 
3.      The FOEs 
Both toy FOEs interviewed were established in the 1990s with investment 
originating from South Korea36. One was the first FOE ever received by the town. It 
was set up in 1993, with a registered investment amount of USD 4.1 million. By 
2008, its investment amount increased to USD 6 million, with a total workforce of 
2,300. It was the biggest toy-maker in the whole city. The toy maker began 
production in the form of a TTP but later it turned into an independent legal entity. 
The owner of this company was the director of the Korean business association in 
Suzhou. With the increased costs of labour and raw materials in recent years, the 
FOE moved part of the production to the neighbouring province Anhui. However ‘the 
officials in Anhui are not as supportive as here.’37  The firm was convinced the 
regime’s committed service and facilitation were unmatchable by rivals. The other 
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toymaker was still a TTP-type. It was a contractor of Disney38. Both toy-makers 
exported all their products to the USA and EU markets through the seaport of 
Shanghai. They abided by the code of conduct of the International Council of Toy 
Industry and standards imposed by big buyers such as Disney. The firms were 
evidently subject to effective enforcement based on the supply chain. 
 
The informants appeared to be reluctant to give information about problems. The 
limited information in this regard was that problems were mainly related to customs 
and tax issues. Inter-customs communication and coordination was commented on 
as poor39. In case of problems, the FOEs contacted directly the relevant agencies 
which were easy to approach. Normally they responded quickly and ironed out the 
problems effectively. If necessary the FOE invited the town council to negotiate with 
other agencies. The council’s involvement generally engendered FOE-friendly 
solutions. Hence the FOEs were confident in the council’s assistance in solving 
problems for them.  The finding here indicated that the firms and the agencies were 
mutually loyal, trusting and accountable. Both kept problems internal rather than 
exposing to outsiders.  
 
 
4.        Agency-FOE Contact40 
The council and the FOEs had close contact with each other. The procedures of the 
departments and agencies were regularised and clearly specified, with the 
responsible persons’ named and accountable. ‘The procedures are easy for me to 
understand and follow.’ The administrators and the FOEs’ relevant personnel were 
familiar with each other. ‘The administrators were helpful and competent, and 
worked efficiently and effectively.’ 
 
The departments and national agencies organised training courses about particular 
regulations. For instance, the labour department organised a lecture to refresh the 
FOEs’ knowledge about handling the annual review. The details covered included 
the preparation of the required documents, the submission timeframe and the 
review method and procedure. They notified the FOEs of newly promulgated or 
altered important regulations such as the labour law, tax policy and social security 
policy. For example, before the national inspection on toy safety began at the end of 
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2007, the AQSIQ and the council summoned the toy FOEs to explain the cause and 
purpose. These briefings helped the FOEs to be well informed and better adaptive.  
 
The officers of the council visited the FOEs for three purposes41. The first was to 
solve problems. They went to the sites in the first instance after receiving reports 
from the FOEs. The second was to understand the impact of particular new policies 
upon the business. The council visited the big toy makers regularly and the small 
ones occasionally. The last was to spot check on FOEs’ law-abiding status and was 
not given early notice. The FOEs acknowledged the worthiness of the agencies’ 
visits.  
 
 
5.       Findings 
Institutional features    Tuqing was classified as a Conciliative regime because of 
its low grid and high group characteristics. It was a government at sub-city level and 
required to be accountable for comprehensive local economic and social 
governance.  Although not a specialist regime for attracting foreign investment, the 
regime was characteristic of close inter-agency cooperation to facilitate business. 
 
Regulating side The council demonstrates a strong sense of competition. Its 
competing strategy deviates from the mainstream. Rather than competing head-on 
with the nation-class SIZs, it strategically targets on the disfavoured type – the 
SMEs from the LRCs – in order to secure an advantage. It adopts an aggressive 
marketing strategy, and enhances committed, well-restrained, efficient and 
responsive facilitation. It takes the incumbent FOEs’ voice seriously and reacts by 
making adjustments to enhance facilitation and community-building. The regime 
never treats its FOEs residents differentially in terms of size, industry, investment 
origin and compliance. Deviating from the national and municipal foreign investment 
strategies, hence illegitimate, it demonstrates the regime’s commitment and 
protection for the FOEs. The regime bans pollutant business from entry, which 
implies its value of the communal interest. The agencies’ restriction is lenient and 
unbalanced against facilitation. Penalty, if any, is not unveiled to an outsider.  
 
Regulated side They comply with high informal standards imposed by big 
buyers. The toy-makers have a high opinion about Tuqing. Like the agencies, the 
FOEs are reluctant to discuss regulatory problems and solutions. In contrast, they 
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praise the agencies for their commitment and facilitation. This shows that the 
agencies and the FOEs are more trusting and accountable to each other than to 
those outside the regime. 
 
Two-sided marriage and match The agency-FOE bilateral relation is close and 
the distribution of power is symmetric. The bilateral interaction follows the logic of 
appropriateness to the secluded local community. Social construction and 
regularised arrangement institutionalises shared value, mutual trust and 
accountability. The representative agency plays the leading role in establishing 
Tuqing’s business-friendly environment. The FOEs’ voice is taken so seriously that 
the FOEs are extraordinarily loyal to the regime. The Tuqing regime’s target and the 
firm’s choice match exactly. 
 
RC outcomes  The Tuqing regime has been a very successful destination for 
SMEs in both low and high tech industries mostly from LRCs. It has prior 
commitment and accountability to the local community and resident FOEs rather 
than to the city or the country. Its over-facilitation and under-restriction are unlikely 
to encourage the FOEs’ social compliance. General enforcement effect is lax. Its 
illegitimate, instrumental and innovative competing strategy is characteristics of 
comparative advantage.  
 
Based on the available information, it is concluded that the Tuqing regime is a 
perfect example of the Conciliative regime. The empirical finding fully supports the 
interpretation of the ER Framework. No outstanding issue is likely to be caused by 
the selectively positive information about the regime given by the agency and firm 
informants. However such an information-giving manner is an exact characteristic of 
a Conciliative regime. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Sharing some common characteristics of the Conciliative, the Lufei and Tuqing 
regimes are notably different in two respects. The first concerns the drive of 
competing for foreign investment. The Lufei regime is characteristic of revenue 
maximisation, whereas the Tuqing regime concerns the overall interest of the local 
community. The second concerns the discipline of the agency. The agencies’ 
facilitative and restrictive performance involves bribery in the Lufei. Their 
counterparts in the Tuqing view bribery as a disease for foreign investment 
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attraction so they consciously avoid it. These two differences between the two 
regimes suggest that revenue maximisation and bribery are not necessarily 
attached to the Conciliative regime, just as the ER Framework interpreted.  They 
also suggest that regimes in the real world are more institutionally peculiar and 
contextually specific than the generalised ER Framework interprets. Notwithstanding 
the identified limitation of the ER Framework, the findings of the two empirical cases 
that exemplify the Conciliative regime agree: the interpretation made by the ER 
Framework for this type of regime is plausible. 
  
Chapter VIII  The Detached Regime 
 
 
Like the previous three case studies, this one begins by explaining why the cases 
are classified as the Detached regimes. The explanation is based on the grid and 
group characteristics, which are also the institutional features of the case. It is 
followed by reporting the factual characteristics of the two samples and the empirical 
findings based on the ER Framework, and finally a scrutiny of outstanding issues so 
as to conclude the plausibility of the theoretical framework.  
 
The two cases the Anke and the Benpo Towns of the city of Shenzhen. Both 
regimes are represented by their town councils - the intermediate level between the 
county government and the village council in the Chinese governmental hierarchy1.  
Like other town councils in Shenzhen, the Anke and Benpo Town Councils have 
identical organisational structures that roughly mirror those of the county 
governments 2 . They are local governments with comprehensive economic and 
social authorities. They are not required to pay special attention to attracting 
overseas business, but are accountable for it as one of their diverse regulatory tasks 
and goals. In fact, neither council gives information about domiciled industries at its 
official website. This is why both regimes are considered as low in grid. Neither town 
council is delegated with complete authority related to business attraction. They are 
not entitled to approve the establishment of an FOE, renew the FOE’s license, 
collect local revenue or lease land. The first three are their immediate superior, 
namely the county governments’ authorities, and the last is the municipal 
government’s discretion. With diverse authority, the Anke and Benpo agencies have 
individual regulatory priorities and agendas. Their incumbent FOEs identify mostly 
inter-agency uncooperation rather than coordination, both among local agencies as 
well as among local and national agencies. This is a sign of low group. Based on 
their low grid and low group, the Anke and Benpo regimes are categorised as the 
Detached regime. Next is to look at their respective characteristics in fact. 
 
 
Case 1:  Anke Town of Shenzhen 
 
1.     The Regime 
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The Anke Town had around 350 FOEs out of 1,500 enterprises by the beginning of 
2008 3 . The rest were domestically funded. Most FOEs were classified by the 
customs as Category-B enterprises, which meant that they were SMEs with a good 
record in complying with the customs rules. Also, most were funded by investment 
originating from Hong Kong and Taiwan. A few were owned by investors from 
Germany, France, Britain and the USA. There were 15 FOEs categorised as high-
tech industries4. With the FOEs less than a quarter of its total industrial population, 
the industrial structure of Anke indicated that this regime was more popular to 
domestic than overseas investors and generally unattractive to big high-tech ones 
from high regulating countries (HRCs).  
 
Inter-agency coordination was unknown to most FOE informants. This was evident 
of low group for Anke. Among the limited information, some was positive, some was 
negative. One FOE informant mentioned that the enterprise-licensing and the 
revenue departments of the county government made annual reviews jointly in order 
to ensure that the FOEs had paid tax appropriately5. Another informant noted that 
the customs’ and AQSIQ’s clearance forms had an identical template 6 . This 
appeared to be the result of coordination between the two agencies. An informant 
from a Taiwanese toy-maker described the practice: ‘The AQSIQ contacted the 
customs in order to attain accurate data about our company’s exports.’7 This finding 
implied that while there was ad hoc communication between the two agencies, they 
did not sufficiently share information of common concern. Shipments of an 
informant’s company were repeatedly delayed because of inter-customs bad 
coordination8.  
 
A few informants of the county government gave details about their cooperation with 
the customs9. The county government was the immediate superior of the Anke 
Town Council. The informants worked in the department that was in charge of 
examining investment projects. It involved the implementation of a specific rule 
jointly set by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the General Administration 
of Customs. The rule was to prevent the enterprises from making fake claims for 
tariff reduction for importing raw materials and equipment which were not actually 
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used for manufacturing export-oriented products. But the rule did not instruct how it 
was to be implemented. The agencies had to figure out the concrete method for 
themselves. The customs and the department agreed upon the necessity of an on-
site verification of the enterprises’ genuine production capacities and needs. Since 
the customs lacked resources to carry out the verification, it became the task of the 
county department. Faced with more than 5,000 enterprises, the inspectors were 
busy all year around. Every day, six groups, two inspectors from each department, 
visited the enterprises according to pre-arranged appointments10. The inspectors 
issued their reports after the on-site verification, based on which the customs 
decided the approvals on the enterprises’ tariff-reduction requests. If attained, the 
tariff-reduction approval was valid for three years. Its renewal required a new on-site 
verification. The FOEs made positive comments on the scheme11. This indicated 
positive effect in business facilitation and rule enforcement. A neighbour county 
council heard about this scheme and dispatched officials to learn.12 The informants 
acknowledged that the cooperation with the customs was unusual, not only in its 
neighbour county but also in its subordinate the Anke town.  
 
 
2.    The Agencies 
2.1 Behaviour 
Although the informants’ opinions about the agencies’ performances were different, 
they coincidentally agreed that in most agencies, some officers were well-behaved 
and others were badly-behaved. Take the customs as an example. A customs-
declarer informant commented: ‘the receptionist administrator is patient in 
interpreting the rules. In case I made a mistake in the declaration form, he corrects it 
for me.’13 However an informant from another FOE criticised, ‘customs’ officials are 
driven by self-interest. Whether you can get their support or not depends on your 
relationship with them.’ 14  An informant from the third company said, ‘they are 
improving. In the past, you had to befriend an officer in order to understand what to 
do to get the approval. Now the customs notifies on its bulletin the required 
documents and the procedure. If you carefully follow the requirements, you can 
generally get the approval.’ 15 However, he admitted that the customs’ support was 
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likely to be related to his company’s excellent compliance record. The finding here 
indicated that the agencies’ performance was individualised and uncertain. 
 
The discretion of the agencies’ staff was at issue. One FOE commented that the 
department in charge of foreign investment affairs of the town was helpful in 
advising how to get the approval to expand and relocate its factory16. In contrast, the 
boss of a Hong Kong electronic FOE complained that the officials within the county 
government and the town and village councils would only work efficiently if bribed17. 
Any support offered by the labour and revenue agencies was dependent on their 
personal relationships. ‘They are abusing a weak legal system.’ In addition to the 
agencies’ individualised performance, the finding here indicated their various 
restraint and instrumentality. 
 
There was additional finding of the village and county government abusing their 
authority. The finding included the county government’s approval of establishing the 
types of manufacturers that were banned by the municipal government. One type 
was the enterprise that undertook three sorts of processing and barter trade (TTP)18. 
An informant with the county government affirmed that they still approved the TTP-
type FOEs, since the villages welcomed them for their revenue and job creation19. 
While pollutant-type FOEs were supposed to be prohibited, it was exposed by an 
informant whose company resided in a village with polluting FOEs. ‘They hide 
themselves behind the walls. But you can see the drainage and smell the smell. The 
village council just pretends not to see it.’20 The town council also made authority-
exceeding approvals. According to an informant with a Taiwanese toy-maker, ‘it is a 
prevailing problem in Anke and Benpo towns that the FOEs like ours cannot attain 
the land lease certificates. Although we have signed a lease contract with the town 
council and paid for the lease, the contract is not acknowledged as valid by the 
municipal land bureau.’ 21  The mentioned finding indicated that the agencies’ ill 
restraint and manipulation were prevailing problems in Anke. Such problems were 
underpinned by the village council’s revenue and employment concerns, and the 
county government’s loose enforcement and monitoring. The finding of the Anke 
Town Council’s immediate superior and subordinate indicated the context of its low 
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grid and low group characteristics. Generally the Anke regimes’ facilitation and 
restriction were misaligned with national and municipal strategies governing quality 
foreign investment attraction and environmental protection. 
 
2.2 Facilitation 
According to an informant of the Anke town council, over recent years the total 
FOEs’ number had remained roughly the same. The town was short of land and 
factory space22. Thus it had actively removed ill-complying traditional manufacturers 
in order to embrace domestic high-tech enterprises. Whereas such aggressive 
measure appeared to be according to provincial government’s ‘empty the cage for 
big birds’ strategy 23 , it was more based on Anke’s own demand for land to 
accommodate big investors, which were not necessarily from abroad.  
 
The agencies occasionally collected the FOEs’ comments on new policies, 
suggestions and complaints but the FOEs never received feedback. Some FOEs 
held that the agencies were not serious in listening to their voice. For example, 
although a toy-maker repetitively complained through all possible communication 
channels about the routine power cuts every week, there had been no positive 
answer or explanation24. In the informant’s guess, ‘the problem is unlikely to be 
solved in the foreseeable future, considering the insufficient power generation and 
unavailable facilities in the town.’ Another toy-maker, in a questionnaire in 2007, 
once suggested adding a new bus route and building a green park25. A new bus 
route was established later but there was still not a green park. Given no feedback, 
the FOE could not determine whether the establishment of the bus route was as a 
result of its suggestion. The town council informant confirmed Anke did not take the 
firms’ voice seriously: ‘The FOEs are under the direct jurisdiction of the village 
councils. We do not invite their opinions.’26  
 
2.3 Restriction 
The agencies demonstrated differentiated practices according to industry, size and 
compliance. The town council actively drove away ill-complying FOEs. In the 
informant’s words, ‘The regulations were not enforced strictly before. They are 
now.’ 27 A high-tech enterprise got the accreditation by the municipal bureau of 
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science and technology. It enjoyed half-rate for corporate income tax 28 . The 
agencies treated big enterprises more favourably than SMEs. ‘We allocate more 
peak-hour power consumption to big enterprises.’ 29  The customs differentiated 
between the FOEs according to their size and compliance records. It allowed the 
well-complying enterprises to use a simpler and faster procedure and charged a 
lower guarantee deposit30 . In contrast, the town council did not emphasise the 
investment origin for the new entrants. An informant with the county government 
said that they had an order from the municipal government to ‘enhance the support 
to domestic private enterprises’31.  
 
Anke’s differential practice tended to be miss-aligned with national strategy for 
attracting quality foreign investment. Most noteworthy, Anke was required to pay 
sufficient attention to facilitating domestic enterprises rather than FOEs. Its 
emphasis on attracting high-tech industry was mostly from home rather than abroad. 
This explained its disinterest in competing for overseas business as well as the 
minor percentage of FOEs in its total industrial population. Meanwhile, Anke 
aggressively got rid of SMEs. Although its aggressive stance could refer to the 
provincial government’s ‘empty the case’ strategy for support, it was unfair 
according to the national government’s criticism. Considering its shortage of land for 
domestic investors, it was understandable why Anke was so adverse to overseas 
SMEs. With contesting regulatory goals, Anke prioritised rule implementation 
according to its own logic and interest.     
 
The FOEs had contrasting opinions towards the agencies’ differentiated strategies. 
A toy-maker informant complained that the agencies’ discrimination against the 
industry and SMEs was unfair. ‘All industries and enterprises are entitled to survive 
and should be treated equally. SMEs also make contributions to local employment 
and economic development.’32  An electronic FOE shared the opinion. ‘As long as 
SMEs are environmentally friendly and comply with the law faithfully, they should be 
supported rather than discouraged.’33 A few FOEs questioned the legitimacy of the 
agencies to determine the right and wrong of the regulatees and suggested that the 
courts should be the authority in this regard34. They also argued that the agencies 
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should aim at educating and correcting the misconduct of ill-complying FOEs rather 
than simply abandoning them35. A toy-maker supporter considered the agencies’ 
preference for high-tech as helpful to improve the local strength of science and 
technology36. The FOEs’ opinions reflected both the agencies’ poor facilitation but 
harsh restriction and the firms’ distrust in the fairness of the agencies. In spite of 
variation, the FOEs’ perspectives confirmed that Anke was adverse to SMEs, or the 
majority of incumbent FOEs.  
 
 
3.    The FOEs 
The Chinese law mostly mentioned was 2007 <Labour Contract Law>37 and the 
FOEs’ reactions varied. A Hong Kong toy-maker was considered as a role model by 
the county government38. It formulated its internal rules according to the labour law, 
which were discussed, revised and passed by vote at the worker’s conference. The 
rules were enforced under the monitoring of the corporate workers’ union. They 
were reflected in the labour contract signed between the employer and the 
employees. The rules were registered at the labour department of the county 
government. A Taiwanese toy-maker mentioned that the labour law pushed the 
company to automate its production so as to tackle the fast-increasing labour cost. 
‘We have invested more capital in technological innovation and developed new 
product series.’39 A Taiwanese electronic FOE claimed to be limitedly affected by 
the labour law. ‘We have a high mobility of workers. The majority of the population is 
short-term. The new labour law is applicable to long-term workers. We don’t have 
dispute.’40  The mentioned finding indicated that the firms had various intentions and 
thus enforcement effects varied. Whereas firms’ enhanced self-regulation or 
technology upgrade were desirable, their creative compliance was not. It was noted 
here that all interviewed FOEs were the survivors of Anke’s aggressive strategy. 
Their compliance with formal enforcement suggested the ways for their survival.  
 
The FOEs must meet the standards of the market countries in order to export their 
products. For example, a South Korean mobile phone producer exported all its 
products to its home country. It complied with the higher product safety standard of 
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South Korea rather than the Chinese corresponding standard 41 . A Taiwanese 
electronic FOE applied the relevant American metallic standard to its products that 
were sold in the USA42. An FOE stated, ‘We must comply with the international 
standards in order to do business. They are stricter and higher than the standards 
set by the Chinese law and regulations.’ 43 He stated that the company’s compliance 
with the Chinese law was secondary in its rule-abiding structure. A TTP-type 
toymaker which exported 100% products to the USA and the EU complied with 
these markets’ standards44. The finding indicated that the firms’ supply chains were 
functioning as an informal enforcement structure and entailed positive effect. 
 
 
4.     Agency-FOE Interaction 
The FOEs’ comments on the agencies’ working arrangement were specific, since 
most agencies’ practice was uncoordinated. The vice general manager of a Hong 
Kong toy-maker praised the centralised affair-handling pattern adopted by the 
county government45. In this so-called affair-handling hall, all departments of the 
county government and the national agencies had their permanent receptions. The 
receptions were staffed by administrators and section chiefs. These officials 
handled, examined and approved relevant affairs on behalf of their organisations. 
The FOEs could handle almost all regulatory affairs with one stop. The informant 
held that this centralised working pattern restricted arbitrary interpretations by the 
agencies’ staff. This one-stop shop made the agencies’ performance restrained, 
standard and comparable.  
 
The FOEs particularly denoted the working procedures of the customs and the 
AQSIQ. One FOE held the customs’ procedure as clearly specified46. Another had a 
different opinion. ‘The local and the seaport customs have different policies. The 
change of the section chief engenders a change in the working arrangements. We 
hire a customs clearance agent to handle all the issues with the two customs. The 
agent has a private connection with the customs officers. They make money out of 
it. The agent always has the job done successfully. If we do it ourselves, we cannot 
be successful.’ 47  This indicated that the agencies’ practice was of fragmented, 
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individualised and gold-digging characteristics. The firm-agency interaction showed 
power asymmetry.  
 
The AQSIQ’s new arrangement was complained about by toymakers. In the words 
of the vice general manager of a Hong Kong toy-maker, ‘since the Mattel recalls, the 
AQSIQ’s policies have been changed too frequently. The implementation of the new 
policies is unclear. There is no mature procedure. We are very confused about what 
to do.’ 48 This general comment was supplemented by another toymaker with details: 
‘The AQSIQ requests us to send both paint samples and a sample of each batch for 
testing. We can attain the permit for exporting the batch of products only after 
passing the test. The testing charges are borne by us. The AQSIQ requests also 
that the paint producer sends the paint for testing. The paint producer must pay for 
the testing to attain the qualification certificate. The AQSIQ double checks us to 
ensure the paint used by us is the certified one supplied by the paint producer. The 
testing method is costly and time-consuming’ 49.  It was evident that the agency’s 
practice was uncertain, inefficient and costly. 
 
The agencies increasingly used their official websites to notify new policies and to 
receive inquiries and applications. For example, at the website of the county 
government, the FOEs could undertake the annual reviews of enterprise-licensing 
and paying tax by uploading and submitting their documents 50 . The customs 
publicised changes of procedures on its website51. The AQSIQ replied to the FOEs’ 
inquiries through emails and notified forthcoming meetings on-line52. In general, the 
FOEs held on-line affair-handling as convenient and transparent. 
 
Some agencies hosted meetings for the purpose of notifying and cautioning 
problems, informing policy changes and explaining new implementation procedures, 
training and friendship-building. For example, the enterprise-licensing department 
trained the FOEs’ personnel in handling the corporate registrations and annual 
reviews53. The town council hosted meetings to brief the economic situation and 
latest policies. The AQSIQ notified the FOEs of the Mattel incident and alerted the 
forthcoming adoption of intensive testing schemes54. The customs informed the 
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FOEs about the change in the policy concerning the guarantee deposit paid for 
importing materials and equipment 55 . Some meetings were organised for all 
industries and others for specific industries56 . The attendant FOEs could make 
comments, raise questions and get immediate answers. The FOEs held that some 
meetings were necessary but others were repetitive. Therefore, enforcement was 
not responsive or efficient. 
 
The FOEs noted that the county government had internal rules to constrain the 
agencies from disturbing the FOEs through unjustifiable visits57. In actual practice, 
many agencies’ visits were arguable. ‘They come and decline to leave. It is a hint of 
requesting a bribe.’58 The informant declined to say exactly which agencies were 
taking bribery. An FOE enjoyed few contacts with the agencies. In the words of its 
vice CEO: ‘They are not very corruptive. But we rarely contact them. It is safe to 
keep a distance.’59 It was evident that the Anke’s agencies were ill-disciplined. Their 
contacts and social construction with the firms were based on inappropriate logic. 
The firm’s opt-out of bilateral interaction and keeping far relational distance were a 
sign of disapproval of the agencies’ values and distrust in the agencies’ justice.  
 
Most problems that the FOEs had were in the fields of labour and the customs. 
Regarding labour problems, the council informant told that before the 2007 labour 
law was promulgated, there were about 100 labour disputes per year. Afterwards, 
the dispute figure doubled60. A Hong Kong high-tech enterprise had encountered 
considerably more labour disputes since 2007. The boss complained, ‘our products 
have a very short life-span, which is characteristic of this rapidly developing 
industry. I must request the workers to work hard and efficiently so as to keep up 
with the fast pace of the market. The labour department cannot advise me on how to 
follow the regulation correctly in order to avoid disputes.’61 Another FOE held that 
the labour department was biased in terms of giving better advice to the workers to 
secure their interests, but showed little empathy with the employers62. A Taiwanese 
toy-maker had a corporate lawyer to advise on the way of coping with the labour 
disputes63. It also got help from the town council and the county government in 
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sorting out the labour disputes. ‘Our boss is the deputy director of the Taiwanese 
Business Association of Shenzhen. He is very familiar with the mayors.’ It was 
evident that in Anke, the firms’ compliance with labour regulation was a big problem. 
This problem was attributable to both the SMEs’ incompetence and ill intentions and 
the agency’s poor education, adverseness and irresponsiveness to investors. This 
problem was symbolic to Anke’s negative enforcement effect. Under such a 
circumstance, the FOEs engaged in self-defence through legal means and personal 
networking. 
 
The customs problem mentioned by the FOE informant was related to a cross-
jurisdiction disagreement. The FOE suffered from three to four shipment delays 
each year on average64. ‘We must use the seaport to ship our containers to the 
USA. The seaport customs often have disputes on the approvals made by the local 
customs. When we seek the solution, they always blame each other and never 
communicate to sort out their disagreement. It usually takes about two months to 
sort out a dispute.’ The town council informant acknowledged that most customs-
related problems were caused by complicated declaration formalities65. Meanwhile, 
incompetence of the FOEs’ customs declarers was also pertinent. The town council 
mostly helped troubled big enterprises and ignored SMEs. ‘The SMEs smuggle.’ 
The finding in this aspect indicated that regulatory problem was caused by both the 
agencies and the firms. The agencies did not cooperate with each other. Nor did 
they facilitate business. Meanwhile the SMEs were infamous for ill compliance. They 
left the Anke an excuse to ignore and abandon them. 
 
 
5. Findings 
Institutional features  The Anke regime is categorised as Detached. As an authority 
with comprehensive governing duties, foreign investment attraction is not given 
special attention. This means low grid. Contrary to its superior county government, 
which acts as an efficient and constraining mechanism, exemplified by its 
centralised arrangements for handling regulatory affairs, the Anke regime 
demonstrates limited inter-agency cooperation. Thus it is low in group.  
 
Regulating side In contrast to the superior county government, the relevant 
agencies at the village and town levels do not show interest in competiting for 
overseas investment. They are ill-constrained, exemplified by their conduct of 
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approvals that are beyond their delegated authorities in order to raise revenue. Both 
facilitative and restrictive practices are of fragmented, individualised, profit-driven 
and uncertain characteristics. Most agencies are indifferent to the FOEs’ voice and 
are open to bribery. They are active in getting rid of low-tech ill-complying overseas 
SMEs and welcoming high-tech business with domestic investment. This indicates 
that the regime’s aggressive strategy is according to the provincial government’s 
‘empty cage for big bird’ policy only in form rather than in principle, because the 
purpose of the latter is for attracting quality foreign investment and is however 
criticised as ‘unfair to the SMEs’ by the national government. With an emphasis on 
domestic investment origin, the regime’s strategy is deviating from the foreign 
investment attracting goal and hence illegitimate. 
 
Regulated side Most incumbent FOEs were SMEs, with investment 
originating from Hong Kong and Taiwan. They react varyingly towards formal rules. 
The considerable rise in labour disputes indicates the FOEs’ general poor 
compliance with the labour law. Hiring short-term workforce means creative 
compliance. Also the SMEs are notorious for smuggling. The FOEs’ compliance with 
informal rules is evidently related to the requests of their overseas markets and 
buyers. While many FOEs have shut down or left Anke, few big investors from 
HRCs enter. 
 
Two-sided marriage and match The agency-FOE relational distance is 
generally wide. Some FOEs deliberately keep a distance from the unreasonable and 
bribery-seeking agencies. The two-sided players have asymmetric distribution of 
power in their interaction – the agencies are superior and the FOEs are inferior. 
There is limited social construction, evident as the agencies do not communicate 
with the FOEs adequately regarding how to comply with regulations. The logic of 
bilateral interaction is inappropriate - mostly cat-vs-mouse. The agencies have quite 
varied arrangements. Only a few agencies, typically the county government, have 
regularised and coordinated arrangements. The regime is primarily responsible for 
Anke’s adverse business environment. The agencies generally do not listen to the 
FOEs’ voice. The two-sided players lack shared values, mutual trust and 
accountability. Many FOEs have exited. The remained FOEs take varied self-
defending measures to survive the adverse conditions. The regime’s disinterest in 
overseas investors and the firms’ negative opinion imply a mismatch between their 
preferences. 
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RC outcomes  Notwithstanding certain attraction to the SMEs from LRCs, the 
Anke regime has become adverse to overseas SMEs and likely scared away big 
investors from HRCs. Requested to enhance facilitation to domestic private 
business, the regime deviates further away from the national strategy of attracting 
desirable type of foreign investment. The agencies’ practice is lack of legitimacy and 
innovation but featured of instrumentality. Meanwhile, the enforcement effect is 
deterrent, considering the uncertain, inefficient, irresponsive and bribery-seeking 
performance of the agencies as well as its distraction to the FOEs’ compliance with 
informal standards. Generally, Anke poses as a regime with regulatory 
disadvantage in attracting overseas investment, particularly one of quality. 
 
 
6.   Outstanding Issues 
The above empirical findings of the Anke regime are mostly agreeable with the 
interpretation of the ER Framework about the Detached regime. Four outstanding 
issues need to be noted and explained.  
 
One issue is that the Anke regime involves constraint and certainty mechanism, 
which is exemplified by the county government’s centralised affair-handling 
arrangement as well as its and the national agencies’ increased use of the internet 
for notifying policies and handling applications. In contrast, the interpretation of the 
ER Framework for the Detached regime is free from any constraining and certainty 
mechanism. The explanation is that, from a narrow perspective, the Anke Town 
council, or the representative agency of the regime, is generally characteristic of low 
constraint and uncertainty. Such characteristics are agreeable with the portrait of the 
ER Framework. From a broad perspective, in spite of the constraint and certainty of 
its superior, the county government, the Anke Town Council and its subordinate, the 
village councils, both behave in a detached fashion. This implies that the constraint 
and certainty mechanism exerts little effect on the generally detached 
characteristics of the Anke regime. Hence the existence of this mechanism is 
viewed as exceptional to the complexity of the real world rather than as a challenge 
to the theoretical interpretation of the Detached regime by the ER Framework.   
 
The heuristic property of the ER Framework as an explanation also applies to the 
second and third issues, namely the inter-agency cooperation and the agencies’ 
bribery-requesting. Concerning the inter-agency cooperation, as commented by the 
informants themselves, the identified inter-agency cooperation is exceptional. 
Whereas empirically this cooperation is not typical of the Anke regime, theoretically 
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the ER Framework is general so that it does not pay attention to exceptional feature. 
Thus, the empirically exceptional existence of inter-agency cooperation is not a 
challenge to the general theory. Concerning the agencies’ bribery-requesting, 
although this form of raising revenue is not addressed by the ER Framework, but its 
nature of seeking resources is agreeable with the description of the framework. 
Besides, in spite of its prevalence in the Anke regime, it is arguable that bribery is 
necessarily involved in the Detached regime. More finding is required to gather from 
additional sources in order to make a conclusion. So far the finding of Anke is 
insufficient to suggest a theoretical modification in this regard.  
 
The last issue is that, the Anke regime has attracted a few hundred SMEs with 
investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan. In contrast, the ER Framework interprets 
that the Detached regime does not attract business of any type. One explanation is 
that, the unattractiveness interpreted by the framework is theoretical, which does not 
mean that in reality a Detached regime cannot attract business at all. As the 
framework clarifies, such unattractiveness is institutional rather than cognitive. A 
firm’s choice of a destination is bounded by its rationality. Thus it is not unusual for a 
firm to choose a destination which is institutionally not suitable. Meanwhile, the ER 
Framework articulates that while it focuses on regulatory attraction and advantage, it 
does not deny non-regulatory attraction and advantage. Indeed, in reality, the firm is 
unlikely to choose a destination entirely based on regulatory consideration 66 . 
Regulatory disadvantage is likely to be offset by other non-regulatory advantage 
such as geographical and linguistic proximity. Therefore, the empirical finding of the 
existence of firms in the Detached regime is not a surprise, and definitely not a 
disagreement to the specific argument of the ER Framework. The other explanation 
is that it is empirically evident that the existing FOEs have experienced a dramatic 
change of the regime, which has become more restrictive, disfavourable and even 
adverse to SMEs. This implies that the SMEs entered in a time when they were 
welcomed. The ones that still remain are those that are able to adapt to the change 
of the regime. Those that are unable to adapt have shut down or exited. This is 
supported by the facts that the FOEs ameliorate the adverse climate through 
assorted means, such as improving self-regulation, employing short-term workers, 
advancing automisation of production, hiring lawyer to solve labour dispute, bribing 
officials and borrowing the power of the mayor based on personal connection. This 
issue proves that the ER Framework is generally static and is limited in capturing 
the institutional dynamic of possible regime changing character. Notwithstanding 
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this limitation, the empirical finding in this aspect does not mean that the framework 
is wrong. 
 
Based on the findings as well as the note and explanation of the identified issues, it 
can be concluded that the case of the Anke regime shows that the ER Framework is 
plausible in its interpretation of the Detached regime. 
 
 
Case 2:  Benpo Town of Shenzhen 
 
1.  The Regime 
In the Benpo Town, there were about 1200 enterprises, including more than 200 
FOEs67 . The remained five sixths enterprises were domestically invested. Most 
FOEs were SMEs with investment originating from Hong Kong and Taiwan. There 
were also a few Japanese and Korean invested enterprises. The structure of 
Benpo’s industrial population indicated that this regime was mostly attractive to 
domestic rather than overseas investment; and that it had nearly no attraction to big 
overseas investors. Therefore, it was likely to have regulatory disadvantage. 
 
Most informants did not identify inter-agency cooperation. This meant low ‘group’. 
There were some exceptions. At the town level, an informant observed that if an 
FOE’s factory failed to meet the inspection by the production safety department, the 
environment department would come to examine the FOE’s indoor air quality68. Yet, 
he was not sure whether the two departments exercised their duties cooperatively. 
One informant used to take advantage of his membership of the local business 
association to enhance communication between the departments of the town 
council. ‘Unfortunately, there is no effect.’ 69  At the village level, an informant 
mentioned that the family planning and the police departments coordinated to 
inspect the implementation of the family planning law among the mobile workers 70. 
They penalised those who did not comply by a fine in accordance with the criteria 
set by the county government. Whereas inter-agency cooperation was generally not 
identified, any cooperative agencies were for restrictive purpose. Considering the 
town council’s ignorance of the firms’ voice also, this showed that the Benpo regime 
was more interested in restriction but not facilitation. 
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2.     The Agencies 
2.1  Behaviour 
The village councils had individualised behaviours. An informant of a Japanese toy-
maker recounted her experience with the village council: ‘The chief councillor is in 
total control. All permits and approvals must be signed by him. But often he is not in 
the office and nobody knows where he is and what he is doing. His decision 
depends on his mood. If he is in a good mood, a difficult problem can be solved 
quickly. If he is in a bad mood, say the night before he has lost money in playing 
majong, an easy problem takes a while to be fixed. The council staff follow suit.’71 
An informant of a Hong Kong electronics company gave an insider’s view: ‘The 
native officers are greedy, badly-behaved and incompetent. The non-native 
university graduates are better. The police department hires comparatively fewer 
natives. Its performance is better than the other departments of the village council 
which mostly hires local natives.’ 72  It was evident that the agencies were ill-
restrained and uncommitted. Hence their performance was individualised, inefficient 
and uncertain. 
 
The FOEs’ informants had varied views about relationship-building with the 
agencies. The vice general manager of a Hong Kong toy-maker showed a positive 
position. ‘It is in the company’s interest to keep regular communication with the 
officials. Thus the company can get their support in case of need. Our company is 
the only one in the whole town that has been supported by the council to solve 
labour dispute since the promulgation of the labour contract law. Some bosses 
came to ask about our experience and I said to them: if you do not talk to the 
officials, they will not talk to you. Who will help you when you are in need?’73 This 
informant’s view was agreed by the factory director of another FOE. ‘How helpful the 
officials are depends on how good your company’s relationship is with them. If you 
hire natives, who speak the same dialect, it is easier to attain their support.’74 He 
also warned: ‘You should never be close to the officials. Otherwise they raise 
unlimited expensive demand.’  The finding suggested most firms kept a distance 
from the agencies. This implied that they distrusted the agencies. However the 
agency-firm relational distance was relevant to the facilitation that the firms could 
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get from the agencies. While close relations enabled the firms to attain the agencies’ 
facilitation, it also made the firms prone to the agencies’ requests for bribe. It was 
evident that the agencies’ facilitation was not regularised and its actional logic was 
likely to be inappropriate.  
 
2.2. Facilitation 
The FOEs generally agreed that the town was not suitable for SMEs. The boss of 
one toymaker considered the town council and the county government as being 
unsupportive of the FOEs75. Many FOEs had left for inland provinces and other 
countries. The boss had established a toy-making base in Guangxi. ‘The investment 
environment is not like here. The local government is very friendly to overseas 
investors. Most workers I hire are local natives. The government has effective 
control over them. There is no labour dispute.’ The vice general manager of another 
FOE commented: ‘The administrative charges are really high here. We have a 
factory in Huiyang. The corresponding cost is about 15% lower.’76 A Hong Kong 
FOE which was established in 1982 was quite upset by the council declining its 
expansion plan. ‘We were one of the earliest FOEs in the town. We have been 
faithfully complying with laws and paying taxes. All our workers admire the Hong 
Kong boss and there is no labour dispute.  We are having an increasing market and 
want to expand our production. But the council disapproved our application because 
we are not high-tech.’ 77  The finding indicated that Benpo was losing competition for 
traditional industries to regimes in less developed regions. This loss was attributable 
to both the firms and the regime. On the one hand, the firms were tempted by lax 
labour enforcement and over-facilitation of rival regimes. On the other hand, 
Benpo’s business environment was becoming worse for SMEs. High administration 
fees implied that the regime exploited domiciled firms in order to increase revenue. 
The regime gave no support for the expansion of well-complying and well-
developing SMEs. 
 
The agencies were not concerned about the FOE’s voice. The council hosted 
special and Spring Festival symposiums to invite the FOEs’ opinions. The boss of a 
Hong Kong toy-maker commented, ‘these symposiums are diplomatic. The officials 
talk mostly about politics but little about real issues.’78 In one informant’s village, the 
council-run Economic and Trade Development Company (ETDC) organised a series 
                                                 
75
 Interview THLG4  
76
 Interview THLG2 
77
 Interview THLG3  
78
 Interview THLG4    
 208 
of investigations into the state of the toy-makers after issues arising from the labour 
contract law and the Mattel recalls. ‘It appears to be a positive sign. But the town 
council still discriminates against toymakers.’79  An informant mentioned that the 
customs and AQSIQ issued questionnaires to comment on which branches worked 
well and which did not. The informant thought the questionnaires would not help to 
monitor the agencies’ performance: ‘How come the officials are pleased to hear 
criticism? If we give our genuine negative opinions, they will retaliate upon us.’80  
The Benpo agencies were evidently uncommitted to facilitation. They did not take 
the firms’ voice seriously. The agencies and firms lacked mutual trust and 
accountability.  
 
2.3 Restriction 
The agencies demonstrated discrimination against SMEs and traditional industries, 
but not towards investment origin and compliance. One informant gave a negative 
comment: ‘Big enterprises grow from SMEs. SMEs like ours are very competitive. 
Discrimination against SMEs impairs us from growing big and strong.’81 Another 
held an opposite opinion: ‘It is reasonable for the government to discourage the 
SMEs from staying. If the SMEs are forced to move to inland locations, they will help 
develop the local economy there. The workers can go back to their home towns. It is 
easier for them as they will be free from homesickness and be less stressed.’82 This 
position was found to be coincidentally agreeable to the Foxconn’s announced plan 
of relocating the factories to inland provinces in the aftermath of a string of workers’ 
suicides in the factory in Shenzhen83. A vice general manager of a Hong Kong toy-
maker blamed governmental poor planning for the agencies’ discriminations. ‘The 
government should have had a better plan so that the FOEs wouldn’t pay the price 
for its bad plan. It should not admit all sorts of FOEs in the first place and later drive 
away the unwanted ones.’84  
 
The agencies did not show enough appreciation to well-complying FOEs. Typically 
the production safety and labour departments adopted a broad-brush approach for 
inspection. ‘We are damned by the poorly-complying FOEs.’ 85  Meanwhile, ‘the 
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agencies do not care who exactly caused the problems for the enterprise. Some 
wrong deeds are conducted not by the employer but by the employee. The agencies 
blame and penalise the innocent boss but not the wrongful employees. It is unfair.’86 
Overall, the FOEs considered the agencies’ broad-brush approach was inefficient 
and inconsiderate of well-complying FOEs.  
 
It was evident that the Benpo regime changed it business-competing strategy – 
becoming to disfavour SMEs. This disfavour was demonstrated by the agencies’ 
discrimination against innocent investors for the fault of wrong-doing workers; and 
the agencies’ depreciation of the firms’ good compliance. The agencies’ adverse 
stance had made many incumbent FOEs shut down or exit. It was high likely to 
deter overseas new entrants.  
 
 
3.    The FOEs 
The FOEs’ good compliance with the labour law resulted either from the 
improvement in the regulatory structure or from the authority of governmental legal 
advice. In the former case, ‘in the past, the labour department penalised by a few 
thousand yuan (a few hundred pounds) if it discovered an enterprise did not buy 
social security for a worker. Now the penalty is increased to a few tens of thousand 
yuan (thousands of pounds). The labour department monitors the enterprises more 
closely.’ 87 The improved compliance was not regarded as a cost by this toymaker 
boss. ‘The social security covers the pension and the compensation for incidents of 
all sorts, including industrial injury and death. Thus abidance by the law costs less 
than non-abidance.’ In the latter case: ‘I consult the municipal Law Bureau. It is the 
authority for interpreting all laws. The officials give me advice on how to implement 
the labour law. Neither the village labour department nor the workers can challenge 
the company’s position.’88   The latter case implied that the labour agency was 
incompetent, and the firm must seek authoritative interpretation about labour 
regulation in order to properly comply with it. Whereas the agency was unable to 
ensure a positive enforcement effect, the firms’ intentional compliance was 
essential.  
 
The FOEs’ compliance with informal rules was related to their market. A Japanese 
and a Hong Kong TTP-type toy-maker respectively sold all their products in Japan 
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and the USA. 89 ‘It is a prerequisite to meet the market countries’ standards in order 
to sell our products.’ Although the AQSIQ had applied stricter product safety 
standards since 2007, both FOEs easily passed the test. Another toy-maker 
informant emphasised: ‘The monitoring by our business partners is penetrating our 
production process.’ The FOE complied with the codes of the International Council 
of Toy Industry, ISO and those imposed by Wal-Mart and Disney. Wal Mart and 
Disney hired third parties to regularly audit the FOE’s implementation of the 
standards.  The standards covered the issues of human rights, product quality and 
safety, labour and environmental protection. They were broader and higher than the 
Chinese national standards90. This indicated the functioning and positive effect of 
informal enforcement structure. 
 
 
4.      Agency-FOE Contact 
A Category-A FOE was allowed by the customs to make customs declaration 
through the internet 91 . However it was frustrated by the AQSIQ’s complicated 
procedure adopted after the Mattel’s recalls. ‘It takes 70 working days to acquire the 
approval for the export – 50 days for taking the product-safety test and 20 days for 
getting the certificate. The certificate is valid for one year. Even with the certificate, 
we must still send samples for each export batch in order to get the specific export 
permit for the batch. We have complained to the AQSIQ about the complicated and 
slow procedure. They stressed the necessity and advised us to apply for the specific 
export permit four months in advance in order to complete the procedure in time.’ It 
was evident that the agencies had contrasting enforcement arrangements. Whereas 
one was simple and efficient, the other was complicated, burdensome and 
irresponsive. 
 
The FOEs might use the telephone for inquiries, yet they had an impression that 
most agencies were not pleased to be phoned. As explained by an informant: ‘Using 
the telephone rather than paying a visit is perceived by the agencies as insufficient 
respect. It is better for us to visit them in order to prove our respect.’92 This indicated 
power asymmetry between the agency and the firm in their bilateral relation and 
interaction. This power asymmetry affected facilitation, making it irresponsive and 
inefficient. 
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The production safety department appeared to be the most active in organising 
meetings. The purpose was to notify the FOEs of the latest problems happening in 
the city, alert them of serious consequences and advise them on precautionary 
measures. However some meetings were either repetitive or irrelevant. ‘They 
request us to attend meetings concerning safe storage of dangerous chemicals. But 
our production involves no dangerous chemicals at all.’ 93 The finding suggested that 
the agency’s social construction was not necessarily desirable and enforcement was 
not responsive or efficient. 
 
Different agencies visited the FOEs at different frequencies and for different 
purposes. In some villages, councils visited the FOEs once a month in order to 
show their care94. The labour department would visit the FOEs upon receiving a 
report about a dispute such as a strike. The police visited the FOEs when there was 
a gang fight, burglary or theft. The customs and the revenue department mostly 
made spot checks of the FOEs when suspicious about the FOEs’ misconduct. Some 
FOEs held these visits as worthwhile. Through the visits, the agencies could better 
understand the FOEs’ genuine state and demands. In the case of diagnosed 
problems, the FOEs could make timely corrections95 . Others worried about the 
agencies’ abuse of the visits. ‘Some officers visit us simply to request treats. They 
arrive around 11am and request us to arrange lunch in a restaurant, followed by 
hair-dressing and foot massage.’ 96 The FOEs were unable to limit the visits of this 
sort: ‘We cannot decline their visits because they will retaliate against us.’ The 
agencies evidently varied in constraint and had various regularised arrangements 
and logics of interaction with the firms. Hence various enforcement effects were 
expected to be engendered. 
 
The problems mentioned by the informants concentrated in three areas: production 
safety, labour and the customs. The boss of a Hong Kong toymaker recounted the 
production safety problems and his way of tackling them. ‘The inspectors often pick 
out minor issues and penalise us for them. The production safety officers insist on 
the necessity of using their specified power switch. But we consider our choice also 
meets the national standard with equal quality, but it’s cheaper. They dislike our 
challenge and fine us as they wish. We are charged between 500 and 50,000 yuan 
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(approximately GBP50 and 5,000). If the fine is high enough, I contact the chief 
town councillor or the governor of the county government. I know these chiefs very 
well. They are always helpful and will order the relevant agencies to reduce or nullify 
the fine.’ 97 Problems of this sort happened two to three times a year on average. 
The finding indicated that the agency was ill-restrained and abusing authority to 
make profit. The firm had to defend its proper interest by inviting senior officials’ 
intervention to correct the agency’s unreasonable and inappropriate decisions. It 
also indicated that Benpo was a regime that was characteristic of individualisation, 
little institutionalisation of value and uncertainty. 
 
Regarding labour problems, the boss of a Hong Kong toy-maker stated that since 
the new labour law came into effect in 2007, there had been several strikes in the 
factory98. He had spent a fortune in compensating the workers. Half of the labour 
population had left. He complained about both the law and the town council: ‘The 
new labour law over-protects the worker. If one hires the worker for 10 years, he has 
to look after the worker for a life time. Even the American and the European laws 
are not so protective to the worker. The town council is not supportive to the 
investors. It doesn’t have the wisdom to advise us on how to deal with the labour 
issues.’ The finding indicated that any regulatory problem was related to both the 
agency and the firm. The agency seemed to be incompetent in social construction 
and inexpert in interpreting labour law. The firm had adopted low labour standard 
and hence suffered from strikes. This problem implied Benpo’s negative effect on 
labour enforcement. 
 
Regarding the problems related to the customs, the informants pinpointed the 
customs’ over-attention to minor details. ‘Our company is frequently subject to the 
customs’ penalties because of minor mistakes. For example we declared “toy shoe” 
as “toy handbag” by mistake.’99 Nevertheless, this FOE seldom missed a shipment. 
Another Category-A FOE encountered more problems in recent years. The 
informant regarded the problems as ‘an outcome of the increased workload of the 
customs. The heavier its workload, the less patient it is to put up with mistakes.’100 
He generalised two causes for the problems. One cause was the FOE’s inaccurate 
forecast of the consumption of imported raw materials. When the customs found 
that the figures for its export products suggested an unnecessary need for the 
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import amount, it would investigate. Another cause was the mistake made by the 
FOE or its supplier in declaring wrongly the quantity or quality of the raw materials. 
Again, the customs investigates to decide whether it involved any attempt to 
smuggle. The finding indicated that the agency adopted a more punitive than 
educating style towards SMEs. Its performance was uncertain, even to big and well-
complying firms. 
 
 
5.   Findings 
Institutional features  Like Anke, the Benpo regime is not a specialist for 
foreign investment attraction. It was not particularly accountable for the achievement 
in attracting overseas investment. This means low grid. With a few exceptions, its 
inter-agency cooperation is rare. This means it is low in group. Thus, Benpo is 
categorised as a Detached regime. 
 
Regulating side The Benpo regime is generally characteristic of uncommitted, 
uncooperative and fragmented agencies. Particularly, the village council is of 
personalised, uncommitted and ill-constrained characteristics. The regime does not 
pay attention to attracting overseas investment. This implies its deviation from 
implementing national foreign investment strategy. In recent years, the agencies’ 
restriction has switched to discriminating against the SMEs in the traditional 
industries, including those who had well-complying records. This harsh stance is not 
in concord with the spirit of the national strategy101. The restrictive agencies’ practice 
is individualised and unreasonable. The agencies abuse their authorities by selling 
products and illegitimately leasing land102 to make profit. Hence, both facilitation and 
restriction are exercised instrumentally and illegitimately. 
 
Regulated side The FOEs’ compliance with the labour law is relevant to the 
improvement of regulatory structure or to the authority of governmental legal advice. 
Their compliance and use of networks to solve problems seems to be from a self-
defence stance in an uncertain, inefficient and inappropriate context. Well-
intentioned and well-comply SMEs are disfavoured and upset by the regime. Their 
adoption of higher informal standards is related to their market in the HRCs and is 
not appreciated by the agencies.  
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Two-sided marriage and match  The agency-firm relational distance 
varies between the FOEs. Few FOEs consider that a close relational distance helps 
enhancing social construction, shared value and mutual trust and accountability. 
Most worry that a close relation makes them vulnerable to the agencies’ 
unrestrained request for bribery. In spite of regularised arrangements, the logic of 
bilateral interaction is likely to be inappropriate. There is limited finding for 
institutionalising shared value. The distribution of power between the two regulatory 
sides is asymmetric. The regime, rather than the firm, was responsible for current 
adverse business environment. The regime seldom takes seriously the incumbent 
FOEs’ voice. Well-complying FOEs become dissatisfied and tend to exit from the 
regime. The regime’s adversity to SMEs, or the majority of the FOEs, and the firms’ 
disappointment about the regime indicate a mismatch between them. 
 
RC outcomes  Based on its current industrial structure, it is indicative of 
Benpo’s little attraction to big investment from the HRC. It discourages overseas 
SMEs residents, in spite of their loyalty and good record of compliance. The 
agencies’ practice involves no legitimacy or innovation but instrumentality. The 
enforcement effect is deterrent. Generally, the Benpo regime demonstrates 
regulatory disadvantage. 
 
 
6.     Outstanding Issues 
The above-mentioned observed characteristics of the Benpo regime are mostly 
agreeable with the interpretation about the Detached regime made by the ER 
Framework. The Benpo case shows little finding of involving constraint and certainty 
mechanism. It is different from the Anke regime which involves constraint and 
certainty mechanism. The difference between the Benpo and Anke regimes 
confirms that constraint and certainty is arguably a certain trait of the Detached 
regime. More finding for other sources is needed in order to make a conclusion in 
this regard. The Benpo regime also shares with the Anke regime such issues as the 
sporadic inter-agency cooperation, the agencies’ bribery-requesting and the 
adversity to the SMEs. These issues have been explained in the Anke regime. Yet 
the Benpo regime still has one issue that differs from Anke. This is individualisation, 
exemplified as the monopoly of stamping approvals by the chief town councillor and 
the county governor’s intervention to reduce or nullify inspectors’ unjustifiable fines. 
The explanation is that individualisation is likely to be contextual to the Benpo. 
Further  investigation is needed from other sources in order to confirm the judgment. 
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Generally, the remaining issues are not considered as disagreeable with the specific 
interpretation of the ER Framework.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Anke and Benpo regimes share in common most characteristics as the 
Detached regimes. Meanwhile they are different in that, for the Anke regime, the 
county government has arrangement with certainty and constraint; whereas for the 
Benpo regime, there is more involvement of individualisation in terms of 
monopolising approving authority, nullifying subordinate’s unreasonable decisions 
and inferior performance. So far, these identified differences cannot be concluded 
as universal. Additional finding is needed from other empirical sources in order to 
determine whether or not the differences are contextual. Till then, they do not 
amount to a challenge to the interpretation of the ER Framework. In general, both 
Anke and Benpo cases support a statement that the ER Framework is plausible in 
its interpretation about the Detached regime. 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
 
The empirical research about RC in China has been reported and the interpretation 
by the ER Framework has been scrutinised. Now, the whole empirical research is to 
be summarised; the framework is to be reviewed in the light of the empirical 
findings; the linkage and contribution of the framework to the theoretically rooted 
subjects of RC and enforcement are to be clarified; and future research is to be 
suggested. These are the tasks of this conclusion to the thesis. 
 
 
1.  Summary of Empirical Research 
This section summarises the general and specific empirical findings and explains 
the identified outstanding issues. The empirical research provides a chance to see 
whether the originally proposed ER Framework is able to make sense of the findings 
from my fieldwork and hence to convincingly interpret the empirical phenomenon of 
RC. It comprises of a general introduction to the macro, middle and micro contexts 
of the sample country and four specific case studies of the micro regimes locating in 
two sample cities. Each case roughly indicates one type of regime of the ER 
Framework. Particular attention is paid to features that appear to be disagreeable to 
specific argument of the ER Framework or missed out by the framework.  The 
structure and focus of case studies are borrowed from the literature review of 
regulatory enforcement, which is also used to structure the ER Framework. 
 
1.1 Findings of Macro and Middle Contexts 
The introduction to the macro and middle contexts sets the scene for the four case 
studies of the micro regimes. The findings show that the institutional characteristics 
of the regimes at the three vertical levels are not the same. While macro regime is 
an Adherent with high oversight and high inter-agency cooperation, middle regimes 
are Uncoordinated with high oversight and low horizontal cooperation, and micro 
regimes are of various types. Macro and middle regimes shape the RC and 
enforcement contexts of micro regimes. Typically, the unified national strategies 
articulate regulatory goals and preferred types of foreign investors. It sets a practical 
benchmark to determine the legitimacy of business attraction and social 
enforcement of the micro regimes in the case studies. The top-down monitoring and 
intervention of the national government indicates its recognition of the significance 
of rule implementations at lower levels. Its outward responses imply joint functioning 
of formal and informal enforcement structures. The inter-city and intra-city RC 
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showcases the middle and micro regimes’ various understandings, learning and 
innovations in fulfilling the regulatory goal of attracting quality overseas investment. 
The micro level is the right perspective to attain precise information about 
fundamental factors of RC, where the agency and the firm act and interact vis-a-vis 
each other in the RC and enforcement context. It is generally found that micro 
regimes respond upwardly in dramatically different fashions and that regulatory 
outcomes at middle and micro levels are not always as desired by macro-level 
government. The findings across the three hierarchical levels suggest that there is 
close link between macro-level rule-making and micro-level practices. Empirically, 
as the ER Framework argues, micro-level enforcement of rules fundamentally 
affects RC through making rules at macro level. The dimension of micro-level 
enforcement deserves in-depth interrogation so as to provide a more 
comprehensive and accurate account for the empirical phenomenon of RC for 
business. 
 
1.2 Regulating Side 
The representative of the regime is the general-purpose agency. In all cases, the 
empirically observed characteristics of the general-purpose agencies are 
dramatically varying, which agree with the interpretations of the ER Framework. 
Specifically, the Adherent Wangda and Guangcheng agencies are mostly well-
restrained and committed. They show strong interest in winning RC and enforce 
social regulations in a balanced, responsive and legitimate fashion. They prefer big 
firms originating from HRCs such as the USA, the EU and Japan, because of their 
voluntary self-enforcement of high social standards.  
 
In contrast, whereas generally restrained, the general-purpose agencies of the 
Uncoordinated Fujia and Ximo demonstrate little interest and commitment to 
competing for desired types of overseas investment or facilitating domiciled firms. 
Whereas both regimes have the authorities to grant favourable conditions, they do 
not use them strategically. Restriction is given apparently more importance than 
facilitation, and is carried out in an uncoordinated manner by Fujia or a coordinated 
manner in Ximo. The general-purpose agencies of both regimes do not show 
particular preference to the firm’s industry, size and investment origin. Well-
complying firms are not necessarily rewarded by responsive facilitation and 
restriction.  
 
The councils of the Conciliative Lufei and Tuqing show strong interest and 
commitment to competing for overseas SMEs. These regimes are found to share 
 218 
some similarities. Both provide innovative, efficient, predictable and responsive 
facilitation. However their over-pursuit of the facilitative goal deviates from superior 
governmental strategies and denies their restrictive duties. They target the SMEs 
from LRCs that are disfavoured by the national government and SIZs. To secure an 
advantage, the regimes establish a regulatory haven for the targeted firms. The two 
regimes have their differences. The Lufei council is driven by the maximisation of 
organisational revenue. Its agencies are not well-restrained. Typically the production 
safety agency and the customs request bribery from any offending FOE in exchange 
for pardon. The labour agency manipulates the interpretation and implementation of 
the law to protect the FOE’s benefit. Meanwhile, the Tuqing is motivated by local 
prosperity. Its agencies are well-restrained. Taking aggressive, committed and 
responsive competing strategies, the agencies never discriminate firms because of 
the size, industry and investment origin. Although the agencies react to complaint 
against firms’ wrong deeds, they do not disclose to the outsider how they penalise 
the wrongdoers. This is indicative of the agencies’ protection and prior accountability 
for the firms. 
 
Unlike their counterparts of the county government, the agencies of the Detached 
Anke town council and their village subordinates are ill-restrained and uncommitted. 
Showing no interest in competing for quality foreign investment, they abuse their 
power in terms of making approvals beyond their authorities and seeking bribery. 
Their practice is fragmented, individualised, profit-driven and unreasonable. They 
are active in sending away low-tech and ill complying SMEs and welcoming 
domestic investment by hi-tech sectors. This aggressive business-attracting strategy 
is illegitimate and instrumental, since it deviates from the national strategy of 
attracting foreign investment. Similarly, the performance of the Detached Benpo 
agencies is uncommitted to facilitative or restrictive goals, fragmented, ill-restrained 
and unreasonable. The regime is disinterested in attracting overseas investment on 
the one hand, and adverse to the SMEs in traditional industries on the other. This 
stance is not congruent with the national strategy for attracting overseas investment. 
The restrictive agencies abuse their authorities by selling products to make profit. 
Both facilitation and restriction are illegitimate and instrumental.  
 
Apart from the above-mentioned theory-supporting findings, there are empirical 
findings that seem to be different from the corresponding interpretations of the 
framework. Explanations are made for these findings. Firstly, individualisation is 
found in the Adherent Wangda, the Uncoordinated Fujia and the Detached Benpo. 
For Wangda and Fujia, individualisation implies institutional change entailed by the 
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change of the leader of the general-purpose agency. For all three regimes, 
individualisation implies how crucial is the leader’s role in shaping the regime’s RC-
related stance and performance. To the contrary, the ER Framework does not pay 
particular attention to individualisation. The framework interprets the agency in a 
collective rather than an individual way. Accordingly, it does not treat the leader’s 
role exceptionally. It is noteworthy that all the three regimes that share 
individualisation are in Shenzhen. Yet the remaining regimes in Shenzhen and all 
regimes in Suzhou are not identified with individualisation. Instead it is 
institutionalisation that is found in the Adherent Gongcheng and Conciliative Tuqing 
regimes of Suzhou. These findings tend to suggest that individualisation is likely to 
be contextual to some micro regimes of Shenzhen. Similar logic applies to 
explaining the outstanding issue of bribery. Bribery-seeking is found in the 
Conciliative Lufei and the Detached Anke and Benpo. Bribery is not a factor 
concerned by the ER Framework, nor is it of most RC and enforcement theories. It 
is noted that all these three bribe-involving regimes locate in Shenzhen. The 
remaining regimes in Shenzhen and all those in Suzhou do not involve agencies’ 
bribery-seeking. Hence an open rather than final statement is that bribery is likely to 
be contextual to the specific regimes. The ignorance of the issues of 
individualisation and bribery by the ER Framework is attributable to its simplicity and 
heurism. 
  
Secondly, the agencies within the same regime never behave uniformly. In the 
Adherent Wangda, the customs branch sticks stubbornly to its wrong decision and 
only corrects it under repetitive orders from its superior based on the persistent 
appeal of the affected firm. Even in the mostly successful Adherent Gongcheng 
regime a few agencies are found to be exceptionally irresponsive, uncommitted and 
inefficient. The customs in the Uncoordinated Fujia is committed and its practice is 
responsive, efficient and innovative. In the Uncoordinated Ximo, the restrictive 
agencies are cooperative and expert in exercising enforcement. In the Detached 
Anke regime, the county governmental agencies provide facilitation with restraint, 
coordination, flexibility and certainty through centralising their regulatory activities. In 
the Detached Benpo, the customs facilitate big well-complying FOEs in terms of 
making declarations through the internet. In contrast, the ER Framework interprets 
the agencies within the same regime in a uniform fashion. There are general and 
specific explanations for the outstanding issues. The general explanation is that the 
framework interprets the agency in archetypal terms. It simply classifies the agency 
into facilitative and restrictive groups. Attention is paid to the cooperation between 
these two types of agencies rather than to that inside each type. Meanwhile, in 
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reality the agencies’ behaviours are much more complex and peculiar. To fully 
capture their complex and peculiar behaviours is impossible not only for the ER 
Framework but for any social science research. The specific explanation is that, as 
clarified in the introduction to the empirical research, in every sample of the case 
study, the general-purpose agency rather than the specific-task one is to be taken 
as representative of the regime. Therefore, the specific-tasked agency such as the 
customs is unrepresentative to the Uncoordinated regime. Also, the customs is 
exceptional in terms of being embedded in both local and national regimes. This 
institutional peculiarity is too complex for the ER Framework to capture. 
  
Finally, inter-agency cooperation does not automatically happen. On the contrary, 
the ER Framework simply assumes inter-agency cooperation will or will not happen. 
Even for high ‘group’ regimes, inter-agency cooperation seems to depend on the 
initiative of the general-purpose agency. In the Adherent Wangda, the director-
general of the regulatory committee is playing a leading role to establish inter-
agency cooperation. In both Adherent regimes, the regulatory committees need to 
bribe the unaffiliated agencies in exchange for their cooperation in business 
facilitation. Similarly, the Conciliative Lufei and Tuqing councils make an effort to 
improve or maintain inter-agency cooperation in order to establish a regulatory 
haven for SMEs that are disfavoured nationally and municipally. The superior county 
government of the Detached Anke plays an active role in collaborating with the 
customs to verify the actual production capacities of the domiciled FOEs. 
Nevertheless this inter-agency cooperation is very exceptional. The explanation is 
that it is necessary for the ER Framework to make simplified assumptions about 
inter-agency cooperation. The inter-agency cooperation is an adaptation of the 
‘group’, or the horizontal dimension of the institutions of the regime and agencies. 
To assume the inter-agency cooperation simplistically is necessary to determine the 
institutional trait of the agency as well as the regime. Therefore, to be simplified in 
this regard is necessary for the framework.  
 
To summarise, the empirical findings about the regulating side are that micro-level 
enforcement regimes demonstrate dramatically different institutional features. 
Notwithstanding a context of prevailing RC for quality foreign investment as well as 
similar implementing similar rules, micro-level regimes demonstrate dramatically 
different interests, performances and strategies. Some competed for quality foreign 
investment as desired by the national government. Some targeted exactly the type 
of overseas firms undesired by the national government. Some were disinterested in 
competition. Some were driving away overseas investors in order to make room for 
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favoured domestic business. Most findings about the distinctive features of specific 
regimes are agreeable to the interpretation of the ER Framework.  
 
 
1.3 Regulated Side 
On most occasions, firms’ stances and reactions towards formal enforcement are 
found to be related to their specific sizes and investment origins. The findings in this 
regard are mostly agreeable with the interpretation of the ER Framework. In the 
Adherent Wangda, big firms from HRCs such as the USA, the EU and Japan have 
well-complying records, whereas the early-movers from LRCs are ill-intentioned and 
ill-complying. The SME in the Conciliative Lufei regime is found to be ill-intentioned 
and well-informed. Its counterparts in the Conciliative Tuqing comply with the 
informal norms imposed by their big buyers such as the Disney. They are reluctant 
to discuss regulatory problems about the regime with the outsider. This is indicative 
of their loyalty and accountability to the regime rather than to external observers. 
The domiciled SMEs in the Detached Anke have a bad record in complying with the 
labour law and customs regulation. In the Detached Benpo, the SMEs adopt high 
informal standards under the request of their buyers in HRCs.  
 
However, firms of the same type do not behave in the stereotyped way as 
interpreted by the ER Framework. It is found in the Detached Anke that an SME 
from a LRC enforces self-regulation of labour protection.  Similarly, in the Detached 
Benpo regime, some small and medium sized toymakers from LRCs are well-
intentioned, well-informed and well-complying, despite their compliance not being 
appreciated by the agencies. Meanwhile, the ER Framework does not interpret big 
firm from LRC – a type which appears to be of different characters. In the Adherent 
Gongcheng and Uncoordinated Ximo, some big firms from LRCs improve self-
regulation to comply with newly promulgated stricter labour law, while some 
creatively comply by hiring short-term workers to avoid cost. In the Uncoordinated 
Fujia, while abiding by informal rules enforced by their powerful American buyers, 
big firms from LRCs are different in terms of correctly or wrongly complying with 
Chinese customs rules. The explanation for these outstanding issues about firms’ 
behaviours is similar to that for the agency. In reality, firms’ behaviours and 
characters are too complex and peculiar for the ER Framework to capture fully. The 
ER Framework is heuristic so that it can only interpret firms in an archetype and 
stereotype fashion. This means that the framework is limited rather than wrong in 
this interpretation. 
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To summarise, the empirical findings show that firms are in different types. Their 
understandings and behaviours are apparently different towards formal and informal 
enforcement and in the context of RC. Generally speaking, the empirical findings in 
this regard support the interpretation of the ER Framework.  
 
1.4 Two Sides: Match and Marriage  
Investigating the marriage and match of the two sides, the focuses are the relations, 
interactions as well as the match and mismatch of preferences of the regime and 
the firm. 
 
1.4.1 Match of Preferences 
Match of preferences of the regime and the firm are one focus in the empirical 
fieldwork. The industrial structure of specific regime is indicative of the match or 
mismatch of its preference with domiciled firms’. Wangda and Gongcheng are 
apparently the most selective regimes, preferring and admitting only quality foreign 
investment – typically big high-tech investors from HRCs. Meanwhile, quality foreign 
investment’s fast growth, or having taken up 50% of the total industrial population, is 
indicative of their preferences for the most desirable type of firms. Generally, the 
regimes’ and the firms’ preferences are in perfect match. Similarly, Lufei and Tuqing 
target on SMEs - the undesirable type according to the national government. The 
SMEs typically from LRCs favour Lufei and Tuqing because of their unusual 
friendliness in a general context of RC for big investors from HRCs. The favourable 
choices of the regimes and SMEs match. In contrast, Fujia and Ximo are not 
actually selective about the type of firms. There is little finding for either SIZ to be 
favoured by big firms from HRC, bearing in mind the structures of their incumbent 
FOEs. Likewise, Anke and Benpo seem to be mostly interested in domestic rather 
than overseas investors. Not only do they deter incumbent overseas SMEs but offer 
no attraction to quality foreign investment. The structures of their total industrial 
populations are indicative of their unpopularity to most desirable types of overseas 
investors by the national and municipal governments. There are apparently 
mismatch between these regimes and business firms. 
 
 
1.4.2 Agency-Firm Relations   
The agency-firm relational distances are found to vary from one type of regime to 
another. The findings agree with the interpretation of the ER Framework. 
Comparatively, the bilateral distance is close in the Adherent Wangda and 
Gongcheng as well as the Conciliative Lufei and Tuqing, but remote in the 
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Uncoordinated Fujia and Ximo as well as the Detached Anke and Benpo. The 
mentioned bilateral distances are typically those between the general-purpose 
agencies and the FOE residents. In fact, under the same regime, the bilateral 
relational distance is not always the same between the agencies and the FOEs. For 
example, in both Fujia and Ximo, the early-mover FOEs are now further from the 
general-purpose agencies than they were before. This is because these FOEs 
consider the agencies have become disinterested in RC, indifferent to the FOEs’ 
voice, and no more committed to their facilitative duties. They even ‘opt out’ of the 
agencies in terms of halting all voluntary contacts. At the same time, the FOEs are 
close to the customs, which are viewed by the FOEs as facilitative, responsive and 
trustworthy. In the Conciliative Lufei, the relation between the council and the FOE 
is bipartisan rather than enforcer-vs-regulatee. It is physically bound by the FOE’s 
production contract and the hiring of the factory director who is a local villager as 
well as a shareholder of the village-owned revenue-raising company. The 
Conciliative Tuqing regime and its FOEs have such a close relationship that they 
are mutually loyal and accountable and neither will give any negative opinion of the 
other to an outsider.  
 
At the same time, some findings are not addressed by the ER Framework. Close 
bilateral relation is found to be costly to the firms. The firms in the Adherent 
Wangda, the Uncoordinated Fujia and the Conciliative Lufei complain about too 
many inspections consuming extra time and human resources. In contrast, the most 
successful Gongcheng regime emphasises professionalism in terms of staying at 
arm’s length from the resident firms. In this way, the agencies are restrained from 
interrupting the firms’ routine but ready to offer facilitation in case of need by the 
firms. Under the Detached Anke, some FOEs would rather keep distant from the 
agencies because of dreading the agencies’ bribery seeking. This view is shared by 
most FOEs in the Detached Benpo, whereas a few consider a close relation is 
helpful to gain the agencies’ support in case of incidents. The explanation is based 
on the theoretical origin of Black’s literature (1976)1. The key point is that the closer 
the enforcer and the regulatee, the strategy the enforcer uses becomes less formal 
and penal. Yet it does not address how to measure the bilateral distance or whether 
close distance would incur unexpected cost to regulated firms. Because of this 
theoretical origin, the ER Framework also misses out these points. Nevertheless, 
empirically the agencies are found not to be using formal and penal measures in 
                                                 
1
 For more details, see the section about the enforcer-regulatee relational distance in Chapter II. 
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most inspections when their relations with the firms are comparatively close. This 
finding is agreeable with the implication of the framework.  
 
1.4.3 Agency-Firm Interactions  
Most characteristics of the bilateral interactions are found to be agreeable with the 
interpretation in the ER Framework. In the Adherent Wangda and Gongcheng, the 
distribution of power between most agencies and the firms is symmetric. Most 
agencies are active in social construction and have regularised working 
arrangements. The bilateral interaction mostly demonstrates the logic of 
appropriateness. Mutual trust and accountability are evident. Most agencies take the 
firms’ voice seriously. Facilitative and restrictive operations are innovative, efficient, 
responsive and legitimate. The firms are loyal to the regimes. The certainty is 
ensured for Wangda under the current leadership and permanently for Gongcheng. 
In the Uncoordinated Fujia and Ximo, the agencies and the firms have varied 
distribution of power, social construction, regularised arrangement and 
institutionalised shared values. The FOEs’ loyalty, trust and accountability vary by 
agency. In the Conciliative Lufei, the agencies and firms enjoy power symmetry. 
Social construction and regularised arrangement institutionalise the shared logic of 
instrumentality. In spite of dislike of the agencies, the FOE still trusts their support 
and protection and never wants to exit. The Conciliative Tuqing is similar to the 
Lufei, but different in that social construction and regularised arrangement 
demonstrate the logic of appropriateness to the local community but instrumentality 
to the mainstream; and in that the agency-FOE are more loyal, trusting and 
accountable to each other than to anyone outside the regime. In the Detached 
Anke, power is distributed asymmetrically between the agencies and the FOEs, 
which is mostly cat-vs-mouse. The logic of bilateral interaction is mostly 
inappropriate and instrumental, considering the agencies’ incompetent, 
unreasonable, unpredictable and bribery-seeking performance as well as the FOEs’ 
varied ways of self-defence. Apart from the non-representative county government, 
most other agencies’ working arrangements are fragmented and individualised. The 
FOEs’ voice is not attached with importance. There is little social construction, 
shared value, mutual trust or accountability. The informant FOEs tend to exit the 
adverse regulatory conditions. In the Detached Benpo, the distribution of power is 
asymmetric between the two regulatory sides. Social construction, regularised 
arrangement, mutual trust and accountability are different for different agencies and 
FOEs. There is little finding of shared values. The logic of bilateral interaction is not 
always appropriate. The FOEs’ voice is generally ignored. The well-complying FOEs 
are upset and tend to exit.  
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A seemingly disagreeing finding is that the restrictive agencies of the Uncoordinated 
Ximo prefer the firms from HRC to those from LRC. This is because the former 
voluntarily self-enforce high labour standard while the latter are manipulative in 
complying with the labour law. This finding appears to be opposite to the 
interpretation of the ER Framework in that the firm’s compliance with informal rule is 
not appreciated by the regime. It is reminded that Ximo is actually not selective as it 
openly claims, exemplified by its admission of low-tech garment producers.  
Meanwhile, no agency awards well-intentioned and well-complying firms in any 
substantial way. Bearing in mind the simplicity of the framework, the empirical 
finding can be said to not be disproving. 
 
The findings from the four case studies showcase different bilateral relations and 
interactions for different regimes. The regime is represented by that of the general-
purpose agency in this regard. Wangda and Gongcheng assure incumbent FOEs 
power symmetry, typically taking serious consideration of the FOEs’ voice in the 
enforcement process and arrangement. So do Lufei and Tuqing. In contrast, Fujia 
and Ximo give no regard to incumbent FOEs’ interests, but adopt and follow their 
own rules of the game. Similarly, Anke and Benpo treat incumbent FOEs inferiorly. 
Besides, the impacts exerted by changes inside the regimes, typically the leadership 
changes of Wangda and Fujia as well as the strategic changes in RC of Ximo, Lufei, 
Anke and Benpo, demonstrate different enforcement styles of regimes in the context 
of RC. We can conclude that different relations and interactions of regime versus 
firm showcase different regimes’ enforcement styles. These different enforcement 
styles reveal how specific two-sided marriages are looked like. The marriage 
indicates the match and mismatch of preferences of the two sides as well as  helps 
to explain relevant RC outcomes of the involved jurisdiction. 
 
 
1.4.4 Summary 
The empirical research findings are that in a prevailing context of RC, regimes 
demonstrate sharply different matches and marriages with domiciled firms. The 
domiciled firms’ reactions as well as the industrial structure of the regime are 
indicators of the match and mismatch of their preferences. Apparently the two-sided 
relations and interactions are not always pleasant. The preferences of the two sides 
do not always match. The findings in this regard show that corresponding 
interpretations of the ER Framework are convincing. 
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1.5 RC Outcomes 
The two-sided match/mismatch of preferences and marriage of the regime and the 
firm are considered as relevant to the economic and social effect of specific 
jurisdiction. The outcomes of business attraction and social effect of specific 
regimes exemplified in the industrial and firm structure are generally agreeable with 
the interpretations in the ER Framework. The findings in the Adherent Wangda and 
Gongcheng as well as the Conciliative Lufei and Tuqing highly agree with the 
framework. Wangda witnesses a rapid growth of big investment in hi-tech sectors 
from the EU. Its efficient enforcement is based on both its strict filter of undesired 
SMEs from LRCs and the chosen firms’ faithful self-enforcement. Gongcheng 
enjoys more than 50% industrial population by HRCs. The rise in labour and land 
cost has made early-movers exit to partner zones. The upgraded industrial structure 
enhances efficient enforcement. The TTP-type firms dominate the industrial 
population of the Conciliative Lufei regime. The enforcement is lax. This finding 
strongly suggests that it is a regulatory haven for ill-intentioned and well-informed 
SMEs from LRCs. The FOEs in Conciliative Tuqing are mostly SMEs from both 
LRCs and HRCs. No heavy industry means Tuqing is a good destination for hi-tech 
industries with a desirable effect for environmental regulation. But the agency’s 
reactive rather than active stance towards labour dispute, and reluctance to expose 
its action to the outside, tend to suggest lax enforcement of labour regulation. Based 
on the limitedly accessible information, the overall enforcement effect can be 
reasonably said as lax.  
 
Meanwhile, some findings need explanations. The Uncoordinated Fujia and Ximo 
are found to have big firms and SMEs from LRCs. The ER Framework interprets the 
Uncoordinated regime as having no attraction to business but burdensome 
enforcement effect. The empirical findings are explicable both from a temporal 
perspective and from the reason of the empowered favourable conditions of the two 
regimes. Fujia has been fully filled by overseas manufacturers under the previous 
leadership of the general-purpose agency. Thus its industrial structure is not 
considered as a valid indicator for its current regulatory attraction. Overall 
enforcement effect tends to be burdensome. This is a conclusion based on the 
active but varied, often robotic, irresponsive and unnecessary performance of 
restrictive agencies on the one hand, and the firms’ compliance with high standards 
insisted by the powerful buyers of the HRCs and managerial competence in abiding 
customs rule on the other. Ximo has abundant land. This puts it in an unrivalled 
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position to absorb new business, since all its competitors are short of land. Judging 
by its overall worsening facilitation, the Ximo regime cannot be said as attractive to 
the desirable type of firm. The restrictive performance is coordinated and 
reasonable. Yet the agencies do not reward the well-complying domiciled FOEs with 
noteworthy responsiveness. This implies that formal and informal enforcement 
structures are not mutually complementary. It hence discounts enforcement effect to 
burdensome.  
 
The FOEs of the Detached Anke are found to take up less than a quarter of its total 
industrial population. Likewise, overseas FOEs take up one sixth of the industrial 
population of the Detached Benpo. Under both regimes, most FOEs are the SMEs 
from LRCs. The ER Framework instead interprets the Detached regime as of 
attracting no particular type of firm. The explanations are that, firstly the framework 
interprets regulatory attraction based on institutions. In reality, the investor’s choice 
is cognitive and bounded by its rationality. This means that the investor is likely to 
be unaware of the institutional match of his preference and the regime’s. Meanwhile, 
the investor rarely chooses a destination purely based on regulatory considerations. 
Non-regulatory consideration may be given more weight by some FOEs. Secondly, 
the information from both regimes confirms that the entry of currently domiciled 
FOEs was at a time when the regimes favoured them. Lastly, it is noted that many 
FOEs have exited the regime. The information is that once there were large 
numbers of undesirable types of firms and that recently they exited or failed to 
survive because of the regimes’ new RC and enforcement strategies. The remaining 
ones are able to protect themselves via varied means, such as enhancing self-
regulation, automating production to replace workforce, hiring the lawyer, inviting the 
mayor or county governor to intervene and bribing officials. This finding also reveals 
the extraordinary adaptability of those remaining SMEs. These explanations also 
underpin the deterrent enforcement effect of both regimes. An abrupt switch to 
stringent enforcement does not evidently improve ill compliers but rather upsets 
good compliers. A simple abandonment of both ill-complying and well-complying 
SMEs implies a dysfunction of formal enforcement mechanism.  In spite of being 
agreeable and seemingly disagreeable, all empirical findings end up supporting the 
theoretical argument of the ER Framework that no regime is successful in attracting 
or enforcing compliance of all sorts of firms.  
 
The RC outcome of regulatory advantage of each specific regime is accounted for 
by the ER Framework. Regulatory advantage is indicated by innovation, legitimacy 
and instrumentality. Both Wangda and Gongcheng innovated their procedures in 
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order to improve facilitative and restrictive responsiveness, certainty and efficiency. 
Their targets and approaches on competing for quality foreign investment conform 
to the national strategy, involve no instrumentality and hence are legitimate. 
Therefore both Wangda and Goncheng are characteristic of competitive advantage. 
On the exact contrary, Anke and Benpo generally make their business environment 
difficult for the SMEs – the majority of their industrial populations. Their 
unreasonableness, irresponsiveness and uncertainty are such a big issue that many 
FOEs have exited the regimes for others and few new overseas investors enter. 
Their adversarial approaches are unacceptably unfair to the SMEs according to the 
national government. Their emphasis on domestic investment deviates from the 
national strategy. Hence the two regimes are characteristic of no innovation but 
instrumentality and illegitimacy. They demonstrate regulatory disadvantage in 
competing for quality foreign investment. Fujia and Ximo do not undertake 
innovation for business attraction or facilitation, but over-emphasise restriction – 
without responsiveness and flexibility. These two regimes showcase legitimacy but 
no instrumentality or innovation and hence no regulatory advantage. Lufei and 
Tuqing are, however, strategic in competing for SMEs and innovative in improving 
their business facilitation. Their competed-for target is not typical quality foreign 
investment, and is out of line with the national strategy. Their strategies are 
characteristic of innovation, instrumentality and illegitimacy. They exemplify 
comparative advantage. 
 
In comparing the four types of regimes, an additional finding about regulatory 
advantage can be summarised. It is recognisable that Adherent Gongcheng and 
Wangda are the most successful regimes in attracting quality foreign investment. 
Between these two regimes, Gongcheng’s success is more likely to endure than 
Wangda. They demonstrate high regulatory advantage. Conciliative Tuqing and 
Lufei are most competitive in attracting overseas SMEs. They also show high 
regulatory advantage. Uncoordinated Fujia and Ximo are less competitive, not only 
less than themselves previously, but also less than Gongcheng, Wangda, Tuqing 
and Lufei. Their attractiveness is dependent on their endowed natural and 
favourable conditions. They do not show regulatory advantage. Detached Anke and 
Benpo are unattractive to big overseas firms and adverse to foreign SMEs. They are 
evident of regulatory disadvantage. This finding, based on cross-case comparison, 
generally supports the interpretation by the ER Framework about RC outcomes of 
regulatory advantage, including competitive and comparative advantage, for the 
various types of regimes. A remaining issue is that it is yet to decide whether the 
Conciliative regimes have more regulatory advantage than the Adherent, as 
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suggested by the ER Framework. More data and finding need to be collected and 
analysed to make a conclusion. Notwithstanding this remaining issue, it is tentative 
to conclude that the empirical finding about regulatory advantages of various 
regimes is plausibly interpreted by the framework.  
 
1.6  Summary 
The significant findings of the empirical research about prevailing RC for foreign 
investment in China can be summarised as follows: 
 
(1) RC at macro and middle levels typically through drafting and changing 
formal legal rules is closely linked to enforcement of these rules at micro level. As a 
matter of fact, the RC effect that is desired by macro-level rule-makers by and large 
depends on the collective practices of front-line enforcement agencies. It is tentative 
to conclude that RC through making rules at macro level as well as through 
implementing rules at middle level are fundamentally affected by enforcement of 
these rules at micro level.  
 
(2)     Actual enforcement practices at micro level can be so dramatically different 
that they are beyond our imagination. Even in the context of the same city, not only 
enforcement agencies and firms think and behave differently, but also they interact 
with each other differently. Indeed each regime forms a peculiar micro institutional 
environment, has its own regulatory culture and follows its own rule of the game. 
What is considered as appropriate inside the boundary of each location is not 
necessarily appropriate in a larger territory. To be well aware of the differences 
between enforcement regimes and those between firms are necessary to 
understand why micro-level practices are so different and why locations are different 
in economic and social effects. 
 
(3)  Matching of the couple’s preferences matters and marriages are different. 
Both agencies and firms are selective about each other. Locations that are 
successful in attracting business demonstrate the match of enforcement and 
business styles, while locations that are not successful indicate the mismatch. 
Indeed match and  mismatch of preferences help to explain why firms conduct 
business at particular locations and why particular locations attract business as 
desired or undesired by rule-makers. 
 
Notwithstanding that the ER framework is proposed to interpret the empirical 
findings, the empirical findings are much richer and more fluid than the ER 
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Framework is able to apprehend. But in spite of the richness and fluidity of the real 
world, the empirical findings are generally interpreted by the ER Framework 
convincingly. The outstanding issues are explicable in terms of the heuristic property 
of the ER Framework, the contextual peculiarity of the sample, or further finding 
from other sources. Based on the empirical findings and necessary explanations, it 
is fair to say the ER Framework is able to give convincing interpretations about the 
RC for overseas investment in China. Focusing on the dimension of micro-level 
enforcement, the ER Framework provides a more comprehensive and accurate 
account for the empirical phenomenon of RC.  
 
 
2.   Theory Revisit 
In the light of the empirical findings, the ER Framework demonstrates both 
theoretical strengths and weaknesses. Indeed, the strength and weakness in each 
theoretical aspect shine side by side. Accordingly, the theory revisit will be carried 
out by critically analysing one theoretical aspect after another by addressing their 
respective strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Interpretive strength  The theoretical interpretation of the agency in cultural 
institutionalist terms is strong. The empirical findings are, in general, found to be 
agreeable to the interpretations of the ER Framework. The findings in this regard 
imply the strength of the fusion of the grid-group typology and historical 
institutionalism. At the same time, some empirical findings shed light on the 
weaknesses of the framework. One weakness is found to be the exclusion of the 
issue of individualisation. This omission is attributable to the use of the grid-group 
typology as a collective typification of agencies. It is noted that this weakness occurs 
in spite of the inclusion of historical institutionalism, which is attentive to 
individualisation versus institutionalisation. Another weakness is that the framework 
does not show a temporal dimension, which is however typical within historical 
institutionalism. Not showing the temporal dimension disables the framework from 
fully capturing the empirical finding of the attraction within the Uncoordinated and 
Detached regimes. The implication here is that, although the grid-group typology 
and historical institutionalism are perfectly compatible, their fusion is not totally 
seamless.  
 
Theoretical comprehensiveness and accuracy The ER Framework is more 
comprehensive and accurate than existing RC theories in answering this question: If 
rules stay the same, how do different locations compete for business? This 
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theoretical framework is context free. The general empirical findings support the 
interpretation of the framework. The theoretical comprehensiveness and accuracy of 
the ER framework attributes to the involved cultural institutionalist approach. 
However, a central argument of the framework is concerned about the regulating-
regulated marriage and match of their preferences. It is particularly relevant to the 
enforcement levels that involve the players vis-a-vis each other. Empirically micro-
level enforcement is the most precise perspective to use this framework. Generally, 
the ER framework is applicable to an RC context in which the agency and the firm 
directly relate and interact each other. 
 
Archetyped characterisation  The framework is heuristic in typifying the 
varieties of regimes, agencies and firms into four collectively exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive archetypes. Consequently the varieties of regimes, agencies and 
firms are interpreted, and relevant implications for RC are explored coherently and 
systematically. The down side is that the framework interprets agencies and firms 
under the same regime uniformly. According to the empirical finding, agencies of the 
same archetyped regime do not behave in exactly the same way. Meanwhile, just 
four archetypes fall short of capturing complex and peculiar types of agencies and 
firms of the real world. This weakness is determined by the cultural categorisation. 
The framework can be improved by suggesting and exploring hybrid types of 
regimes, agencies and firms in the future.  
 
Simplified assumption Simplified assumptions in terms of the ‘grid’ and 
‘group’ underpin the ER Framework’s strong plausibility. However, simplicity costs 
elegance. The framework makes simplified assumption about inter-agency 
cooperation; and the agencies’ behavioural tendencies in line with the functions of 
their regulatory duties. Empirically inter-agency cooperation does not necessarily 
happen automatically. Restrictive agencies do not enforce restrictive rules in the 
same way, nor do facilitative agencies support the FOEs evenly. In a similar vein, 
the ER Framework cannot differentiate nuanced scales of the ‘group’. This 
weakness is traceable to the heurism of the cultural categorisation. 
 
Theoretical root The ER Framework borrows the behavioural and interactive 
dimension from relevant research of regulatory enforcement. The inclusion of this 
dimension distinguishes the ER Framework from all other RC theories. It illustrates 
for the first time how enforcement is relevant to RC for attracting business. 
Nevertheless, since the borrowed dimension is mostly concerned about 
enforcement style, any implications concerning business facilitation are not all 
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sufficiently explored. Typically, the concept of relational distance is relevant to 
enforcement style. Close relational distance implies the enforcer’s likely adoption of 
an informal style and hence infers his likely business facilitation and flexibility. 
However, enforcement scholars do not determine how ‘close’ the agency and the 
firm must be to mean that the players are in close bilateral relation. Nor do the 
scholars expect that too close a relational distance may bring about undesired 
burden and distraction to the regulatee. Therefore, the point that close agency-firm 
relational distance entails business facilitation lacks precision. This weak point 
showcases that the borrowing of concepts from the enforcement subject to address 
the topic of RC is not always precise in some contexts.  
 
To summarise, a theoretical revisit in the light of the empirical findings exposes the 
strengths and weaknesses of the ER Framework. The framework has heuristic and 
interpretive strengths. Meanwhile, it falls short in capturing the real world on account 
of the archetyped characterisation and simplified assumption. Both strengths and 
weaknesses of the framework are underpinned by the cultural institutionalist 
approach and theoretically rooted subjects used, namely existing studies of RC and 
enforcement. 
 
 
3.   Reflecting Existing RC and Enforcement Literature 
The ER Framework is original to the RC subject. Its theory finds root in the RC and 
enforcement studies. But exactly how the Framework sit among existing RC 
theories accounting for the empirical phenomenon of RC? 
 
3.1 Reflecting Existing RC Theories 
The ER Framework is more comprehensive than existing RC theory in interpreting 
the empirical phenomenon of RC. It distinguishes itself from as well as makes itself 
to be reconcilable to existing theories of RC in the following ways.  
 
3.1.1  Theories through economic lens 
The ER Framework argues that whether RC is a driving force to satisfy the firm’s 
preference depends on the type of the regime. The agency’s incentive, interest and 
understanding towards the dual duties of facilitation and restriction are determined 
by the institutions on the regulating side. So is the firm’s influence. An across-the-
board assertion of the firm’s powerful influence by existing theories through 
economic lens ignores the institutional variety of regime and thus is over-optimistic.  
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The ER Framework considers that the ‘race’ analogy of RC is inaccurate. The ‘race’ 
analogy is underpinned by a rational choice or instrumental assumption. This 
assumption can only capture the features of a certain type of regime but misses out 
most others. In contrast, the ER Framework highlights the institutionally varied types 
of regimes. It admits that one type of regime, namely the Detached, is driven purely 
by rational choice logic. At the same time, it illuminates that other types of regimes 
are oriented either by instrumentality or social appropriateness or by a mixture of 
these two logics. In this regard, the framework draws attention to the contrasting 
functioning of the instrumental and social logics, in terms of being balanced versus 
unbalanced, and in the interest of constituent versus in that of wider society. The 
implication of the accommodative assumptions of the ER Framework is that the 
analogy of the government as a marketplace competitor is neither fully right nor fully 
wrong. The government’s choice of RC strategies is institutionally bounded. The 
adjustment of enforcement stringency and the deployment of natural or institutional 
resources are strategic and instrumental. Making a strategic and instrumental 
choice is unlikely for all types of regimes, but for the Conciliative and Detached 
regimes only 2 . Meanwhile strategic and instrumental choices are appealing to 
SMEs, but not to big and environmentally friendly investors. This explains why 
neither ‘race to the bottom (RTB)’ nor ‘race to the top (RTT)’ does not always prevail 
in reality. 
 
3.1.2 Theories through sociological lens 
The ER Framework agrees with the intra-governmental contest theory in 
emphasising the significance of governmental institutional arrangement to RC. 
However the framework interprets the institutional arrangements in a general rather 
than contextual fashion. It focuses on scrutinising two particular institutional 
arrangements in the rule-implementing context, namely vertical top-down oversight 
(grid) and horizontal inter-agency cooperation (group). Such a focus makes the 
framework more comprehensive than existing theories. Additionally, the ER 
Framework gives a more complex account for inter-agency relations by borrowing 
relevant ideas from the jurisdictional interdependence theory. Interpreting inter-
agency relations as being different, the ER framework better captures the real-world 
phenomenon than existing intra-governmental theories. 
 
The ER Framework agrees with the jurisdictional interdependence theory in 
appreciating that RC for business attraction is highly likely to function together with 
                                                 
2
 See Chapter VII and VIII. 
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social concerns. Yet unlike the interdependence theory that pays primary attention 
to social concerns, the ER Framework puts the tension of enforcing economic and 
social regulations at the theoretical centre. Consequently it renders more authentic 
and sophisticated interpretations about the agency’s incentive, inter-agency 
relations, the firm’s preference, and the regime’s innovation and legitimacy. 
 
The ER Framework agrees with the theory of RC as a contest of home-based 
institutions in acknowledging that the regime/agency and the firm are the 
representatives of their respective institutions and that RC is of an institutional 
nature. Like the home-based institutions theory, the ER Framework is vague about 
geographical boundary. But distinctively, it emphasises institutional geography 
(Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin: 2001), and suggests that the enforcement regime is 
a plausible unit of analysis where the enforcer and the firm embedded institutions 
and structures meet, act and react. In this regard, both institutions of the regulating 
and the regulated sides are considered as being involved in RC. Unlike the home-
based institution theory, the ER Framework also makes the RC outcomes visible.  
  
The ER Framework shares with the international rule-setting theory in characterising 
the dynamics and effects of the interplay of relevant players. Meanwhile, the ER 
Framework is different in two ways. In one way, it borrows the characterising 
mechanism from the literature of regulatory enforcement and pays particular 
attention to enforcement effect. In the other way, its interpretation of the interplay is 
not multi-lateral but bilateral, highlighting the regulating and regulated sides. Other 
social structure such as the third party is out of the focus of the ER Framework. This 
bilateral perspective provides a more balanced viewpoint than the unilateral 
perspective drawn by most existing theories. At the same time, it is more narrowly 
focused than the multi-lateral perspective of the international rule-setting theory.  
 
3.2    Reflecting Existing Enforcement Literatures 
Relevant existing enforcement theories lend a building block to the ER framework. 
Broadly speaking, the general structure of the ER Framework borrows that of the 
enforcement theories about the enforcer’s and regulatee’s behaviour, relation and 
interaction. The RC fundamental factors correspond to the focii of relevant 
enforcement theories. The competing entity of the framework corresponds to the 
enforcer of the enforcement theories; the competed-for target, the regulated firm; 
the regulating and regulated sides, the enforcer-firm bilateral relation and interaction 
in the enforcement process; and the RC outcomes, the enforcement effects. The ER 
Framework systemises the focii of these enforcement theories in order to create a 
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coherent analytical framework. In contrast, other enforcement theories form 
comprehensive but disconnected arguments about the players’ action and 
interaction. 
 
Narrowly speaking, the ER Framework borrows the enforcer-regulatee relational 
and interactive dimension. Through scrutinising the involved aspects of this 
dimension, the framework infers the implications for RC characteristics and 
outcomes. Additionally, the framework clarifies how its typifications of regimes and 
firms are related to different sets of taxonomies of enforcers and regulatees made 
by enforcement scholars. Moreover, the framework emphasises enforcement effects 
other than corporate compliance. 
 
 
4.   Contribution to RC and Enforcement Subjects 
Following the clarification of the linkage between the ER Framework and relevant 
RC and enforcement literatures, it is to articulate the theoretical originality of the 
framework. Before that, it is noted that the empirical research contributes to both 
subjects with original and relevant information from a developing country - China. 
Even more noteworthy is the theoretical significance of this empirical research. 
Rather than merely providing contextual information, it demonstrates the plausibility 
of the ER Framework in both RC and enforcement studies.  
 
4.1 Contribution to RC Study 
This thesis aims at advancing scholarly understanding about the empirical 
phenomenon of RC through the knowledge of micro-level enforcement regime. It fills 
the gap of the lack of coherence of RC theories. This theory in the form of the ER 
Framework demonstrates how to analyse RC based on cultural institutionalism 
through analysing enforcement dimension. This analysis is carried out by defining 
RC based on a context-free theoretical framework - the ER framework. Specifically, 
the ER Framework makes the following contributions to the subject of RC. 
 
Nature of RC  Defining RC as of an institutional nature, the ER Framework 
reconciles the logics and emphases of existing economic and sociological 
institutionalist approaches. It focuses on the micro-level enforcement dimension. It 
pays an unusual attention to the regulated side, the regulating-regulated marriage 
and match of their preferences, and the RC outcome of business attraction. This 
dimension as well as the fundamental factors are ignored in current RC studies. It 
alerts that RC through micro-level enforcement of rules fundamentally affects that 
 236 
through macro-level making of rules. It assumes players on both the regulating and 
regulated sides are of heterogeneous rather than homogeneous types and interests. 
Such an assumption is more sophisticated and nearer to reality than existing 
theories based on economic lens. At the same time, the ER framework pays 
attention to the institutions on the regulating side. It elucidates the institutional 
implications of the regulating side’s interacting with the regulated side and of its 
winning business attraction. These implications are given insufficient attention in 
existing RC theories. In general, the ER Framework ameliorates the isolation 
between various hitherto lenses concerning the nature of RC as well as introducing 
a new dimension to the debate. 
 
Regulating side The ER Framework improves the knowledge about the 
regulating side’s understanding and behaviour in an RC context. It suggests such a 
sophisticated assumption that agencies exercise conflicting duties rather than 
following a conventional simplistic assumption that agencies share common 
regulatory goals. Thus it helps to explain why there is always a contention between 
regulatory competition and enforcement; between instrumentality and social 
appropriateness; and between economic and social regulations. Also the framework 
is the first RC research that systematically interprets the competing entity. Although 
the enforcement regime is a specific competing entity, its interpretation is 
fundamental and helps ameliorating the contextual relativity of current RC study.  
 
Regulated side The framework provides precise knowledge about how the 
regulated side’ characteristics affect RC for business. Unlike existing economic 
theories, the ER Framework pays primary attention to the regulatory rather than 
industrial feature of the firm as the competed-for target. To fill the void of all sorts of 
existing theories, it systematically interprets the firm’s understanding and behaviour 
towards formal and informal controls in the RC context. This interpretation is 
expected to make any current contention about the firm’s role in RC for business 
less pointless and more sensible. 
 
Two-sided marriage and match The analysis of the ER Framework sets an 
example in terms of how to understand RC from a bilateral, relational and interactive 
perspective. It clarifies the implications of competitive instrument versus institutions; 
understanding and behaviour; regulatory inter-dependent modes; formal and 
informal structures with regard to RC. It offers explicit knowledge about how the 
regulating and regulated sides affect RC. It is original in suggesting to understand 
RC with a thinking of the regulating and regulated sides finding a partner to form a 
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marriage as well as through the match and mismatch of their preferences. The 
empirical research of Chine shows that such a thinking is helpful to develop a 
convincing interpretation about the phenomenon of RC.  
 
RC outcomes  The ER Framework makes progress in developing business 
attraction as a theme of RC study. It stands as positive qualitative research in this 
regard. Acknowledging scholarly contentious concerns of economic and social 
regulations, it addresses business attraction intertwined with enforcement effect and 
defines both as RC outcomes. Refining the concept of ‘regulatory advantage’ and its 
derivatives, it further advocates that positive research about RC for business always 
involves social concern. The framework demonstrates how to address the 
contention of economic and social regulations in a positive rather than normative 
manner. It hopefully inspires more positive studies for RC in the future.  
 
 
4.2     Contribution to Regulatory Enforcement Study 
Analytical framework  The ER Framework offers a way to enhance the 
strength of the socio-legal study about regulatory enforcement. It proposes an 
analytical framework that coheres and systemises relevant theories about formal 
and informal enforcement structures in different institutional contexts, interpreted by 
the enforcer’s and the regulatee’s behaviours, relation and interaction as well as 
their affecting factors and effects. For the first time it draws attention to the bilateral 
preferences of the regulating and regulated sides and likely caused enforcement 
effects. It demonstrates the strength of cultural institutionalism in forming and 
structuring a comprehensive theory.  
 
The enforcer and regulatee The ER Framework offers a systematic way to typify 
both the enforcer and the regulatee. Such a simultaneous typification for both 
players by the same approach is original. It enables us to get a full and contrasting 
idea about what impacts the two players are subject to vis-a-vis each other as well 
as how formal and informal enforcement structures function and inter-play. So it 
does about the varieties of the enforcer and the regulatee with regard to their 
behaviours, responses and preferences in the enforcement context. The typification 
approach is applicable to contexts with endogenous and exogenous controls. In 
addition, the framework clarifies its connection with hitherto sets of taxonomies 
respectively of the enforcer and the regulatee. Hence it informs how all taxonomies 
are inter-related to each other. 
 
 238 
Bilateral relation and interaction The ER Framework develops further 
implications of the enforcer-regulatee relation and interaction other than enforcing 
strategy and style. It advances our understanding about the enforcement context in 
terms of career versus marriage; regularity versus irregularity; and culture versus 
sub-culture. It clarifies the institutions on the regulating side affects the bilateral 
relation and interaction. With the use of cultural institutionalism, the framework 
expands the scope to illuminate the implications of the enforcement process and 
arrangement, where the two players interplay vis-a-vis each other. 
 
Enforcement effect The framework adds value to studying the relevance of 
enforcement and business attraction. It offers a framework to interpret varied 
business-attracting effects under varied enforcement contexts. This framework is 
more sophisticated than the dichotomy of attracting versus deterring business, 
which is solely underpinned by enforcement stringency. It furthers such an advocacy 
that enforcement effect is symbiotic rather than extra to business attraction.  
 
 
4.3     Bridging RC and Enforcement Studies 
The ER Framework is original in bridging the gap between the two subjects of RC 
and enforcement. The choice of the enforcement regime as the RC entity is 
symbolic as a marriage of the two topics. The framework merges the dynamics of 
enforcement and RC. It inter-links the corresponding factors, redefines RC in terms 
of enforcement regime and interprets the empirical phenomenon of RC based on a 
structure borrowed from enforcement theories. The use of cultural institutionalism 
structures and cements the merge of the two subjects. Specifically, it connects the 
two subjects in the following respects: 
 
Governmental institutions The framework systemises and interprets exogenous 
and endogenous control of governmental institutions in vertical and horizontal terms. 
This brings a perspective to the RC study as well as provides a context-free and 
coherent framework for scrutinising the affecting factors of the enforcer for the 
enforcement study. The framework furthers such an advocacy that the institutions 
on the regulating side are both endowment and restraint (Levy and Spiller: 1994). 
The institutions are significant to the regime’s practice and performance of both RC 
and enforcement. To put this significance in an alternative way, both RC and 
enforcement are institutional by nature. The shared institutional nature lays a 
foundation for future research of these dual themes. Consequently, both RC and 
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enforcement research have a common framework to analyse governmental 
institutions. 
 
Typology of regulatory players Proposing a collectively exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive typology of regulatory players, the framework makes original 
contribution to RC in terms of systematically characterising the regulating and 
regulated sides, and at the same time, inter-relates different sets of taxonomies of 
the enforcer and regulatee. This typology provides RC and enforcement scholars a 
common discourse when addressing the types and behaviours of the enforcer and 
the regulated firm.  
 
Behavioural and interactive dimension The framework borrows the enforcer-
regulatee behavioural and interactive dimension from enforcement study to 
elucidate the implications for RC. This expands the analytic dimension and 
enhances the strength of current RC study. It interweaves the RC and enforcement 
themes whenever rule implementation draws attention in a context of RC for 
business.  
 
Regulatory effect The framework uses the same attributes to regulatory effects 
that are identified both in the RC and enforcement studies to interpret and measure 
RC outcomes. Linking and using the commonly identified attributes, the framework 
highlights the significance of enforcement in the dynamics of RC. It offers a solution 
to such a long-term puzzle as why there seems to be an inevitable tension between 
business attraction and social enforcement.  
 
 
5.  Suggested Future Research  
Like all social science research, the ER Framework covers only limited issues. The 
excluded issues suggest future research on relevant topics. While examining RC at 
various hierarchical levels in other sample contexts, future researchers may 
consider the following specific themes. 
 
Based on the four archetypes of the ER Framework, develop hybrid types of 
regimes and firms. This research will improve the sophistication of RC theory in 
capturing various regimes and firms in the real world. 
 
Contrasting to the heuristic research of the ER Framework, future research can be 
specific and in-depth. Rather than covering all four quadrants of the grid-group 
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typology, future research can focus on one particular quadrant. Correspondingly, 
scrutinise in-depth a particular type of regime or firm. A comparative study is 
possible for regimes of the same type. Comparison could be made spatially if 
attention is paid to varied scales of grid and group, and temporally if encompassing 
a change in the grid or/and the group. Further research can also determine whether 
to include individualisation as an institutional factor of RC or not. 
 
Whereas the ER Framework concentrates on answering a ‘how’ question, future 
research can answer other questions. For example, ‘why’ the regime and the firm 
prefer and attract each other in the way suggested by the ER Framework?  
 
Unlike the two-sided perspective taken by the ER Framework, future research can 
scrutinise the control and impact exerted by any third party or other societal forces. 
The research can either focus on addressing one party, or take into consideration 
the functioning and interplay of multiple forces.  
 
Studying an agency that is embedded not only in local institutions but also in other 
institutions can be an area of future research. An example is the national agency – 
the customs of China in the empirical research of this thesis. A suggested theme is 
to examine how the dually embedded national-local institutions affect the agency’s 
performance at the micro level. Another theme can be a comparative study of 
national and local agencies that share the same local regime.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I proposes the ER Framework in order to provide a key to the puzzle 
that I had faced for many years: If rules are the same, how do regulatory authorities 
compete for business to come to their jurisdictions? This framework uses the 
cultural institutionalist approach to develop the following main argument: An 
important dimension of RC is a competition of different types of micro-level 
enforcement regimes for different types of firms. Depending on the match and 
mismatch of preferences of the regime and the firm, different locations have 
different regulatory outcomes in business attraction, enforcement effect and 
regulatory advantage. The ER framework has been used to interpret the empirical 
phenomenon of RC for foreign investment in China. Except for a few remaining 
issues that require further investigations, empirical findings are convincingly 
interpreted by the ER Framework. This means that the framework is plausible in its 
empirical interpretation. The framework is heuristic at the expense of its fineness, 
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because of the used cultural institutionalist approach. It sits among theories about 
RC with economic and sociological institutionalisms as well as behavioural, 
relational and interactive literature of regulatory enforcement study. It fills the gaps 
inside and between the RC and enforcement subjects by providing a context-free 
and coherent theoretical framework. It also inspires future research about RC and 
enforcement related issues. Above all, the ER Framework adds value to the positive 
and socio-legal studies of RC and enforcement. It stands as an original qualitative 
empirical research in the discipline of regulation. 
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Appendix I   Fieldwork Method 
 
 
1. Ethical Issues1 
The author has fully complied with the LSE’s code of ethics for this PhD research. 
The topic of this thesis is not ethically sensitive. The empirical research does not 
involve the interests of either organisational or individual funding body, deception, 
access into confidential information, intrusive intervention, unacceptable 
psychological problems, vulnerable or gate-keeper groups. When carrying out the 
field research in China, the author was cautiously abiding by relevant laws and 
regulations in China and avoiding raising ethical and political issues. 
 
 
2. Fact-Finding Methods 
The fact-finding was carried out from randomly available and referred informants, 
on-line and hard-copy sources and by other various means. These included 
interviews with informants from the enforcement agencies 2  and the firms; 
participant-observation of the inspectors’ on-site inspections; written documents 
issued by agencies acquired during visits to the informants; internet survey at official 
websites of the sample regimes, relevant firms, governments and agencies of 
various levels, and newspapers between the beginning of 2008 and the end of 
2010. The information reported in each sample case is factual and gathered from 
triangular sources. In particular, the details about the behaviour, relationship and 
interaction of the agency and the firm were found mostly through structured and 
semi-structured interviews based on pre-drafted questionnaires. 
 
 
3. Recruitment and Structure of Informants 
The interviewees were determined purely based on accessibility. For ethical 
reasons, the sources are kept anonymous in order to protect the identities of the 
micro regimes and informants.  
 
To recruit informants for interview the author began by notifying people already 
known in China that she needed to carry out interviews for the purpose of PhD 
                                                 
1
 For the details, see <LSE Research Ethics Policy> at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/intranet/researchAndDevelopment/ethicsGuidanceAndForms/Research_Ethics_Review_Po
licy_FINAL.pdf 
2 Simplified as ‘the agency’ 
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research and would appreciate help in this regard. The interviewee must have been 
personally dealing with regulatory affairs for at least three years. The involved 
regulatees must be solely foreign owned enterprises (FOEs) in the toy and/or 
electronics industries based in the cities of Shenzhen and Suzhou. They must have 
been settled in one of these two cities for at least three years. The interviewee 
should be able to spare at least an hour for the interview. The notified people 
worked for the local enforcement agencies 3 , FOEs, ministries, the chamber of 
commerce, law firm and joint venture. Among them, one official and two 
businesswomen in Shenzhen came forward to attend individual questionnaire-based 
interviews. They were the exceptional few informants with no reference and were 
the most generous in sparing time for interview. Among the others known to the 
author, some referred people who agreed to be interviewed or who referred on other 
potential candidates. A few asked for the questionnaire to read before making a 
decision about the interview. The informants in the toy industries were more difficult 
to access than those in electronics. For the seven out of ten questionnaire-based 
interviews with the toy FOEs in Shenzhen, the author was referred four times so as 
to approach the informants; and for the two interviews in Suzhou, five times. These 
do not count the unsuccessful referrals. The biggest toy-maker in Shenzhen refused 
interview. For all interviews through reference, exactly who were asked and who 
refused or agreed to be informants were only known by the referrers and entirely 
unknown by the author.  The referrers did not have any advance discussion with the 
author about the informants, but simply notified the accurate contacts’ name, 
companies’ name, telephone numbers, meeting dates and times after they had 
arranged the individual interviews. The above-mentioned way of recruiting 
informants shows that it was very difficult to gain agreement from people to be 
interviewed and that the interviews for the empirical research were purely based on 
the accessibility and willingness of informants. The agencies and FOEs, hence their 
affiliated and based sub-city jurisdictions (SCJs) including special investment zones 
(SIZs), involved in the empirical research were randomly cooperative rather than 
planned or organised by the author. As a result, the acquired findings are 
suggestive and indicative rather than representative or conclusive. Nevertheless the 
randomness avoids systematic bias in fact-finding.  
 
Most informants are from the FOEs. Among the 41 structured interviews, 6 were 
from the agencies, and 35 were carried out with informants from the FOEs – 12 from 
the toy industry and 23 from electronics. FOEs were chosen because comparing 
                                                 
3
 Hereinafter simplified as ‘agencies’ 
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with Chinese domestic firms, they were subject to less local impact but to more 
transnational influence. Thus the effect of micro enforcement regime upon them and 
their embeddedness in informal enforcement structure were relatively convincing. 
The two industries were chosen because of the sharp contrast in governmental 
regulations towards them4. Toy manufacture was not an encouraged industry but 
electronics was. In light of the differentiation in their regulations, the scrutiny of the 
enforcement practised by the agencies would uncover more implications. 
Additionally, the author was a team member of the China’s toy safety regulation 
research sponsored by the LSE seed fund (2008). Using the toy industry as a 
sample sector in the empirical research of this thesis took the best advantage of the 
fund in overcoming financial constraint to acquire first-hand information. 
 
The involved FOEs share the following characteristics: sole overseas ownership; 
varied sizes;5 and undertaking toy or electronics manufacturing. All had tangible 
factories for production and hired Chinese workers. The investment origins of the 
interviewed FOEs’ were Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the USA, Samoa 
and the British Cayman Islands. Their overseas markets included the USA, the EU, 
Japan, South Korea, Israel and South Africa. The FOEs informants had direct and 
regular working contacts with local and national agencies. They personally were 
handling regulatory affairs such as leasing land, constructing factory plants, 
registering the establishment of companies, recruiting and managing workers, 
importing raw materials and necessary equipments, exporting the products, 
transferring half-finished products to business partners for refinement or finish, 
paying corporate tax, applying for favourable conditions, processing industrial 
waste, managing currency conversion and cross-border capital flow.  
 
It is noted that the majority of informants are from the FOEs and the minority from 
the agencies. This informant structure is deliberately planned so as to offset 
systematic bias. Typical systematic bias was that the Chinese governmental officials 
and official websites generally give positive stories6. The officials were generally 
reluctant to be interviewed by a research student. When interviewed, the officials 
tended to give diplomatic and politically correct answers. Their answers were, by 
                                                 
4
 See <Catalogue Guiding Industries for Foreign Investment>. The name in Chinese is <WaiShang Touzi 
Changye Zhidao Mulu>, promulgated by the national government on 1st April, 2002 
(http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/zcfg/law_ch_info.jsp?docid=55073). Hereinafter simplified as ‘the Catalogue’ 
5
 Referring to <Interim Specifications of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises> (<Zhong Xiao Qiye Biaozhun 
ZanXing Guiding> in Chinese) promulgated by the national government on 19th February 2003 
(http://www.gx.xinhuanet.com/zxqy/2007-10/23/content_11477255.htm) 
6 For details, see Chapter IV. 
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and large, a repetition of the content shown at official governmental websites. 
Therefore, the information sourced from interviewing the agencies was replaceable 
by the one that was more easily available at the internet. In contrast, the opinions of 
the FOEs as the party affected by enforcement practice were inadequately covered 
in the public media in China. The FOE informants were lively in telling stories, 
particularly when reassured that the author was an independent researcher who had 
nothing to do with the government. The FOEs domiciling at the same locality were 
independent from each other. Their interviews were carried out individually. Most 
interviews were carried out at the sites of the informants’ companies. The author’s 
on-site presence made it possible to verify the informants’ identities and if possible, 
to witness first hand their relevant activities. The authenticity of each FOE’s story 
was verified through acquiring the information from at least two additional 
independent sources. This implies that the information was gathered from triangular 
sources for every case study. The interviews with the firm and the agency were 
supplemented by research through a third party, the internet, written documents 
and/or the author’s direct observation. With triangular fact-finding sources, any bias 
of the information was likely to be balanced in reliability. 
 
 
4. Codes of Interviews 
Different interviews are labelled by different codes (see the list in the following 
Section 4). For the codes used to refer to the interviews, the first letter refers to the 
industry, i.e. ‘E’ for electronics FOEs and ‘T’ for toy FOEs. The second letter, and 
sometimes with the third, refers to the investment origin, e.g. ‘H’ for Hong Kong, ‘T’ 
for Taiwan and ‘SM’ for Samoa. The next one, or two, refers to SCJ, e.g. ‘S’ for a 
special investment zone (SIZ) such as a free trade zone or an industrial park. When 
there is ‘I’ followed by a number, it means that the interview was participated by 
more than one interviewee from the same agency or FOE. For example, ‘I4’ means 
that four persons participated in the same interview and answered the 
questionnaires together. The last letter refers to the location of the city, i.e. ‘E’ for 
east China, namely Suzhou; and ‘S’ for south China, namely Shenzhen. Sometimes 
the code is ended with a number. It means that there are three to four interviews 
with the FOEs with similar backgrounds carried out on the same day, and hence a 
number for their sequence is given in order to distinguish between them.  
 
 
5.    List of Interviews and Informants for Case Studies 
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Most interviews were carried out based on relevant questionnaires, depending on 
the interviewees being the agency or the FOE7. The interviews were conducted 
without questionnaires on only four occasions: (1) when the informants were not 
directly involved in micro-enforcement, typically those worked at the ministerial 
agencies in Beijing; (2); when the informants were viewed as additional information 
sources, because they were the third party, for example the lawyer, the officer of 
municipal chamber of commerce, and the general manager of a joint-venture of 
China and Hong Kong; and (3) when the informants were unable to spare sufficient 
time for a questionnaire-based interview but were able to give specific details, 
typically a factory director of a TTP-type FOE, and a former director-general  of an 
SIZ. On this last occasion, the details addressed in the questionnaire-free interview 
were specific issues as included in the relevant questionnaire. This shows that the 
information gathered from questionnaire-free interviews was relevant; and that the 
questionnaire-free interviews were based on a semi-structured approach, although 
not a fully structured linear fashion following the questionnaire. 
 
                                                 
7
 For specific questionnaires, see Appendix II.  
  
City Interview 
Code 
Sub-City 
Regime 
Sector Country of 
Origin  
(if applicable) 
Market (if 
applicable) 
Registered 
Investment 
Volume 
(if applicable) 
Number of 
Involved 
Informant  
Organisational 
Position Held by 
Informant 
Date of 
Interview 
(in 2008) 
Length of 
Interview  
Beijing CADZ n/a ER  
 
 
 
 
n/a 
1 Director-general 17 Sept. 2h 
AQSIQ ER 1 Deputy section 
chief 
16 Sept.  1h 
Shenzhen GIDG Wangda ER 1 Director-general 30 Jan.  1h42 min 
GISC Wangda ER 1 Section chief 19 Feb.  2h 
FTFDG Fujia ER 1 Former Director-
general 
1 Feb 20min 
ACSC Anke ER 1 Section chief 25 Feb. 1h30 min 
CGSC1 Anke ER 1 Section chief 25 Feb. 1h30 min 
CGAD Anke ER 2 Administrators 26-28 Feb. 1h20 min 
CGSC2 Anke ER 1 Section chief 29 Feb.  1h 
BOSVDG n/a ER 1 Deputy director-
general 
4 Mar. 30min 
LWY n/a Law firm 2 Lawyer and client 
general manager 
of Sino-Hong 
Kong joint venture 
7 Mar. 2h 
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COC n/a Chamber of 
Commerce 
1 Section chief 22 Feb. 1h 
EHSS2 Wangda Electronics Hong Kong USA & EU HKD 110 million 1 Governmental 
coordination 
manager 
6 Mar 2h 
EHSS1 Wangda Electronics Hong Kong North America, EU 
& Japan 
USD 50 million 1 Manager of 
governmental 
coordination, HR 
& customs affairs 
30 Jan. 1h25 min 
EJSS2 Wangda Electronics Japan & Hong 
Kong 
60% overseas & 
40% domestic 
HKD 38.73 million 1 Section chief of 
legal and tax 
affairs 
6 Mar 1h 
EJSS1 Wangda Electronics Japan Downstream 
locally domiciled 
Japanese 
Companies, i.e. 
Sony & Hitachi 
USD 16 million 1 Chief of 
governmental 
coordination, 
industrial safety & 
environmental 
issues 
30 Jan.  1h 
ETSS Fujia Electronics Taiwan USA & EU USD 45 million 1 Vice president 1 Feb.  2h30 min 
THLG1 Lufei Toy Hong Kong USA, EU & Israel  HKD 1 million 1 Member of board 
& Governmental 
coordinator 
27 Feb.  4h 
THLG1A Lufei Toy Hong Kong USA, EU & Israel  HKD 1 million 1 Factory chief 3 Mar. 30min 
THLG2 Benpo Toy Hong Kong USA & EU HKD 50 million 1 Section chief of  
human and 
production 
resources 
6 Mar. 1h 
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EHLG2 Benpo Electronics Hong Kong USA & EU USD 1950 million 1 Factory chief 7 Mar. 1h 
THLG3 Benpo Toy Hong Kong USA & EU HKD 3 million 1 Factory chief 7 Mar. 1h 
EHLG1 Benpo Electronics Hong Kong USA HKD 4 million 1 Factory chief 5 Mar. 1h30min 
TJLG Benpo Toy Japan Japan USD 400,000 1 Factory chief 3 Mar. 1h20min 
THLG4 Benpo Toy Hong Kong USA, EU, South 
America & middle 
east 
USD 1.6 million 1 Investor 3 Mar. 1h 
EHBA1 Anke Electronics Hong Kong USA, UK & Japan HKD 32.28 million 1 Customs declarer 26 
Feb.2008 
30min 
ESMBA Anke Electronics Samoa Taiwan HKD 3 million 1 Factory chief 26 Feb. 
2008 
35min 
EABA Anke Electronics The USA USA, Canada, 
South America 
(80%) & domestic 
(20%) 
USD 2.5 million 1 Manger of 
customs 
declaration 
27 Feb. 
2008 
40min 
EKBA Anke Electronics South Korea South Korea UKD 580,000 1 Manager of 
customs affairs 
28 Feb. 
2008 
30min 
ETBA Anke Electronics Taiwan USA USD 9.17 million 1 Vice general 
manager 
27 Feb. 
2008 
35min 
EHBA2 Anke Electronics Hong Kong Worldwide (50%) 
& domestic (50%) 
USD 5 million 1 Director 27 Feb. 
2008 
2h 
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THBA1 Anke Toy Hong Kong Overseas HKD 30 million 1 Factory chief 26 Feb. 
2008 
30min 
THBA2 Anke Toy Hong Kong USA & EU HKD 20 million 1 Administration 
manager 
26 Feb. 
2008 
1h15min 
TTBA Anke Toy Taiwan USA & EU USD 7.9 million 1 Vice manager of 
public relations 
29 Feb. 
2008 
1h 
THBA2 Anke Toy Hong Kong USA & EU HKD 23 million 1 Manager of 
administration 
and HR 
29 Feb. 
2008 
1h 
TH2BA Anke Toy Hong Kong EU & USA HKD 3 million 2 Factory chief; 
customs & 
commodity 
inspection 
administrator 
29 Feb. 
2008 
1h 
Suzhou SIDG Gongcheng ER  
n/a 
1 Vice director-
general 
24 Jul. 1h 
LZSC Tuqing ER 1 Section chief 26 Jul 1h10min 
ETSIE1 Gongcheng Electronics Taiwan Domestic USD 2.3 million 1 HR specialist 21 Jul 1h 
ETSI4E Gongcheng Electronics Taiwan Downstream 
manufacturers 
USD 4 million 4 Sales specialist; 
customs 
specialist; HR 
manager; 
accountant 
21 Jul. 1h40min 
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EJSIE2 Gongcheng Electronics Japan Downstream 
locally domiciled 
manufacturers, 
e.g. Asus 
USD 9 million 2 Accounting 
manager; Sales 
manager 
21 Jul. 1h 
ETS3I3E Ximo Electronics Taiwan Downstream 
manufactures 
USD 25 million 3 Sales specialist; 
custom declarer; 
HR chief 
23 Jul. 1h20min 
ECS3I2E Ximo Electronics British 
Cayman Island 
USA, Taiwan & 
domestic market 
USD 5 million 2 Administration 
manager; sales 
manager 
23 Jul. 1h30min 
ETS3E3 Ximo Electronics Taiwan USA Untold 2 Sale specialist; 
purchasing 
specialist 
23 Jul. 1h 
TKLZ1 Tuqing Toy South Korea USA & EU USD 1.1 million 1 Deputy chief of 
accounting 
26 Jul 1h 
TKLZ2 Tuqing Toy South Korea EU & USA USD 6 million 1 Assistant chief of 
administration 
department 
26 Jul. 1h 
 
List of Interviews and Informants for Case Studies 
  
Appendix II   Questionnaires 
 
 
The questionnaires are designed for fact-finding purpose. Their design is in 
accordance with the quality requirements and criteria for multiple case studies1. 
They are not planned to be pre-posted or filled out alone by the informants, but to be 
used by the author to structure the interviews and field investigations. The use of the 
questionnaires in this way ensures the field research to be relevant, purposeful and 
fruitful, bearing in mind the limited timeframe and budget as well as difficulty of 
recruiting informants. All answers to the questionnaires were acquired through face-
to-face interviews. Although the questionnaires are long, in practice this was not 
found to pose difficulties and all issues covered by the questionnaire were 
discussed. All informants were aware in advance that the interviews would take 
about an hour. In practice, most questionnaire-based interviews took at least an 
hour, with a comfortable pace for the informants to give complete information. The 
exception was those taken on the same days as the author’s participant 
observations. Because of the inspectors’ tight daily schedules to visit multiple FOEs, 
the interviews were taken at a quicker pace in order to cover all questions 2 . 
However, the author complemented the interview-acquired information by inquiring 
of the inspectors. While the informants gave answers to the questions one by one, 
the author simultaneously and faithfully recorded their answers. The informants’ 
answers are complemented by the information acquired from other sources and 
methods, which ensures that the fact-finding results are reliable. The questionnaires 
answers and other sourced information are then synthesised and analysed. The 
findings of the analyses are reported faithfully in the case studies.  
 
In order to gather useful and sufficient information from the interviews, two sets of 
questionnaire were formulated, one for the firm and one for the agency. Although 
the questionnaires were long, the informants were given early notice about the 
length of interview and willing to answer all questions in the interviews. All the 
questions listed in the questionnaires were carefully chosen in order to acquire all 
necessary information concerning the agency, the firm, their bilateral relation and 
interaction as well as preference, the regime’s profile and established industrial 
structure3. For the questionnaire for the FOE, Questions 1-13 are for gathering 
background information about the firm. Questions 14-47 are about the agency-firm 
                                                 
1
 For details, see Yin (2003) pp19-56 
2
 See the list of interviews in Appendix I. 
3
 For relevant aspects and focuses of field investigation, see the section about the method in Chapter IV.  
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relation and interaction. Questions 48-55 concern inter-agency cooperation and the 
agency’s business-competing and enforcement strategies. The last few questions 
are for additional information-gathering and further necessary clarification of details. 
For the agency questionnaire, Questions 1-12 are about the organisational 
background of the general-purpose agency as well as the profile and industrial 
structure of the regime. Questions 13-27a concern the agency’s stance and strategy 
towards attracting business and enforcing rules. Questions 28-48a are about the 
agency-firm relation and interaction, and Questions 49-55 the inter-agency 
cooperation. The last questions are for additional information gathering or 
clarification.  
 
 
 
Questionnaire for Foreign Owned Enterprise 
 
Company’s Name:  
Interviewee’s Name, Position and Working Years for the Company:  
Contact Details (Name-card):  
Place of Interview:  
Time and Date of Interview:  
Would like the author to acknowledge you with your name: Yes/ No 
Year of Setup in Current Location: 
Registered Investment Amount: 
Actual Investment Amount: 
Workforce:  
Main Products: 
Main Markets: 
Investment Destinations in Mainland China Apart From Current Location: 
Company Brochure: Yes/ No 
Customs Category: 
    
1. What is the country / region of origin of your company?   
2.   When did your company start production in this location? 
3. Is this the first production plant that your company has set up in mainland 
China? Yes/ No 
3a.   If no, where were earlier production plants set up?  
4.    Why did your company choose this location? 
5.  Has the size of your work-force changed compared to three years ago?        
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Yes/No   
5a.   If so, how? 
6.   In the past three years, have you made additional investment? Yes /No  
7.   If so, did you make the additional investment here or somewhere else?  
8.   Do you often work with the following agencies? 
a.  Local council: Yes/ No  
b.  Labour: Yes/ No   
c.  Commodity inspection: Yes/ No  
d.  Customs: Yes/ No  
e.  Others – please specify: 
9. Based on the past three years, how do you generally rank the treatment by  
the agencies? Very good, good, satisfactory, poor, very poor 
10.  Based on interaction with whom do you make above-mentioned ranking? 
11.   Based on your treatment, would you like to recommend another investor to 
set up his business in the current location? Yes/ Maybe/ No/ Don’t know 
12.  If you would like to recommend another location in China, which location 
would it be?  
13.   Could you explain the main reasons for recommending this location? 
14.  Do you have any arrangements with the agencies about the way you work 
with each other? 
15.   If yes, what are the forms and main content of the arrangements? 
16.   If yes, when did the arrangements start? 
17.  If yes, in your opinion, how well do the agencies follow these arrangements? 
18.  Do you have problems in following the arrangements? 
19.  How much do you think the arrangements are helpful to your company? 
19a.  Could you explain the reasons and give examples for your answer? 
20.   What are the main forms of communication the agencies use to contact you? 
a.  Telephone  
b.  Fax/ mail (including email) 
c.  Meeting  
d.  Visit 
21.   Why do the agencies invite you to have meetings? 
22.  On most occasions, which members of the agencies attend the meetings? 
23.  On most occasions, which members of your company attend the meetings? 
24.  Do you think the agencies’ meetings are worthwhile? 
24a.  If yes, why do you think some agencies’ meetings are worthwhile? 
25.   If the agencies’ meetings are not worthwhile, why do you think so?  
26.  Why do the agencies visit you? 
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27.  On most occasions, which members of the agencies visit your company? 
28.  On most occasions, which members of your company receive the agencies? 
29.   Do you think the agencies’ visits worthwhile? 
30.  If yes, why do you think some agencies’ visits are worthwhile? 
31.  Do the agencies tell you in advance about their visits? 
32.  What are the main forms you use to contact the agencies? 
a.  Telephone 
b.  Fax/mail (including email)   
c.  Meeting 
d.  Visit   
33.   On average, each year, how many times do you visit the following agencies?  
34.   Why do you visit them? 
35.  Which members of your company visit the agencies mostly? 
36.  Which members of the agencies does your company mostly visit? 
37. Generally, how well do you rank the help the agencies offer you when you 
visit them? 
38.  Why do you think the agencies helpful or not helpful? Any examples? 
39.  In the past three years, on average, how many incidents do you encounter? 
40. Generally, what are the main areas of incidents you encounter? Any 
examples? 
41. Who do you mostly approach to seek solutions when encountering incidents 
in the mentioned aspects? 
42. Which members of your company contact the agencies mostly on these 
occasions? 
43. Which members of the agencies does your company mostly approach in 
these circumstances? 
44.  How easy are they easy to be found?  
45. How do you rank the speed and effectiveness of the help provided by the 
agencies when you have incidents? 
46.  Do you make suggestions or comments to the agencies to help improve their 
work? 
46a.  If yes, what suggestions or comments do you make? 
47.  How seriously do you think the agencies consider your opinions or 
comments? Example(s)? 
48.   Do the agencies coordinate their work routinely in order to treat you well? 
48a.  If yes, could you give some examples of their routine coordination? 
49.  How well do you rank the effect of the agencies’ coordination in this 
circumstance?   Very Good, Good, Moderate, Poor, Very Poor 
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50.   Do the agencies coordinate their work to help you when you have incidents? 
50a.  If yes, could you give some examples in these circumstances? 
51.  How well do you rank the effect of the agencies’ coordination when you have 
incidents? Very Good, Good, Moderate, Poor, Very Poor  
52. Do agencies work with investors differently according to their different 
registered/ actual investment volume? 
53.  Do agencies work with investors differently according to their different 
industries? 
54.  Do agencies work with investors differently according to their different 
countries of origin? 
55.  Do agencies work with investors differently according to their different 
compliance? 
56. Is there any other information that you think would help me to know more 
about the interactions between you and the agencies? Yes/ No 
57.  Do you mind if I come back to clarify some issues later? 
58. Would you like to recommend another company / other companies for me to 
interview in Suzhou? 
Thank you! 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for Enforcement Agency 
 
Agency’s Name:  
Interviewee’s Name，Position and Working Years for the agency:  
Contact Details: 
Place of Interview:  
Time and Date of Interview:  
Would like the author to acknowledge you with your name: Yes/ No 
   
1.  When was your organisation set up? 
2.  What are the main duties of your organisation? 
3.  What sections are there in your organization? 
4.  Which sections have routine and direct contact with FOEs? 
5.  How many staff members in each of these sections? 
6.  Who are your superiors? 
7.  What regulations does your organisation follow? 
8.  How many FOEs are there in this location? 
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9.  Which countries do they come from?  (From most to lest countries of origin) 
10.  What industries do they undertake?  (From major to minor industries) 
11.  On average, how much is amount of investment of each FOE? 
12.  How many years have most FOEs been in production? 
13.  Do you think that there are competitions between different locations in 
attracting foreign investment? Yes / No / Don’t Know 
13a.  Why do you think so? 
14.  If there are competitions, who do you think are your main competitors? 
a.  An SIZ/SIZs of the same city  
b.  A location/locations of the same city excluding SIZs  
c.  A neighbour city excluding its SIZs  
d.  An SIZ/SIZs of a neighbour city  
e.  Others, please specify  
f.   Few competitor  
14a.    Why do you think they are your competitors? 
15.  How do you rank the current attraction of your location?  
Very attractive, attractive, moderate, limitedly attractive, not attractive 
15a.  Could you explain why you rank so? 
16.  Compared with three years ago, how has the attraction of your location 
changed? 
 a.  From little to some  
 b.  From some to more  
 c.  Maintain strong attraction  
 d.  Reverse to a   
e.  Reverse to b   
f.   Attraction becomes less strong  
g.  Others，please specify  
16a.  Could you show examples for this change in attraction? 
17.  What are the most important measures you have taken for attracting 
investors? 
18.  In general, how effective do you think these measures are?  
Very effective, effective, moderate, limitedly effective, not effective, not sure 
19.  How important do you think favourable conditions are to the attraction of 
your location? Very important, important, moderate, limitedly important, not 
important 
19a.  Could you explain the reasons? 
20.  How important do you think lax regulation is to attraction of your location?  
Very important, important, moderate, limitedly important, not important 
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20a.  Could you explain the reasons? 
21.  How important do you think the roles play director-generals of the agencies 
of your location to the attraction?  
21a． Could you explain the reasons?  
22． How important do you think changes in director-generals of the agencies of 
your location to the attraction?  
22a． Could you explain the reasons?  
23． What are your main incentives for attracting investors?  
 a.  Municipal government / organisational target of winning competition 
 b.  Material rewards, e.g. bonus, promotion  
 c.  Professionalism 
d.  Some of them, please specify  
e.  Others  
24. Do you work with investors in different ways according to their registered/ 
actual investment volume? Yes / No 
24a.  Why so? 
25.  Do you work with investors in different ways according to their industries? 
Yes / No 
25a.  Why so? 
26.  Do you work with investors in different ways according to their countries of 
origin? Yes / No 
26a.  Why so? 
27.  Do you work with investors in different ways according to their compliance 
with regulation? Yes / No 
27a.  Why so? 
28.  Does your organisation have any arrangement with investors about the ways 
you work with each other? Yes / No 
28a.  If yes, when did the arrangement start? 
28b.  Could you tell the content and form of the arrangement? (e.g. what you are 
to do, what investors are to do, etc.) 
29.  In general, how well do you think your organisation follows the arrangement? 
Very well, well, moderate, poorly, very poorly 
29a.  What are the main reasons for your rank in this regards? 
30.  How well do investors follow the arrangement? Very well, well, moderate, 
poorly, very poorly 
31. What are the main forms for you to contact investors? (From most to lest 
used) 
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32.  In the past three years, on average, how often do you contact them each 
year? (In main forms) 
33.  What are the main occasions do you visit investors? 
34.  Which members of investors’ companies do you visit mostly? 
35.  What are the main occasions do you invite investors to have meetings? 
36.  Generally, do you inform investors about changes in policies? Yes/ No 
37.  What are the main occasions when investors visit you? 
38.  On average, each year, how frequently do investors have incidents? 
39.  Which are the main areas of their incidents? 
40.  Whom do they mostly ask for help from when in incidents? 
a.  You  
b.  Other members of your organisation (please specify)  
c.  The relevant agency  
d.  Other agencies   
e.  None  
41.  If they come to you, what measures do you usually take to help investors? 
42.  Are investors informed your mobile number? Yes/ No 
43.  Are investors informed of the mobile numbers of other members of your 
organisation? Yes/ No 
44.  How quickly do you reply to investors’ call for help?  
45.  How effective is your help when investors are in incidents? 
46.  Do you invite investors to give their comments and opinions for improving 
your work? Yes / No 
46a.  If so, why do you invite investors to give their comments and opinions? 
47.  What are investors’ comments and opinions mainly about? 
48.  Have you made improvements in your work according to their comments and 
opinions? Yes / no 
48a.  Could you give examples of these improvements? 
49.  Which agencies do you work mostly with for the purpose of facilitating the 
FOEs? 
50. Do you routinely contact these agencies? Yes / No 
51.  Do you contact other agencies for help when investors are in incidents? Yes 
/ No / It depends. 
52.  Is it easy for you to reach the right persons of relevant agencies in this 
circumstance? 
53.  Generally, how well do you think their response to your contact in this 
circumstance? Very well, well, moderate, poorly, very poorly 
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54.  Do other agencies invite investors to give comments and opinions to improve 
their work? Yes/ No / Perhaps/ Don’t know 
54a.  If yes，do you think other agencies consider investors’ comments and 
opinions seriously? Yes/ No/ Perhaps/ Don’t Know 
54b.  Could you give some examples? 
55.  How much do you think other agencies care about attracting business? 
More than you do/ As much as you do/ Not as much as you do / Not care at 
all/ Don’t Know 
56. Is there any other information that you think would help me to know more 
about the interactions between you, investors and other agencies? 
57.  Do you mind if I come back to clarify some issues later? 
58.  Would you like to recommend agencies/ companies for me to interview? 
(Contact details) 
Thank you! 
